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P. Bos and W. Fritschy
Introduction1
This book on aspects of society, economy and culture in Morocco and theNetherlands focuses on the tension between tradition and modernity. Nowadays
the old opposition between ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ seems to have been replaced by
an uneasy co-existence between ‘fundamentalism’ and ‘post-modernism’. In contrast to
‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’, however, both ‘fundamentalism’ and ‘post-modernism’ seem
to reside mainly in a virtual world.
Radical fundamentalism is primarily located in the world of international Internet
contacts. It seeks to conquer the minds of an uprooted generation of young Muslims
without affinity to the states from which their parents migrated.2 Yet another target are
young people who cannot feel loyalty towards states that are unable to offer jobs and
political influence to a young generation. Radical fundamentalism is characterized by a
lack of ties to historical developments and specific cultures. It believes in a worldwide
umma or ‘community of believers’, to be governed by ancient Islamic laws. It denies
historical developments and the need to adapt laws to new situations.3 Extreme funda-
mentalism only seems prepared to enter the real world of politics to engage in acts of
violence, with no regard for the reality of human suffering.
The main characteristic of post-modernism is a complete loss of belief in historical
reality and the relevance and possibility of historical knowledge. Radical post-moder-
nism postulates a virtual world consisting only of stories about reality. It has no other
‘message’ for young people than its analysis of ‘differends’,4 situations of irresolvable con-
flict arising from the lack of universal frames of reference. It no longer seems to believe
in the possibility of making the real world a better place for humanity.The core of both
radical fundamentalism and radical post-modernism seems to be a conscious denial of
the interconnectedness of human historical reality.
Morocco and the Netherlands have been confronted with the reality of human inter-
connectedness since the 1960s, when a conscious policy of ‘globalizing’ labour mobility
was set in motion. The two countries, which had been loosely connected during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by trade flows and treaties and conflicts concerning
trade, corsairs and captives, and during the nineteenth century by reports from Dutch tra-
7
1 We would like to thank Taalcentrum-VU in Amsterdam for their insightful and often quite
intensive revision of all English and French contributions by non-native speakers.
2 Kepel (2004) ‘Introduction’ and Ch. 3.
3 Roy (2002) Ch. 6 and 7, esp. p. 142. See also the contributions to this book by Azzine and 
Van der Velden on the subject of ‘ijtihad’.
4 Lyotard (1988); see also Zakri’s contribution to this book.
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vellers, writers and painters,5 now became interconnected in a much deeper way. In the
wake of this labour-immigration policy, which lasted less than a decade, the Netherlands
had to adapt its cities to the reality of tens of thousands of Moroccan immigrants, main-
ly originating from the countryside of Morocco’s northern Rif region, whose religion
and cultural habits were very different from the (non-)religious attitudes and values of its
own urban society.The migration of Moroccans to the Netherlands helped relieve the
acute demographic pressure in a country characterized by political tension and a lack of
sufficient employment opportunities. At the same time it eased the Netherlands’ transi-
tion from an industrial to a service economy during the 1960s and 1970s.
It took some time before both Dutch society and the migrants themselves became
aware that they would not be returning with a suitcase full of money to build a new life
in Morocco once the economic transition of Dutch society had been completed and the
jobs they had been asked to fulfil in the Netherlands began to disappear. Conditions in
Morocco had not changed enough in the meantime to make return and investment very
attractive, although many migrants continued to buy or build houses in Morocco, clin-
ging to the idea of being able to return one day. Despite increasing unemployment, ill-
nesses due to homesickness and growing tensions within Dutch society, life and pros-
pects for their children still seemed so much better in the Netherlands than in Morocco
that migrants sought to help as many friends and relatives as possible to escape from the
conditions of life in Morocco.This is hardly surprising, as even now the average natio-
nal income per head in Morocco is only 14% of that in the Netherlands.6 In the mean-
time local Dutch society began to realize the historical reality of the emergence of what
has now come to be known as ‘European Islam’.7 Since the second half of the 1970s,
Dutch policy has drifted between attempts to uphold human values by allowing ‘family
reunion’ and the building of mosques, and attempts to put a stop to immigration for
economic reasons.
Recently this drifting policy has come to be replaced by panic-stricken measures to
restrict immigration much more fiercely, and to artificially intensify the ‘integration’ of
migrants into Dutch society.The visibility of mosques and the wearing of the Muslim
headscarf came to be openly criticized by some people.This was due to the change in
the political climate after ‘9/11’ - the terrorist attacks by Muslim fundamentalists on the
World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington - but even more to
two subsequent events within the Netherlands which had a major impact on Dutch
society. In 2002, Pim Fortuyn, a new figure on the political scene, threatened to desta-
bilize Dutch politics by gaining massive support for a right-wing programme that rejec-
8
5 Benali & Obdeijn (2005).
6 For 2005, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ gives $4,300 as the gross domestic
product per head for Morocco, compared to $30,500 for the Netherlands.
7 The concept is elaborated in the works of Tariq Ramadan, one of whose books, Les musulmans
d’Occident et l'avenir de l’islam published in Paris in 2003 has recently been translated into Dutch.
He has been invited to the Netherlands several times in the last two years. In January 2006, a talk
by Ramadan at Erasmus University Rotterdam was attended by about 800 young people, mainly
of immigrant origin, and was opened by the Mayor of Rotterdam
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ted immigration and the visibility of Islam in Dutch society. He had been able to con-
vincingly articulate a growing unease about the effects of ‘globalization’ in many districts
of big cities like Rotterdam and Amsterdam, where relatively poor, lower educated
‘white’ sections of Dutch society felt that their job prospects and living conditions had
deteriorated as a result.This new political programme also found favour with certain cir-
cles of ‘enlightened’ anti-religious right-wing intellectuals. Fortuyn was murdered befo-
re he could be elected to office – shot down, not by a radical Muslim, but by a radical
animal liberation activist who justified his deed by calling Fortuyn a danger to vulnera-
ble groups in society. In November 2004, however, one of those intellectuals who had
supported Fortuyn, the filmmaker Theo van Gogh, was murdered by a young funda-
mentalist Muslim, whose parents had been born and raised in a small village in the
Berber countryside of northern Morocco before their migration to the Netherlands.
Between those two events in the Netherlands, the bloody attack carried out by
Muslim fundamentalists in Casablanca on ‘16/5’ 2003 sent shock waves through
Moroccan society. At the time, the Dutch media had emphasized that the violence of
‘radical fundamentalism’ was just as abhorrent to the vast majority of Moroccans in
Morocco as it was to the vast majority of Moroccans and non-Moroccans living in the
Netherlands. Such feelings of solidarity and ‘interconnectedness’ were endangered by the
subsequent killing of Theo van Gogh, as the fundamentalist murderer was referred to as
‘Moroccan’, even though he had never shown much personal interest in his parents’
Moroccan roots.
This is the background against which this book was conceived. It seemed important
to try to restore a sense of normality to Moroccan-Dutch-relations.We decided to revi-
ve the contacts between Moroccan and Dutch universities which had existed in the late
1980s and early 1990s, and to invite scholars from universities in Morocco, and scholars
from Dutch universities with an interest in Morocco or Dutch-Moroccan relations, to
reflect on different aspects of Moroccan and Dutch society.8 As we did not want to limit
the discussion to issues related to the virtual worlds of radical ‘fundamentalism’ and aca-
demic ‘post-modernism’, we invited them to focus on the old concepts of ‘tradition and
modernity’ as a unifying theme for their contributions, in order to obtain a more down-
to-earth and ‘real’ view of what is going on in various sections of both societies.
9
8 We owe much gratitude to Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam for hosting and subsidizing a conference
under the title ‘Tradition and Modernity. Morocco and the Netherlands, 1605-2005’ on 30 and
31 May 2005, to mark its 125th anniversary and 400 years of Dutch-Moroccan relations, which
formed the basis for this book.The results of previous conferences, held in 1986 in Rabat, in
1988 in Leiden and Amsterdam, in 1990 in Rabat and Marrakech, and in 1992 in Nijmegen and
Amsterdam, were published in Rabat under the title Le Maroc et la Hollande with the following
subtitles: Études sur l’histoire, la migration, la linguistique et la sémiologie de la culture (1988), Étude sur
l’histoire, la migration, la langue et la culture (1990), La recherche scientifique au service du développement
(1992),Une approche comparative des grands intérêts communs (1995).To mark the occasion of 400
years of Moroccan-Dutch relations, a second Dutch-Moroccan conference was held in
Marrakech in November 2005, under the title ‘L’eau entre moulin et noria’, the results of which
will also be published.
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We also asked them to share and discuss their views with a broad audience, not only
of scholars but also of students and people outside universities with an interest in
Morocco and the relations between Morocco and the Netherlands. To enable some
young people from Morocco to participate in the discussions, we organized an essay
competition for MA and PhD students from three Moroccan universities, in Rabat,
Oujda and Fes.The seven winners of this contest were invited to come to Amsterdam.
Four of their essays are published in this book.The other participants in the conference
were invited to write a contribution on the basis of their presentations.9 The book con-
sists of five parts, in each of which at least one Moroccan and one Dutch author high-
light several aspects of society, economy and culture.
In the introductory section of this book, the unifying theme ‘tradition and moderni-
ty’ is stated and discussed in general terms. Zakya Daoud, who was the editor of the cri-
tical journal Lamalif 10 in Morocco and who has written several books on Moroccan
society and history, discusses how the concepts of ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ have been
used and abused in the context of Moroccan society now and in the past. She points to
the ambiguity of the meaning of these concepts in different contexts, especially since
nowadays many young Muslims consider ‘fundamentalism’ to be ‘modern’.The histori-
an Herman Obdeijn compares historical developments in both countries as regards the
relation of tradition and modernity. As a former cultural attaché of the Netherlands in
Morocco, and after that as the head of the Institute of Migration and Minorities Studies
at Leiden University, Obdeijn was the initiator of the commemoration of ‘400 years of
Dutch-Moroccan relations’. In his contribution, he suggests that modernity in the
Netherlands nowadays seems to imply a break with a tradition of tolerance and he
contrasts this with the respect for valued aspects of tradition shown by prominent men
and women in Morocco’s current modernization process.
The second part of this volume highlights more specific developments in both socie-
ties. It starts with a chapter on the management of religious affairs in Morocco by
Abdelhamid Lotfi of Mohammed V University in Rabat and Al Akhawayn University in
Ifrane. He is particularly interested in the efforts undertaken by King Mohammed VI to
formulate new religious policies that take into consideration recent socio-economic
changes in Morocco as well as the globalization of Islam. Lotfi offers interesting infor-
mation on the modernization of the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic
Affairs under minister Ahmed Taoufiq. The chapter by Hendrik Vroom, Professor of
Theology at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, can be considered as a counterpart to Lotfi’s
contribution.Vroom reports on one modern aspect of ‘managing religious affairs’ in the
Netherlands: the launch of a new study programme in Islamic theology in order to pro-
10
9 The contributions of De Haas and Bartels and De Koning were anonymously refereed at their
specific request and were revised on the basis of the referee reports.
10 Lamalif was a monthly review that existed from 1966 until 1988 and that is still often cited to
this day. It tried to combine engagement and sound reasoning and many of its journalists came
from academic circles. It sold 12,000 copies of each issue. It was founded by Jacqueline Loghlam
and her husband. (Zakya Daoud is the pseudonym of Jacqueline Loghlam.): see
http://www.telquel-online.com/130/sujet2.shtml.
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vide Islamic spiritual care in hospitals and penitentiary institutions in the Netherlands.
He provides the reader with inside information on the curriculum of the new pro-
gramme and its first students.
In the next two chapters in this part, a Dutch and a Moroccan jurist discuss the most
important recent modernization in Moroccan society: the new Moroccan Family Code.
Frans van der Velden, a specialist at the Dutch Ministry of Justice in the application of
Moroccan law to issues of marriage and divorce among Moroccans in the Netherlands,
reviews modern and traditional aspects of the new law. He concludes that what is still
badly needed is an authoritative interpretation of the new Code. Mohamed Azzine, a
legal advisor to the Moroccan Embassy in the Netherlands, does not hesitate to conclu-
de that the new Code is neither in contradiction to the traditional shari‘a nor to the exi-
gencies of modernity.
Lastly, this part contains chapters on two quite different political aspects of Moroccan
society.Arne Musch, who is involved in the organization of partnerships between Dutch
and Moroccan cities, considers the effects of the simultaneous process of increasing
modernization and the growing influence of the moderately fundamentalist PJD, Parti de
la Justice et du Développement, at local rather than national level and expresses the hope
that recent and future changes in Moroccan politics may result in an increase in the deli-
very of real services to the population at this level. Mustapha El Qadéry, a historian who
spent a number of years working for IRCAM, the Institut Royal de la Culture Amazighe
in Rabat, discusses the political impact of the lack of attention devoted to the Amazigh
or ‘Berber’ past of Moroccan society in the ‘Arabo-Islamic’ state that resulted from the
nationalist movement. He considers the important part played in modern and traditio-
nal aspects of Moroccan society by the memory of Abdelkrim, the hero of the Rif.
Abdelkrim is held in very high esteem by many Dutch Moroccans, the majority of
whom originate from the Rif. 11
The third part of the book focuses on economy and migration. Hans Visser, Professor
of International Economics at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, and Omar Aloui and Saad
Belghazi, economists who work for the research agency Agro Concept and for INSEA,
the Institut National de Statistique et d’Economie Appliquée, in Rabat, discuss the impact on
Morocco of the European-Mediterranean Partnership, also known as the ‘Barcelona
Process’. In his contribution,Visser uses the most recent information available to empha-
size the positive effects that Morocco’s increased openness to trade is having on its econ-
omic growth.Aloui and Belghazi stress the desirability of a real ‘Neighbourhood Policy’
on the part of the European Union in addition to the Barcelona Process, especially with
regard to agriculture. They also point out the importance of keeping an open mind
regarding win-win scenarios in terms of labour mobility.Van der Veen analyzes attempts
of the Moroccan government to control illegal sectors of the economy focusing on
drug-trafficking, a poignant aspect of Dutch-Moroccan relations.
11
11 See for instance the documentary film ‘Abdelkrim, rebellie of legitieme opstand’ on
http://www.omroep.nl/nps/maroc/welcome.html?abdelkrim.html~content by Dr Mustapha
Aarab, who was Qadéry’s Moroccan-Dutch counterpart during the conference in Amsterdam.
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Aspects of emigration from Morocco are considered by the Dutch geographer Hein
de Haas and the Moroccan geographer Mohammed Boudoudou. In a thoroughly rese-
arched article, De Haas emphasizes the extent to which migration has become an all per-
vasive phenomenon in Moroccan society. As he sees it, migration is not only of econ-
omic importance due to the remittances of money to the regions of origin, but it is also
‘the inevitable corollary of development and globalization processes that broaden hori-
zons and increase capabilities and aspirations’. Boudoudou draws attention to the colo-
nial background of the migration phenomenon and summarizes the three ‘ages’ of
Maghreb migration to European countries and the consequences of the continuing lack
of a genuine experience of equal citizenship among immigrants.
The fourth part of the book concentrates on young people.The anthropologists Edien
Bartels, Martijn de Koning and Lenie Brouwer present the results of Dutch research on
young Dutch Moroccans. Bartels and De Koning focus on ‘identity construction’ and
cast doubt on Olivier Roy’s argument that globalization and the ensuing deculturation
lead to Muslim radicalism.They observe a quest among young people for a ‘real’ Islam
suitable for western society. Brouwer elaborates this argument on behalf of her research
into the meaning of ‘Moroccan’ websites as ‘a new social space’ for young Dutch
Moroccans.The young Belgian anthropologist Els Vanderwaeren reports on some of the
results of her research into the perceptions of Islam among highly educated Muslims in
Flanders.The criminologist Anas Talbi of the university of Marrakech reflects on the pos-
sible causes of criminality among young Dutch-Moroccans. On the one hand he pleads
for respect, dialogue and the rejection of violence, and on the other hand for ‘intégration
réciproque’, mutual integration.
The next two chapters in this part consist of two of the four essays selected for publi-
cation from the entries to the essay competition for MA and PhD students at Moroccan
universities. The first one is by first prize winner Rachid Touhtouh, who is currently
working on his PhD thesis at Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah University in Fes. His essay
was based on fieldwork conducted at a high school in northern Morocco. It argues that
a system of education based on hshouma, the traditional culture of fear and taboo in the
contact between boys and girls, creates ‘gendered identities’. His work shows a preferen-
ce among young people for co-education and illustrates how gender education can help
in the development of social relationships between men and women and in the eman-
cipation of women. Zakaria Zakri, who studied English linguistics in Rabat, is fascina-
ted by the analytical possibilities offered by post-modernism to understand the situation
of his own generation in Morocco. In his essay, he asks whether the idea of Dutch-
Moroccan relations has any meaning as long as European borders are closed to young
people from Morocco with intellectual ambitions. Does this idea have any meaning as
long as Morocco itself, as he perceives it, still lacks a real openness to the rest of the Arab
world and to the West? 
The last part of the book offers some insights in the effects of globalization, of which
Moroccan-Dutch relations are an aspect.The first chapter contains a winning essay by
young historian Ouafaâ El-Mesmoudi of the University of Rabat. She analyses the story
told by the Dutch woman Maria ter Meetelen about her experiences when she was held
12
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captive in Morocco as a young woman between 1731 and 1743. She considers the story
to be an example of ‘modern’ attitudes and a ‘dialogue between civilizations’ during the
eighteenth century. Marianne Hermans, a young researcher in literature at Vrije
Universiteit Amsterdam, focuses on the narratives of young Dutch-Moroccan writers ‘at
the crossroads of two cultures’. Moha Ennaji, Professor of English Linguistics in Fes, con-
siders the impact of globalization on language and identity in Morocco. He ends with a
strong plea for a continuing dialogue between civilizations and the recognition and pre-
servation of cultural diversity both within and among nations.
The last three chapters focus on architecture.The first is another of the prize winning
essays, this one written by a young student at the Ecole Nationale d’Architecture in Rabat,
Hanane Bouchtalla. She reflects on the tension between tradition and modernity in
architecture. On the one hand she applauds the importance of the great modern archi-
tects of the twentieth century. On the other hand she pleads for an architecture condi-
tioned by and sensitive to the context in which it is present. Fatima Sadiqi, Professor of
Linguistics and Gender Studies at Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah University in Fes offers
a ‘feminist view’ of the architecture of Fes. She sees this architecture as conditioned by
the predominance of a tribal mentality, as well as by the need to enforce Islamic law, and
supposes that it offers a symbolic expression of the ways in which masculinity and femin-
inity are perceived. Monique Eleb of the École d’Architecture in Paris offers some of the
results of her research into the influence of changing social values on the development
of living arrangements and lifestyle in Casablanca. Despite a certain attachment to tradi-
tional forms, there is no doubt that growing wealth is, for example, signalling the demi-
se of the traditional ‘multifunctionality’ of the main room in Moroccan houses, and lea-
ding to the introduction of separate bedrooms for the various members of the family.
Her article ends this book by giving us glimpses into the reality of private daily life in
Morocco’s biggest and most ‘modern’ city.
What is needed for the future is research that does not focus exclusively on pheno-
mena at the margins of society, such as radical fundamentalism, and research on societies
that is not exclusively inspired by post-modernistic academic approaches.This book calls
for attention to be paid to the ongoing tensions between striving for modernity and
clinging to tradition, to the tensions between striving for the preservation of respectable
traditions and clinging to a narrow concept of modernity, and to the role these tensions
play in the development of societies.Taking into account traditions of different origins
is unavoidable within the real-life context of historical development in a globalizing
world.
As for Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands, there is no doubt at all that they are
here to stay.The Dutch Moroccan minority of 315,821 persons in 2005 now constitu-
tes 1.9% of the Dutch population. In major cities such as Amsterdam and Rotterdam,
this figure is about 6%.12 Although Dutch immigration policy is much more restrictive
than it used to be, this percentage is certain to increase in the future as a result of ‘import
marriages’ and birth-rate differentials. Many Dutch Moroccans will continue to cherish
13
12 http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb
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ties with their country of origin, as migrants to foreign countries everywhere in the
world have always done. Moreover, they will continue to cherish their religion, proba-
bly even more than Moroccans in Morocco do, as this has also been a typical phenome-
non for migrants in all times and in all places. For the future of both countries, it seems
more rewarding to develop an interest in each other’s reality and the consequences of an
unavoidable continuation of globalization than to try to shut doors and retreat into one’s
own supposedly ‘superior’ culture, the contours of which are either increasingly unclear
in the case of non-Muslim Dutch, or characterized by a lack of knowledge about the
reality of historical developments in their country of origin in the case of many
Muslims.13 We hope that this book will further the continuation of contacts between
Dutch and Moroccan universities, to the benefit of both countries.
13 See also Obdeijn’s contribution to this book.
14
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Part I
Tradition and
modernity 
in Morocco and 
the Netherlands
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Zakya Daoud 
Tradition et modernité au Maroc, passé et présent
Tradition et modernité: des comportements fluctuants, relatifs
Dans les années 70, notre ami Paul Pascon, sociologue, malheureusement disparu etauquel je tiens à rendre hommage, inventait le concept de ‘société composite’. Il
expliquait que la société marocaine était composite dans la mesure où chaque Marocain,
confronté journellement à des types variés de modes de production, d’idéologie, de con-
vention, de valeurs, de morale, de systèmes juridiques, de technologie, voire à différentes
langues, monnaies et même calendriers, pouvait, dans la même journée et selon les
domaines, avoir des idées et des comportements que l’on pouvait qualifier de modernes
et d’autres que l’on pouvait qualifier de traditionnels.1 Il attestait de cette réflexion en
décrivant la journée d’un paysan du Haouz.2
Ce dernier quittait sa ferme sur son vélo moteur – qu’il devait réparer, car il ne démar-
rait pas – pour discuter avec le fonctionnaire d’un organisme de crédit d’un prêt pour
construire une étable.Habillé de sa traditionnelle djellaba, il glissait dans sa choukhara3, non
seulement ses papiers mais aussi un poulet à destination du fonctionnaire – pour non
seulement s’attribuer ses faveurs, mais encore comme rémunération, selon le système
patriarcal du temps – et de l’argent qu’il allait lui consacrer. Bien sûr, enfourchant sa
bécane, il invoquait le nom de Dieu!...Arrivé à l’administration en question, il lui fallait
chercher un introducteur, ne pouvant se présenter sans celui ci devant le fonctionnaire:
car comment le reconnaîtrait-on? C’est le problème de l’identité qui est là posée.
Ce n’est qu’après qu’il pouvait discuter crédit, intérêt, encore que ceux ci se mélan-
gent pour lui avec don et aide, d’autant qu’il devait prendre une assurance, ce qui heur-
tait son traditionnel fatalisme. Quand il lui fallait signer, le problème de l’identité – donc
de l’existence dans cette société multiple – se posait à nouveau: comment une signature
pourrait garantir l’identité à un homme analphabète?
L’exemple de Paul Pascon, également analysé par Jacques Berque dans Le Maghreb entre
deux guerres (1962) a beaucoup frappé. Mais le concept de société composite n’a pas été
assez creusé et il l’a été d’autant moins que l’évolution du Maroc a été ce qu’elle a été.
De plus, la conclusion de Paul Pascon était passée dans les années 60 totalement inaper-
çue.Elle était pourtant déterminante pour l’avenir. Selon lui, pour s’y retrouver au milieu
de ces dilemmes contradictoires, de ses causalités enchevêtrées, fondées constamment sur
des compromis et des équilibres instables, le Marocain ne pouvait suivre qu’un seul fil
17
1 Dans l’ouvrage dont cet exemple est extrait Paul Pascon citait les modes de production 
d’énergie qui s’entrechoquaient dans le Haouz: animale, humaine, solaire, mécanique, électrique
(Pascon (1977)).
2 Pascon (1986) 211-212.
3 Sorte de besace en cuir.
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conducteur, celui de son intérêt. D’où un individualisme dont l’essor dans cette société
patriarcale et traditionnelle, fondée sur le groupe, a interpellé sans que l’on s’y attarde
vraiment.
La sémantique est importante
Un tel exemple, propre aux sociétés dites aussi dualistes, qui éclaire le vécu, montre bien
que tradition et modernité sont des concepts relatifs. Le débat se réduit donc à la séman-
tique. Pour avancer dans la discussion, il importe de bien préciser ce que l’on entend par
modernité et tradition, sous peine de tourner en rond et de ne plus savoir de quoi on
parle.
Qu’entend-on par tradition? Selon le professeur Johanssen de l’Université de Berlin,
écrivant dans Lamalif en 1975 un texte sur la question, ‘la tradition est l’appropriation
d’une pratique passée que l’on veut restituer dans le présent’.4 C’est aussi une histoire
qui s’est arrêtée et qui se répète, que l’on veut répéter plutôt.Tandis que le présent lui –
à tort ou à raison – est assimilé à la modernité, conçue elle avec une idée de progrès dans
le processus historique. Entre les deux – car c’est l’opposition des deux concepts qui est
majeure, pas seulement chacun d’entre eux – il peut y avoir coexistence, mais plus sou-
vent compétition, résistance, concurrence, multiples contradictions qui, en général, ne
sont pas fructueuses mais bloquantes. C’est cette tension qui, à mon sens, fonde la paire
tradition/modernité.
Le dualisme a été étudié sous le colonialisme, parce qu’il a été introduit par exemple
au Maghreb ou au Maroc par le colonialisme. Le maréchal Lyautey, résident général de
la France au Maroc de 1912 à 1924, a ainsi poussé très loin l’utilisation de la tradition
comme instrument de pénétration, puis de consolidation, puis de domination. Cela a
fondé, au Maroc, un dualisme perdurant, ce que Lyautey appelait ‘gouverner avec le man-
darin, pas contre le mandarin’, constituer une réserve de bons sauvages, ‘passionnément
provinciaux’. De ce fait découle que la tradition est une forme imposée de pouvoir.
Tradition et modernité: des concepts de pouvoir, des systèmes de pouvoir
Tradition et modernité sont des concepts de pouvoir, des systèmes de pouvoir. Ce qui
signifie que tradition et modernité sont des catégories idéologiques, elles fondent certes
une identité sociologique, mais surtout elles légitiment une action, elles sont donc avant
tout un concept politique, pour fonder une politique de manière inégalitaire, la tradition
étant soit méprisée, soit marginalisée, mais nécessaire au maintien de l’ensemble d’un
système double. Le respect de la tradition n’est vu qu’autant qu’il aide à maintenir un
pouvoir et donc à réaliser des profits économiques.
L’instrumentalisation est inhérente même aux concepts et à leur opposition. C’est à la
fois un discours et une pratique, mais le discours est important puisqu’il peut même aller
jusqu’à qualifier la modernité improductive de traditionnelle. Avec cette observation
majeure que l’instrumentalisation de la tradition détruit son contenu. Ainsi une société
traditionnelle est supposée avoir une économie traditionnelle, ce qui n’est jamais le cas,
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puisque tout évolue, puisque les structures se transforment – qu’on le veuille ou non –
par l’effet de proximité, par l’information, par des mesures qui ne peuvent pas toujours
rester dans un champ clos, par des politiques suivies.
On assiste alors à ce que l’historien Abdallah Laroui appelait la ‘retraditionalisation’.
C’est ce qui s’est passé sous Hassan II: nous avons assisté, et spécialement après les
coups d’états militaires de 1971 et de 1972, à une politique de retraditionalisation systé-
matique. On pouvait le constater au niveau des timbres, du costume national, des fêtes,
de la résurgence des moussems, de l’appel à pratiquer une architecture s’inspirant de la
tradition, mais aussi dans la définition de la forme du gouvernement, le Maghzen, non
seulement glorifié dans sa continuité historique mais encore fondé sur une des applica-
tions possibles de la beia. La bei‘a est l’allégeance, que les tribus ou les corps constitués
pratiquent en s’inclinant devant le roi.
Mais au début de l’indépendance, lorsque les jeux de la tradition au service d’un systè-
me de gouvernance n’étaient pas encore joués, les nationalistes, avec en tête Mehdi Ben
Barka – et nous y reviendrons – lui donnaient le sens – en prétendant qu’il était histo-
rique – de contrat: le roi s’engageait à soutenir, à appuyer, à servir ses sujets, lesquels s’en-
gageaient à lui obéir et à le servir. Dans ce que nous avons vu à l’œuvre, c’est le sens d’al-
légeance sans contrat qui a prévalu. On ne peut que relever que fonder le système
monarchique sur le contrat aurait été plus moderne et que le contraire était tradition-
nel, même si le discours alors devait importer et employer des termes tels que démocra-
tie, parlement, et faire pratiquer des élections, des référendas et autres consultations. La
distorsion alors entre le discours et la pratique, le dualisme poursuivi, avait de quoi ren-
dre schizophrénique.
Pour bien attester de cette relativité de deux concepts, ambigus et contradictoires,
d’une part et d’autre part, de leur instrumentalisation, tant par des pouvoirs que par des
individus, d’ailleurs, qui fonde leur opposition, je vais prendre trois exemples.
Zaynab, reine de Marrakech 
J’ai publié une histoire romancée de la femme de Youssef Ben Tachfine, le plus grand roi
almoravide, mouvement religieux parti du Sahara profond au onzième siècle et qui est à
l’origine de la création d’un empire qui durera moins d’un siècle, couvrant tout le
Maghreb jusqu’à la Kabylie, et au delà de l’Andalousie en Espagne.5
Certaines des attitudes des Almoravides et spécialement de Youssef Ben Tachfine, peu-
vent sembler modernes. Le sens de l’administration et de l’organisation du territoire de
Youssef Ben Tachfine, la qualité de ses conquêtes donc son organisation militaire, sa capa-
cité de mobilisation, la construction de son armée et de son état, sont non seulement des
qualités modernes, mais elles influencent encore le Maroc d’aujourd’hui, donc le Maroc
dit moderne. Mais hormis cette personnalité dominante, les Almoravides sont présentés
comme ayant des défauts d’intolérance, de machisme, de patriarcalisme, d’organisation
tribale et patrimoniale que l’on pourrait qualifier de traditionnels. Ils les perdront d’ail-
leurs au contact de l’Andalousie ce qui contribuera d’une certaine façon à leur chute:
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leur traditionalité ayant été plutôt un facteur de permanence, leur modernité, un facteur
de déclin. Paradoxal mais pas unique.
Cependant la question principale sous les Almoravides me semble être autre: c’est celle
du centre et de la périphérie. Les Almoravides ont fondé un empire qui partait du Sahara
jusqu’à la Kabylie, plus de la moitié du Maghreb donc et plus de la moitié de l’Espagne.
Sur la zone qu’ils contrôlaient ce sont eux qui dictaient la norme, donc qui décidaient
de ce qui était moderne et de ce qui était traditionnel. Comme aujourd’hui.
Aujourd’hui, ce sont les puissances dominantes qui donnent son sens à la modernité.
C’est ainsi que les Etats Unis dictent la norme mondiale en cette matière comme en
d’autres. Du même coup, les fondamentalistes évangéliques qui sont au pouvoir dans ce
pays, et qui détiennent les rouages politiques et administratifs, sont devenus modernes,
l’essence même de la modernité, alors qu’ils paraissaient, il y a encore peu, totalement
ringards. Non seulement ils sont modernes, mais encore ils sont post modernes, à la
pointe donc de la modernité, ce dont on peut avoir conscience dans la diffusion mon-
diale et l’imitation tout aussi mondiales de leurs pratiques, prières, idéologies, musique.
Tout comme je pense profondément que la modernité et la tradition sont des concepts
relatifs qui ne valent que par leur opposition et leur tension réciproque, je pense égale-
ment que ce sont les idéologues dominants et en l’occurrence, autrefois comme aujour-
d’hui, les politiques dominants qui décident de ce qui est moderne et traditionnel en
fixant les normes. Ce qui ajoute encore à la relativité des deux concepts.
Autre enseignement de cette période: la figure de Zaynab, femme de sultan, mais sur-
tout elle même femme de pouvoir, femme cultivée et donc femme de savoir, femme
intelligente, donc intemporelle, femme tolérante vis à vis de la religion, femme de créa-
tion, utilisant la technique. Peut on rêver plus moderne que cette figure? Ce qui mon-
tre bien que la modernité est de tous les temps et de tous les âges et que présenter systé-
matiquement le passé comme traditionnel est une grossière erreur. Ce qui renforce
encore le caractère fluctuant et relatif de l’opposition tradition/modernité et, j’oserais
dire, la réduit à néant.
Abdelkrim el Khatabi
Abdelkrim el Khatabi était le héros du Rif qui parvient dans les années 20 à bâtir un état
réformateur sur une partie du Maroc et à tenir en échec une énorme armée franco
espagnole.6 Dans les années 20, la démarche d’Abdelkrim, en totale similitude avec celle,
dans l’ensemble du monde musulman, des réformateurs, tels Atatürk, Chakib Arslan,
Ferhat Abbas et autres, est fondée sur la nécessité d’acquérir sciences, techniques, éduca-
tion, enseignement, savoir, pour combler le retard qui a engendré la colonisation, se his-
ser au niveau de l’Occident dominant et en être un partenaire et un interlocuteur, dans
le cadre de la paix et du progrès que l’on croyait à l’époque irréversibles.
C’est sur ces fondements, qui traversent toute la nahda (renaissance) arabe, que
Abdelkrim fonde sa démarche et bâtit son état: place centrale du droit dans cette con-
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struction étatique, lutte contre le clanisme, le tribalisme, le pouvoir des zaouias, con-
struction rationnelle et rigoureuse de l’armée, rédaction d’une Constitution, intérêt pour
l’enseignement, attention constante aux sciences et techniques, téléphone, radios, arme-
ment, propagande, intérêt pour les médias, pour la politique internationale, volonté affi-
chée et poursuivie de développement économique, etc. Les exemples sont nombreux.
Cependant, on ne peut pas dire que Abdelkrim ait été moderne, du moins ce que nous
entendons aujourd’hui par moderne, pour son rapport au mariage - il avait deux fem-
mes - et à la condition de la femme qu’il n’a évidemment pas eu le temps de transfor-
mer, ce dont toutefois, il n’a pas manifesté l’intention. Mademoiselle Ponzo, une infir-
mière ayant visité le Rif sous Abdelkrim, raconte, par exemple, que l’on doit examiner
les femmes malades derrière des rideaux car personne, et en tous cas surtout pas un
homme, fut-il médecin, ne peut les aperçevoir. Ce que j’en retiens c’est que la moder-
nité est une revendication politique, une méthode, un but à atteindre mais qu’elle n’est
jamais totale et en l’occurrence, il a processus par étapes, pour ne pas aller trop vite, pour
ne pas choquer. Que l’on se souvienne à cet égard, de la démarche plus globalisante de
Atatürk qui fut plus tard contestée et sur le coup assez mal vue par certaines couches de
la population turque. C’est là d’ailleurs une des applications de ce retour en arrière que
l’on constate aujourd’hui.
Cependant on peut tirer aussi un autre enseignement de l’histoire d’Abdelkrim dont
la mémoire reste très présente non seulement dans tout le Maroc mais aussi et surtout
dans sa région d’origine. Ceux qui se réfèrent à lui, à son exemple, à sa mémoire, ont,
semble-t-il surtout gardé de lui l’idée de revendication politique, mais pas cette idée
pourtant présente de modernisation. On peut supposer que l’état d’arriération dans
lequel le Rif a été laissé presque sciemment tant par les Espagnols – quand ils en ont
repris le contrôle après l’échec de l’épopée d’Abdelkrim – que par le Maroc indépen-
dant, délaissant une région rebelle et contestataire, a joué pour tirer vers une tradition
recréée là encore, les esprits de la région au lieu de les porter à suivre les enseignements
politiques et économiques de celui dont ils se réclament. Là on peut aussi vérifier enco-
re le caractère relatif de l’opposition des deux concepts, leur caractère également fluctu-
ant, et souligner que l’absence de modernité économique ne peut jouer qu’en faveur
d’une tradition refuge donc recréée.
Mehdi Ben Barka
Mehdi Ben Barka était un chef politique marocain, tué à Paris en 1965 à l’âge de qua-
rante cinq ans, qui fut à la fois un homme de gauche marocain et un des acteurs de la
tricontinentale tiers mondiste7. Dans le cas de Ben Barka qui naît pratiquement au
moment où le rêve d’Abdelkrim prend forme et disparaît au bout de 5 ans, la moderni-
té est totale, l’attitude politique se conjugue avec une attitude à l’égard de l’enseigne-
ment, et des femmes entrant dans les catégories idéologiques de la modernité: appren-
tissage de la lecture à sa propre mère, dévoilement de sa propre femme, par exemple. Il
n’y a pas de faille dans une revendication moderniste appuyée sur des idées nationalistes
et progressistes qui ambitionnent une création étatique nouvelle, bien dans les termes du
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tiers-mondisme des années 50/60, jusque et y compris le fait de puiser dans la tradition,
par exemple pour la beia, des acceptions modernisantes.
On est alors dans le jeu et l’alternance des deux concepts: la modernité de la tradition,
la tradition de la modernité. Dans le cas de Ben Barka, la modernité n’est pas seulement
une méthode et un objectif à terme comme dans le cas d’Abdelkrim, elle est une reven-
dication profonde qui s’inscrit dans un projet politique et dans une conquête du pou-
voir, par opposition justement à ce qui fondait les caractéristiques du régime alors com-
battu, le Makhzen, qualifié de traditionnel et contré politiquement à ce titre également.
La modernité est donc un concept qui fonde et détermine l’avenir. On peut ajouter que
cet homme moderne a disparu selon des méthodes traditionnelles, mais en France, ce qui
brouille aussi les pistes.
Qu’en est-il d’aujourd’hui?
Je voudrais examiner l’aujourd’hui de deux façons, à l’égard du Maroc, puisque c’est
l’objet de cet article, mais en dépassant le cas du Maroc pour l’inclure dans la globalisa-
tion et la mondialisation d’aujourd’hui.
Le Maroc d’aujourd’hui continue-t-il d’être travaillé par l’opposition, la contradicti-
on, entre la tradition et la modernité? Je dirais oui, c’est ce qui fait d’ailleurs sa com-
plexité. On ne peut pas faire table rase du passé si facilement et le Maroc est fier de son
passé, donc il ne l’évacue pas, bien au contraire. Dans certains domaines, y compris dans
celui du pouvoir, certaines survivances peuvent être qualifiées de traditionnelles. Mais
dans d’autres aspects, on est clairement dans le champ du présent mondial, donc de ce
que l’on appelle aujourd’hui la modernité. Dans certains domaines, on s’efforce très clai-
rement de dépasser le traditionnel pour accéder à la modernité, notamment dans le
domaine économique. Dans d’autres domaines encore on empile les deux concepts de
tradition et de modernité et on les fait cohabiter, comme chez le paysan du Haouz de
Paul Pascon. Je n’en prendrais qu’un, pour la discussion. Celui de la nouvelle
Moudawana8: on peut constater que la polygamie par exemple n’est pas éradiquée, elle
est sérieusement freinée, mais les gens sont laissés libres de l’observer, sous certaines con-
ditions. Même chose pour la répudiation dans les différentes formes de dissolution du
mariage: elle en est une forme parmi d’autres, on peut s’y référer, ce n’est pas conseillé
certes, mais c’est laissé à la libre appréciation de chacun pour peu, là encore, que certai-
nes conditions soient observées.
La seule question alors, et je ne me risque pas pour ma part à y répondre, est celle ci:
cette cohabitation que l’on souhaiterait paisible, cette alliance pourrait on même dire, est
elle voulue. Est elle un système de pouvoir? Conscient ou inconscient? Une conception
du progrès par étapes, une transition? 
Modernité et de tradition: réalités fluctuantes et relatives
Ces exemples donnent leur sens réel aux deux concepts ou au deux termes de moder-
nité et de tradition: ce sont des réalités fluctuantes et relatives, qui sont au service de poli-
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tiques différentes, mais peuvent coexister dans des comportements quotidiens, pas plus
schizophréniques que dans d’autres aires culturelles. On est toujours moderne par rap-
port à quelqu’un comme on est toujours traditionnel par rapport à quelque chose. Il n’y
en l’occurrence aucune connotation morale dans ces deux termes, qui n’ont en eux
mêmes que la valeur que l’on veut bien leur donner. On ne peut fonder aucun jugement
réel sur ces deux termes. C’est leur relativisme qui est essentiel.
Mais le Maroc ne pourrait être vu comme unique dans le monde d’aujourd’hui.
Qu’en est il alors de la tradition et de la modernité dans le monde d’aujourd’hui? Il me
semble qu’aujourd’hui, modernité et tradition sont étroitement imbriquées dans chaque
individu de part le monde et pas seulement dans chaque Marocain. Et ceci est encore
plus prégnant qu’il y a trente ou quarante ans. Pourquoi? Parce qu’il y a un ‘retour en
arrière’ et que des comportements et des idées extrémistes, religieux ou politiques d’ail-
leurs, tout comme le communautarisme, le clanisme, etc., etc., qui semblaient il y a quel-
ques décennies des survivances du passé destinées à disparaître, sont revenues au devant
de la scène au point d’être post modernes, donc modernes.
L’histoire tourne, elle pivote, et, contrairement à ce que l’on avait cru, parce qu’on l’a-
vait appris, elle n’avance pas forcément, ni ne progresse forcément. Elle peut tout aussi
bien stagner, voire reculer. Il n’est encore que dans les sciences, et pas toujours, que l’on
puisse parler de processus ascensionnel constant.
Aujourd’hui donc la tradition est devenue moderne. Le débat ne se pose plus dans les
mêmes termes, la tension est dans l’autre sens, celui où des gens d’autres générations qui
ont connu autre chose que les temps présents combattent cette tradition new look au nom
de leur idée de la modernité d’hier. Mais pour les très jeunes, cette situation là est
moderne et c’est la modernité d’hier qui leur semble ringarde, dépassée, donc tradition-
nelle. Nulle part ces deux concepts ne sont figés, ils ne cessent d’évoluer l’un et l’autre,
l’un par rapport à l’autre, tant dans le temps que dans l’espace, et leur éventuelle tension
– j’aurais plutôt tendance d’accord avec Paul Pascon, à parler de cohabitation – forme la
trame d’aujourd’hui.
C’est pourquoi, selon moi, ces deux concepts ont cessé d’être opérants. On pourrait
les remplacer au niveau de la tension, de l’opposition, de la cohabitation par une autre
paire, celle de fondamentaliste et de post moderniste, les deux prétendant sciemment
ignorer les besoins et les sentiments d’hommes et de femmes, qui, de part le monde,
revendiquent le progrès tout en conservant – pourquoi pas ? – certains aspects de leur
passé ou de leur tradition et en voulant donner un nouveau sens à la modernité, en la
revalorisant vers plus d’humanisme, au delà de ce que la modernité – ou la post moder-
nité d’aujourd’hui – veut faire en transformant l’homme en objet de marchandise et de
consommation.
Tel est le véritable dilemme d’aujourd’hui, au Maroc mais pas seulement. La prégnan-
ce du fondamentalisme et du post modernisme ne peut ignorer la tension de cette nou-
velle modernité à l’œuvre et l’intérêt pour une tradition qui a, parfois, montré ses qua-
lités. Non seulement les deux termes doivent donc être revalorisés mais leur interaction
également.
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Herman Obdeijn
Modernity and tradition in Morocco and the Netherlands. 
A comparison
Introduction1
‘Tradition and Modernity: Morocco and the Netherlands’ was the title of the con-ference for which this contribution was originally written.The word order sug-
gested, albeit unintentionally, that Morocco represented tradition, and the Netherlands
modernity. Most people usually think of modernity as ‘progressive’ and desirable, while
tradition is associated with backwardness and is therefore undesirable. But the issue is not
that simple.
As a historian I do not necessarily view modernity as a good thing in all situations.
The dynamism and vitality of tradition as a force for continuity in history should not be
underrated. A modernity that has no roots in tradition tends to chaos.Tradition can be
seen as an appropriation of the past that has been reconstituted today. Humanity dispo-
ses of memory, and history is the collective memory of humanity. For every society inter-
action between tradition and modernity is desirable for a healthy future. Against this
background I plan to focus on some developments in Morocco and the Netherlands
over the last hundred years in order to stimulate a discussion on the relevance of the con-
cepts of tradition and modernity for relations between Morocco and the Netherlands. I
will touch on some political, religious, and cultural developments in the traditional and
modern social aspects of both countries. In the final paragraph I will focus on the ambi-
guous position of young Moroccans in the Netherlands with respect to tradition and
modernity.
Politics and democratization
In the Netherlands modern political developments during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries mainly consisted of extending suffrage, along with a gradual ‘de-pillarization’
of society. In the nineteenth century the right to vote and participate in government had
been based on property or wealth and gender. Men who paid a certain amount of taxes
had the vote. In 1880 only thirteen percent of the male population older than fifteen
could vote. In 1917 general male suffrage was introduced, and in 1922 general female
suffrage was added. Dutch society had also arrived at a de facto sharing of power and
responsibility among the different religious and ideological groups.Twenthieth-century
Dutch society was ‘pillarized’: Catholics, Protestants, socialists and liberals lived in their
own spheres, in ‘pillars’ that consisted of institutions that encompassed all aspects of life.
The leaders of each of these pillars made coalitions at the top. From almost the moment
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of his or her birth nearly every individual was aware of the religious affiliation and party
he or she belonged to. In the traditions of this pillarized society differences among peo-
ple could easily be tolerated and accepted.
Much of this changed after World War II, especially in the sixties.The process of secu-
larization meant that individuals were no longer automatically members of a particular
party or group. Children of liberals could become socialists. Sons and daughters of
Catholic parents might be more at home in the liberal party.Votes shifted and certain-
ties disappeared. New political leaders and parties tried to rally adherents to programmes
no longer based on the old religious and ideological convictions. New political groups
appeared on the scene.There was now room for demagogues as well. One of the most
spectacular recent political developments was the mass support for the right-wing leader
Pim Fortuyn. It collapsed soon after he was murdered in 2002, but new right-wing poli-
ticians are following his example.
Even the famous Dutch polder model of mutual consultation to reach agreement –
especially in labour relations – disappeared.The ideology of balance and shared power
also disappeared.Along with their disappearance, the idea of a shared community whose
members respected one another’s convictions and lived according to a model of tole-
rance disappeared as well. Secularization led to an ideological levelling of society. Many
people felt lost without the anchors they had known. Religious people began to be seen
as deviant. The ‘other’ was no longer viewed as a partner but as a stranger, or even a
potential danger.
These changes had major implications for a multicultural society. For centuries Dutch
society had shown how different groups with different beliefs could live together. It had
profited from the wealth of the differences and varieties in skills and convictions among
the various parts of its population. But this attitude changed during the last quarter of
the twentieth century.The other, the ‘newcomer’ was no longer welcomed as a partner
or new member of the family, but was seen as a stranger and potential threat to Dutch
society.
At the same time the Dutch seemed to lose their faith in politics, in a shared com-
munity where every member would shoulder his or her responsibilities. Politicians and
political parties were regarded with mistrust. Dutch Prime Minister Balkenende's pro-
gramme to restore a climate of norms and values met with much scepticism. Although
the Dutch were among the founding fathers of the European Union, in the summer of
2005 they refused to approve the European Constitution. Europe was no longer a beau-
tiful dream but was viewed as a nightmare, a source of evil.There was mistrust and dis-
satisfaction, not only for the Euro and the bureaucracy in Brussels, but also because of
the intention to make Turkey, a Muslim country, part of the European Union.
Historical developments in Morocco during the twentieth century were very different.
There was a French Protectorate in the first half of the century (1912-1956) that gave
the Moroccan population no voting rights at all. Opposition against the protectorate
united Moroccans. French policy during the protectorate forged the unity of a nationa-
list movement.The sultan and the Istiqlal (Independence) party became the symbols of
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a new reality. It was the ambition of left-wing Istiqlal leader Ben Barka to make Morocco
a true democracy. Yet, after independence had been attained in 1956, the monarchy
strengthened its position, succeeded in relegating the Istiqlal party to the sidelines, and
became nearly all powerful. Although there were still political parties, a parliament, and
universal suffrage, there was no real opposition and no freedom of expression in
Moroccan politics.The hated Minister of Interior Affairs, Driss Basri (1973-1999), crus-
hed all opposition, from the left as well as the right. Prisons were full of political priso-
ners and many of them disappeared.
It was only with the accession to the throne of Mohammed VI in 1999 that a shift
occurred. Driss Basri was no longer powerful, and the press started to explore new pos-
sibilities of free expression. In 2002 the first fair elections without government manipu-
lation took place. Citizens took advantage of their right of association and assembly as
part of a civil society. In a speech to parliament in October 2003, King Mohammed VI
said: 'There can be no democracy without democrats.' He was aware that education,
freedom of expression, and a free civil society are the best ways to bring about demo-
cracy. Moroccans were very eager to proceed, although not everybody was convinced of
the sincerity of those in power. People still feared oppression if they criticized public
authorities, and not without reason.
The meetings of the Commission for Justice and Reconciliation installed by the king
in 2004 created an opportunity to recognize and make good many of the injustices per-
petrated during the reign of Hassan II. It remained a source of deep frustration, howe-
ver, that the Commission was not able to prosecute those responsible for the injustices,
casting doubt on the extent to which modernization may have been a clever tactical
approach by those in power to maintain their positions.
Religion
It is well-known that Islam is one of the foundations of Moroccan society, but which
Islam? Calling today's differences between Muslims and Christians a ‘clash of civiliza-
tions’ shows a tendency to consider the Islam - and Christianity - as monolithic, unchan-
geable, a fixed ideology or religion. Islam in Morocco, however, is quite different from
Islam in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, or Indonesia.There is also a difference between Islam as a
religion, with its dogmatic and moralistic components, and Islam as the organizing prin-
ciple of a society.This does not mean that these are completely separate aspects, but the
ways in which they are linked differ within societies in the Muslim world.
Morocco is a special case because in Morocco the monarchy, with the king as Amir al-
Muminin (the Commander of the Believers), is the symbol of this unity.There is no other
country where the head of state claims this religious authority based on his descent from
the prophet Mohammed. In present-day Morocco two very interesting developments are
linked. On the one hand there is a tendency to free up religion from an overly legalistic,
unchangeable system to one that has a more spiritual flexible attitude and belief. The
ulama, religious scholars specialized in the Koran, the hadith (traditions about the sayings
and deeds of Mohammed) and the shari‘a have given way to the Sufis, spiritual leaders
who are also interested in other ways to know God. Faith as such is not discussed, but
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the long traditions of mysticism and Sufi practiced in the traditional brotherhoods or
zawias are being re-evaluated. Mysticism has always been important in Morocco.As such,
this development could be described as a return to tradition, although the Minister of
Religious Affairs Ahmed Taoufik, a real representative of this line, is a very open-min-
ded modern intellectual.2
Linked to this is also a tendency to a more vivid, practical interpretation of the Koran.
Enemies of Islam are eager to stress that Islamic doctrine is immutable and not open to
interpretation and adaptation.As part of the history of Islam, ijtihad (offering new inter-
pretations of the Koran and the hadith) that is necessary to adapt them to new historical
circumstances, has often played an important role. Political leaders unsympathetic to such
flexibility discouraged the practice of ijtihad, almost causing it to disappear in Morocco
in the last decades of the twentieth century.The new king of Morocco, Mohammed VI,
took a firm and daring position on this. In reforming the Mudawwana, the Moroccan
family and marriage laws, he did not abolish the Koranic laws, as did Kemal Atatürk in
Turkey or Habib Bourguiba in Tunisia. Examining the interpretations of the Malekite
school of law as well as the interpretations of experts of other law schools, he chose the
most open and liberal interpretations.3
He was not the first to argue that not everything in Islamic tradition is unchangeable.
The world-famous Moroccan social scientist Fatema Mernissi, in her book Le harem poli-
tique. Le Prophète et les femmes, had already questioned the reliability of some hadith, espe-
cially on the position of women.4 Abu Hurayra, one of the companions of the prophet
and source, or possibly even the originator of many hadith on the position of women,
was known as someone who did not like women. In January 2005 the Moroccan week-
ly TelQuel published a piece called ‘Et si on relisait le Coran?’The authors recommended
an interpretation of Koranic texts in the context of history. 5
Morocco was traditionally an open, tolerant society where Muslims, Jews, and
Christians could live and practice their religion. Islam had moreover always accepted 
different practices. The attacks of May 2003 in Casablanca shocked Morocco.
Fundamentalism seemed to have possessed the population.The reaction of the govern-
ment was prompt and severe. More than one hundred people were arrested. Morocco
thus retains her image as an open society where modernity is firmly rooted in the tra-
dition.
Religious developments in the Netherlands were quite different.The churches played an
important role in public life during the first sixty years of the twentieth century.
Religious leaders exercised their influence through the system of the ‘pillarized’ society
and its institutions. But the sexual revolution of the sixties loosened their hold on socie-
ty. Church members no longer accepted the strict rule of the churches. They did not
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2 See also Dr Lotfi's contribution elsewhere in this book.
3 See also Professor Van der Velden's and Dr Azzine's contributions on ijtihad elsewhere in this
book.
4 Mernissi (1987).
5 Ksikes and Benchemsi (2005).
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accept the authority of priests and bishops with respect to sexuality. And an amazingly
rapid secularization process took place. The leaders of many Christian denominations
tried to maintain a strict interpretation of traditional mores. Nevertheless, if church
members did not completely cut their ties with the old traditions, they were more inte-
rested in the spirit of religion than in the rules of the church.The traditional churches
lost followers, and all kinds of ‘new age’ groups seemed more attractive to the religious
minded.
Most Dutch people, however, no longer considered themselves members of a specific
denomination. In a certain sense they lost their roots, and it is not very clear what will
replace them, as even socialism and liberalism were no longer firm convictions or ideo-
logies. The Dutch seem to have lost their links with tradition, while Moroccans have
remained more in harmony with their history.
The cultural dimension
Morocco has a strong tradition of multiculturalism: during the long history of Morocco
Imazighen (Berbers), Arabs, Jews, sub-Saharan Africans, and Europeans helped to esta-
blish a genuinely multicultural society. It has to be admitted, however, that during the
period of the protectorate and the first forty years following independence Moroccan
nationalist leaders tended to stress the Arab Islamic identity of the country.6 This was to
unite the Moroccan population, first against colonialism and then to consolidate the new
state. Even during the last years of the reign of King Hassan II and especially since the
accession of Mohammed VI the richness of the multicultural society has again come to
be recognized.The Amazigh culture is now presented as an integral part of Moroccan
civilization, and the contributions of Jews and Europeans are cherished. Minister of
Culture Mohammed Achaari, in a lecture in Amsterdam in April 2005, stressed that the
process of democratization is strongly stimulated by cultural developments. In this field
new initiatives stimulate the creativity of the population.
The Dutch historian Geert Mak argued in a recent essay that in the merchant socie-
ty of the Republic of the United Provinces tolerance and mutual understanding were
fundamental.7 Open borders and open minds were essential characteristics of Dutch
society. In a Europe where ethnic and religious uniformity were frequently advocated by
the authorities, the Republic was a harbour for persecuted individuals.The ‘pillarized’
society of the first part of the twentieth century also existed through an agreement that
there was room for different opinions and ways of life in the country.
A new situation arose with the arrival of many immigrants from the former colonies;
this was later intensified by the arrival of invited labourers – called ‘guest workers’ – in
the l960s and 70s as well as asylum seekers. The experience of a massive immigration
from non-Western countries was new. For a while Dutch society seemed to adapt to the
new situation very well. Maintaining the tradition of the ‘pillarized’ society, the official
28
6 See Dr Qadéry's contribution elsewhere in this book.
7 Mak (2005), which analyzes the atmosphere in Dutch society in the two months following the
murder of Theo van Gogh by a Dutch-Moroccan fundamentalist.
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policy was integration while retaining one’s identity.The Dutch example of the multi-
cultural society was considered a model for the rest of Europe.
A fundamental change in attitude occurred in the 1990s. Islam came to be perceived
by an increasing number of people as a threat to Dutch society. Some opinion leaders
argued that the fundamental values of Islam were incompatible with Dutch values.This
affected the way Moroccan immigrants were regarded: Moroccans were no longer con-
sidered an ethnic minority but a religious one, and as Arab Muslims (especially those
who were visibly religious) they were seen as potential terrorists.
The multicultural society was proclaimed a failure. It was felt that Dutch identity
should be the standard, even though it had become an identity that was eroded by deve-
lopments prior to immigration. While it was indeed important to have a thorough
knowledge of Dutch, suddenly immigrants were supposed to learn more about Dutch
history than most autochthonous inhabitants.They were also supposed to identify with
this history. Immigrants had become strangers, and immigration came to be seen as a
danger that had to be halted by any means. Fear became the dominant feeling, and safe-
ty was more important than privacy. From what had traditionally been one of the most
open societies in Europe, the modern Netherlands changed to a very closed society.
Young Moroccans in the Netherlands: are they a bridge between cultures and transnatio-
nal citizens, or are they strangers and potential terrorists?
The first generation of Moroccans was invited to the Netherlands during the 1960s.
They arrived in a society undergoing rapid change. There was plenty of work for the
newcomers: the Dutch no longer wanted to work in the factories, and were looking for
white-collar jobs.
The Moroccan immigrants did not intend to stay.They believed they had come to the
Netherlands temporarily, but changing conditions and poor prospects in their homeland
led them to bring their families to the Netherlands. Most of the immigrants did not have
much education, and tended to retain their traditions. Dutch society ‘tolerated’ them but
did not encourage integration or assimilation. Moreover, many of the first generation
immigrants lost their jobs in the 1980s.
The second generation had a difficult time: poor results in school, conflicts in the
family, and few opportunities to find jobs. Nevertheless, there was some change in the
1990s: young Moroccans began to adapt quickly to Dutch society, Dutch became their
means of expression, and writers of Moroccan origin became successful.They did bet-
ter at school, and there was more appreciation for such elements of Moroccan culture as
food, music, and clothing.Young Dutch-Moroccans began to feel they were transnatio-
nal citizens, not living between two worlds but in two worlds.They seemed to represent
the best outcome of the multicultural society, and the Internet became their way of com-
municating and discovering the world.
But their position changed dramatically in the beginning of the new millennium.The
attacks on the World Trade Center in the USA on 9/11 reinforced existing feelings of
suspicion against Islam and Muslims.Young Moroccans suddenly were no longer consi-
dered an ethnic minority or as having an interesting and valuable contribution to the
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multicultural society.They were regarded as Muslims of Arab origin, as potential terro-
rists, and were forced to reconsider their position in Dutch society. Intensive discussions
on different Web sites revealed their anger, their fear, and their despair.
Reactions were diverse. Many continued to consider themselves Dutch citizens of
Moroccan origin; they continued to be confident of their place in a Dutch society that
valued their particular qualities.They can be seen as representatives of a modernization
process that had roots in tradition – but which tradition? Some discovered and stressed
their Amazigh identity and harboured suspicions against a Morocco where Amazigh cul-
ture and the development of Amazigh regions remained marginal. Others cultivated or
rediscovered their Islamic roots.The scarf became a symbol of self-esteem. Discussions
on the Internet showed their interest in Islam, but they were also proud of the moder-
nization process in Morocco and proud of their Moroccan identity.8 A minority, but a
minority that received much publicity, rejected Dutch society and turned to a ‘pure’
Islam, one without compromise, and some individuals even adopted violence as a means
to realize their ideas.
Conclusion
In 1997 an American political scientist described the confrontation between Islam and
the Western world as a ‘clash of civilizations’.9 His book received a great deal of notice,
both approval and criticism world-wide, and was reprinted and translated many times.
But his argument distorts what happened in the decades preceding 9/11 in Morocco and
the Netherlands. It is not a useful way to describe the history and relations among these
peoples.
Immigrants are by definition innovators. They take a risk in leaving their homes to
build a new life in an unknown society. Over the centuries immigrants constituted an
immense force for innovation in the societies that received them. Immigrants are not
only needed for their labour, but also for their spirit of enterprise.While it cannot be
denied that some young Moroccans have not yet found their places in Dutch society, but
the great majority feels at home.They consider themselves to be Dutch with Moroccan
roots. If they are approached with sincere interest and respect, it will help them provide
a fruitful contribution to Dutch society.Their Moroccan and Islamic roots are not a han-
dicap but can enrich a multicultural society. In much of Western Europe modernity
seems to consist of closing the borders and regarding immigrants as people to be kept
out of the country. In choosing this path Dutch people go counter to their own valua-
ble traditions.
8 See Dr Brouwer's contribution elsewhere in this book.
9 Huntington (1997).
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Society
opm marokko 3  20-06-2006  15:14  Pagina 31
32
opm marokko 3  20-06-2006  15:14  Pagina 32
Abdelhamid Lotfi
Managing religious affairs in Morocco
Article Six of the 1996 Moroccan Constitution states that ‘Islam shall be the statereligion [and that] the state shall guarantee freedom of worship for all.’ Article
Nineteen, on the other hand stipulates that ‘the King, Amir al-Muminin, Commander of
the Faithful, [is the] Defender of the Faith.’The Constitution confirms a situation that
has existed for centuries in Morocco. It grants the Moroccan monarch a constitutional
monopoly of managing religious affairs both as a constitutional monarch who exercises
power, and as a Commander of the Faithful whose spiritual leadership rests on his shari-
fian lineage, as a descendant of Prophet Mohammed.
The management of religious affairs is achieved through a variety of means, where
rituals and ceremonies are opportunities to affirm and display symbolic power and to
reformulate policies and guidelines designed to establish continuity, and to legitimize the
monarch’s right to regulate religious matters.The management of religious affairs is also
carried out through a variety of government departments, the most important of which
is the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs (MREIA). The MREIA
supervises a network of over thirty thousand mosques, the ulama councils, and manages
extensive religious endowments which make this department the single largest landow-
ner in the country. Through its various departments, the Ministry of Religious
Endowments and Islamic Affairs implements the nation’s religious policy as defined by
Amir al-Muminin.
This paper will describe the religious situation in Morocco, and discuss the institutions
through which religious affairs are managed. It will also highlight King Mohammed VI’s
efforts to formulate new religious policies for the country, which take into consideration
recent socio-economic changes in Morocco, and the globalization of Islam and of world
economies.
The religious scene in Morocco
Morocco is an ancient country that is three times the size of Great Britain, and has a
population of about thirty million. Its religious scene displays the hallmarks of a proud
nation that once held sway over vast portions of North Africa and Andalusia. It also
reflects the fight to preserve the country’s religious and national integrity through cen-
turies of struggle against Iberian powers bent on spreading Christianity in Africa, as well
as Ottoman domination.The country finally yielded to intense economic and military
pressures, leading to the establishment of the French and Spanish protectorates in 1912.
Centuries of fierce struggle to preserve its independence have shaped Morocco’s cultu-
re and produced a specific religious identity. This identity was shaped by the nation’s
attachment to the Maliki Madhab, and the office of Commander of the Faithful, Imarat
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al-Muminin, which for centuries has been held by all Moroccan monarchs1. It has also
been shaped by the nation’s strong commitment to Islam, as expressed through the flo-
wering of popular Islam, whose mainstays were the religious brotherhoods whose zawi-
yas, shrines, and schools dot the Moroccan landscape.
Until the middle of the twentieth century, Moroccans considered matters of faith to
be local matters. They resorted to the national religious leadership only when issues
required national attention.This home-grown ‘Moroccan Islam’ that was represented by
the various Moroccan zawiyas was challenged in the nineteen-forties by the emerging
Salafi2 elites. Under the influence of a number of religious reformers such as Jamal Eddin
al-Afghani and Mohammed Abduh, these elites began to call for the eradication of prac-
tices they deemed un-Islamic, including saint worship.The message of the Salafi ulama3
was soon relayed by the independence movement in the mid-nineteen-thirties, which
launched a widespread attack on popular Islam.This attack was prompted by the latter’s
strong ties to the local zawiyas, or religious brotherhoods, whose leaders had occasional-
ly collaborated with the Spanish and French colonial authorities.
Moroccans have traditionally enjoyed a large degree of autonomy in managing their
religious affairs. Nonetheless, kings of various dynasties who were also Amir al-Muminin,
have always played an important role in the management of Islamic affairs.They did so
through the appointment of higher level cadis and officials responsible for the manage-
ment of religious endowments and Islamic affairs4. Moroccan kings have also often gone
out of their way to co-opt leading religious scholars.They set up well endowed madra-
sas (higher schools), in the country’s principal cities, to train the religious and admi-
nistrative personnel needed to guide and supervise religious life in the country. In the
early decades of the twentieth century, they initiated successive attempts to reorganize
and reform leading Islamic universities such as al-Qarawiyyin University (Fès) and Ben
Youssef University (Marrakech), in an attempt to modernize and improve their curricu-
la and teaching practices.
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1 Initiated by Malik ibn Anas (713-795) the Maliki Madhab, the Maliki School of Islamic juris-
prudence, represents with the Hanafi, Shafi’i and Hanbali the four main juristic schools that have
prevailed among Sunni Muslims for the last twelve centuries.The Maliki Madhab is said to express
the Moroccan national character because it favours consensus, good judgment and public interest,
and is said to help people steer a middle of the road course and shun all forms of extremism.
Moroccan official religious discourse equates Malikism with faithfulness to tradition, even-
handedness and tolerance. See the ‘Maliki School’ in Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic
World 2 (1995) 459-460.
2 Salafi refers to the followers of the salaf as-salih, or the righteous ancestors, companions of
Prophet Muhammad.The Salafi movement was launched in the 19th century by Muslim religi-
ous reformers who wanted to reconnect with pristine Islamic teachings.
3 Ulama, plural of alim, refers to the body of religious scholars in the Muslim World. For more on
the role of the Ulama see Keddie ed. (1978).
4 It is worth pointing out that the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs is the
only government department to be located within the Royal Palace in Rabat.This proximity
indicates the importance of this ministry.
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A quarter of a century ago, the religious scene was characterized by the co-existence
of very dynamic, socially oriented, loosely organized religious associations and more
conservative, state controlled mosques.The latter rarely challenged the religious or soci-
al status quo, except for occasional pronouncements by a handful of imams, who were
quickly brought under control.
Religious freedom in Morocco
A Muslim country, Morocco has traditionally guaranteed freedom of worship to all of
its citizens, as Islam grants such rights to Jews and Christians.The management of reli-
gious affairs in Morocco has always been based on upholding the right of Jewish and
Christian minorities to practice their faith. It also allows them to establish religious
courts to oversee their community affairs and to set up synagogues and churches, as well
as schools, to teach religious subjects and train religious scholars.
Managing the religious affairs of non-Muslim communities meant granting them offi-
cial recognition.This extended to the rights of these communities to practice their faith
and to set up all the structures necessary for community life, in addition to providing
them with a secure environment. These communities have enjoyed total autonomy in
the management of their religious affairs, an autonomy that was guaranteed by every
dynasty that has ruled Morocco, often with the help of local religious brotherhood lea-
ders.
The primacy of the Maliki Madhab
In Morocco, the Maliki Madhab had, for centuries, served as a single framework for all
religious activities, one to which all adhered.The privileged position of this Madhab was
regularly reaffirmed. In a speech delivered on April 30, 2004, Mohammed VI defined the
strategy of the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs for the years to
come. He reaffirmed Morocco’s attachment to Islamic orthodoxy as expressed by the
Maliki Madhab. He renewed his commitment to ensure that Islamic principles keep pace
with the community’s changing needs, urging the members of the ‘ulama councils to ‘lis-
ten to all Moroccans, particularly the youth, and to help protect their faith and their
minds against mystifiers.’
The main thrust of these measures is to affirm the principle of the adaptability of reli-
gious institutions.They also reinforce the role of religion as the foundation of national
unity, through adhesion to the Maliki Madhab.This denies legitimacy to other madahib,
or doctrines such as Wahhabism5, that have begun to attract followers in Morocco.
Providing religious education and training religious specialists
The authorities in the independent state of Morocco were well aware of the crucial role
schools play in the religious education of the young. They made repeated attempts to
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5 Wahhabism is the movement of the followers of Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab, an eigh-
teenth-century reformer from the Arabian Peninsula, and now the dominant form of Islam in
Saudi Arabia.
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reform and upgrade Islamic schools, to facilitate the integration of their graduates into
the modern socio-economic sector, and to bring the schools closer to modern state-run
schools.Their efforts to modernize these schools met with mixed success. Since Islamic
schools attracted only a fraction of all school children, the modern school system had to
provide classes in religious education.Thus Islamic subjects were taught in the modern
state-run schools that catered to almost 98% of school children.The main role of the tra-
ditional Islamic schools was to train low-level religious specialists. Islamic subjects were
taught throughout the curriculum in elementary and secondary schools, using textbooks
produced or approved by the Ministry of Education. In 1972, the traditional msids or kut-
tab (Qur’anic schools)6 were required to adopt government approved curricula, and to
prepare children for the modern school system. Furthermore, departments of Islamic
Studies offering undergraduate and graduate programmes were set up in the fourteen
Moroccan state universities. Dar al-Hadith al-Hassania was founded to provide graduate
programmes in various Islamic sciences, and to serve as a parallel structure to al-
Qarawiyyin University, a traditional institution dating back eleven centuries, which was
proving difficult to reform.The result of this was that the bulk of upper-level religious
specialists were trained in modern state-controlled schools.
While allowing the government to bring Islamic education into the fold, these four
measures also contributed to the emergence of a new corps of religious specialists with
advanced degrees from national universities who claimed both mastery of Islamic sub-
jects and access to modernity.This double claim, added to the fact that many had inte-
grated the school system of the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs,
enhanced their claims to religious leadership.This corps claims to be more representati-
ve of the nation’s ethos than the Western educated elites who had, until very recently,
controlled the Moroccan educational system.
The reforms launched by Mohammed VI
The reforms undertaken by King Mohammed VI concern the institutions involved 
in the management of religious affairs. These include the Ministry of Religious
Endowments and Islamic Affairs (MREIA), the supervisory bodies represented by the
national and the local councils of ulama, and the institutions responsible for the educa-
tion and the training of religious professionals.
MREIA reforms included the creation of a ‘Directorate of Mosque Affairs’.This body
establishes architectural standards for mosques, and devises management structures in
areas such as funding.This is intended to prevent the foundation of ‘unofficial’ mosques,
funded by undesirable sources.The reorganization of traditional Islamic schools is desig-
ned to adapt the content of traditional Islamic education to society’s current needs.
Another of its aims is to train religious professionals who will stress the values of tole-
rance and plurality within Islam.These values are referred to as ‘a middle-way Islam’ that
shuns extremism and values popular Islam in Morocco, whose tolerance and moderation
rest on a solid base of Sufi and Sharifian traditions. Under the guidance of the King, the
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Higher Council of Ulama is responsible for ‘spiritual security’ as defined by Amir al-
Muminin.This concept is embodied by men and women from a wide range of educa-
tional and professional backgrounds that are usually thought to have little or no con-
nection with religious affairs.
Reforming the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs
In November 2002, Professor Ahmed Taoufik was appointed Minister of Religious
Endowments and Islamic Affairs. He succeeded Abdelkebir Alaoui Mdaghri, who had
been head of this department for eighteen years. Prof.Taoufik’s appointment is signifi-
cant in many ways. A renowned novelist and seasoned historian, his contributions to
Moroccan historiography exhibit a deep understanding of Moroccan society and cultu-
re. Prof.Taoufik is a popular lecturer, who is fluent in four languages including English.
He is also a devout Muslim and a prominent member of the Boutchichiyya Sufi order.
Prof. Taoufik brought to this department the rigour of his training as a historian, the
openness of his outlook, the legitimacy of a religious scholar, and the tolerance of a Sufi.
His task consists of translating into political programmes the views of the Commander
of the Faithful concerning religious life in Morocco. The hallmarks of this policy are
tolerance and openness, which are reflected in the restructuring programme that he has
implemented since his appointment as head of this Ministry.This policy addresses both
form and content. It stresses the message that Islam promotes tolerance and calls for a
pluralism that rests on shared humanity. In addition, it displays a resolutely modern
approach in its communication programmes.
To reform the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs two royal 
dahirs 7 were enacted. One defined the responsibilities of the Ministry (December 4,
2003), while the second reorganized the local and national ulama councils (April 22,
2004). This resulted in the creation of three new directorates within the MREIA, to
oversee Islamic Affairs, Mosques and Islamic schools.The latter’s mission is to ensure that
these schools’ curricula conform to modern scientific knowledge. It is interesting to note
that the men who were appointed to head these departments come from the modern
sector. For instance, the director in charge of traditional Islamic schools, Abdelwahed
Bendaoud, holds a PhD in French literature, and is a former Dean of the Faculty of
Letters and Social Science of Mohammed V University in Agdal Rabat.The director in
charge of Mosque Affairs,Abdelaziz Derouiche, is a civil engineer.
The second dahir established the ‘High Council of Ulama’ and its thirty local branches8
to provide close supervision of religious matters.They are designed to play a more acti-
ve and qualitatively different role.This has been made possible by a generous allocation
of human and financial resources, and through the educational background of a mem-
bership that includes thirty-seven alimat.9 These bodies are required to implement a pro-
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7 A dahir is a decree issued by the king.
8 These national and local bodies do not replace the existing (independent) ‘League of the
Moroccan Ulama’, renamed the ‘Mohammadia League of the Moroccan Ulama’ (MLMU).
9 An alima (plural alimat) is a female religious scholar.
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found modernization programme for this sector.They will also issue fatwas (legal opi-
nions on religious matters), in the name of the Commander of the Faithful, on impor-
tant societal matters. This will counter those who issue fatwas outside the proper legal
and institutional channels.
The reorganization of the ulama councils and the redefinition of their missions were
matched by a reorganization of the local and regional representatives of the Ministry of
Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs.The latter are called upon to implement this
department’s policies at regional and local levels, through the ‘modern management of
Islamic affairs’.
Communicating Islam in Morocco
The department responsible for the communication of Islam in Morocco has also been
deeply affected by this process of reorganizing and modernizing the management of reli-
gious affairs. Traditional religious programmes on Moroccan radio and television have
been redesigned and re-packaged to present a modern image of Islam.This image invol-
ves technologically oriented young men dressed in Western clothes, and women who
highlight the humane values of Islam. In addition to a monthly publication targeting reli-
gious professionals, on October 16, 2004 the MREIA launched a radio station called
Mohammed VI Qur’an Radio. This station broadcasts its programmes in Arabic and
Berber dialects, as well as a couple of European languages. It stresses the venerable tradi-
tion of Islamic tolerance in Morocco and denounces all forms of intolerance and fun-
damentalism.The new communications policy of the MREIA uses modern technolo-
gies and techniques to display an image of Islam that connects Moroccans to the modern
and globalized world in which they live.
The MREIA has also launched a TV station and a Website10. Both the Assadissa satel-
lite TV channel and the Website aim to stress the unique features of Moroccan Islam,
which derive from the nation’s attachment to the Maliki Madhab.The Assadissa TV chan-
nel will broadcast in Arabic,Amazigh and French, to reach a wider audience.The Website
www.islam-maroc.ma stresses the determination of Morocco to remain faithful to its tra-
dition of tolerance. It also emphasizes the specific nature of Moroccan Islam, which is
grounded in the Maliki Madhab and is given form by the Commander of the Faithful,
who brings together both the Sufi and non-Sufi traditions.
The TV channel, the Internet site and the radio station support communication.They
show that the government is sparing no effort to involve a wide range of institutions in
the management of religious affairs.This has the appearance of an integrated project, one
that seeks to involve all of the nation’s institutions in a wide-ranging societal project. It
encompasses a new approach to the management of religious affairs, as well as a com-
mitment to democratic reforms and human development, including women’s rights.
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10 Mohammed VI Qur’an TV-Assadissa and www.islam-maroc.ma
11 See Prof.Taoufiq’s lecture delivered at Dar al Hadith al Hassania in Rabat, ‘La mission 
des oulémas dans le contexte du choix démocratique’ http://www.almajlis-
alilmi.org.ma/fr/index.aspx [Accessed 14/11/2005]
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As part of the management of religious affairs, the nation’s ulama are being urged to
adhere to new values based on tolerance and democracy11. In Morocco, symbolic capi-
tal is shared between the ‘ulama and other social groups.The ulama, like other intellec-
tuals, are urged to make use of all the tools available to them and to adhere to the rules
imposed by Morocco’s commitment to the democratization of all aspects of public life.
Democracy is necessary, because it is the best available tool for managing diversity wit-
hout endangering overall national unity.The essence of democracy is inherent to Islam.
Muslims should use democratic principles to promote justice and humanity, because
Muslim ‘ulama have not developed a view of man that is equivalent to the one devel-
oped by modern democracy. Muslims have to live in history and the ulama must acqui-
re a stake in democracy.This involves a genuine acknowledgment of the universality of
human experience, the acceptance of pluralism in theory and practice, and a willingness
to embrace the specialization that comes with democracy, i.e. distribution of power.
Moroccan ulama are urged to integrate democratic practices into Islam and to moralize
and spiritualize democracy, in addition to abiding by all of the nation’s laws.The ulama
are now institutionally connected to the Commander of the Faithful, through their
national council.12
The rehabilitation of popular Islam (a more relaxed and tolerant manifestation of
Islam), both at the ceremonial and doctrinal level, has reconnected a large number of
Moroccans with a native form of spirituality. It has also drawn into the fold a large seg-
ment of the middle class, many of whom are devout Muslims who have been put off by
the ‘roughness’ and the ‘rigors’ of a number of imported Islamic practices.
The ongoing reorganization of the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic
Affairs has been seen by some as a clear attempt on the part of Amir al-Muminin to
monopolize this important sector of public life. They view it as a means of excluding
important religious actors, such as Al-‘Adl wal-Ihsane (Justice and Charity)13, and of pre-
venting them from shaping the religious scene in Morocco. Prof. Taoufik argues that
these reforms are meant to ‘establish a dialogue between moderate Muslims and those
who hold extremist political views, in order to seek the integration of all, acknowledge
the uniqueness of our cultural heritage, and work to help our nation achieve a harmo-
nious development that balances religious traditions and modernity.’
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12 This paragraph is based on ‘La mission des oulémas dans le contexte du choix démocratique’
referred to above.
13 Launched by Abdessalam Yassine in 1974 this association has not been granted recognition by
the Moroccan government. It has, however, managed to build a well organized structure with
branches throughout the country, and a strong presence at the University where its members,
who have taken over the National Union of Moroccan Students, work very hard to islamize both
students and university alike, and to press the group’s political demands.This organization is very
active on the religious, social and communication fronts. See
http://www.aljamaa.com/ar/index.asp, http://www.yassine.net/Main.aspx and http://www.nadi-
ayassine.net/
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Managing Islamic affairs 
Managing religious affairs for the Muslim community has obviously meant more than
simply granting Muslim populations the right to practice their faith. Indeed, throughout
the country’s long history, Moroccan monarchs have acted as the supreme religious lea-
ders of the land.Their temporal authority was either legitimated by the sharifian descent
that connected them to the Prophet Mohammed, or by patent piety and uprightness. In
both cases, the rulers’ legitimacy was reinforced by the support of prominent religious
scholars from around the country. The legitimacy of Moroccan kings has sometimes
been challenged by religious scholars and reformers of various kinds.This occurred in
times of crisis, when these individuals felt that the monarch was meeting his obligations
as defender of the faith.The Moroccan Constitution has now granted the King the title
of Amir al-Muminin, and his power as Commander of the Faithful has been steadily
increasing, thanks to his growing political role. There is an unchallenged and wide-
spread consensus today that that the Moroccan King is indeed a Commander of the
Faithful.14
Mosque management
The management of religious affairs also includes control of the mosques and other pla-
ces of worship. In the early nineteen-seventies, control of the mosques was tightened.
They were required to open only for the regular prayers, rather than always being open
for worshippers and visitors as had previously been the case. In addition, the imams’
weekly sermons were monitored to ensure doctrinal and political ‘correctness’.The reac-
tion to this policy took many forms, ranging from the boycott of some mosques to the
creation of an impressive number of ‘store front’ mosques15. The latter were set up in
popular neighbourhoods and urban shanty towns by a variety of self styled cultural and
educational associations, as part of a loose umbrella network of nationwide Islamic asso-
ciations such as Al-‘Adl wal-Ihsane and others.
Ulama organizations
The League of Moroccan Ulama, whose members were supposed to provide guidance
nationally and locally, was little more than a rubber stamp body with minimal impact on
the Moroccan religious scene.
Symbolically, the King of Morocco continued to be involved with the religious scene.
He did so by taking an active role in religious ceremonies and through his highly visi-
ble participation in the Ramadan Hassani Lectures, when he presided over scores of lec-
tures delivered by Muslim scholars from around the world. Royal religious prestige was
staged and reaffirmed during these lectures, which were broadcast live on Moroccan TV
and later translated into many languages and distributed around the world.
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14 Abdessalam Yassin, spiritual leader of the al-‘Adl wal-Ihsane movement is the only official 
challenger to the King’s right to this title. For more on Yassin and his movement see below.
15 A survey conducted by the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs in 2003
showed that about 37% of the thirty thousand mosques in the country were ‘store-front mos-
ques’ that were under the influence of ‘unauthorized’ imams.
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Religious affairs have also been managed through a comprehensive communications
programme that includes radio and television programmes, print and non-print publica-
tions such as VHS, CD Rom and audiotape.This management extended to attempts to
control the type of publications being imported into the country. Such attempts are
mainly restricted to materials available through established outlets, since little can be
done to restrict materials that are available through the informal sector or through satel-
lite TV programmes and the Internet.
Managing religious affairs in the political arena
The Moroccan Constitution forbids the creation of political parties on an ethnic or reli-
gious basis, and all attempts to do so have been opposed by the government. Religious
expression has therefore been channelled through cultural and social associations. Over
the past twenty years, however, there has been considerable pressure to allow religious
sentiment to be expressed and represented by political parties.These forces are current-
ly represented by three main groups, Al-Islah wat-Tawhid,Al-‘Adl wal-Ihsane and Al-Badil
al-Hadari (the Civilizational Alternative), whose members promote an Islamic agenda
through a number of political and social outlets. Only one of these groups, the Al-Islah
wat-Tawhid, has so far managed to achieve political legitimacy.While still struggling to
gain official recognition, the others nevertheless play a very dynamic role in the social
and political spheres, particularly Al-‘Adl wal-Ihsane.
Founded in 1982 as Al-Jama‘a al-Islamiya (the Islamic Community), this group chan-
ged its name to Al-Islah wat-Tajdid (Reform and renewal) in 1992, to distance itself from
what was happening in Algeria at the time. In 1996, it decided to join ranks with Dr Al-
Khatib’s party, the Democratic, Constitutional and Popular Movement (MPCD) and to
change its name to Al-Islah wat-Tawhid (Reform and Unity).After the 1997 general elec-
tion, members of Al-Islah wat-Tawhid transformed the MPCD from within. The party
acquired a clear Islamic identity, under its new name of the Justice and Development
Party (JDP)16, and worked very hard to enhance its image and legitimacy.
Thus, although the Moroccan Constitution prohibits the organization of political par-
ties along ethnic and religious lines, the JDP is currently represented by 40 members in
Parliament and promotes an Islamic political agenda.The JDP has weathered the crisis
represented by the bloody terrorist attacks that were carried out by disgruntled Islamists
in Casablanca on May 16, 2003.
On the political front, the management of religious affairs has involved keeping the
most radical forces at bay while co-opting moderate Islamists who accept the pre-emi-
nence of the Commander of the Faithful, and agree to play the democratic game and
shun all forms of intolerance.This has also compelled the King to play a very dynamic
and visible role on the social front, to crowd out the myriad religious and cultural asso-
ciations that have invested this field.This year, under the direct supervision of the King,
the Mohammed V Foundation for Solidarity17 launched its eighth national collection
41
16 In French: PJD: www.pjd.ma.
17 http://www.fm5.ma/ 
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campaign to finance a host of social programmes for the needy and the handicapped
across the country. Mohammed VI plays a prominent role in the promotion of a culture
of institutional solidarity.The aim is to ensure the perenniality of the ambitious social
programmes initiated by the Mohammed V Foundation for Solidarity.
Managing religious dissent 
The management of religious dissent in Morocco is carried out through long-term pro-
jects involving education and communication, and through short-term measures which
include security and judicial action. Religious dissent is represented in Morocco by what
some have called a ‘fundamentalist galaxy’18 of over forty groups and movements. Some
of these seek to establish an Islamic state in the country, based on shari‘a. These include
groups that resort to violence, some that condone it, and others that reject it outright.
The groups include Al-‘Adl wal-Ihsane,At-Takfir wal-Hijra (Excommunication and Exile),
Salafia Jihadiya (Arduous Reformism), As-Sirat al-Mustakim (the Straight Path), Ahl as-
Sunna wal-Jama‘a (the Followers of as-Sunna).
Given the historical and constitutional primacy of the Commander of the Faithful in
the Moroccan religious scene, any serious attempts to challenge this primacy are swiftly
countered.Thus, when Abdessalam Yassin19 addressed an open letter entitled ‘Islam or the
Flood’ to the late Hassan II in 1974 in which he called upon the King to move towards
the creation of an Islamic state, he was jailed for three and a half years. Upon his release
from prison, almost all his attempts to communicate or to organize were countered. His
various publications were subjected to heavy-handed censorship and eventually forced
to shut down. Over the following twenty years, he was seldom a free man, spending most
of the time in prison or under house arrest.This police harassment only ended in May
2000. However, his organization, Al-‘Adl wal-Ihsane, has never been granted official
recognition, despite its strong presence in society and in the media. Its more militant
members are routinely jailed.
The leadership of these movements and some of their prominent members are sub-
jected to close police scrutiny.They have often been condemned to long prison senten-
ces for criminal activities or for speeches calling for violence. Indeed, after the May 16
terrorist attacks, prominent leaders of the Salafia Jihadiya and others (such as Miloudi
Zakaria, Mohammed Fizazi, Omar Haddouchi, Abdelouahab Rafiki also known as
Chaykh Abou-Hafs, Abdelkrim Chadli and Hassan Kettani) were condemned to long
prison terms.20 The management of religious dissent involves the use of a carrot and stick
approach. Its aim here is to achieve some form of consensus about the need for toleran-
ce and diversity, and about the primacy of the Maliki Madhab and the Commander of
the Faithful.
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18 Taïeb Chadi,“La galaxie intégriste”. [Accessed 21-Nov-05]
19 Yassine has published over thirty books and dozens of articles, including Islamiser la modernité
(in French) in 1998.
20 Some of these individuals were pardoned by King Mohammed VI in October 2005.
opm marokko 3  20-06-2006  15:14  Pagina 42
A new management of religious affairs policy
The September 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., and the ensuing
American ‘War on Terrorism’ had a profound impact on Muslims worldwide, as Islamic
schools (particularly the more traditional ones) and religious professionals came under
attack for having ‘produced’ the men who attacked America.21
Morocco, like most Muslim countries, was challenged to address the issue from this
perspective, as America launched a variety of programmes designed to prod Muslim
countries along the road to democracy and modernization of their religious and educa-
tional institutions.22 Morocco subsequently took a number of steps to overhaul its mana-
gement of religious affairs. However, it was only after the well coordinated terrorist
attacks in Casablanca on May 16 2003, which left forty-four people dead, that Morocco
adopted drastic measures to control the religious scene in the country.These measures,
as we have seen, are based on the primacy of the Maliki Madhab, Imarat al-Muminin.This
home-grown form of tolerance has for centuries been the hallmark of Islam in Morocco,
and of democracy and social justice.The management of religious affairs in Morocco is
an integral part of a new social project that rests squarely on Islamic and universal valu-
es of tolerance and coexistence. It uses democracy as a process for establishing the rule
of law and for managing diversity.
This promising approach aims to help Muslims claim a comfortable position in histo-
ry as they come to terms with a modernity that uses the noblest aspects of Islam - justi-
ce, equality, brotherhood, solidarity and a commitment to women’s rights. The recent
enactment of a bold Family Law in Morocco that grants new rights to women is a first
step in that direction.23 As indicated above, Morocco now communicates a new messa-
ge of Islam to its citizens and to the rest of the world.
21 In fact most of the men behind the 9/11 attacks on America had a modern Western educa-
tion, or were educated in the West, and came from the middle-classes.
22 These plans include among others,The Greater Middle East Initiative, the Middle East
Partnership Initiative, the Foundation for the Future, the Fund for the Future and the Broader
Middle East and North Africa Initiative.
23 See the articles by F. van der Velden and M.Azzine elsewhere in this book.
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Hendrik M. Vroom
Islamic theology at the Vrije Universiteit
Introduction
T h e V rije Universiteit (VU) Amsterdam has started a new study programme inIslamic theology in september 2005. VU Amsterdam has about fifteen hundred
Muslim students, many of them in the faculties of Law, Economics, and Social Sciences.
Furthermore, since 2002, many Muslim students have taken part in the Faculty of
Theology’s religious studies programme.This initiative was not entirely unrelated to the
political debate surrounding the question of integration. However, this debate has focu-
sed on the education of imams, because mosques are seen as centres of conservative
thought. Rather than helping people to integrate Arabic or Turkish speaking imams
often actually distance them from Dutch society.VU Amsterdam, however, has taken the
initiative of providing a programme for Islamic Spiritual Care in hospitals and peniten-
tiary institutions, not for imams in mosques.The university has applied for the right to
launch a programme of Islamic theology for this group. It has also requested government
support to this end, and has been promised a modest subsidy.1
Islamic organizations in the Netherlands organized a meeting at Elspeet, from
February 19-20, to discuss the education of imams. Almost all traditional organizations
sent experts to the meeting, which was also attended by specialists from Rabat and
Ankara. The foreign experts, along with some muftis and a few Dutch islamologists,
expressed the opinion that, for the next ten to twenty years, imams should be educated
in Turkey or Morocco.They felt that it would take at least that long to set up appropri-
ate programmes in the Netherlands. Their argument was that the education of future
imams starts with the teaching of schoolboys and takes more than twelve years.
In Turkey boys attend a lycée hatip for five years. Here they are taught Arabic and learn
to recite the Qur’an. In Morocco they learn the Qur’an by heart. Many of them pursue
their studies for a further four years at college or university level. Some also follow cour-
ses for another two years.This enables them to reach a level at which they can obtain
the authority to decide on ethical issues, with regard to cases in which the application
of shari‘a is not immediately clear.Those experts at the Elspeet meeting who opposed
the creation of a Dutch programme for the education of imams felt that a system of this
kind cannot be realized in the Netherlands.
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1 Note from the editors: In the meantime it has been decided that from september 2006 also
Leyden University will be subsidised for a curriculum in Islamic studies, while the college for
higher professional education ‘Inholland’ has been allowed, in cooperation with five Muslim-
organizations, to start in september 2006 a professional Dutch-language training to become
imam.
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Those who disagreed with this viewpoint included women, some leaders of Muslim
organizations, and some Dutch-born converts to Islam.Their main argument concerned
the transmission of Islam to young people.This will be hampered if their imams remain
foreigners in this country, are educated elsewhere and just stay here for four years, as
many have tended to do. They are not familiar with the kinds of problems faced by
young people in the Netherlands, nor are they conversant with the situation of young
women here. Indeed, many of the Moroccan imams teach the customs of traditional
rural Islam.These imams are ill-equipped to deal with young Muslims who tend to radi-
calize or who read messages from radical imams at certain websites.These were the argu-
ments put forward by Muslims at Elspeet.
In the public debate that took place on 19 February, they contended that the Dutch
Muslim community needs a contextual training programme for imams. On the 20th, the
‘Committee for the Relations between Muslim Organizations and the Government’
(CMO), decided to launch an Islamic programme for the training of imams. This ran
counter to the recommendations made by a Turkish government official from Ankara,
two professors of Islamic theology, one from Turkey, the other from Morocco, and some
Dutch islamologists. The Center for Islamic Theology at VU Amsterdam only trains
imams to provide spiritual care, it does not train them to work in mosques. It plans to
offer a programme of study on the topic of religious education and the media.
Imams
What are the duties of an imam, and what level of education is needed?2 In a compara-
tive approach, we must be careful to avoid making easy comparisons. Imams are neither
Protestant ministers nor Catholic priests. Some imams merely recite the ritual prayers,
and invite others to preach each Friday. Other imams recite, preach and teach, conduct
Qur’anic study groups, as well as visiting the homes of those who are in difficulty and
advising them on their best course of action. The latter are roughly equivalent to
Protestant ministers and Catholic pastoral assistants. Still other imams have the authori-
ty to determine what good Muslims should do in new and difficult situations.
In Amsterdam, Muslims are bound to encounter new situations all the time, as they
are surrounded by pagans. Traditional imams might preach against engaging pagans in
conversation, something that is not feasible for those working in factories or attending
non-Islamic schools.What of women who prefer to live their own lives? Are they none-
theless obliged to remain at home all day? A way has to be found of modernizing
Moroccan life in the Dutch context. Events in Casablanca mirror those in Holland, but
here the older generation has had to surmount two hurdles.The first was a migration
from the countryside to the cities, the second a leap from Morocco to the Netherlands.
For centuries, they and their ancestors have lived in a culture shaped by Islamic tradi-
tions. Now they have to find a new way of life, in an open and permissive society. Here,
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2 For those who wish to read more on this subject in Dutch, I would refer them to a volume on
religious leaders such as imams, ministers, pandits and rabbi’s, edited by one of our staff members:
Kranenborg (2005).
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people tolerate all kinds of opinions, and many do not believe in God. Furthermore,
almost everyone accepts that the world is billions rather than mere thousands of years
old.To these migrants, this appears to be a place where people experiment with almost
everything that God has forbidden, and where everybody is free to find their own way.
If you don’t want to be an individualist, stick to your family. If you believe in God, have
it your way. If you prefer to wear a head scarf, feel free to do so. Many Muslims very
much appreciate this freedom!
It is an imam’s job to provide an example of how to live as a Muslim.Whether they
are from Morocco,Turkey or Surinam, they all have an excellent knowledge of Arabic.
They know Arabic, but they are not Arabists. Instead, they are believers who see the
Qur’an as the Revelation of God, rather than as an Arabic text.They are not students of
Islam, but practitioners.What this means is that their lives reflect trust in God and obe-
dience to His will.They are neither Arabists nor islamologists, but theologians who are
interested in God and in human life. Students following theological study programmes
do not study religious phenomena, they themselves are part of the phenomenon of
Islam.The Islamic community in the Netherlands was in great need of just such a the-
ological programme. If students follow Arabic studies, they learn Arabic, and read
Egyptian papers, novels or classic philosophers, in addition to the Qur’an. However, they
will not learn how to believe the Qur’an, nor how to renew their understanding as belie-
vers.To put it bluntly, they learn to watch but not to take part.There is an urgent need
for Islamic theology study centres offering courses taught by Muslims who are in dialo-
gue with scholars from other traditions. That is exactly what the Center of Islamic
Theology at the Vrije Universiteit tries to offer.
Imams are poorly paid. Some of them just get free housing, and have to support them-
selves by taking a second job. Many mosques pay low salaries and are less interested in
an imam’s academic background than they are in his integrity as a Muslim.The Turkish
governmental organization Diyanet pays better salaries but requires academic qualifica-
tions. Over the next ten years there will be a need for imams with Bachelor’s degrees,
but at this stage not all mosques will require their imam to have a MA-degree.The situ-
ation in Belgium is different, as the state pays the salaries and pensions of priests and
imams.3 In Norway, the government has adopted yet another arrangement. Previously,
the state only paid the salaries of those employed by the Lutheran state church. However,
it has now decided to make similar payments to every religious community that has been
officially acknowledged. In each case, the amount involved will correspond to the mem-
bership of the community in question.
Better salaries would clearly make the post of imam more attractive. This in turn
would prompt young Muslims to study Islam at university. Most politicians in the
Netherlands and France, however, would not contemplate following the examples of
Belgium and Norway. It would not occur to them that such systems guarantee better
educated members of the ministry, who can help to establish better relations between
the various sections of the population. Rather than pleading for state payments for the
46
3 Cf. Mayer (2005) 41.
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ministry, I simply wish to highlight the dogmatic notions associated with secularization
and the atheist climate. Such notions set the tone in the Dutch debate and hinder the
development of creative solutions.This has serious consequences for the establishment
of educational programmes for imams in the Netherlands and elsewhere.4
Theology at the Vrije Universiteit
According to the Muslim community, what is needed is an institution for Islamic theo-
logy in which those who are familiar with Islamic tradition reflect on their role as
Muslims in a European culture.The community wants to train theologians who are both
believers and Dutch citizens. While they respect Arabists and islamologists, they doubt
their ability to develop an inculturated form of Islam.These scholars can, of course, help
by sharing their knowledge of the various inculturated forms of Islam that have devel-
oped throughout the world in the long history of the faith. However, the spadework must
be done by the Muslim community itself.After all, to describe what believers think and
do differs from taking responsibility to formulate beliefs and propose courses of action as
a believer. Muslims and Christians have to think for themselves about how they should
view atheism, liberalism, Hinduism, the theory of evolution, and so on and so forth.
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam was founded in 1880, by Christians who wanted the free-
dom to pursue Christian modes of thought when dealing with the challenges they faced.
This meant that they did not want the university to be owned by the church.Those dea-
ling with new issues cannot allow themselves to be dictated to by synods, bishops or
muftis.They have to be free to think for themselves, until they arrive at answers to novel
issues. Contextual theology is practised by believers who, while being of the tradition in
question, are nevertheless capable of thinking freely about it. Approaches that worked
within the Faculty of Theology for 125 years now - involving many nuances, complica-
tions and interesting cases that cannot be explored here - are, in my opinion, equally
valid for the Muslim community. The latter has a genuine need for Islamic theology
taught by Muslims who genuinely represent their Islamic communities, and who are able
to re-think their tradition within the horizon of their faith and of the wider Islamic tra-
dition.The university should guarantee them the freedom to speak, write and teach as
they see fit, because the only standard is truth, not the immediate consent of a majority.
The founders of this university took as their example the private, freely constituted uni-
versities in the United States: no government should force you to be ‘neutral’ and
‘modern’ in a sceptical and secularized way, no church should dictate what you have to
say about emancipation, creation or historical developments in holy scriptures, instead all
are free to re-think and reconsider their beliefs and ethical practices and find their way
in a changing culture.5
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4 A private Muslim institute has been founded near Dyon, in France. Here, a number of Dutch
students with no knowledge of the French language have studied Islamic theology .
5 See Vroom (1997) 395-414 and on theological institutions in the USA Dyrness (2003).
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Islamic theology
Since 2002, the Faculty of Theology has taught a Master’s programme in Spiritual Care for
students of theology and religious studies.The students of this programme include a small
group of Muslims, some of whom are already working as imams in prisons or institutions
for juvenile delinquents.These individuals have advised the Faculty to expand the present
course of study into a fully fledged programme in Islamic theology. Theo van Gogh, a
public figure who regularly expressed fierce criticisms of Islam, was murdered in
Amsterdam on November 2, 2004, by a young Muslim. This prompted a visit to The
Hague, in December 2004, by the boards of the University and the Faculty, where they
suggested that the Minister of Education should back their efforts to launch a programme
in Islamic theology. In January 2005, the government invited educational institutions to
submit proposals for programmes in Islam. In February, the government officially gave its
backing to the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. The VU proposal was broader than Islamic
Spiritual Care alone.The proposed programme would also offer young Muslims the option
of studying their own tradition while training for a career in education and the media.
The programme in Islamic Theology has been incorporated into the Religious
Studies programme, with the same dialogical and hermeneutical scope. This aspect is dis-
cussed in further detail below. Four lecturers have now been appointed. One will teach
Islamic Spiritual Care, another fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) and Islamic ethics, the third
Islam in a European context, and the fourth Arabic.These individuals are all Muslims,
with close ties with Islamic communities in the Netherlands. So, in addition to imams
working in hospitals and prisons,VU Amsterdam now offers younger Muslim students
the option of studying their own tradition in a wider university setting, one with a long
tradition in inter-religious dialogue and in societal and political involvement.6 Students
at other faculties will have the option of taking Islamic Theology as a minor subject.VU
Amsterdam takes religion seriously, and tries to bring it ‘into rapport with contempora-
ry thought’, as the university’s founder put it.7 It now offers the same opportunity to its
Muslim neighbours as well.We are convinced that this is the right course of action, given
our identity as a university which follows an open and ecumenical path within the
Christian tradition.
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6 Since 1987 the research group on inter-religious relations and intercultural theology has orga-
nized five workshops and two conferences with volumes on Syncretism & Dialogue; On Sharing
Religious Experience; Human Rights and Religious Values; Holy Scriptures in Judaism,
Christianity and Islam; Religion, Conflict and Reconciliation; Religions View Religions; and two
on Religions and Evil (forthcoming). In the series Currents of Encounter (since 1989; www.rod-
opi.nl) three volumes on contextual theology have been published.A few additional volumes are
in press. Since 1990, together with staff of the Radboud University in Nijmegen, staff members
have edited the journal Studies in Interreligious Dialogue.The Vrije Universiteit has a tradition in
the dialogical study of Islam (Johan H. Bavinck, Dick C. Mulder,Anton Wessels and, since 2004,
Nelly van Doorn).The establishment of the Center for Islamic Theology has to be seen against
this background as well.
7 Cf. for Abraham Kuyper’s idea of theology sec Vroom (1978) 62-87.
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Programmes and the selection of applicants
The Center for Islamic Theology launched its Bachelor’s and Master’s programmes on 
1 September, 2005.The Bachelor’s programme amounts to 180 ECTS (European Credit
Transfer System) credits. One ECTS credit represents twenty-eight study load hours, one
academic year is worth sixty ECTS credits. The Bachelor’s has been built into a
Religious Studies programme that focuses on the plural society, contemporary religious
life, and dialogue.Together with students from the other Religious Studies programme,
Muslim students follow courses worth sixty ECTS credits. There are courses in
Hinduism, the history of Western philosophy, theology & philosophy of science, an
introduction into the sociology and psychology of religion, Judaism and Christianity,
secular world views, ethics and comparative philosophy. Depending on their choice of
subject for their bachelor thesis, these students can acquire up to ninety ECTS credits
for classes in Islamic theology.There are classes on introductions to the history of Islam,
the Qur’an and hadith (traditions about the sayings and deeds of Mohammed), in kalam
(theology), Islamic philosophy and ethics, tafsir (exegesis), fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence),
contemporary Islam and Islam in the public domain.The Arabic course is worth thirty
ECTS credits.About eighteen students are taking this BA programme. Most of them are
young and female and, incidentally, have opted to wear Islamic headscarves, but there are
also a few older students and men. Students are admitted if they have either a pre-uni-
versity-level secondary school diploma or if they have completed one year of a BA pro-
gramme at a college of tertiary education.
The second course of study is the Master’s programme in Islamic Spiritual Care.Worth
sixty ECTS credits, this one-year programme can be studied on a part-time basis.
Together with the other students, Muslims take classes in psychology and spiritual care.
After this, they follow further classes in Islamic spiritual care, Islamic ethics and European
Islam,undertake a supervised apprenticeship, and write their Master’s thesis.To date,most
of the students who have taken this programme are imams working either in prisons or
in institutions for juvenile delinquents.
Universities restrict admission to Master’s programmes to holders of a Bachelor’s
degree from accredited academic institutions. Non-native speakers must be able to pre-
sent the diploma awarded for passing the state examination for proficiency in Dutch.
Students with a college-level diploma – this level is more practically oriented, and less
abstract – must follow a preparatory programme prior to joining the Master’s program-
me. Following the government’s decision to subsidize the Master’s in Islamic Spiritual
Care, some two hundred individuals have requested information about the programme.
It was, of course, quite apparent that not all of them would have suitable qualifications.
It was therefore decided to set up a pre-Master's course.This consists of two parts, each
worth thirty ECTS credits, i.e. each involving one year’s study on a part-time basis. Pre-
Master’s course A includes Religious Studies and Theology, while pre-Master’s course B
deals with Islamic Theology. The courses are taken from the Islamic programme that
makes up part of the Bachelor’s in Religious Studies.This implies that the Master’s pro-
gramme as a whole has three groups of students: pre-Master’s course A students, pre-
Master’s course B students and those taking the Master’s programme itself, which, for
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students who have to follow both pre-master programmes, to four years of study on a
part-time basis.
A committee consisting of two or three Muslims and the co-ordinator has been for-
med to deal with admissions to the Master’s in Islamic Spiritual Care.The task of this
Admissions Committee is to advise the Faculty’s examination board on the admission of
candidates and about preparatory studies. Between fifty and sixty candidates have applied
for admission.They come from a variety of backgrounds, one is an imam, another is an
advisor to the diplomatic mission of an Arabic country, there is also a schoolteacher, and
an employee of a transport firm. Quite a few were unemployed, but had previously wor-
ked in research or for cleaning services. Many of them had been trained in theology at
Islamic institutions in Morocco,Turkey, Syria, Egypt, or France.
Most of the candidates had received their early education in madrassas or lycées hatip.
Given the difficulty of assessing the academic standard of these institutions, the commit-
tee decided to invite most of the candidates to interview them. The requirements are
that the candidates must be able to recite major sections of the Qur’an by heart, and that
they must be able to read and speak Dutch and Arabic. Furthermore, they must have a
knowledge of Islam to BA level, in addition to some knowledge of Dutch culture in par-
ticular and Western-European culture in general. Before exploring the background and
content of these requirements in greater detail, let us review the facts.
The committee interviewed about forty candidates between mid-June and early
September. Six were admitted directly to the Master’s programme, four were required to
take pre-Master’s course B or some of its component courses, while twenty were requi-
red to take pre-Master’s course A, with many of these taking pre-Master’s course B as
well.Three were required to take a short-track Bachelor’s equivalent to 120 ECTS cre-
dits.The remaining applicants were either referred to the Bachelor’s programme or rejec-
ted. Most of the students who were required to follow pre-Master’s course A have star-
ted their studies, while a few have opted to postpone their studies until next year. Others
will not be enrolling, for a variety of reasons.The committee accepted some students for
pre-Master’s course A who, although capable of expressing themselves quite well in
Dutch, did not have the diploma awarded for passing the state examination for profi-
ciency in Dutch as a second language.Their admission was subject to the condition that
they start a course for this state examination immediately and that they have sufficient
time to pursue both studies in parallel.
Almost all of the candidates were strongly motivated to work in the field of spiritual
care and to help Muslims to find their way in our secularized, plural and individualistic
society. Many of them had taught primary school courses in Islam and, in some cases,
Arabic, in addition to preaching in mosques on Fridays.
A hermeneutical and dialogical profile
Islamic lecturers in the Netherlands are faced with a very difficult task. Like their coun-
terparts in Britain,Germany,Denmark,Norway and elsewhere, they have to translate tra-
ditional Arabic and Turkish Islam into a local context.There are no Dutch textbooks on
Islamic Spiritual Care, which means that the lecturer in this field has no textbooks for
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the students. In Turkey the practice of ‘spiritual care’ is, as yet, unknown.The lecturer for
fiqh and ethics has started the work of translating Arabic jurisprudential terms into
Dutch.That, in itself, is a very demanding job. At the same time, however, fiqh also has
to be expanded to embrace modern ethical issues.
There is complete agreement concerning the need for students graduating from the
Master’s programme in Islamic Spiritual Care to be capable of talking to Muslims in cri-
sis situations - i.e. resulting from admission to hospital, imprisonment, or army service -
about the meaning of their faith.They also have to be able to deal with fellow profes-
sionals at work, such as Christian chaplains, humanists, and medical specialists in hospi-
tals, as well as those working in prisons and institutions for juvenile delinquents.These
considerations require students to be knowledgeable about such things as secular ethics,
Christian ideas about abortion, and the discontinuation of fruitless treatment.They may
find medical questions such as these more difficult to handle than discussions with pri-
son inmates, and with young people who have not yet managed to give a direction to
their lives.
The task of Muslim theologians is not only to translate Arabic texts into European
languages, but also to translate Islam into an entirely different context. For that reason,
the Center’s profile is hermeneutical, i.e. understanding the tradition from its sources in a
new context.Work on the further development of Islam will also be carried out in medi-
cal and theological faculties in Islamic countries. Unlike those in Islamic countries,
Muslim theologians in the Netherlands must learn to communicate with practitioners
from a variety of backgrounds.
Perhaps the most challenging task is to help young Muslims to give account of their
faith and beliefs in our culture. If the gap between Muslim communities and the rest of
the population is to be bridged, Muslims must learn to give account of their ideas.This
touches upon one of the most serious problems for the Islamic community. Most of the
older members are neither radicals nor fundamentalists, but deeply traditional individu-
als.A great many of those within the inner circles of Muslim communities have very litt-
le contact with non-Muslims.They neither read Dutch papers nor watch Dutch televi-
sion. They restrict themselves to Moroccan, Turkish or Arabic TV channels. The main
challenge for the Muslim community is to contextualize Islam. This will help young
people to find the Dutch words needed to discuss their beliefs and their Islamic way of
life, in essence to find a contextualized way of life as a Muslim.
Contextual theology requires dialogue with those holding different world-views. It
also means learning how to give account of your views, which in turn involves dialogue.
For that reason, from the moment that the first application was made to the government,
the Center has maintained a hermeneutical and dialogical profile.The developments with
which the Muslim community now has to contend are actually quite similar to events
in recent Christian history.We speak easily about female emancipation now, but it is less
than fifty years since women here were first given the right to sign documents on behalf
of their family.Women have only been able to officiate in the mainstream Dutch chur-
ches since the sixties, a development that many churches still oppose. Other issues were
not resolved until the eighties. Muslims have to find their own way in these matters, but
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the problem is that they cannot take fifty years to do so...
This description of the Islamic staff ’s hermeneutical and dialogical task helps to clari-
fy the reasons for adopting the current policy. One objection was that the Faculty should
not have appointed Muslim lecturers who stem from the Netherlands’ more or less tra-
ditional Islamic community. It has been suggested that we would have been better advi-
sed to bring in liberal Muslims from other countries, individuals capable of steering the
more traditionally-minded students in the direction of modern Islamic thought.The ans-
wer, rather predictably, is that inculturation is a hermeneutical process involving those
who have responsibilities within a community. Muslim lecturers have to find their own
way, free of compulsion by others.The re-interpretation of a living tradition cannot be
achieved by brainwashing.While the programme includes an introduction to contem-
porary Islam, this is intended to challenge students to study topics such as secular ethics,
comparative theology and philosophy, other religions and secular world-views, and then
to re-think shari‘a.This is why I believe that a dialogical programme of this kind would
be much more helpful than a separate Islamic institution.These students have to follow
classes with students from other backgrounds.Together they set the norm, question one
another, and – hopefully - they may learn to talk about their beliefs. All of their lectu-
rers, not just the Muslim members of staff, are part of that process.
The need to bridge the gap between tradition and ‘modernity’
Finally I would like to outline the challenges that have to be met. Candidates who were
educated at a Mediterranean university or madrassa have received excellent training.
Those who have been training to be imams since they were twelve years old know the
Qur’an by heart, can recite beautifully, are familiar with the various schools of shari’a, and
are able to debate on the topic of how Muslims should live. On the other hand, they
trained in a traditional Muslim culture, and have had little or no exposure to other cul-
tures and religions.This means that most of the students who are required to follow pre-
Master’s courses A and B tend not to discuss new and difficult issues from an indepen-
dent viewpoint.They mainly repeat what they have been taught.This enables them to
deal with traditional ethical questions, however, many young Moroccans in this country
face very different problems.
In addition, these individuals have not yet mastered the Dutch language. Many of the
better candidates that we have admitted are incapable of analyzing texts in Dutch, or of
understanding exercises that are given to all students.While they are committed people,
they are not used to the Dutch educational system. Here, students are required to write
numerous papers, and to learn how to debate with those holding other beliefs. In this
system, students are helped to form their own opinions in a multi-cultural and religi-
ously plural society.These candidates are willing to study.They readily acknowledge that
they have to grow, develop and adapt to what for them is a new situation, here in the
Netherlands. Nevertheless, they face a Herculean task.
At this point I would like to cite a few examples. I should add immediately that these
students completed their studies several years ago, that they studied at different institu-
tions, and that I am sure that university programmes in Morocco and Turkey have chan-
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ged in the intervening years.We asked some of the candidates about their knowledge of
Judaism. One commonly heard answer was that they had covered Judaism in their stu-
dies of the Revelation, and that the Qur’an accurately describes the beliefs of Jews and
Christians.This answer alone was sufficient cause for the full committee to conclude that
these students required further studies before they could enter the Master’s programme.
The underlying issue here, however, concerns the nature of revelation. If the behaviour
and beliefs of Jews and Christians is not exactly as set out in the Qur’an, how does this
affect the way in which you deal with Qur’anic texts? The hermeneutical question is
inescapable.8
Another example concerns the meaning of ‘postmodernism’ and ‘Enlightenment’.Very
few candidates were able to outline the background to the problems faced by a pluralist
society.They have little or no knowledge of the history of Western philosophy in parti-
cular, or of European history in general.Their task is not simply to translate Islam into
another language. Instead, they must learn to re-think the tradition and the implications
for life as a minority within a secularized, plural culture. Accordingly, they must study
both of the above aspects!9
The students in pre-Master’s course A were required to write a short paper taking up
only a single sheet of A4.This was to consist of a thesis, its relevance, arguments for and
against, and their conclusion. One topic might be the cognitive element in a conversa-
tion between the student and his neighbour or – why not? – a soul’s debate with itself.
‘What kind of thesis?,’ many asked.The answer was e.g.‘God exists’. Set out the pros and
cons.’ Question: ‘But He does exist, and I would not know how to formulate an argu-
ment against this.’ So we take this as a starting point for a learning process which most
of the students find both difficult and challenging.
The problem of language makes it very difficult indeed. Our committee posed the fol-
lowing question to a very capable young person.A baby is born prematurely, in the thir-
tieth week of pregnancy. It has serious health problems and a bad medical prognosis. Its
life will be difficult, painful and short, no more than six or seven years. Should the doc-
tors treat this baby to prolong its life, or should they not? Very reasonably, the student
explained how he could answer that question on the basis of Islamic sources. In several
such cases the outcome was always the same: ‘murder’.That word was used as the sole
translation for a range of different Arabic words.The Islamic community in European
countries must find equivalent terms in European languages for all of the nuances in fiqh.
Only then they can participate in ethical discussions and further develop their tradition.
An additional problem is that many individuals in this generation of Muslims in the
Netherlands speak neither English nor German, which is understandable in itself. For the
younger generation this will be different.
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8 Quite a few professors at our Faculty have acquired expertise on these hermeneutical questions
during debates in the churches, as well as from the Faculty’s international Master’s programme in
Cross-Cultural and Contextual Theology.
9 As do Tariq Ramadan, Farid Esack and other Islamic theologians.
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Such are the problems that we have to face. I anticipate that theological training at
many Islamic universities has changed considerably in the intervening years. In the cour-
se of their studies, modern-day students probably learn English, are taught more about
world history, and reflect more upon hermeneutics and other religions.The difficulties
that I have described do not detract from the fact that the candidates we have met are
deeply committed, want to develop as individuals, and to contribute to a re-thinking of
their tradition in their new context.
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Frans van der Velden
Ijtihad and Moroccan family law1
Introduction 
On the fifth of February 2004, a new Moroccan Family Code came into effect.2 Thecode that it replaced had been in effect since 1957, although it had been slightly
revised in 1993. Compared with the 1957 version, this new family code is unmistakably
progressive. It takes account of up-to-date human rights concepts such as the equality of
husband and wife within a marriage and within the family.
Article 6 of the 1996 Moroccan constitution, which has not undergone any funda-
mental changes, states that Islam is the official state religion in Morocco. One wonders,
therefore, which religious notions might form the bases for progressive attitudes such as
favouring the rights of women. In this article, we will attempt to reveal some of the poli-
cies behind this change.3
History of family law legislation in Morocco
It was only during the period of the French protectorate that Morocco started to codi-
fy its laws. Immediately after independence, King Mohamed V ordered the drafting of a
code of personal status and succession, the Mudawwana. Part of this code came into effect
in 1957, and the remainder in 1958. It was an important token of regained self-esteem
and a clear reaction to the French occupation, during which attempts were made to
dominate and westernize the country.The dramatic Berber dahir of 1930, in particular,
was seen by the people of Morocco – and indeed the entire Islamic world – as an attempt
by France to divide Morocco into Arabic and Berber areas. By granting Berbers the right
to use customary laws instead of the shari‘a, it was viewed as an attempt to destroy the
religious unity of Morocco, which would enable the occupying power to govern the
country more easily.
On most points, the general tenor of the 1957 Code was very traditional and ortho-
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1 This article is directly related to the article by Judge Mohammed Azzine. His article gives more
specific information about the Islamic sources on which the new Moroccan Family Code is
based.
2 The Code introduced in 1957 (partly 1958) was called the Mudawwana al-’Ahwal ash-Shakhsiyya
(Code of Personal draft family code, as well as remarks in the Guide pratique du Code de la
Famille, published in 2004 by the Mudawwana al Usra (Family Code).
3 The Moroccan Family Code does not have an explanatory report, which refers to general 
principles of law, nor does it indicate the targets of the code and its provisions.Therefore this
article is based on more or less indirect sources, such as speeches by the king, answers and reflec-
tions of the government on parliamentary questions and proposals during the debate of the draft
family code, as well as remarks in the Guide practique du Code de la Famille, published in 2004.
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dox. It followed the prescriptions of the classical Malikite School of Jurisprudence,which
is followed in Morocco.4 The problem of incompleteness in the code was resolved by
references, in several articles, to the doctrinal works of the Malikite School, such as the
Mokhtasar of Khalil ben Ishaq al-Kairuwani.5
Soon after the 1957 Code came into effect, its traditional character engendered con-
siderable opposition. Fearing social unrest, King Hassan II refused to allow a public deba-
te on the need for revisions. In 1993, however, he did allow a slight, although not unim-
portant, revision to be made. Given that many years of demands and public debate had
preceded the publication of this revision, when it finally came into effect in September
1993 this was seen as a remarkable event. It was timed to take place on one of the final
days of the interregnum between the June parliamentary elections and the inauguration
of the new parliament in October.This is a period of time during which, according to
the Constitution, legislative power devolves to the king.
Just before the turn of the century, the king and his government became increasingly
aware that the position of women in Moroccan society needed a fundamental re-evalu-
ation. In May 1999, the new Moroccan government - the country’s first socialist based
government - published a ‘National Action Plan for the Integration of Women into
Development’. This Action Plan had four targets: increasing literacy, improving health
care for pregnant women and young mothers, integrating women in the process of econ-
omic development, and reinforcing the legal position of women.The latter target set out
fifty-one items for legal action, of which almost half pertained to family law, in particu-
lar to improvements to the 1957 Code.
Soon after the demise of King Hassan II, the new king decided to push ahead with
the Action Plan’s last target, regarding the legal position of women. He constituted an ad
hoc committee consisting of shari‘a specialists, sociologists, lawyers, psychologists, social
workers, women’s representatives, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and human
rights specialists. The committee’s mission was to reflect on ways of harmonizing and
updating the Moroccan family code in particular, taking into account all of the legal
measures identified in the action plan.
The legal paragraph of the action plan had an unexpected side effect, which took the
form of serious social disturbances. Hundreds of thousands of people from Women’s Lib
groups and other progressive organizations marched through the streets of Rabat deman-
ding more radical changes. Conservatives and religious traditionalists claimed that even
larger numbers of people, many of them women, took part in marches in Casablanca
opposing any modernization that might conflict with Islam. In the course of this con-
flict, conservatives even issued fatwas declaring progressives to be heretics.This compel-
led the progressives to break with a long-held principle by demanding that the king
intervene, which he did.
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4 See the contribution of Lotfi in this book.
5 Art. 82, 172, 216 and 297 of the 1957 Code prescribed that for cases not provided for in the
Code, one had to consult the jurisprudence of the School of Imam Malik.Article 400 of the
new Family Code gives the same reference, although in a more liberal way.
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On Coronation Day, 30 July 2003, the king proclaimed that, as the Amir al-Muminin
(leader of the faithful), he was the ultimate authority in religious matters in Morocco
and that no-one else was entitled to claim that right. Such a warning was well under-
stood, especially by his most outspoken opponent, sheikh Yassine, the intellectual leader
of the Al ‘Adl wal-Ihsan Party. Two months later, on 10 October 2003, in a speech to
mark the opening of the new parliamentary year, the king presented the outlines of the
newly drafted Family Code.
‘Ijtihad’ as a legal phenomenon
In concluding his presentation of the eleven revisions, the king made three explicit (and
many implicit) references to ijtihad, ‘thanks to which, Islam is a suitable religion for all
times and places’, he is quoted as saying in this context.What is this ijtihad? According
to textbooks on Islam and shari‘a, as well as legal dictionaries, in a very general sense ijti-
had is the right to elaborate and explain Islamic law, the shari‘a.
As many are aware, the two primary sources of Islamic law are firstly the holy Koran
and secondly the Sunna.The latter contains, in general terms, the religious rules or tra-
ditions, ahadith (plural of hadith) given by the Prophet through his words and by his
example. However, these two sources of shari‘a ceased when the Prophet passed away.
Some questions of religious law remained unresolved, while in other areas there was a
lack of clarity with regard to meaning. During its early period of rapid expansion, the
Islamic world needed secondary sources of law. Accordingly, in Sunni Islam, two more
sources were added. One was the ijma‘, the consensus of the community, represented by
its religious lawyers.The other was qiyas, or analogy.
The existence of ijtihad enabled these additional sources to come into existence and
to play an important role in religious law.Accordingly, it is through ijtihad that Islam can
respond to the requirements of modern life.Without ijtihad, Muslim society in our cen-
tury would only be left with taqlid, the strict obedience to shari‘a rules of times long past.
The literal meaning of ijtihad is ‘effort’. It is derived from the Arabic root jahada ‘to do
your best’.The form ijtahada of this root means ‘to do your very best’, primarily in rela-
tion to religious matters. Ijtihad is the right to give a legal opinion either in a specific
dispute, or on the interpretation and application of the legal rules of the shari‘a. It is the
right to elaborate and explain Islamic law using one’s intellectual creativity or ‘ray’, (the-
refore also called ijtihad ar-ray). Santillana, a renowned Italian orientalist, expresses the
process of ijtihad as follows:
By concentrating all his mental facilities on the penetration of the spirit and precise meaning of the
law, and not merely upon this or that specific provision, but upon the totality of the law, the lawy-
er relies upon his conscience, thus illuminated and supported, to find the solution for a case in
question. Ijtihad, therefore, is not the arbitrarily objective, personal opinion of lawyers, but a care-
fully considered opinion. It is based upon a lawyer’s legal conscience, refined and disciplined by the
intense and profound contemplation of the law in its entirety.6
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An important question in discussions concerning ijtihad is the matter of an individual’s
competence to use ijtihad, and to reform current law through the use of ijtihad. In other
words, is the individual in question entitled to refer to himself as mujtahid, which means
‘entitled to exercise ijtihad’? Even those who are recognized as mujtahid may not be allo-
wed to question and re-interpret the entire corpus of shari‘a rules. Instead, such action
may be limited to those rules that are characteristic of one particular school, possibly just
those associated with an even more restricted sub-category. So it is important to deter-
mine an individual’s right of ijtihad, in terms of the kind of interpretation and supple-
mentation of the shari‘a that it encompasses. One thing is certain, however. The only
rights and duties of those who are not mujtahid, is taqlid – strict obedience of the shari‘a.
Ijtihad and the revision of the Family Code
After the publication of the above mentioned Moroccan Action Plan, with its proposals
for revising Moroccan family law, the question of who exactly is competent to propose
revisions became a matter of the utmost importance. Soon after the publication of the
Plan, conservative groups, headed by the Minister of Religious Affairs,Abdelkebir Alaoui
Mdaghri, intervened.They claimed that any review of family law could only be initia-
ted by the king, as Amir al-Muminin, and that it must be based on the sacred texts and
the ijtihad of the religious lawyers or ulama. Liberal politicians reacted to this by stressing
that, in Islam, the right to interpret the sacred text is exclusive to any privileged group.
Ijtihad is a right possessed by every believer.7
A conservative fatwa, condemning all Moroccans with more reformist views as here-
tics, forced the progressives to appeal to the king.They asked the king to intervene, and
to make use of the centuries-old Malakite tradition which gives the king, as the Amir al-
Muminin, the right to exercise ijtihad. As stated, the king subsequently referred to his right
to ijtihad in the speech that he made in October 2003. Going one step further, he made
it a constitutional issue by stating that:‘I have decided that the proposed family law should
be submitted to Parliament (...), in view of its implications with respect to civil law. As
for those provisions of a religious nature, these fall within the competence of Amir al-
Muminin, the ‘commander of the faithful’.According to the king, any ijtihad-based provi-
sions in the new code were excluded from parliamentary debate for religious reasons.
This really peaks our curiosity. Under the Malikite shari‘a law of Morocco, is the right
of ijtihad solely restricted to the Amir al-Muminin, or does it also extend to the legal spe-
cialists or ulama, or is it a right enjoyed by all believers? As Mohammed Azzine’s article
elsewhere in this book shows, when using ijtihad, the king is not exercising his rights as
the monarch, but is instead acting as a simple mujtahid with a special mission. Being the
Amir al-Muminin, he was not chosen by God but elected by the Muslim community of
Morocco. By taking an oath of allegiance, members of this community gave him their
trust and submission, so that he could fulfil his task. Legislation comes from Allah
through the Holy Koran and was completed by the Sunna of the Prophet.The mujtahids
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Buskens (2003).
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are responsible for interpreting this to conform with contemporary requirements.When
the king intervenes, he is not acting as a khalifa (a successor to the prophet) but as an
ordinary mujtahid, who also happens to be the head of the Council of Ulama.The King
does not often invoke his rights as Amir al-Muminin. He generally asks for the opinion
of suitably qualified specialists. He will only use these rights to give an example to his
people, or to instruct the judges or qadis.
In Morocco, this way of justifying the king’s competence to use ijtihad to transform
family law remains a subject of debate. However, let us turn to the major innovations in
Morocco’s new family code.We must try to determine how, in the light of ijtihad, these
innovations can be seen as being consistent with Islamic law.The king very clearly indi-
cated that it was his wish, and that of the Moroccan government, that the new family
code should conform with the rules of Islamic law.When presenting the code, he decla-
red that: ‘in my capacity as Amir al-Muminin, I cannot make legal what God has for-
bidden, nor forbid what He has made lawful’.
Turning to the provisions of the new Family Code, it is not difficult to identify those
modifications which are most innovative in the light of the shari‘a.These concern the
chapters on marriage and divorce.Very few innovative rules have been inserted into the
chapter on parent-child relations and personal status, and fathers are still entitled to the
sole right of tutorship over their children. In the chapters on succession almost nothing
has changed,which is to the detriment of women who inherit together with male heirs.8
Marriage
In Islamic countries, family law and succession are the legal disciplines most influenced
by Islamic law. Under Islamic law, and in the codifications of Islamic countries, the fami-
ly remains the cornerstone of society. Marriage defines the framework within which a
stable and fertile family may be created. Divorce is the ultimate sanction in this context.
When attempting to update the law of marriage and divorce without departing from the
principles of shari‘a, the individuals responsible for drafting the new Moroccan family
code used quite different instruments.
1) Innovations through procedure
One instrument is traditional in nature. It involves the use of formal/procedural requi-
rements, such as both spouses appearing in person. If one or other of them cannot 
appear then they can only be excused by obtaining the permission of the court.With
the aim of combating forced marriages, both man and wife are obliged to be present in
person at the signing of the marriage contract.The permission of the court is required
for the use of proxies, which is only allowed under very special circumstances (Art. 17
Family Code). Measures have also been included to reduce the incidence of rash divor-
ces. Repudiation (talaq) now requires the permission of a court, and it must be preceded
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8 In succession law, the Code enlarged on the rules concerning obligatory bequests, which give
an ex lege testamentary disposition to the children of the predeceased sons, so that it now also
includes the children of the predeceased daughters.
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by a reconciliation procedure. Such permission is conditional upon the man depositing
a sum of money to cover his financial obligations towards his wife. However effective it
may be, the use of procedural measures to structure family law is not the subject of this
exposé.
2) Innovations through ijtihad
A second instrument used for innovating the Moroccan Family Code is the one we are
discussing here, the ijtihad. Many aspects of the new Code cause one to question whe-
ther the new rule was in fact a direct result of an ijtihad procedure carried out by the
king and his Commission.The most important of these aspects, which are discussed in
more detail below, are: abrogation of a wife’s duty of obedience to her spouse; abroga-
tion of a wife’s duty to be represented by a male person at the conclusion of the marri-
age contract; divorce on the grounds of sustained discord; and the introduction of an
option for the spouses to select a matrimonial property regime involving the joint
ownership of gains.
3) Definition of Marriage
The change of the definition of marriage is particularly noteworthy. The Mudawwana
1957 stated in its first article that:
‘Marriage is a convention … between a man and a woman, aimed at loyalty and chastity and a des-
ire for procreation through fertility, on stable foundations and under the supervision of the hus-
band, of a family that allows them to meet their mutual obligations and to enjoy security, peace,
affection and mutual respect’.
This definition was unmistakably taken from a Koranic verse (4:34), which reads:
‘Men are in charge of women, because Allah hath made one of them to excel the other, and they
spend of their property (to support them).’9
or in a slightly different translation:
‘Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has given the one more (strength)
than the other, and because they support them from their means.’10
The Mudawwana 2004, however, makes man and wife jointly responsible for the family,
as it no longer refers to the guardianship of the husband but to the supervision of both
spouses. In its Article 4 it explains that:
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10 Translation in Doi (1984) 129.
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‘… the purpose of marriage is loyalty and chastity and the foundation of a stable marriage under
the supervision of the two spouses, in conformity with the provisions of this code.’
To those who have studied shari‘a for many years, this change came as something of a
surprise. Ta’a, the wife’s duty of obedience, was always held to be one of the pillars of
Islamic family law. It was strongly advocated in several ahadith, like the one reported by
Hakim from Aisha, when she asked the Messenger of Allah: ‘who has greater right over
a woman’, and the Prophet replied: ‘her husband’.
In his inaugural lecture, the king explained the change to the definition of marriage in
the 2004 Code by quoting from another hadith: ‘only an honourable man will honour
them (the women), and only an ignoble man will humble them’. This seems to be a
rather weak defence against both the above-mentioned Koranic verse and a variety of
ahadith.
As Mohammed Azzine’s article elsewhere in this book shows, the duty of obedience
was the price a woman paid to her husband for his duty to spend his money to main-
tain her (Koranic verse 4:34).This obedience should not be the fruit of constraint but of
love and respect. As the Prophet in a hadith has said, men and women are equal in the
light of the law.This equality, which is enshrined in the Moroccan Constitution, has now
been incorporated into the Family Code. Marriage and the family are now the joint res-
ponsibility of both spouses.The man no longer has rights over his wife, instead all rights
and duties are reciprocal.
The new Moroccan Family Code devotes sixty-five articles to marriage, eighteen
more than the previous code. Fundamental revisions and new procedural rules are used
to guarantee the code’s goal of equality between man and wife, within a marriage that
is based on the free will of both spouses.This starts with the rules on the conclusion of
the marriage, in which important changes have been made.
4) Essential marriage requirements 
The new Family Code involves substantial changes to the conditions governing the con-
clusion of a valid marriage.Article 13 lists the five classical conditions, which are also set
out in the 1957 Code.These concern issues such as minimum age, impediments to mar-
riage, bride gift, witnesses, and the wali nikeh. At least two of them are of major interest,
in the context of ijtihad. Let us briefly discuss these five conditions.
Classical shari‘a set out no minimum age for spouses. It allowed a father to give his
child in marriage whenever he wished.Twenty-century codification in the Islamic world
has nevertheless led to the introduction of a minimum marriageable age in almost all
such states, although different ages apply to males and females. In 1957, Morocco intro-
duced a minimum of eighteen for boys and fifteen for girls, subject to possible dispen-
sations. In the new code, marriageable age is set at eighteen for both men and women,
subject to the possibility of a judicial dispensation.
An obvious question is whether the introduction of a minimum age is in conformity
with the shari‘a. Perhaps we should not pursue that particular issue, however, since very
few Islamic states allow marriages between young boys and girls.11
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As to impediments to marriage, no changes have been introduced. The degrees of
blood relationship and milk-relationship as well as of affinity, and the prohibitions for
diversity of religion, have remained.
The bride gift (mahr/sadaq) is an essential element of the marriage contract.An Islamic
marriage contract is only valid if the man offers a gift to his future wife and pays at least
part of it at or before the wedding.The Malikite School requires that the amount of the
bride gift be stipulated in the marriage contract.The remaining three Sunni schools do
not oblige parties to mention the mahr, as long as the marriage contract does not acquit
the man of this obligation. The new Family Code abandoned this requirement and
accepted the rule of the three other Sunni schools. Here we can see that although fol-
lowers of Sunni Islam are supposed to follow the school of their descent (taqlid), they are
also free to adhere to the rules of other schools (ikhtiyar) which may be more in line with
their religious ideas.
A fourth requirement is publicity. From the beginning of Islam, there has been a requi-
rement for marriages to be concluded in public.The presence of at least two witnesses
of honourable and trustworthy character (adl) guarantees that this requirement is met. In
Morocco, the role of the witness has been formalized, and is nowadays carried out by
two adoul.12
As stated, in Islam marriage is a contract between a man and a woman. Classical Islam
stipulates that during the negotiation and conclusion of a marriage contract the woman,
regardless of her age, must be represented by a male member of her family: the wali nikeh.
The wali nikeh may be her father or grandfather, her brother or uncle or even her son if
he is of age. Malakite Islam countenanced no exemptions to this rule, while the Hanefite
School allowed an adult woman whose father had died to conclude a marriage-contract
without a wali nikeh. Morocco adopted this rule in its 1993 legal reform. The new
Moroccan Family Code goes still further, allowing every woman aged eighteen and
above to conclude a marriage without the need for a wali nikeh.This rather radical chan-
ge was motivated by the argument that while women were entitled to have a wali nikeh
present at the conclusion of their marriage contract, they were not obliged to do so. Such
an innovative reformulation of the requirement for a wali nikeh is only feasible through
the use of ijtihad. However, it is not known which shari‘a rule can be used to account
for this drastic U-turn.
With regard to the requirement for a wali nikeh, Mohammed Azzine’s article shows
that this has been a topic of discussion for many centuries, possibly even from the begin-
ning of Islam itself. In the case of brides who have come of age13, the Hanefite school
of jurisprudence, and others, take the view that she has no obligation to be represented
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11 Iranian Civil Code art. 1041 requires that girls be aged at least thirteen and boys at least 
fifteen, the marriage of individuals below these ages is only possible with dispensation from the
court.
12 Adoul are notaries charged with the drawing up of authenticated acts marriage and divorce.
They are constantly supervised by the court (qadi at-tawtiq), which certifies the acts of the adoul.
13 She could even ask for an annulment if her wedding was concluded before she reached the
age of majority, if her interests were not served by the marriage.
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by a male member of her family.The general opinion of the Malikite and Shafiite schools
is that a marriage concluded without wali nikeh is null and void. However, even the adhe-
rents of the Malikite school were not unanimous on this point. For instance, the famous
Malikite scholar, Ibn Rushd (Averroes), declared this requirement to be inconsistent with
the Koran.The passage to which he alluded reads: ‘Do not prevent them from marrying
when they have agreed among themselves to marry in a lawful manner’.There is also a
hadith of the Prophet, which allows a woman to marry independently, without a wali
nikeh, whether it is her first marriage or not.
The new code introduced a large amount of additional paperwork.This was intended
to safeguard the completion of the formalities required at the conclusion of the marri-
age and to prevent forced marriages.
5) Polygamy 
The king did not feel free to abolish polygamy, and he expressed this in the following
way: ‘in my capacity as Amir al-Muminin I cannot make licit what God has forbidden,
nor forbid what he has made lawful’. The question of polygamy is mentioned in the
Koran, and so it is part of the Moroccan Family Code (art. 40-46). However, further
restrictions have been imposed on bigamy. It now requires court permission, which may
only be given in exceptional circumstances and only if the man has sufficient financial
means to support two families equally.The court is also required to inform both wives
and to ask for their formal acceptance of the bigamous relationship.
Divorce
In addition to the Moroccan law governing marriage, major changes have been intro-
duced into the law governing divorce.The new Moroccan Family Code devotes twice
as many articles to divorce as does the 1957 code.14 Many of these articles introduce for-
mal requirements. In particular, the courts now have substantial influence in the dissolu-
tion of family ties.The intervention of the court in such cases is a quintessential part of
its duty to protect the interests of the weaker party.
1) Reconciliation 
Reconciliation was not generally required in the 1957 Mudawwana, which had only a
single reference to the matter, in Article 56. Reconciliation was also mentioned in Article
179 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where it was part of the proceedings to acquire the
court’s permission for a repudiation. In conformity with shari‘a, the new code requires
that all divorce cases be preceded by a reconciliation procedure. So, as far as reconcilia-
tion is concerned, the legislature did its utmost to comply with the Koranic requirement
set out in Sura 4:35, which reads: ‘And if you fear a breach between them, appoint an
arbiter from his folk and an arbiter from her folk.’
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marriage, the new Code has 65 articles, while the former one had 43.
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2) Types of dissolution of marriage
The new Moroccan family code enumerates six different types of dissolution of a mar-
riage, three of which (talaq, khula and tatliq) were already codified in the former
Mudawwana. Not only were the other three, muba’arat, tamlik and shiqaq, not mentioned
in the former code, they may not even have been known when that code was drafted.
As provided for in 1993, and in conformity with restrictions introduced in the Tunisian
family code of a 1957, the marriage can only be dissolved by a talaq once the court has
granted its permission to repudiate. Such permission will only be given once the man
has deposited at the court’s registry a sum of money covering his financial obligations to
his wife and children. Talaq, as a rule, entitles the man to revoke his talaq within three
months of the iddah.The new Family Code recognizes this right of revocation, but only
under the court’s supervision and with consent of the wife. If she refuses to resume mari-
tal life, she may start divorce proceedings.
In the past, frequent use was made of the khula. In classical law, khula is a means of dis-
solving the marriage at the wife’s initiative, although the proceedings end up in the
hands of the man alone. It is a talaq based on a contract between man and wife, one that
has been initiated and paid for by the wife. In classical law and under the former code,
the man was entitled to name his own price as payment for his talaq. The new code,
however, limits the man’s rights in this regard.The new code provides that, if the parties
fail to reach an agreement on the price to be paid, the wife may request the court to fix
a fair price (art. 120). If the wife is not satisfied with the sum stipulated by the court, she
may start a divorce proceeding referred to as shiqaq, disharmony.15
Divorce by court ruling, or tatliq, is a third classical means of dissolving a marriage.
Tatliq is a talaq issued by a court in lieu of the man. It is especially important in Malikite
law.The court represents the man in situations in which current circumstances dictate
that he should have pronounced a talaq but – either willingly or unwillingly - did not
so. In Malikite law, there are six distinct circumstances under which the court uses tat-
liq.These are when the man fails to meet his obligation to pay maintenance, protracted
absence, an incurable illness, maltreatment of the wife (darar), the oath of chastity (ila)
and the oath of continence (zihar).
The new family code adds three further grounds for divorce.The first of these is the
tamliq, a mandate by the husband to his wife by which she acquires the right to exerci-
se the man’s right of repudiation and to repudiate herself.16 The mandate will as a rule
– but not necessarily - be included in the marriage contract and will indicate the con-
ditions under which the right of self-repudiation may be exercised. Although mentio-
ned in Article 44 of the 1957 Code, the wife’s right to opt for divorce by self-repudia-
tion has hardly ever been used as it was seen as flying in the face of Moroccan tradition.
In devoting a provision of the new Code to tamliq (Article 89), the legislature clearly
advocates tamliq as a means of striving for equality between men and women. Tamliq, as
a legal institution, is widely known in shari‘a. In particular, it is used by schools in which
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courts have only a restricted right of tatliq.
The second novelty of the new Code is a divorce ‘à l’amiable’ (Article 114). Here, the
spouses conclude a contract to end the marriage contract, subject either to no condi-
tions whatsoever or to only a few necessary arrangements.This divorce contract is often
called mubara’at. Under the code, execution of the contract requires the court’s permis-
sion.
By far the most surprising innovation of the new Family Code is the introduction of
a judicial divorce on the basis of discord between the spouses, which is set out in Articles
94 to 97.This shiqaq procedure starts with a request, submitted to the court by one or
both spouses, to settle a dispute which might otherwise result in long-term discord.The
court must first attempt to reconcile the parties in question, in an attempt to prevent a
divorce. However, if these attempts at reconciliation fail and the cause of the discord can-
not be resolved, then the court will pronounce the divorce and give its rulings on the
associated repercussions.This shiqaq was previously unknown in Islamic law. In spite of
its modernistic appearance, it must have a basis in the shari‘a, and is certainly a product
of the ijtihad to which the king alluded during his presentation of the draft code in
October 2003.As is explained in the article by Azzine, such grounds for divorce may be
based directly on the Koranic verses 4:128 and 4:130:
‘If a woman fears ill-treatment from her husband, or desertion, it is no sin for them if they make
terms of peace between themselves….’, ‘But if they separate, Allah will compensate each out of His
abundance…’.
According to Moroccan authors shiqaq has the potential to replace in practice all other
grounds for divorce since it can be used in a very liberal way and has few formal requi-
rements.
Matrimonial property
The final item to be discussed in this study of ijtihad concerns marriage and money or,
in legal terms, matrimonial property.At the time of their marriage, the parties may each
have some property, some money, and (as is often the case) many debts. During the mar-
riage, the economic situation of each spouse will change. It may improve or worsen.The
man’s capital may have increased as a result of the wife running the household, looking
after the children and much besides, without any compensation whatsoever.The wife’s
capital may have decreased if she has voluntarily paid household expenses. In classical
shari‘a, absolute separation of the man’s property and that of his wife is the rule.
However, this is not the case in the new Moroccan Family Code. Under this code, the
individuals in question are free to convene a process for dividing up both parties’ gains
and losses during their marriage.The code goes on to stipulate that, in the absence of
any such matrimonial property convention, the division of such gains and losses during
the marriage must be decided by the court.Within the shari‘a, this provision on the divi-
sion of matrimonial property must of course have been justified through ijtihad, but
exactly how was this done? A detailed explanation of this approach is set out in our
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French article. It refers to the fiqh, or Islamic jurisprudence, which - on the basis of the
principle of ‘autonomie de la volonté’ - grants everyone freedom of action, as long as they
do not disregard the mandatory rules of religious law.
Conclusion
It is not easy to draw conclusions from our research.There is an unmistakably progres-
sive atmosphere in the new provisions of the Family Code.As mentioned, the Moroccan
authorities have not published any explanation of the legislator’s competence to formu-
late innovative solutions. Details are also lacking concerning the acceptability of the new
marriage and divorce provisions in light of the shari‘a. Although the innovations are
based on ijtihad, their justification remains veiled. In the Koran and Sunna one can find
grounds for justification, but it is not known which of these formed the basis of the new
rules.An authoritative interpretation of the new code would therefore be of great value,
not only to legal researchers and practitioners, but to the Moroccan people in general.
66
opm marokko 3  20-06-2006  15:14  Pagina 66
Mohamed Azzine
Ijtihad et le droit de la famille marocain1
Introduction 
Le code du statut personnel a connu des modifications substantielles.2 La caractéristi-que la plus importante de ses modifications du 5 février 2004 est qu’elles ont tou-
ché un texte juridique, considéré, bien qu’il soit une loi positive, comme un texte d’une
spécificité particulière. Il est désacralisé puisqu’il quitte les cercles religieux et peut être
soumis au parlement.
La réforme de la moudawana découla d’une volonté royale exprimée par sa Majesté le
Roi Mohamed VI commandeur des croyants (Amir al Muminin) qui a placé depuis son
accession au trône, la promotion des droits de l’homme au centre du projet sociétal
démocratique et moderne. Ce projet se propose notamment de rendre justice à la
femme, de protéger les droits de l’enfant et de préserver la dignité de l’homme tout. Il
demeure fidèle aux desseins de tolérance de l’islam en matière de justice, d’égalité, de
solidarité, d’effort jurisprudentiel et d’ouverture sur l’esprit de l’époque et les exigences
du développement et du progrès. En vue de la réalisation de cet objectif suprême le roi
a confié à une commission royale consultative composée d’éminents et d’experts, tant
hommes que femmes, la mission de faire une révision du code de la famille. Il a veillé
en permanence à donner ses instructions à cette commission en vue d’élaborer le projet
d’un nouveau code de la famille. Il a insisté sur le respect de la charia et des desseins tolé-
rants de l’islam. Il a incité à l’effort intellectuel l’ijtihad pour la déduction des prescrip-
tions légales en évitant un décollement entre la réalité sociale et la jurisprudence.
Ijtihad de l’émir des croyants 
Qu’est ce que l’ijtihad? L‘ijtihad c’est l’adaptation du texte au contexte, nul ne songe en
effet à ignorer le rôle que peuvent jouer les mujtahids, docteurs capables de faire œuvre
d’ijtihad, d’interprétation et jurisprudence créatrice de droits, dans les réformes en fonc-
tion de l’évolution des mœurs et des idées par le droit et le reflet de l’évolution de la
société. Est-ce que le commandeur des croyants possède le droit de légiférer voir de l’ij-
tihad?
La responsabilité de faire respecter l’ordre de dieu est elle-même une obligation reli-
gieuse directement prescrite par le coran: ‘Allah vous ordonne de rendre les dépôts à
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1 Cette contribution est directement liée à la contribution du prof. van der Velden à ce livre. Sa
contribution, en langue anglaise, inclut de l’information plus générale et se réfère plusieurs fois à
cette contribution-ci qui est plus spécifique quant aux sources religieuses.
2 Le Code introduit en 1957 (partiellement en 1958) portait le nom de ‘Mudawwana al-’Ahwal
ash-Shakhsiyya’ (Code du statut personnel et des successions); en 2004 il a été remplacé par le
‘Mudawwana al-Usra’ (Code de la famille).
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leurs ayants droits et, quand vous jugez entre les hommes, de juger avec justice.3 Les doc-
teurs de l’interprétation coranique comprennent le terme ‘dépôts’ dans le sens général de
toute obligation confiée à la responsabilité des hommes. Sur le même sujet les versets 26
et 27 de la sourat Sâd (n° 38) disposent d’une manière encore plus claire: ‘David, nous
t’avons fait vicaire sur la terre, arbitre entre les hommes par le moyen de la vérité! Ne
suis pas la passion car elle t’égarerait loin du chemin de dieu’.
Le fondement religieux de la magistrature suprême ne fait pas, de doute la consé-
quence rapidement tirée, surtout par les occidentaux et de croire que le caractère reli-
gieux de l’institution du califat implique un califat identique à la monarchie de droit
public européen du moyen âge et de la renaissance. La différence entre les deux institu-
tions demeure très nette. En droit musulman l’émir des croyants exécute l’ordre de dieu,
il reste un sujet humain ayant strictement le même statut que tous les autres sujets de
dieu. Il ne bénéficie d’aucun droit exorbitant, ou avantage particulier accordé par dieu.
Il n’est ni envoyé, ni élu de dieu, il reste l’élu et le mandataire de la communauté musul-
mane qui lui accorde sa confiance et sa soumission pour qu’il puisse remplir convena-
blement la mission indiquée. Le pouvoir législatif revient à dieu qu’il a exercé en révé-
lant le coran. La sounna, ce que le prophète a dit et fait selon la tradition, le complète.
Pour les questions temporelles et incidentes les mujtahids, docteurs capables de faire
œuvre d’interprétation et jurisprudence créatrice de droits, en ont toujours eu la res-
ponsabilité.
Lors qu’un souverain intervient dans ce domaine il n’agit point en sa qualité de Roi,
il exécute plutôt son devoir de simple mujtahid. Observons que même dans ce cadre les
exemples restent rarissimes. L’attitude inverse paraît particulièrement dominante au
Maroc où les califes des différentes dynasties font systématiquement appel à l’avis des
docteurs par le biais des consultations ‘fatwa’ à l’exemple de leurs sujets et des juges
(cadis). L’unification des pouvoirs exécutif et judiciaire entre les mains du calife consti-
tue une application littérale de l’ordre coranique. Le calife est à la fois administrateur et
juge. Seuls les contraintes pratiques de l’exercice de ses fonctions l’obligent à déléguer la
mission de juger à certains de ses sujets.
Ceci étant, il est intéressant de noter certains nouveautés introduites dans le nouveau
code, grâce aux efforts de l’ijtihad, comme l’abolition de l’obéissance de la femme envers
son mari (a), la suppression de la tutelle matrimoniale pour la femme majeure (b), l’in-
troduction du partage des biens conjugaux après le divorce (c) et celle de la discorde en
tant que motif de dissolution des liens du mariage (d).
Mariage
a) L’obéissance
Le nouveau code de la famille a suivi une nouvelle voie pour définir les effets du mari-
age par rapport aux deux conjoints en tant que droits et devoirs réciproques. Chacun des
conjoints doit s’en acquitter à l’égard de l’autre conformément au principe de l’égalité
consacré par le code de la famille. Cette égalité se manifeste dans la responsabilité atta-
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chée à la gestion et la protection des affaires de la famille. Elle se manifeste à l’intérêt qui
doit leur être porté à la concertation en ce qui concerne les décisions relatives au foyer
conjugal. Elle se manifeste en plus à l’éducation et à l’orientation des enfants et à la pla-
nification familiale.
La concertation découlant de l’égalité a pour but de parvenir à dégager un avis com-
mun, consensuel loin de l’attachement intransigeant à une opinion personnelle. Sinon
l’égalité conduirait à la ruine de la famille au lieu de poursuivre le but qui en est escomp-
té et qui consiste à contribuer à l’édification de la famille à travers l’instauration d’un
dialogue serein, d’un esprit de coopération, de solidarité et d’altruisme.
Mais la question qui se pose, est: est-ce que la femme doit obéir à son mari? Le coran
stipule: ‘Les femmes vertueuses sont obéissantes conservant le secret de ce que dieu a
conservé.4 Selon l’ancien code de la moudawana et dans le cadre du fonctionnement de
la famille qui est la première institution de la vie humaine et dont la préservation est
essentielle dans le régime islamique, la femme ‘doit’ obéir à son mari.Vu les dépenses que
les hommes effectuent sur leurs biens en faveur des femmes, il s’agit du versement de la
dot à l’épouse de son entretien. Mais l’obéissance n’est pas le fruit de la contrainte mais
celui de l’amour et du respect qui doivent régner entre les deux parties d’une âme uni-
que. Par ailleurs le coran stipule que les femmes ont des droits comme elles ont des
devoirs conformément à l’usage, de même le prophète a dit ‘les femmes sont égales aux
hommes au regard de loi’ et ‘les femmes sont les sœurs germaines des hommes’.
Donc les femmes et les hommes sont égaux selon la Constitution, article 5, c’est pour-
quoi la moudawana a adopté une formulation moderne et a placé la famille sous la res-
ponsabilité conjointe des deux époux et il n’y a plus les droits du mari à l’égard de sa
femme mais des droits et devoirs réciproqués entre conjoints. Ceci marque la fin de l’in-
égalité juridique entre l’épouse et son mari et permet à la femme de devenir un parte-
naire à part entière de l’homme en jouissant des mêmes droits que lui.
b) La wilaya (tutelle) matrimonial
La wilaya dans le mariage a été traitée dans des ouvrages d’exégèse et du fiqh (jurispru-
dence) sur la base des interprétations qui divergent selon les écoles, étant donné qu’il
n’existe pas de texte catégorique dans ce domaine. L’érudit Ibn Rochd qui appartient à
l’école malikite, l’école suivie au Maroc, a longtemps espacé l’argumentation des uns et
des autres en relevant que l’imam Malik et l’imam Chafei ont considère l’accord du wali
ou de celui qui en tient lieu comme une condition de validité de l’acte de mariage.
Mais l’imam Abou Hanifa et de plusieurs autres érudits ont tous établi qu’en l’absence
d’une prescription claire dans le livre saint ou la sounna la femme n’est pas obligée de
présenter un wali et qu’elle peut disposer librement de sa personne pour la conclusion
du mariage, sans distinction entre la jeune fille et la divorcée. En l’absence d’un texte
précis les ouléma ont fait preuve d’ijtihad les uns et les autres, selon qu’ils conditionnent
l’acte de mariage à la présence ou non du wali et ils ont recouru à l’interprétation de
versets du coran ou du hadiths pour corroborer leur avis autorisé.
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L’érudit Ibn Rochd cite le verset suivant: ‘ne les empêchez pas de ce (re)marier avec
leurs (nouveaux) époux s’ils se sont mis d’accord conformément à l’usage’ (Sura 2 : 232).
C’est le même verset qui a été cité par sa majesté dans son discours sur le projet du code
de la famille devant le parlement, pour soutenir que la femme n’a pas besoin de l’auto-
risation du wali pour contracter mariage alors que les ouléma d’avis opposé font
remarquer que le verset concerne la femme divorcée dont le désir de se remarier ne doit
pas être contrarié par le premier époux qui rechigne à consommer la séparation.
Un autre auteur Chams al-Haq cite un fait rapporté par Ibn Abbas selon lequel une
femme s’est plainte au prophète d’avoir été mariée par son tuteur contre son gré. Elle
s’est vue confirmer dans son droit de disposer librement de sa personne. En s’y basant, il
conclut que la contrainte en la matière est prohibée de façon catégorique. Il conclut qu’il
n’y pas lieu d’invoquer l’autorisation du wali puisque le prophète a reconnu à cette
femme la liberté de disposer de son destin sans différencier entre le fait si elle se marie
pour la première fois ou si elle est divorcée.5
Abderahman Aljaziri a résumé la position des quatre grandes écoles du fiqh.6 Chez les
malikites, les hanbalites et les chaféites, explique t’il, la femme ne peut prendre l’initiati-
ve exclusive de disposer de son destin en matière de mariage, et le wali ne peut non plus
imposer le mariage à la femme sous sa tutelle jusqu'à ce qu’elle atteigne l’âge requis et
qu’elle puisse donner son consentement. Les hanafites exigent la présence du wali pour
la fille en bas age, et pour celle souffrant de démence quelque soit son âge, alors que la
femme majeure vierge ou non peut contracter mariage de son propre chef. Il apparaît
de ce qui précède que la condition de la présence du wali relève d’interprétations ne
reposant sur aucune indication claire et expresse du Livre ou de la sounna. Par consé-
quent, le code de la famille a opté pour la suppression de la tutelle pour la femme majeu-
re lors du mariage, parce qu’il considère que cette pratique est désuète et n’a guère fait
le consensus des grands rites malikite et hanafite.
Divorce
a) La discorde
Le code a élargi le droit dont dispose la femme pour demander le divorce par l’adjonc-
tion du cas de la discorde (chiqaq) aux autres causes prévues à l’article 98. La discorde est
le différent profond et permanent qui oppose les deux conjoints au point de rendre
impossible la vie conjugable. La procédure prévue à cet effet consiste à demander par
l’un des conjoints ou par les deux à la fois qu’une solution soit apportée par le tribunal
qui doit entreprendre une tentative de conciliation. Il délègue à cet effet deux arbitres
ou toute personne qualifiée pouvant en tenir lieu conformément aux paroles de dieu:
‘Si vous craignez-vous un désaccord entre les époux, déléguez un arbitre pris dans la
famille du mari et un autre pris dans la famille de la femme, s’ils désirent sincèrement se
réconcilier dieu les fera vivre en bonne intelligence.7
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5 http://www.map.co.ma/mapfr/moudawana/textes/wilaya_fiqh.htm
6 http://www.map.co.ma/mapfr/moudawana/textes/wilaya_fiqh.htm
7 Sourate 4, Les Femmes, verset 35.
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Si la tentative des arbitres aboutit à une réconciliation des époux ils dressent un rap-
port qui consigne les causes du différent et les solutions convenues. Si la tentative n’a pas
aboutit, un rapport est adressé au tribunal pour faire le nécessaire, voire prononcer le
divorce pour cause de discorde en déterminant les droits dus à l’épouse et aux enfants le
cas échéant. Le tribunal peut également décider dans le même jugement de l’octroi
d’une indemnisation au profit de conjoint lésé sur sa demande.
La répartition des biens
Chacun des deux époux dispose d’un patrimoine distinct du patrimoine de l’autre. Mais
il a conféré aux conjoints la possibilité de se mettre d’accord, en vertu d’un acte séparé,
sur la gestion des biens à acquérir après la conclusion du mariage. Il a fait cela afin que
chacun d’eux puisse de son côte assumer les charges familiales. Il a fait cela dans le cadre
de la nouvelle vision du législateur et de la dimension qu’il a souhaité donner à l’esprit
d’entraide qui doit régner au sein de la famille. Il s’agit d’un accord optionnel basé sur
les actes qualifiés selon le fiqh, la jurisprudence musulmane, et la loi d’actes entrant dans
le cadre du principe de l’autonomie de la volonté qui confère à toute personne le droit
de gérer ses affaires, d’administrer ses biens et d’en disposer de la manière qui lui parait
convenable sans en freindre les règles impératives. L’accord susvisé doit fixer la part de
chacun des conjoints des biens acquis après la conclusion du mariage.
Cette règle n’a aucun rapport avec celle prévue par certains lois en ce qui concerne
la conclusion d’acte de mariage dans le cadre de la séparation ou la communauté des
biens, du fait que la nouvelle disposition diffère totalement de ce qui précède. De même
que la dite règle n’a aucun lien avec les règles de l’héritage étant donné qu’il s’agit de la
disposition des biens durant toute la vie de l’individu, à l’instar même des autres actes
réalisés à titre onéreux ou à titre gracieux, telles la donation aumônière (sadaka), la dona-
tion, la vente ou autre.
Il arrive que les conjoints ne parviennent pas à conclure un accord à propos de la
gestion desdits biens et que l’un d’eux prétend avoir droit sur les biens acquis par l’au-
tre durant la période de mariage. En cas de litige, chacun peut apporter la preuve de sa
participation au développement des biens de l’autre. Dans ce cas, il est fait application
des règles générales de la preuve. Le juge évalue la contribution de chacun des époux.
Ainsi, la décision à prendre en ce qui concerne la prétention ci-dessus ne portera jamais
sur les biens que possédait chacun d’eux avant la conclusion de l’acte de mariage. Elle se
limitera uniquement aux biens acquis durant la période du mariage et ce, à la lumière
du travail accompli, des efforts déployés et des charges assumées par le demandeur pour
le développement et la mise en valeur des biens.
Le droit au bénifice du travail et des efforts fournis n’implique pas le partage des biens
acquis en deux parts égales. Ce que les fuqaha (pluriel de fqih, docteur de jurisprudence)
stimulent dans la jurisprudence des cas d’espèce, c’est que la femme bénéficie de la for-
tune acquise relativement à sa participation et à ses efforts pour créer cette fortune. Sa
part pourrait donc être la moitié, ou moins ou plus. Évidemment l’évaluation des efforts
appartiennent au tribunal qui doit en apprécier l’importance, la nature et leur effet sur
les profits réalisés durant la période du mariage.
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Conclusion
Ces nouvelles dispositions du code de la famille ne font aucune entorse à la charia isla-
mique et répondent aux normes des états modernes à l’instar de l’occident. Cela traduit
ainsi le souci de Sa Majesté d’épouser l’air du temps, à savoir la globalisation. Cela fait
du Maroc un pays qui plonge sa tête dans le modernisme, mais garde ses pieds dans les
riches traditions ancestrales.
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Arne Musch
Local government and Morocco’s political 
and administrative transition
Introduction
After the national elections of 1997, Morocco experienced a period of political andadministrative transition. Seen from afar, the subsequent course of events looks
simple: the reforms lasted from 1997 until the fundamentalist attacks in Casablanca in
2003, and they have stagnated since. But seen from up close, the picture becomes more
complex. Inside Morocco, the forces of the old order and the new continue to wrestle
with one another in the Makhzen1, there are fundamentalists of very different hues, and
the ruling social democrats are increasingly embattled. Internationally, Morocco is seen
on the one hand as a relatively liberal friend of both the West and the world of Islam and
as such, it is handsomely rewarded with aid. On the other hand it is regarded as a troub-
lesome neighbour of the European Union and as a place where Islamist extremism is
rife. All this makes Morocco’s political and administrative transition a kind of shadow
play that is hard to understand.
Most commentators tend to focus on national politics. But local government has been
changing too. I will argue that while reforms may have run out of steam at national level,
the wind of change is still blowing steadily at local level.To what degree does local poli-
tics point the way to Morocco’s future? The trends identified at the end of this chapter
can be seen as tentative answers to this question. It is in focusing on local government
that this chapter seeks to make a contribution to the debate about Morocco’s political
and administrative transition.
It is structured as follows. Firstly it outlines the recent history of reform at national
level. Secondly it presents the state of affairs with regard to local government. Lastly it
suggests a number of trends at local level, observed over the last five years in the Platform
for Intermunicipal Cooperation between the Netherlands and Morocco, in which
Dutch local authorities work together with Moroccan local authorities.
The history of reform: is reform now history?
At national level, incremental but sweeping changes have come to Morocco’s political
and administrative landscape since 1997.That year, parliamentary elections were held and
the next year, the social democrat party USFP (Union socialiste des forces populaires) and
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1 The Makhzen – the palace – is a word that signifies the power of the King and the political for-
ces close to him. Morocco’s constitution assigns a formidable position to the King, and his influ-
ence is especially strong when the country is torn over issues. Since the accession of Mohamed
VI in 1999, the connotation of conservatism no longer applies to the Makhzen.
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the former communist party PPS (Parti du progrès et du socialisme) took up seats in govern-
ment, with social democrat Youssoufi as the prime minister.This took place within the
context of greater respect of human rights and humanitarian gestures by King Hassan II,
such as the release of political prisoners.
However, the bureaucracy and the security services were left essentially unaffected.
That is, the early reforms concerned the outward aspect of the state but not its internal
workings. King Hassan II, ever the deft puppet master, allowed more actors into the
governance system. But he had no desire to have it crash, becoming Morocco’s
Honecker in the process.2 This did not happen. Hassan II died in 1999, after which his
eldest son took over as King Mohammed VI.
Under Mohammed VI, the outward aspects of reform, apart from the important new
law governing marriage and the family,3 concerned greater - but not complete - press
freedom and more respect of the rule of law. Its inward aspects have been focused on
decentralization and curbing the power of the security services.4 A tentative coming to
terms with the country’s repressive past and attention to disadvantaged regions have been
the further hallmarks of Morocco’s recent history. The parliamentary election in 2002
resulted in a balance between the social democrats and the conservatives in parliament,
and in a cabinet around Prime Minister Jettou, a non-party politician who announced
that reforms would go ahead.
In short, Morocco seemed to be on the right governance track until 16 May 2003,
when Casablanca became the scene of a series of bombings and attacks perpetrated by a
group of Moroccans calling themselves Salafia Jihadia. Prominent among the targets were
a hotel and a restaurant, both foreign owned.At least thirty three people died.The reac-
tion to the bombings was fierce, both on the part of the security services, which soon
arrested thousands of ‘extremists’, and on the part of civil society, which organized mass
demonstrations against violence.The King visited the scene of the bombings soon after,
and his shaken people rallied around him.
The implications of the bombings for Moroccan politics and administration are still
unclear. The events shattered Morocco’s self-image as a nation coming to terms with
pluralism, under a young, modern King beloved by all.The security services were quick
to capitalize on this opportunity to redeem themselves in the public eye.The bombings
presented opponents of reform with the argument that the changes had gone too far,
because it was the reforms that allowed pockets of extremism to arise in deprived urban
areas.
A sketch of Moroccan politics today shows three ‘movements’: a social-democratic
one, a fundamentalist one, and one close to the Makhzen.These movements are made up
of loose groupings of political parties, civil society organizations, associations for social
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2 Erich Honecker, leader of the German Democratic Republic (‘East Germany’), famously lost
his touch in 1989, greatly accelerating the disintegration of the state and the eventual absorption
of the German Democratic Republic into the Federal Republic of Germany.
3 See the contributions of Van der Velden and Azzine elsewhere in this book.
4 Relieving Driss Bachri, the dreaded Minister of the Interior and public face of the repression,
of his post was the most visible sign of further change.
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work, and in some cases sections of the bureaucracy. Each movement has its own pro-
blems. First, the social-democratic movement lacks legitimacy because it seemed to have
the opportunity to change the political system but failed to do so. Second, the funda-
mentalist movement has the most solid grassroots organizations and a good record of
delivering social services in slum areas, but it now suffers from the insistent image that it
is window dressing for terrorists.5 And third, the Casablanca bombings demonstrated the
Makhzen’s inability to protect its people from harm.This view was compounded by the
authorities’ response to the subsequent earthquake in the north of the country, which
was widely seen as inadequate.
So these days, the three main political movements all have their own particular legiti-
macy problem. Handling extremism is now Morocco’s central political issue. For the
moment, this rules out the broad consensus needed for further reform at national level,
even when this is needed to address the causes of extremism. But what about the impact
and the prospect of reform at local level?
Local government in Morocco: its state of affairs and its politics
The municipal level of administration used to be the least-developed level in French
colonial times. It was firmly under the control of administrators dispatched by the cen-
tral government.At one point in time, these administrators were even called commandant
du cercle, a martial term which says it all: local populations were not supposed to have any
real influence. Rural areas were left to their own devices and were paid only scant atten-
tion by colonial administrators.
As the state started growing in the decades after independence (1956), ministries such
as education and health created local units.The officials that head them are called délé-
gués. This was a form of de-concentration of the state, with the délégués answering to the
centre and receiving their funds from it. Municipal councils, which elect a president who
serves as the mayor, have been in place since the 1960s.6 But they had little influence on
the délégués. And everyone in local politics and local administration, including délégués
and mayors, was very much subordinate to the wali, the administrative head of the
region, chief representative of central government and governor of the forces of law and
order.
The essence of the system of central control survived until the period of reforms,
when decentralization hit home in two important respects. In the first place, a revised
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5 Much like Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland or Fatah in Palestine.To the dismay of Moroccan par-
ties like the PJD (Parti de la Justice et du Développement), which calls itself moderate and peaceful,
others hint that its participation in the political system is little more than a cynical front while
other parts of the fundamentalist movement plot more violence.
6 As always in Morocco, the rural areas were given their governance structures later than their
urban counterparts. Essentials such as the civil registry, the tax registry, and some services have
been introduced to rural areas since independence, but rural communes are still markedly diffe-
rent from urban municipalities to this day.There are now about 1,500 communes, urban and
rural taken together, spread over sixteen regions and thirty nine provinces. Casablanca, Morocco’s
largest city, has its own special structure.
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local government law gave municipalities competencies in policy areas such as services,
waste and the environment, culture and sports, and town planning.The boundaries of
these areas are still fuzzy, but it is now clearly up to the local councils to draw up the
budget for some of these policy areas. The Ministry of the Interior has to check and
approve the budget.When executing the budget, there are autonomous policy areas –
these tend to be the less glamorous ones – and other policy areas where councils have
to work together with délégués or the regional bureaucracy of the wali.
In the second place, 2003 saw the first local council elections based on a party list
system rather than an electoral district system.That is, in 2003 people from all over town
voted for parties which in turn occupied the seats on the council. Before, the people of
an electoral district – a neighbourhood – voted for individual candidates to occupy that
particular district’s seat on the council. It is important to detail the ramifications of this
change in the system.
Before decentralization, local politics worked more or less as follows. Citizens had an
interest in voting for the ‘big man’ of the neighbourhood, in the hope that he would
bring home benefits in the form of jobs, services, and public infrastructure.These favours
needed to be extracted from the centre, to the disadvantage of other neighbourhoods.
The system resulted in inefficient allocation of resources and reinforced patronage.7 The
deal in the electoral district system was attractive to both sides: with a unanimous block
of support, the citizens of a neighbourhood would have a better chance of obtaining
benefits, while the big man stood a chance of being propelled into national politics if he
delivered the block of votes at parliamentary elections.
The new system of the 2003 municipal elections did not, of course, rid local politics
of patronage overnight. But there has been a noticeable change in incentives. Local poli-
ticians now have an incentive to consider the interests of the town as a whole. If they
want votes, local party branches have to come up with programme content, giving citi-
zens more choice.This may in fact be the first time that party affiliation has really star-
ted to matter at local level. New themes such as town planning and youth policy have
made their entrance, now that the relentless grind of bringing benefits to electoral
districts has abated.
Local governments have yet to establish their position in the political and administra-
tive landscape of Morocco, and there is still an ingrained habit of waiting for orders from
above. But the reforms have had a significant impact at local level, in terms of new com-
petencies for municipalities and altered incentives for local politicians.The next section
of this chapter is about the changes that this has brought about.
Local government in Morocco: trends
In the context of reform, the following trends or phenomena can be observed at local
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7 By the end of the 1990s, the demand for drugs had soared in some parts of Europe and culti-
vation in Morocco intensified. It became an uncomfortably common phenomenon that families
with an interest in the drug trade had members on local councils, much to the dismay of
European countries.
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level. Because the reforms are so recent, it is still impossible to say whether these transi-
tions will stand the test of time. Nor does this chapter seek to claim that they are occur-
ring everywhere in Morocco.8
In the first place, local civil society is taking over local councils. Many people who ran
non-governmental organizations (NGOs)9 critical of the state have been elected coun-
cillor.This background and the fact that local councils have yet to become an undispu-
table feature of the political and administrative landscape makes local government a place
where much criticism of central government can be heard.
But what about local government and fundamentalist parties? Is it not the case that
such parties emerge directly from civil society, with strong grassroots associations? Are
they taking over? These questions are often raised in the West and are tinged with
awkwardness. In fact, the number of local council seats occupied by the moderately fun-
damentalist Parti de la Justice et du Développement (PJD) and the like is nowhere very large.
This forces fundamentalist parties to forge local coalitions, thereby tempering any extre-
me standpoints they might have.There are persistent rumours that fundamentalist par-
ties could have won more seats in 2003 but chose to limit the number of candidates fiel-
ded, due to pressure from the Makhzen. It is impossible to know what really happened.
It is clear, however, that both the fundamentalist parties and the Makhzen have an inte-
rest in cultivating this story: the fundamentalists because it implies they are more impor-
tant than they would otherwise seem, and the Makhzen because it reinforces the belief
in its power.
The second trend which can be observed is a weakening of party affiliations, especi-
ally in Morocco’s peripheral areas. Local politics often offers a similar general picture to
national politics: it is divided between a social-democrat, fundamentalist and Makhzen-
related movement. But there is also ample evidence of conflicts between local party
branches and central party organizations. New local parties are established as a result, or
the local party branch ends up openly disagreeing with central office. Even the PJD,
famous for its discipline and social networks in local communities, suffers from this.The
weakening of party affiliations may seem to contradict the conclusion above that parties
are starting to matter at local level. But it is quite possible to distrust central party struc-
tures while adhering to local party branches. Morocco has a long tradition of distrust of
the centre.
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8 The Moroccan municipalities involved in the Platform for Intermunicipal Cooperation bet-
ween the Netherlands and Morocco, of which the author is the secretary, are: Maârif (part of
Casablanca), Sisi Maarouf (part of Casablanca), Ben Msik (part of Casablanca),Al Alaroui, Zaio,
Figuig, Nador, Oujda, Larache,Assilah, Guercif, Jerada,Al Hoceima, Imzourene,Tetouan, Midar,
and Berkane.
9 Contrary to widespread use of the term in Morocco, the definition of civil society used in this
paper stresses that merely being non-governmental - not being part of the state - is not enough.
After all, football clubs and bakeries are also non-governmental. Civil society organizations need
to be active in the political landscape and critical of the state to be worthy of the name: to moni-
tor, criticize or take action against the state, or to publish on such issues.This sort of definition
has been pioneered by the Indian academic Neera Chandoke.
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Local parties are also criticizing their own central organizations because of the third
observed trend.This is a nascent administrative culture of negotiation and compromise.
To get things done, local governments have to engage in deals with the state, represen-
ted by the walis of the Ministry of the Interior and the délégués of the line ministries.The
positive side to this is a modest switch away from the old habit of waiting for orders.The
problematic side is that local populations can be profoundly intolerant of compromise
with the state, especially if the local government in question is composed of old civil
society hands of Berber origin. Compromise with the state gets things done, but also
makes one vulnerable.The strategy of criticizing the state in such circumstances helps to
mask the underlying process of negotiation and compromise.
The fourth observed trend is that local governments are increasingly engaging with
local NGOs for service delivery, especially for implementation of social policy. This is
hardly surprising, since many of today’s councillors come from an NGO background.
Local governments in Morocco these days are wondering how to contract with NGOs,
whether the Ministry of the Interior will allow greatly expanded budget lines for local
NGOs, what sort of NGO influence to allow over local government policy, and how to
organize participation generally. Most of this is purely local stuff, which again flags a
move away from waiting for orders from above.
The fifth and last observed trend is the politicization of local media.As local govern-
ments are given the power to spend more money as a result of decentralization, the
media have taken an interest and now have the courage to report on a wider range of
issues, regardless of the consequences.This is a sign that real politics has finally arrived
on the local scene. However, the media sometimes seem less interested in reporting facts,
and challenging local governments to come up with different facts, thereby holding
them to account, than in speculation about power struggles, allegations of corruption, or
rumours of involvement in the drug trade. While it is certainly true that some of the
scandals are outrageous and some of the allegations are founded, this type of politiciza-
tion of local media makes life hard for local governments in an awkward and counter-
productive way: it puts local governments in the dock of public opinion, and it distracts
councillors and officials from their tasks.
Conclusion
This short overview of recent trends is certainly far from complete and probably fails to
take into account the great regional differences in Morocco. Nevertheless, it does allow
us to draw a number of conclusions. The most significant conclusion is probably that
when reforms were stopped in their tracks at national level, they continued unabated at
local level. It is also fair to say that a genuine transition is taking place from local admi-
nistration by the centre to local government. Decentralization has resulted in local poli-
tical scenes, which are drifting away from national politics and taking on their own cha-
racteristics. This does not automatically mean better local government, but it has cer-
tainly resulted in more pluriform local government. It marks the impact of decentrali-
zation, cementing Morocco’s reputation as one of the trailblazers of change in the
Muslim world.
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Whether this transition is irreversible is too early to tell.The scandals and media pres-
sure could be used as a pretext for placing local governments under stricter central con-
trol again. A take-over of councils by fundamentalist parties at the next elections could
have the same effect. Public statements by King Mohamed VI, however, indicate that
decentralization is here to stay. So local governments will likely see a second electoral
cycle in accordance with the new system. In the end it will come down to delivering
real services to citizens, both with regard to local politics - allegations and negations -
and national politics - the merits and risks of decentralization. Hopefully local govern-
ments in Morocco will soon be in a position to present a reasonably consistent record
of delivering real services to the population, irrespective of the political colour of the
majority.
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Mustapha El Qadéry 
Abdelkrim and the struggle for the past
Introduction
In Morocco today we see a territorial organization of state power and governance that
derives from a French Jacobean and colonial model.This offers us a standpoint for dis-
cussing social and political changes and recent events in the Rifian north or the Saharan
south.
The present Kingdom of Morocco is the result of five systems of colonization under
the regime of the Protectorate.The city of Tangier was once administered by a council
of representatives of European states, as part of the International Zone. The north of
Morocco was ruled by Spain, with Tetuan as its capital.The centre of Morocco down to
the Sahara was under French rule, with Rabat as its capital.This French zone included
the enclave of Ifni and the Aït Baamrane tribal area, which were under Spanish rule. In
the south of the French Saharan zone, the Seguia Lhamra and Rio d’Oro were also
under Spanish rule.All of these territories had been seized by military force. Hostilities
in the north ended in 1927, following the defeat of Abdelkrim. In the French zone, figh-
ting stopped in 1934 with the conquest of the entire mountain area and the Sahara as
far as Tindouf (which is in modern-day Algeria). In the south, Spain conquered Aït
Baamrane in 1932 and Smara in 1934.
The Sultan signed the Protectorate treaty with a French emissary in May 1912. In
November 1912, as a result of the congress of Algeciras in Spain in 1906, France signed
a convention with Spain on the repartition of Moroccan territory between the two con-
quering nations.This decision was taken after all of the European powers had agreed in
principle, in the presence of a delegation from the Sultan of Morocco, regarding the con-
quest of Morocco by France. Moroccan territory was then ruled by two powers, with
different regimes of governance and different relations with the conquered tribal terri-
tories.
The case of Bin Abdelkrim – or Mmis n Abdkrim as he is known in the Tamazight
spoken in the Rif area1 – provides us with an example of ‘symbol recuperation’. Stories
about a leader’s life and death can be seen as the result of ideological actions by various
groups.The Moroccan socialist movement and the Moroccan Amazigh Movement dif-
fer in their interpretations of the historical significance of Abdelkrim.
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1 The real name of the so-called ‘Berber’ language is ‘Tamazight’.The Tamazight expression 
mmis n means ‘son of ’ like the Arabic and Hebrew bin (or ben).The full name of the Rif-leader
was Mohammed ben Abd al-Krim al-Khattabi.As a shortened form ‘Bin Abdelkrim’ or just
‘Abdelkrim’ is often to be found, which in spoken Tamazight became ‘Abdkrim’.
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Bin Abdelkrim and symbolism
In 1973, the socialist leader and later Prime Minister Abderrahman Youssoufi organized
a colloquium in Paris. Several Morocco specialists were invited to talk about Abdelkrim
(1882-1963) and the Rif Republic (1921-1926).2 The objective of this colloquium was
to present Abdelkrim as a ‘testator’ for the spirit of the party’s future plans.The Rif expe-
rience was presented as a frame of reference for the continuation of the struggle against
colonialism, as well as so-called neo-colonialism and its agents in Morocco. The
Moroccan left represented Bin Abdelkrim as an ‘internationalist leader’ of ‘popular strug-
gle’ acknowledged by guerrilla leaders around the world.
This event occurred at a time when the violent wing of that same socialist party sent
an armed commando from Algeria to the Moroccan Eastern High and Middle Atlas
mountains in March 1973, three months after the Paris colloquium. It was hoped that
tribal solidarity among all ‘Berbers’ would launch guerrilla attacks and make armed fora-
ys from the mountains to the coastal cities.The commando had selected a region close
to the Algerian border in the hope of gaining the support of local tribes. In this region,
the Party had at its disposal some remaining networks of the former Liberation Army
organization. It is worth noting that, with the exception of their chief, who was from
Rabat, the members of the commando were all from ‘Berber’ regions and tribes.Their
chief was the brother-in-law of the socialist leader Mehdi Bin Barka.3
The events of March 1973 took place under the auspices of a tentative attempt by the
‘left’ to seize power by violence.This followed two coups d’états against the king in 1971-
1972, in which the principal protagonists4 were a group of officers from the Rif and
Middle Atlas mountains who were described as ‘Berber’.5 It is also worth noting that the
regions in which this left-wing commando operated were subjected to a collective
regional punishment after this adventure. Following the intervention of state forces and
the destruction of the commando, various alleged collaborators were arrested. Public
declarations to this effect have recently been made in the Tamazight language, by tribes-
men and tribeswomen from these regions. These declarations were made before the
‘Equity and Reconciliation Authority’, which was created by the King in 2004, to cla-
rify the circumstances of human rights violations in the period from 1959 to 1999.
Another point worth noting is that the socialist party considered itself to be part of the
Arabo-Islamic movement which had fought for an ‘authentic’ Morocco, one which was
part of the Arab nation.
The Amazigh Movement today prefers to see Abdelkrim as a central and iconic figu-
re in the history of the country. This is because he embodied the Rif struggle against
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2 In 1921 the Spanish army was defeated by a confederation of tribes in the Rif region. On
February 1 1923 Abdelkrim proclaimed the Rif republic. In his contacts with Britain and
Germany he emphasized that the new Republic would have not only a government and a flag
and its own money, but also a constitution and a modern system of law. Pennell (1986) and
Abdelkrim et la République du Rif (1976).
3 Bennouna (2003).
4 Coram (1972).
5 Coram (1972).
opm marokko 3  20-06-2006  15:14  Pagina 81
European conquests, while the Sultan on the other hand had signed the Protectorate tre-
aty, thereby accepting foreign domination. Seeing Abdkrim as mmis n tmurt (‘son of the
country’), the Amazigh Movement takes the view that, in addition to being the leader
of the Rif Republic (1921-1926), he was the de facto leader of the National Liberation
Army (1955). Under the leadership of operations chief,Abbas Msaadi, and based in the
northern Spanish Zone, this organization launched military strikes against French out-
posts.6 Before initiating operations in the Rif, Msaadi had obtained the blessings and
backing of Abdelkrim, who was in Cairo at that time. Abdelkrim believed that there
should be a union of North African countries, as a matter of necessity. He considered
joint military actions with the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN), seeing this as
a way of liberating of those still living under the yoke of colonization. In fact, he had no
ambition whatsoever to become the leader of a worldwide international socialist strug-
gle.While in exile in Cairo, he maintained close relations with the leaders of the rene-
wed Rifian revolt, in 1958-59, against the new system of government in the ‘indepen-
dent’ and ‘unified’ Morocco.
For the Amazigh Movement, the story of Mmis n Abdkrim is a heritage that has been
passed down by word of mouth. This oral transmission takes the form of poetic verse
which relates past events to more recent ones.The struggle at the time of the colonial
and postcolonial conquests remains alive today in the collective memory. It has been
augmented with local versions of events that took place both during and after the Rif
War. One poem in particular is so well known that everyone can quote parts of it.These
verses portray a period covering the battle against the Spanish army in Dhar Ubarran
(1921) but also the events in Asgwas Iqbbaren, where the Moroccan Army invaded the
Rif, in 1958-59.They also refer to the tragic earthquake of 2004-2005 and the protests
against the way in which the state managed its social repercussions. No-one is sure how
many verses this poem actually contains.
As in the Odyssey, details of the tragedies and heroism of past actors are chanted in a
social language which makes particular use of local cultural references.The poem des-
cribes the great suffering endured by the tribesmen and convey brutal images of the
death and destruction.The situation in the region around Al Hoceima after the recent
earthquake is perceived in the same light.
Even today, the position of the Rif within the state is still a complex issue.This is a
result of the state system devised by Morocco, when organizing its institutions of gover-
nance. It is worth noting that the Sahara region in the south has a similarly complex
position within the state system. Both regions were formerly part of the Spanish
Protectorate. Given that the Spanish zones were absorbed by the French zone in the
name of unity and unification, the similarity of their current situation is hardly surpri-
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movement to start armed guerrilla warfare, in collaboration with the Algerian National
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sing.The repercussions can still be seen in numerous collective confrontations in these
regions today.
Modernity and tradition and the Imazighen: the case of the Rif
In 1930, the French promulgated a decree that the shari‘a should not be enforced among
the ‘Berber’ populations of Morocco. Instead, their own customary laws were to apply,
the so-called dahir berbère.Those who considered themselves Arabs, Muslims or Arabo-
Muslims, accused the Amazigh Movement in the Rif of attempting to reformulate this
French dahir berbère. This seems rather odd, since the Rif area was part of the Spanish
Protectorate at the time, and was therefore unaffected by the laws within the French
zone of the Moroccan Empire. In the nineteen thirties, ‘nationalists’ declared that this
dahir berbère represented the birth of their movement.Today, their political heirs consider
all movements that do not adhere to the Arabo-Islamic ideology as creations of coloni-
alism, and as instruments of neo-colonialism against Arabo-Islamic nations.
The Rif region offers us an interesting opportunity to discuss the question of notions
of ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’ in the Moroccan context, with particular reference to the
history of issues relating to power, the state, and culture, as well as intellectual matters.
What is meant by ‘tradition’ in Morocco? And what is ‘modernity’? For a long time, the
two concepts were seen as total opposites.These are universal paradigms, however, and
the Moroccan view of them is by no means unique.The materials and arguments used
by ‘modernists’ and ‘traditionalists’ are no different from those seen elsewhere in the
world.
The experience of the Rif Republic can be presented as the result of applying a
‘modern’ concept of power structures to the north of Morocco. However, anyone taking
this view may well be jumping to conclusions. Before launching hostilities against the
Spanish army, Bin Abdelkrim’s first act was to organize a congress at Adrar n Qamt, in
the Tamsaman tribal area.A general convocation of the tribes, to agree on specific mat-
ters, is a tradition found in all great Moroccan political movements. Recently published
documents give us some idea of the context within which tribal confederation has con-
tinued to grow throughout Moroccan history.7
Indeed, some tribal confederations concentrated power over a very large territory.This
applied to certain dynasties during the Islamic period, from the Almoravids in the tenth
century to the Dila dynasty in the sixteenth century.The same is true of the present-day
Alawites, from the seventeenth century onwards. Other tribal confederations had a much
more restricted power zone.These include Aït Yaflman in the seventeenth century or Aït
Umalou in the nineteenth century, in the centre of Morocco. Other examples are Aït
Atta in the sixteenth century, the Taguzult, from the eleventh to the twentieth century,
and the Tekna from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, in the south.These attempts
at confederation provide points of reference that are essential for an understanding of the
country’s political and territorial history. Similar attempts are still very much in eviden-
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ce today. Mmis n Abdkrim therefore used the traditional system of tribal confederation
as a vector of a modern system of governance.This reflected events in other countries,
especially Mustapaha Kemal’s new Turkish Republic.
Robert Montagne, a leading ethnologist, dealt with various issues affecting the
‘Berbers’. He worked for the French Residency, and was based in Rabat. Sent on a mis-
sion by Lyautey, Montagne found himself in close contact with Abdkrim. In his last
book, while preparing to be discharged from the French Army, Montagne accurately
portrayed the man and made his mea culpa concerning French colonial practices in
Morocco.8 Montagne worked within the tribal context, trying to understand the Berber
life, which involved ‘legitimate violence’ within a ‘Republican’ system.9 He also worked
with the Berbers in Casablanca, trying to understand the changes occurring within the
urban proletariat at the end of the 1940s and 1950s.10 Having joined the struggle for
Moroccan independence, this proletariat demonstrated its readiness for political action
by organizing armed resistance in Casablanca and by setting up the National Liberation
Army in the northern Spanish zone.
Robert Montagne certainly enjoyed considerable influence during the colonial peri-
od. In a chapter entitled ‘Trois Hommes’11, he accorded a pre-eminent position to
Lyautey, the conqueror of Morocco and the first French Resident. Montagne reserved
the second place for Abdelkrim in his Rif and Cairo periods, and the third place for
Sultan Mohammed Bin Yousef, who became King Mohammed V, following indepen-
dence. Montagne refers to Abdkrim as a figure representing archaic tribalism. He takes
the view that Abdkrim never had a chance of victory against the two colonial powers,
France and Spain, nor of being recognised by them as an independent power.
Furthermore, as a tribesman, he would never have been totally accepted by the new
Moroccan nationalists in Cairo, who were creating a new logic of identity.This image of
Abdelkrim can be seen as a ‘condemnation’ of his modernist project. However, it can also
be viewed as a recognition of the fact that his concept of the tribe as a real political force
is still in operation today.
Needless to say, the tribe is projected by Montagne as a static notion in a classical anth-
ropological sense.This is the way he used it in his first published thesis on tribes in the
south, as a static alliance and individual groups.12 An alternative and more realistic appro-
ach would be to see the tribe instead as dynamic, as an element representing a political
attitude in a territorial arena. It is important to be aware of the fact that, like tribes, all
political groupings and parties have their own territories, social roots, political alliances,
interests, leaders and strategies.
During the period of the Republic, Mmis n Abdkrim abolished all ‘customary laws’
in the Rif.The context of this decision was his attempt to achieve a concentration of
power. Does this make him a modernist? Probably not. In fact, Mmis n Abdkrim him-
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self later expressed regret at having abolished the customary laws during the period of
the Republic. This was revealed in a paper by Attilio Gaudio, an Italian journalist and
specialist in Moroccan nationalism. Gaudio’s paper, which was entitled ‘J’ai bu le thé avec
Abdelkrim’13, was based on an interview with Abdelkrim in Cairo (1953). How should
we interpret this contradiction? Perhaps the emergence of the Rifian Republic as an
experiment in Islamic puritanism could have been predicted, given that its objective at
the time was to obtain legitimacy in the eyes of other tribes and regional powers, or at
least their support.
In the past, political movements attempting to gain power or achieve independence
have resorted to declaring a jihad against heretics or Christians as a source of legitimacy
and a means of gaining tribal loyalty.The abolition of customary law can only be pro-
perly understood within the context of the struggle against foreign, non-Muslim con-
querors. In trying to consolidate his power and authority, Mmis n Abdkrim needed to
demonstrate that he monopolized the use of legitimate violence and the management
of public affairs within the Republic. By eliminating competing powers such as the
Raïsouli and the Darkawi Zawya on the western and southern slopes of the Rif
Mountains of Jbala, he won the right to be the sole leader of all the tribes. This may
explain why tribes under French authority offered their loyalty to Abdelkrim and accep-
ted him as a chief, thereby causing the French to take up arms against him. His attempts
to consolidate his power base and to unite the tribes under his command, by abolishing
customary law, should be seen in the light of his need to eliminate any potential com-
petition from local powers.
An ethnographic study of tribal laws in the Rif, including the texts of laws, judiciary
procedures and sanctions, which was carried out by a Spanish officer, has recently been
published by David M. Hart14.This remains, for the moment, the only published study
in this field.There is a need for further investigations, and for the publication of much
more historical material. We still have too few details concerning the historical events
that influenced the development of the judiciary system, and about the legitimate local
violence used by elected groups before and after the period of the Republic.
The French Jacobean system considered Moroccan and North African tribal positive
law to be customary, in a strictly judiciary sense. Following independence, the post-colo-
nial leaders and intellectuals, like the state structures and the system of government, felt
that it was unqualified to be source of law for the judicial system of independent
Morocco. How can independence mean anything for the people of the Rif, or for any
Amazighs in Morocco, when the new power’s agenda takes no account of the way of
organizing local and public affairs that is their heritage?  
The struggle for Morocco’s past and the Imazighen 
In his first published work on Morocco and the collective tribal system of managing reli-
gious and secular issues, Ernest Gellner devoted a whole chapter to ‘nationalists’ and ‘the
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struggle for Morocco’s past’.15 He later published another paper under this title, contai-
ning an analysis of what he meant by this stage of the ‘struggle’ in the Moroccan politi-
cal context just after independence16, together with substantial information on this topic.
In both publications, Gellner refers to two books published immediately after indepen-
dence by two intellectuals affiliated to the Moroccan ‘nationalist’ movement. At that
time, this movement was divided along political lines into so-called ‘modernists’ and ‘tra-
ditionalists’. Each group presented itself as the principal actor of the political indepen-
dence movement.17
The first book was prefaced by Allal el Fassi, the leader of the ‘traditionalist’ wing of
the dominant Istiqlal Party.The second was prefaced by Mehdi Bin Barka, the leader of
‘modernist’ and ‘progressive’ wing of the Istiqlal Party. In 1958, the latter became the
Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP).Another transformation, in 1975, produced
the present Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP). For Gellner, the writing of these
prefaces by two political leaders was a part of the struggle for the Moroccan past, a past
which had previously only been documented in colonial studies.
What Gellner failed to appreciate was that the nationalists on both wings essentially
wanted to redefine the ‘crucial’ position of the ‘Berbers’ within the building of a
Moroccan ‘Arabo-Islamic’ national state.They saw the ‘Berbers’ as a group that had been
the object of French policy.They felt that the French had ignored the fact that it was
Arabo-Islamic culture that had brought civilization to the Berbers.This culture was the
fruit of the intellectual efforts of Arab and Andalusian thinkers, jurisprudence and theo-
logical reasoning. It spanned all material and immaterial aspects of Moroccan civilization
during the Islamic period.Therefore both books can be seen as a translation of the views
of many French Orientalists, who drew no distinction between Muslims and Arabs, and
who classified all manuscripts in Arabic as Arab intellectual production. They saw the
Maghreb as a consumer of thought elaborated by civilized Muslim Arab intellectuals. By
the same token, they considered the ‘Berbers’ to be a barbaric people, less Muslim in faith
than the Arabs who were seen as the civilized producers of high culture!18
It is important to remember that the ‘nationalist’ movement believed that its origins
lay in a struggle against the ‘French Berber policy’ in Morocco. By means of the dahir
berbère, the Berber Decree, the Protectorate had promulgated the customary law for
‘Berber’ tribes as a replacement for shari‘a.19 The nationalists represented this dahir as an
attempt to divide ‘Berbers’ from their ‘Arab brothers’.They saw it as a kind of rebirth of
traditions that were heretical to Islam and as an attempt to push the ‘Berbers’ into embra-
cing Christianity. In fact, traditional forms of jurisdiction had always remained impor-
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following independence.
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tant among Muslims living in the mountainous regions of Morocco.
Today, researchers are increasingly viewing this interpretation of the so-called ‘dahir
berbère’ as an imposture, nothing more than a ‘nationalist’ creation directed against the
‘Berbers’ and their secular institutions.20 Once again, we should not lose sight of the fact
that the ‘Berber-decree’ was issued by France, for its own political and colonial purpo-
ses. This was at a time when some ‘Berber tribes’ were fighting against the ‘French
Colonial Makhzen’, the new conquering power.The story of the dahir berbère is of fun-
damental importance. Until the year 2000, all Moroccan newspapers celebrated this as a
‘national’ memorial event, one that should be seen as pivotal to the struggle against colo-
nialism, by ‘Moroccans’.
Since this ‘nationalist’ interpretation of the ‘Berber-decree’ emerged, any reference to
the ‘Berbers’ was seen as heretical and rebellious, and as an instrument of colonialism,
separatism, regionalism and division. Accordingly, from 1930 on, there was a conscious
effort to cultivate a negative image of the ‘Berbers’.This involved memorial rituals, like
the one mentioned above, undertaken by the mass media and incorporated into the cur-
ricula of schools and universities.21 Tamazight and Imazighen came to be seen as barba-
rous, and as folkloric commodities for tourist attractions, certainly not as a patrimony or
cultural legacy for the future of the country.
The remarkable thing about the dahir berbère, therefore, is that the Moroccan nationa-
list movement identifies the birth of its legitimacy with the struggle against the ‘Berber
policy’ (and, de facto, against all things ‘Berber’) rather than against the ‘colonial policy’
as such.The Moroccan intellectual market offers an abundance of literature for the study
of this construction in connection with various ‘modern’ as well as ‘traditional’ ideolo-
gies.Written mainly in Arabic and French, these are the works of political leaders and
writers. During the period in which the ‘Arabo-Islamic’ views of society and nation
were in the ascendant, all intellectually and politically dominant leaders exploited the
theme of the dahir berbère for their own purposes. They essentially reduced the entire
colonial period to that single event and its consequences. In this way, the Amazigh move-
ment was reduced to a mere phantom. Despite the fact that Tamazight-speaking peop-
les had been the fiercest and most tenacious adversaries of French colonialism, the move-
ment’s roots came to be defined as a residue of French Berber policy, encouraging eth-
nic division, promoting racism and reinforcing separatism.
Conclusion 
Today Mmis n Abdkrim’s remains still lie in Egypt, and the Rif region is still caught up
in various ‘struggles’ against nature and the Moroccan system, in a symbolic as well as a
political sense. Emigration is still the only way out to achieve social mobility. The
Amazigh movement is increasingly insisting on its right to reclaim a place in the memo-
ry and the real history of the country. At the center of these demands, of course, is the
name of Mmis n Abdkrim. Other regions of the former Spanish zone are still engaged
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in a ‘struggle’ for autonomy (Sahara) or for a change of administrative status (Sidi Ifni).
Fifty years after independence, we still find analogous elements in the struggle between
the post-1956 concept that governed the building of the national state and the questions
currently being posed by the Amazigh movement. For the last fifty years, the ‘Arabo-
Islamist’ view of the world has been the official ideology throughout the educational
system.The triumph of ‘Arabo-Islamist’ ideology in Morocco can be seen in the results
of modern-day public policy. Half the population of Morocco are still illiterate. Poor
socio-economic conditions still prevail in the rural areas.The periphery is still seen as a
danger to the centre.
The Spanish and French colonial past must be seen as a period in which Moroccans
became an indigenous people at the service of foreign powers and states, which colla-
borated with an indigenous elite and its economic interests. Independence transformed
the indigenous peoples into nationals within a strict new colonial vision, one in which
the nation is seen as being at the service of the state and those in command.That was
the beginning of a new system of relations between the centre of the state and all peri-
pheral regions, between Morocco and Moroccans.This period was marked by various
‘events’ in some ‘peripheral’ regions, in the former French or Spanish zones.There was
the revolt of Addi U-Bihi, the Governor of the south-eastern region of Tafilalet (1957),
the Sellam Amzian revolt in the northern Rif (1958-59), the Middle Atlas (socialist)
commando in the central region (1973), and the Saharan guerrilla war in the south
(1975). The motivations underpinning all of these events are analogous. They clearly
demonstrate the attitude of the independent national power and the nature of the poli-
tical and territorial system used to organize regions with an identity and history of their
own, and a new set of problems. These movements can be seen as forms of resistance
against the nationalist Jacobean conception of the Moroccan independent state.
A better understanding of its past and of its history may be the key to a better future
for Morocco.That is one way to build the foundations of national cohesion, in the sense
of Gellner’s view of nations.22 There can be no clear understanding of Morocco’s histo-
ry without due recognition of the all-pervasive role of Amazigh values and organizatio-
nal forms within Moroccan institutions.
22 Gellner (1993) 29-46.
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Hans Visser
Morocco and the European Union: 
the economics of association
Introduction
On 26 February 1996, Morocco and the European Union (hereafter referred to asthe EU) signed an Association Agreement.This association forms part of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, which was established at Barcelona on 27-28 November 1995,
at a meeting between the EU and the majority of the non-European Mediterranean
countries. It is known in Euro-speak as the ‘Barcelona Process’.The agreement, which
came into effect on 1 March 2000, should lead to the creation of a free-trade area by the
year 2010.This will give Morocco free access to EU markets, at least as far as industrial
products are concerned.The agreement also aims to achieve the progressive liberaliza-
tion of trade in agricultural and fishery products, but without any firm commitment by
the parties concerned. It also requires Morocco and the EU to explore ways of liberali-
zing trade in services, above and beyond their WTO (World Trade Organization) obli-
gations.
What benefits can Morocco expect from this association? In order to answer this
question, we will start with some background information on international trade theo-
ry, with an application to Morocco’s trading situation.We will then proceed to discuss
the process of trade liberalization.This, in turn, is followed by an analysis of the problems
associated with Morocco’s economic integration with other countries.The next section
deals with the costs and benefits deriving from the Association, and from a higher degree
of integration in the world economy in general. From here we move on to examine the
preconditions that must be fulfilled if this integration is to be successful.The final secti-
on draws conclusions on the basis of the discussions and empirical data contained in the
preceding sections.
International trade
The positive effects of international trade can be said to derive from three sources.
Firstly, specialization dictated by comparative advantage. If countries, like individuals,
specialize in those activities at which they excel, or are most efficient, then production
and income will be maximized.This is explained by the Ricardo and Heckscher-Ohlin
models, which form the core of international trade theory.1 Secondly, economies of
scale. Free trade provides opportunities for large-scale production, as well as the chance
to exploit the economies of large-scale production, i.e., to reduce the production and
marketing costs per product unit.Thirdly, competition effects.When borders are open-
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ed, competition increases. This means that firms will have to constantly improve the
goods and services they produce, to prevent their customers from shifting their allegian-
ce.The same applies to these companies’ production technology and marketing methods.
In view of these benefits, why is there no free trade on a global scale? There are basi-
cally three reasons for this. Firstly, trade affects the distribution of income. If we liberali-
ze trade and import more goods produced using unskilled labour, while at the same time
exporting more goods produced with highly skilled labour, this will have several effects.
The demand for poorly-skilled labour falls, the demand for highly-skilled labour incre-
ases, and the wage gap between the two will widen.This may then result in attempts by
trade unions to prevent trade liberalization.
Secondly, when a country liberalizes trade, industries competing with the imported
goods will suffer.This will cause some firms and industries to contract, while others may
even disappear completely. People will have to be retrained.There may be an anxiety that
new jobs are not being created fast enough to compensate for the disappearance of the
old ones.Again, those affected will resist liberalization.A very curious case of resistance
against freer imports occurred in the mid-1990s, when tomatoes from Morocco were
granted freer entry into the EU. Fully aware that this would impinge on their profit mar-
gins, tomato growers in the EU conducted a successful lobbying campaign in Brussels.
It was subsequently ruled that, in the month of April, the door would be closed to
Moroccan tomatoes2.The reason for this was that, in April, EU tomato production is low
and prices are high.The ban on Moroccan tomatoes enabled EU tomato growers to flee-
ce the consumer in times of scarcity.
Thirdly, trade restrictions in the form of import tariffs also serve an entirely different
purpose, the generation of tax revenue.The perception costs of import tariffs are likely
to be substantially lower than those associated with income tax or a turnover tax. Poor
countries in particular, including Morocco in the early 1980s, often derive some thirty
per cent of their total tax income from import tariffs.3
There is no question that international trade is essential to Morocco’s welfare. It has a
comparative advantage in phosphates, a number of agricultural products, and the simpler
kinds of industrial processes, such as garment manufacture and electronics assembly.
Morocco’s export revenue derives mainly from these products and activities (see Table
1). It is better to specialize in these areas and import those industrial products that requi-
re highly skilled labour and a large amount of capital and/or are dependent on high
volumes for efficient production. A case in point is truck assembly. In the year 2000,
some two thousand trucks were assembled in Morocco by no less than nine producers.
This is a waste of resources.4
It serves as a reminder that Morocco is a relatively small market. In 2003, Morocco
had 30.6 million inhabitants and its gross domestic product or GDP amounted to €39
billion (bn). By comparison, the Netherlands had 16.2 million inhabitants and a GDP of
2 Trouw (1995).
3 Ebrill, Stotsky and Gropp (1999).
4 WTO (2003) 85.
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$454 bn. For most industries, the domestic market is simply too small for them to be
able to exploit economies of scale.Trade liberalization is of the essence. Products which
are expensive to produce in Morocco should be imported.This will free up production
factors that can be used to better advantage in the export industries.
Table 1. Morocco, percentage share of commodity exports, 1995 and 2002
1995 2002
textiles 31 40
agriculture 32 20
electronics 3 17
fertilizer (phosphates) 9 3
Source: Söderling (2005).
The EU is the country’s natural partner when it comes to international trade. In 2003,
the EU accounted for no less than 71% of Morocco’s exports and 58% of its imports.5
It is a sad fact that the EU has not allowed Morocco to fully exploit its comparative
advantage. Under the Association Agreement, industrial imports from Morocco have
unrestricted entry into the EU, but there has been little progress on trade in agricultu-
ral goods.The trade agreement of October 2003 imposed tariff quotas on a number of
products, such as tomatoes.This means that imports carry a low tariff, possibly even a
zero tariff, up to a certain volume.Additional imports are subject to a higher tariff.
Such agreements are only concluded for short periods.This uncertainty does little to
stimulate investment. A fisheries agreement, for example, which was due to take effect
on 1 March 2006, is only valid for a period of four years.The agreement regulates the
activities of EU fishing fleets – mainly Spanish and Portuguese – in Moroccan waters. It
contains detailed stipulations regarding the percentage of the catch that has to be unlo-
aded on Moroccan soil.This was in response to Moroccan demands, which were aimed
at boosting employment and tax income. In addition, it was hoped that the measure
would stimulate the development of local fish processing industries.6 However, it remains
to be seen whether or not people will be willing to make substantial investments on the
basis of an agreement with a lifetime of just four years.As for services, prior to 2005 the
EU had not even started to think seriously about discussing the subject.
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6 L’économiste (17 July 2005, 23 December 2005).
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Trade liberalization
The import of Moroccan industrial products into the EU had already been liberalized
before the 2000 Association Agreement was concluded. So one might well ask ‘What is
in it for Morocco?’After all, Morocco will bear the brunt of the necessary adjustments.
It is under an obligation to liberalize its imports, especially those involving industrial
products. Nevertheless, countries generally benefit considerably from import liberaliza-
tion. In the past, Morocco has used quite high rates of protection. According to 2002
figures from the World Bank, the weighted mean import tariff in Morocco was 25.8 %,
against 1.80% for the EU. If anything, this still paints a too favourable picture.7 Some
goods are subject to prohibitively high tariffs. The maximum rate was a whopping
339%.8 As a result, the goods that fall under this tariff scarcely figure among the coun-
try’s imports.This means that they are not included in the weighted average, which is
therefore subject to a downward bias. Such high levels of protection are detrimental to
a country’s welfare.They enable inefficient industries to survive.This in its turn makes
life harder for industries operating in those areas in which a country has a comparative
advantage.
Three mechanisms are involved.The first derives from the fact that protection results
in reduced demand for foreign goods, which in turn causes a reduction in the demand
for foreign exchange. Accordingly, the external value of the country’s currency will be
higher than it would have been under free trade conditions, which means that exports
suffer. Secondly, more labour and capital remain tied up in the protected sectors, which
translates into higher labour and capital costs in the other sectors. Thirdly, potential
exporters see their competitiveness impaired by the higher cost (or sheer unavailability)
of imported inputs. In the case of Morocco, agricultural exporters have suffered from the
high prices of such imports as tractors and seeds, which are a direct result of import
duties. As a result, a large number of industries have seen their growth reduced by the
unavailability of inputs.9
In Morocco, things are made even more complicated by the enormous variation in
import tariffs. This leads to a completely opaque structure of effective protection.
Effective protection differs from nominal protection (import tariffs on goods), in that it
refers to the protection of domestic activities, taking account of tariffs on imported raw
materials or semi-finished products. Consider the case of carpenters involved in the
manufacture of tables.The amount of timber required to make one table costs $100 on
world markets, whereas complete tables cost $200 on world markets. If timber is subject
to a 5% import tariff and complete tables are charged 10%, then the domestic price of
the imported timber is $105 and the domestic price of an imported table is $220.The
work of transforming the timber into a table can cost up to $115 before domestic car-
penters lose the fight against imports. This means that the effective protection on
domestic activity is 15%, which is higher than the nominal tariff on tables. However, if
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opm marokko 3  20-06-2006  15:14  Pagina 94
timber is subject to a 15% tariff, for example, while tables only carry a 5% tariff, the result
is negative effective protection. Imported timber will cost $115, while imported tables
cost $210. Domestic carpenters will therefore be handicapped, since they can charge no
more than $95, which is $5 less than their colleagues abroad receive.
It may very well be that activities in areas where Morocco enjoys a comparative advan-
tage cannot prosper because of adverse effective protection.According to the WTO and
the IMF (International Monetary Fund), the existing tariff structure stacks the odds
against industries producing semi-finished products, in which Morocco is said to have a
comparative advantage10. However, it might be more accurate to say that Morocco has a
comparative advantage in the area of relatively simple industrial processes. In the textile
industry, for instance, there is considerable outsourcing and/or intra-firm trade by
Spanish and British firms.This means that there are substantial imports of intermediate
goods from Spain and Britain, and that the finished goods are exported to these same
countries.The export of finished textile products to the UK and Spain increased 18-fold
and 26-fold respectively, in nominal terms, between 1995 and 2002.11
Morocco will undoubtedly benefit from the phasing out of import tariffs on industri-
al goods. However, the sequencing of this process will involve adverse side effects.This
is because the tariffs for final products – an area in which Morocco has no comparative
advantage, at least not for sophisticated goods –, will be the last to go. As a result, these
products will continue to receive protection while others do not, which will give false
signals to producers.
While the effects of import liberalization are generally beneficial, as we have seen,
there may be a cost in terms of tax income foregone. In the year 2000, import tariffs
accounted for 4.8 % of GDP, or 17.9 % of government income.12 If import tariffs are to
be drastically reduced, then Morocco needs to find other sources of tax revenue. The
problem appears to be manageable, however. Since 1988, increases in the amount of VAT
(Value Added Tax) collected on imported goods at the country’s borders seem to have
matched the reduction in import tariffs, thanks largely to increased international trade.13
Problems of economic integration
The phasing out of import tariffs is not the only measure that will help Morocco impro-
ve its economic performance.The country is also adopting a large part of the EU acquis
communautaire14 in fields such as intellectual property, competition policy and govern-
ment subsidies.This will impose a temporary, but nevertheless heavy, administrative bur-
den. However, it will also make for a more efficient economy, in which clear rules are
observed. It will, furthermore, reduce the risk of Morocco becoming involved in trade
disputes with other countries as a result of ‘unfair’ trade practices. Even with these mea-
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sures, however, the risk of such disputes cannot be completely excluded. Aside from its
free trade agreement with the EU, Morocco has entered into a similar agreement with
EFTA, the European Free Trade Association, which is made up of Iceland, Liechtenstein,
Norway and Switzerland.The country opened other avenues to free trade in 2004, when
it signed the Agadir Agreement together with Jordan, Tunisia and Egypt. In that same
year, Morocco also concluded bilateral free-trade agreements with Turkey and with the
United States.The latter deal, which is to be implemented in the period from 2006 to
2021, is particularly likely to result in all kinds of complications.
Consider the following case. Under their bilateral free-trade agreement, Morocco
imports certain goods from the US, free of duty. However, these same American goods
are subject to an import tariff when they enter the EU. In this situation, traders would
be tempted to import the goods into Morocco free of duty, and then to re-export them
to the EU.This phenomenon is referred to as deflection of trade, and such imports are not
welcomed by the EU.The EU therefore requires certificates of origin, stating that at least
some minimum percentage of the added value of the goods in question originates from
Morocco. The US naturally operates a similar scheme. Aside from being extremely
expensive in terms of the administrative burdens that they impose, these measures open
the way to corruption and may also sour relations with trade partners. People will 
always try to cheat.15 In fact, the rules of origin included in the various free trade agree-
ments concluded by Morocco are very diverse.This is not helped by the complex struc-
ture of import tariffs.The World Bank and the IMF have put pressure on the Moroccan
government to harmonize and simplify the system.16
There is one bright spot, however. The EU wants to stimulate trade between the
Mediterranean countries and to counteract the hub-and-spoke effects that have charac-
terized trade ever since French colonial rule.17 It therefore allows what is referred to as
the cumulation of certificates of origin.This means that the minimum requirements per-
taining to the sources of added value include value added in other Mediterranean coun-
tries, a rule which applies to the Agadir Agreement, for instance.While this is undoub-
tedly a step in the right direction, in itself it is not sufficient to bring about an intensi-
fication of trade between the Mediterranean countries. Morocco and its neighbours
could do much more in this respect. In the year 2000, four neighbouring countries pro-
vided no more than 2.5% of Morocco’s imports and took a measly 1.9% of its exports.18
More regional liberalization and integration would create opportunities to exploit the
economies of scale. Such steps would also make the region more attractive for direct
foreign investment, which would help to introduce better technology, management and
marketing. Between them, the three Maghreb countries of Algeria,Tunesia and Morocco
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15 More on the problems associated with free-trade areas and the points of difference with
customs unions in Visser (2004).
16 L’économiste (13 December 2005), IMF (2005a) 15.
17 This refers to the fact that there has been very little trade between the Maghreb countries;
most trade has been with France, which is seen here as the centre or hub.
18 WTO (2003) 22.
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have more than 75 million inhabitants.The importance of this fact is that there is solid
evidence that larger regional economic areas tend to attract more direct foreign invest-
ment.19
Cooperation beween the Maghreb countries was slow to take off, but it seems to be
gathering pace at last.A conference on trade facilitation in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia
was held in Algiers on November 21-22, 2005.Those attending included ministers, the
presidents of various central banks, and the managing director of the IMF. Working
groups were set up to formulate proposals on issues relating to closer regional econom-
ic cooperation. One such issue concerns the harmonization of trade regulations linked
to the implementation of free trade agreements, with particular reference to procedures
and rules of origin. Other issues are the modernization of administrative procedures
within the customs service, the streamlining of document processing, the improvement
of cross-border payment systems, and a review of logistical chains, including transporta-
tion. Dates have been fixed for follow-up meetings and there seems to be a fair chance
that the respective governments will keep up the momentum, perhaps with some prod-
ding from the IMF and the World Bank.
What can be expected from trade liberalization?
Full-scale model estimates of the benefits of economic association with the EU are few
and far between. An idea of the quantities involved can be gleaned from a World Bank
study of Tunisia, which is also involved in the Barcelona Process.20 The static reallocation
effects of association with the EU were estimated to permanently increase GDP by 1.7
per cent.These effects derive from the reallocation of economic resources to bring them
more into line with the country’s comparative advantage. In addition, there are dynamic
effects, resulting from economies of scale and from the effects of harmonizing health and
technical regulations that were forced upon Tunisia by the European Union. Another
factor is the increased trading efficiency brought about by improved financial, telecom-
munication and transport facilities, which were upgraded with EU assistance.The gains
for Morocco are likely to be of the same order of magnitude, with the static gains in one
study estimated to be in the range of 1.5 – 2 per cent.21 It should be noted that the
effects may turn out to be much larger in reality.This is because the World Bank study
did not address the effects of increased competition from abroad, such as the adoption
of best practices, improved technologies, and better marketing techniques from other
countries.
It will take time to reallocate resources between the various branches of industry. Nor
can it be assumed that this process will be entirely cost-free, in terms of frictional unem-
ployment. Rutherford et al. expected that it would take a full five years before any sta-
tic reallocation effects become visible.22 When labour and capital have to move from one
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industry to another, the expansion of new industries may very well lag behind the
contraction of old ones. Firstly, businessmen have to exploit new opportunities created
by trade liberalization and secondly, part of the labour force will have to be retrained.
Rutherford et al. estimated that the cost of such retraining was roughly equivalent to one
year’s salary.
The reallocation of labour may be especially difficult in poor agricultural districts.
Under the free trade agreement with the United States, import tariffs on cereals, which
run at up to 100 per cent, are to be phased out. It has to be said that cereal production
in Morocco is not very efficient. It takes up scarce resources, water in particular, that
would give higher yields if channelled into the production of other goods. Nevertheless,
the World Bank has expressed concern that duty-free imports of cereals from the United
States will only serve to exacerbate rural poverty.The Moroccan government has been
singularly slow in preparing support measures for those affected.23
These costs must be balanced against the additional benefits that can be expected from
trade liberalization, over and above the efficiency gains from production which exploits
the country’s comparative advantage.These benefits accrue from the possible reduction
of ‘rent-seeking activities’, which would free up resources for more productive activities.
What are ‘rent-seeking activities’? In a system of regulated trade, politicians and civil ser-
vants have discretionary power over the granting of import permits and tariff exemp-
tions. Import licenses and exemptions are important sources of income. Import restric-
tions reduce the supply of goods, which means that higher prices can be charged. If the
reduction of supply is brought about by a licensing system rather than import duties,
there will be a large gap between the prices paid by importers and the prices they can
charge on the domestic market.They will receive a much higher price than is required
for them to stay in the market, in other words, they earn a ‘rent’.The same applies to
exemptions from import duties, of course. Licenses and exemptions have a monetary
value, so importers will devote time and other resources trying to secure them. From the
point of view of society as a whole, such ‘rent-seeking activities’ are extremely wasteful.
Moreover, they easily result in shady dealings. Politicians and civil servants grant permits
and exemptions, then pocket a share of the ‘rents’ created by the import restrictions as
payment. Even if they can withstand the temptation to accept a bribe, their control over
import restrictions gives them considerable power. Such power is seldom used to allo-
cate licenses in an equitable and efficient way.There tends to be a coterie of politicians,
civil servants and leading traders, to which small businessmen have no access.
Furthermore, the whole system is detrimental to efficiency. Entrepreneurs are compel-
led to divert time and energy into maintaining good contacts with the state bureaucra-
cy, to the detriment of innovative activity.
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Additional requirements for success
International trade theory is unclear about whether trade should be seen as an engine of
growth or as nothing more than its handmaiden.24 Perhaps this question will never be
satisfactorily answered.This is because, in the peculiarly un-erotic universe of the meta-
phors that make up a large part of economic theory, it is difficult to distinguish ‘hand-
maidens’ from ‘engines’. But even assuming that trade is an engine, it would only run in
fits and starts unless a number of conditions are fulfilled.
First of all, while Morocco has concluded various free trade agreements, this does not
necessarily mean that trade is genuinely free.Trade in manufactured goods with the EU
may indeed leave less room for the restrictions that create ‘rents’. Nevertheless, there are
still plenty of opportunities to impose such restrictions in trade with other countries, and
in agricultural trade. Not only does this hinder trade, it also impedes the development
of industries that are able to compete on world markets.
Furthermore, trade liberalization must be accompanied by similar liberalization on the
domestic front, to bring about an efficient allocation of resources. More importantly still,
this will allow talented individuals to give full rein to their entrepreneurial abilities.
Domestic liberalization includes a reduction of the costs of doing business, mainly by
doing away with red tape. It may also include the privatization of government enterpri-
ses. Unfortunately, this does not always help to create the sort of competitive environ-
ment in which entrepreneurs are constantly introducing innovations: new products, new
production methods, new markets, new sources of supply of raw materials or semi-finis-
hed goods, or the re-structuring of an industry. Such Schumpeterian ‘new combinations’
are essential to ongoing economic development.25 It is all too easy, and unfortunately all
too common, for governments to sell assets cheaply to favoured buyers. During the late
1980s, some thirty large families with close ties to the royal palace in Morocco seem to
have profited in this way.26 This favours the development of oligopolies, in which indi-
vidual firms are left in peace in their cosy corner of the market.They have little incen-
tive to innovate and create new jobs.There are signs, however, that the privatization that
has taken place in recent years has been more successful. In addition, foreign investors
are taking up a large proportion of the assets put up for sale.27
Furthermore, there is the question of education.According to World Bank figures, in
2002 illiteracy rates in individuals above the age of 14 were 37% for males and 62%
among females.28 Moreover, the emphasis on Arabic, coupled with a neglect of French
and other foreign languages, means that education is not well geared to the needs of a
developing economy. Nor does it help that there are no less than four different ministries
of education.
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There are other requirements for faster economic development and job creation,
which we can only mention in passing here. One is a sophisticated financial system that
is subject to clear rules and efficient supervision.A further cause for concern is the limi-
ted availability and high cost of credit for small and medium-sized enterprises.29 An effi-
cient, low-cost transport infrastructure is also essential for economic growth, yet the
charges levied for the use of Moroccan ports are outrageously high.30 Things are likely
to improve, however, as the Tanger-Med (Tanger-Méditerranée) port complex, which
will be accessible to ships carrying up to 2000 containers, is nearing completion.
Final observations
There is every reason to believe that Morocco will benefit from the Association
Agreement, but not to the full extent possible.The EU should liberalize imports of agri-
cultural products and, for its part, Morocco could do more to stimulate trade with its
neighbours. Furthermore, the country can only fully profit from liberalization if
domestic markets are also opened up, and if entrepreneurs are not hindered by excessi-
ve red tape. In addition, educational levels are too low for Morocco to profit fully from
the opportunities provided by more openness.While the liberalization of trade helps to
fight poverty, it is by no means a panacea.This is a vital first step, nothing more.
When compared to developing countries as a whole (see Table 2) and to its neighbour
Tunisia in particular, Morocco’s economic growth to date has been quite lack-lustre.31
Table 2. GDP Growth, 1971–2004 (in percent)
Real GDP growth Real GDP per-capita growth
Morocco Developing Morocco Developing
countries countries
1971–2004 3.81 4.47 1.75 2.58
1971–1982 4.75 0.74 0.09 2.58
1982–1991 4.32 3.75 2.16 1.80
1991–1998 2.11 4.20 0.42 2.51
1998–2004 3.33 5.35 2.05 3.84
Source: Morocco: Selected Issues, IMF Country Report No. 05/419, p. 6; based on Moroccan
National Accounts;WEO database; and IMF Staff estimates.The group of developing countries
encompasses 152 nations.
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developments see 10 Years of Barcelona process (2005).
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Although badly affected by a series of droughts in the 1990s, growth has now picked up
again. It is difficult to say how much of the increase in growth is due to the impact of
the Association Agreement with the EU. However, econometric studies have revealed a
positive relationship between Morocco’s increased openness in trade and its economic
growth.32 The official unemployment figures have dropped steadily from 14.5 per cent
in 1999 to an estimated 10.8 per cent in 2004. However, the latter figure disguises the
fact that urban unemployment stood at 18.4 per cent in 2004.33 There is still a long way
to go and one can only hope that the groundwork for sustained growth has been laid.
32 IMF (2005b) 27.Trade openness is the ratio of this volume of trade (real exports plus imports)
over GDP, adjusted for the size (area and population) of the country, per capita GDP, whether it
is landlocked, and whether it is an oil exporter.
33 IMF (2005b) 62.
101
opm marokko 3  20-06-2006  15:14  Pagina 101
Omar Aloui and Saad Belghazi
The ‘Barcelona Process’: ten years after
Introduction
This chapter evaluates the Barcelona process, which aimed at ‘turning the Euro-Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange, and co-operation, guaran-
teeing peace, stability, and prosperity’, according to the ‘Barcelona Declaration’ of 1995.1
The most widely-known aspect of the Declaration is its intention to create a free trade
zone in the Mediterranean area by 2010.A great many trade agreements, meetings, and
financial aid efforts were channelled through this process, but even from an official point
of view, progress has been too slow to adapt to the new international and regional con-
texts.This chapter uses recent documentation about the process, and is based on an ana-
lysis of external factors and internal policies.We comment on its prospects for success.
The chapter is organized in three sections.The first is a general presentation of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, or Barcelona process.The second provides comments on the
partnership’s achievements over the past 10 years.The third presents an analysis of inter-
nal and external strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats to the partnership.We
conclude with an analysis of relevant scenarios and prospects for the Barcelona process.
Our analysis shows that it will be difficult for the process to survive if it cannot deal
rapidly with several controversial questions, including extension of free trade agreements
to agriculture and services, inclusion of a migrations management policy in the regional
framework, and reallocation of funds to sustain effective taxation reforms and attract
more foreign direct investment to the southern Mediterranean countries.We conclude
by stating our concern for the combination of external challenges and internal obstacles
that represent major handicaps to the Barcelona process: the various protection and sub-
sidy policies in the northern countries and governance issues in the southern ones.
Especially important is the question: can the integration issue be tackled more efficient-
ly by combining Euro-Mediterranean Partnership acquis2 with the opportunities offered
by the European Neighbourhood Policy to extend free trade to agriculture, services, and
mobility to labour on a bilateral basis? 
The Barcelona process
The Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in Barcelona
on 27 and 28 November 1995, was an integration initiative to provide regional stability
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2 The ‘acquis communautaire’ is the total body of European Union (EU) law dealing with freedom,
justice, and property-rights in economy and society that forms the basis for negotiations with
other countries.
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through free trade and financial aid. This conference marked the start of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, or Barcelona process. It dealt with a broad framework of
political, economic, and social relations among the 15 member states of the European
Union and 12 partners in the Mediterranean region: Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel,
Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria,Tunisia, and Turkey.
The climate in 1995 was favourable to this effort. In 1994 an official report by the
European Commission first perceived ‘European security’ as being threatened by the
economic and social gap between the northern and southern Mediterranean countries.
In addition, in the international arena, following the Madrid Conference in 1991, the
negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority begun in Oslo in 1994, along
with the end of the first Gulf War, seemed to be promising for long-term peace in the
Middle East. Balanced against this, southern EU countries felt that their interests were
not fairly represented in the aid programmes: too much had been done for East
European partners to benefit German interests and too little for southern Mediterranean
countries, the traditional partners of France, Spain, and Italy. On the other hand, some
of these countries justified their demand for increased aid by the cost entailed in mana-
ging border issues related to migration with the southern Mediterranean countries.This
last point, a classic argument in ‘border’ states,3 may be what has been most commented
on in the press. Moreover, some of the EU states wanted to achieve greater political
influence on the Middle East peace process through this regional initiative and break the
traditional division of roles between the USA and the EU.These differences consisted of
‘soft’ issues in the west Mediterranean for the EU and ‘hard’ issues in the east
Mediterranean for the USA. Finally, the apparent success of NAFTA (the North
American Free Trade Agreement) and the multiplicity of international regional agree-
ments about other regions, concerning about half the international trade, were probably
motivating factors for the Barcelona process.
The thrust of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was to reduce instability and pro-
mote peace through economic prosperity by means of market unification, free trade, and
financial transfers.This idea was at the heart of the formation of the EU in the 1950s.
Based on this experience, the philosophy of the Barcelona process aimed at regional
peace and stability through ‘irreversible’ economic and political reforms that increase the
cost of war and confrontation to the belligerent parties.War between wealthy democra-
cies was believed to be counter-productive. The expectation of economic gains was
based on the potential for liberalization of trade and capital transfers to increase income
and reduce migration flows. Moreover, it was believed that economic prosperity pro-
motes democracy. International commitments can sustain the political reforms required
by this prosperity, which is critical in southern Mediterranean countries, since regional
conflicts lead to prudence on the part of leaders when adopting new policies with long-
term benefits but immediate social costs. It is true that this kind of virtuous circle has
greatly contributed to EU growth and prosperity, especially for latter EU entrants such
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as Spain, Portugal, and Ireland.
In the Barcelona Declaration, the twenty-seven Euro-Mediterranean partners laid
down the three main objectives of the partnership.The section on politics and security
defines a common area of peace and stability as one that reinforces political and securi-
ty dialogue.The economic and financial section aims to build a zone of shared prospe-
rity by means of an economic and financial partnership and the gradual establishment of
a free trade zone.The social, cultural, and human section aims at a rapprochement be-
tween peoples through a social, cultural, and human partnership to encourage under-
standing and exchange among cultures and civil societies. The Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership comprises two complementary dimensions: a bilateral dimension (i.e. the
Euro-Mediterranean association agreements) and a regional one.This ‘regional dialogue’
represents one of the most innovative aspects of the partnership, covering political, econ-
omic, and cultural areas.
The Barcelona process takes account of the substantial north-south asymmetries in the
Mediterranean region.According to the World Bank, the gross national income per capi-
ta ratios, after correction for the price level in France, is six times that of Morocco, Italy,
and Egypt; in Spain it is four times the level of Algeria. On average, the per capita inco-
me in the EU is about ten times the southern Mediterranean countries.The combined
gross domestic product (GDP) of the Maghreb States (Algeria, Morocco,Tunisia), with
a population of 66 million, is less than that of Portugal, which has a population of 10
million. The GDP of the Mashreq States (Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria), with a total
population of 86 million, is roughly equal to Greece or Finland, which have populations
of 10 and 5 million, respectively. One problem in the area is that intra-regional trade
accounts for only 5 percent of the twelve Mediterranean partners’ trade volume.Another
problem is that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership incorporates major exceptions that
represent vital interests for southern Mediterranean countries, such as agriculture and
labour mobility. It excludes liberalization of services that can be of interest to both par-
ties. In addition, countries such as Morocco or Tunisia depend greatly on customs inco-
mes. Free trade will thus entail important fiscal effort.
It is also important to note that the Barcelona process does not support some of its
basic arguments, as it links free trade with an increase in foreign direct investment and a
decrease in emigration. Free trade cannot always substitute for labour movements, nor is
it a complement to the movement of capital. In theory, the reverse can also be true, as
has been noted by Schiff and Winters in their examination of the details of the links.4
For example, liberalization can make imports more attractive than direct investment in
southern countries. Liberalization can promote increased emigration by reducing its
costs.
Evaluation of the Barcelona process
In this section we discuss the various Euro-Mediterranean Partnership instruments, eva-
luate some of their results, and comment on the lost opportunities to co-operate.The
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Barcelona process envisions the association agreements as replacing the co-operation
agreements of the 70s. Each agreement includes the three main areas covered by the
Barcelona Declaration: political dialogue, economic relations, and co-operation in soci-
al and cultural affairs.All agreements contain a clause that includes respect for democra-
tic principles and fundamental human rights as essential elements of the agreement.They
all contain clauses dealing with political dialogue, free movement of goods, services, and
capital, economic co-operation, social and cultural co-operation, financial co-operation,
and institutional arrangements. The main financial instruments for implementing the
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are the bilateral provisions for Mediterranean
European Development Aid (MEDA) that include agreements with Algeria, Egypt,
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Territories, Syria, and Tunisia. From
1995 to 2002 MEDA accounted for € 5731 million. Over this period 86 percent of the
resources allocated to MEDA were channelled bilaterally; the rest were devoted to regio-
nal activities. MEDA II (2000-2006) has a budget of € 5350 million.
In 2002 the political and security partnership centred on the Euro-Mediterranean
Parliamentary Forum, the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission, and training for
diplomats, the Middle East peace process, and human rights.The economic and financi-
al partnership centred on industrial co-operation, economic transition, the European
Investment Bank’s new facility for Euro-Mediterranean investment and partnership,
employers’ organizations, dialogue among business communities in the Mediterranean,
research on Mediterranean economies (the Femise network), energy, transport, regional
statistical cooperation (Medstat), the information society (Eumedis), and  water. In addi-
tion, there is the Euro-Mediterranean programme for the environment, whose main aim
is to counter ‘desertification’.The social, cultural and human partnership in 2002 com-
prised the Euro-Med audio-visual programme, programmes on ‘Cultural heritage –
Euro-Med heritage’, the museum with no frontiers: a way to learn about one another,
young people – Euro-Med youth action, civil society, the Euro-Mediterranean Civil
Forum, women, justice, and home affairs, and information and communication educa-
tion.The Commission’s delegations in the Mediterranean were key players in the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership.
From official reports established by the European Commission, we can draw some
general assessment of the results of the process. Hardly any progress has been made in
the political and security area: this is mainly a result of the persistence of tension and
conflict in the Mediterranean region.The Middle East peace process does not progress
well, and the initial project for a regional Charter for Peace and Stability has not been
achieved. On the political side, substantial power is generally concentrated in the heads
of state in southern Mediterranean countries.There is now increasing recognition of the
need to liberalize the political systems across the region to harness the energies and
increase popular participation.
Results in the cultural area include highly successful activities as well as less useful
ones.5 This extremely sensitive component of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is
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also the weakest. Notwithstanding a number of achievements, it appears to be focused
on the problem of immigration.Will it end up simply as a number of readmission agree-
ments that make the EU the much decried ‘Fortress Europe’? The spirit of Schengen and
the increasingly restrictive immigration policies of the member states have relegated the
partnership to a virtual reality by barring entry in the European states to the other half
of the partners, thus sapping the credibility of the partnership.
We will concentrate on the economic area, which has indeed progressed: several asso-
ciation agreements have been adopted, especially in such areas as textiles, because of the
competitive pressure from China. But there has not really been any progress in sub-
regional integration, except for the Agadir accord among Morocco,Tunisia, Egypt, and
Jordan. Nor has there been much progress in the liberalization of services, in the pro-
blem of ‘rules of origin accumulation’, in the liberalization of the food sector, or in trade
and non-trade issues. Moreover, trade relations and foreign direct investment flows have
failed to increase at the anticipated rates.
In the areas of trade and investment, the legacy of  structural heterogeneity and fre-
quent political instability in the Mediterranean is reflected in the present economic mar-
ginalization of the partners from the mainstream of global trading patterns, and in its
inadequate growth. Mediterranean Partners represent a heterogeneous group of small
economies. Three countries (Cyprus, Israel, and Malta) have income levels similar to
those of some EU countries, and account for almost a quarter of the regional GDP, but
this includes only three percent of an area population of more than 220 million.The nine
other countries have a per capita income ranging between € 1000 and € 3000 per year.
While previous policies focused on inward looking and state-directed development, over
the last decade nearly all partners have begun to undertake substantial programmes of
structural adjustment.These were designed to restore macro-economic balance, to open
their economies to the outside world, and to transition from state sector economies to
private sector supporting policies.Today the economic situation of the Mediterranean
Partners shows progress in macroeconomic stabilization, along with considerable market
liberalization, albeit this is not equal across the region. Nevertheless, real GDP growth –
mostly in the range of two percent annually – has been insufficient to raise living stan-
dards, given the rapid population growth.The growth of the GDP has been very volati-
le, since most economies are still agricultural, and unemployment – ranging from 12 to
24 percent – is especially acute among the urban young and educated.
Noteworthy is that a substantial flow of investment to emerging economies has pas-
sed the Mediterranean partners by. Foreign investors still shy away from the Middle East
and southern Mediterranean region, preferring to invest in the central European or
Mercosur countries.6 The proportion of EU foreign direct investment going to
Mediterranean partners fell from 2.2 percent in 1992 to below 1 percent in 1999.
Starting from roughly similar levels in the early 1990s, annual EU investment flows to
the central European countries have increased nine fold, to some $21 billion, while
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a common market.
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investment to the Mediterranean partners has increased only threefold over the entire
decade, to just over $7 billion.
The openness of the Mediterranean partners to foreign trade has improved somewhat
since 1992. Still, the region ranks behind Southeast Asia and the countries of central and
Eastern Europe. Above all, intra-regional trade accounts for no more than 5 percent of
the total, despite the fact that successive Euro-Med conferences have underlined the
importance of intra-regional integration. The north-south pattern has changed little
since the Barcelona Declaration, with the EU being the Mediterranean partners’ main
trading partner, in roughly the same proportion. The export base of all but the most
industrial of the Mediterranean partners is still too narrow, or it relies too much on low-
level processing. On the whole, therefore, the figures for growth in trade and foreign
direct investment in the Mediterranean region fall short of those achieved by Latin
America, and economic integration with the EU and openness to the world at large is
proceeding too slowly.
As to trade in agricultural products, there have been many lost opportunities to co-
operate. The bilateral agricultural trade balance between the EU and southern
Mediterranean countries remains clearly favourable to the EU. In 1998-2002 the avera-
ge value of EU agricultural exports to southern Mediterranean countries was $1.3 bil-
lion greater than the average value of EU agricultural imports from southern
Mediterranean countries.While agriculture is an area of great importance to both the
EU and its Mediterranean partners, so far the discussion of topics related to agriculture
has mainly taken place in the framework of negotiations of association agreements,
reflecting the intense dependence of the Mediterranean partners on agricultural exports.
Closer economic integration, however, will require a broad discussion of agricultural
policies among the twenty-seven partners. On both sides of the Mediterranean, the agri-
cultural sector is subsidized.To bring about increased exchange of goods, there must be
a co-ordinated approach to this highly sensitive issue, one that coordinates all the econ-
omic and social dimensions. Dissatisfaction with the management of agricultural trade
in the Barcelona process has become a constant during the negotiations and reviews of
the trade arrangements among the EU and the southern Mediterranean countries.
Such dissatisfaction has appeared on both sides of the Mediterranean basin, as reflec-
ted by southern Mediterranean exporters’ desire for greater EU market access and EU
producers’ fears of increased competition that would come about from a loss of com-
munity preference.While the Barcelona process called for a progressive liberalization of
agricultural trade based on traditional flows, the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements do not
consider full liberalization of agricultural trade. Because of this ‘controlled’ approach, no
priority was given to agriculture in the definition and implementation of the agree-
ments. Negotiations concerning agriculture were usually considered last in bilateral trade
talks between the EU and the Mediterranean partners.
Under the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area agriculture was largely treated on an
ad hoc basis, and commercial concessions varied with the sensitivity of the product for
EU markets and the export competitiveness of each partner.There were no in-depth dis-
cussions at top-level meetings (e.g. ministerial conferences) about the pros and cons of a
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common approach for agricultural trade and rural development in the Mediterranean
basin. In the last section we will point to the future prospects for Euro-Mediterranean
agricultural trade relations. Only a reform of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) can help overcome existing political constraints on full inclusion of agricultural
trade in the Barcelona process.
Labour mobility
With respect to labour mobility, we note the same lost opportunities to co-operate.The
declared objective of labour immigration policies in European Mediterranean countries
is to protect their labour markets, preventing undesired flows and sending back migrants
to their countries of origin, through incentives or by force. Recent studies on the econ-
omic effects of demography reveal several facts that are worthwhile to recall in this con-
text.
On the demand side Europe is increasingly dependent on immigration. Without
immigration, Europe’s total population could fall by twelve percent by 2050.The migra-
tory experience of the 1950s and the 1960s was marked by a growing labour demand,
particularly in manufacturing industries in the period of rapid industrialization. The
migration flows of the 1980s and 1990s, on the other hand, were characterized by incre-
ased internationalization and globalization, as well as de-industrialization, and by the ‘ter-
tiarization’ of the advanced industrial economies. Southern European countries have
become immigration countries in the last fifteen years, but the dynamics of labour
migration in the Mediterranean basin started to change in the mid-1980s. Flows com-
prised of workers in agriculture, construction, and services that add little value, such as
hotels and restaurants, now go to Italy and Spain. These workers do not receive any
documents to legalize their activities, thus, they do not benefit from immigration and
labour laws. Because agriculture and the informal economy are relatively less important
for the overall French economy than in Italy or Spain, flows of undocumented migrants
now go to the southern countries. It is worth stressing, however, that the informal econ-
omy is still mainly composed of national workers.The opposite side of the labour spec-
trum is comprised of skilled workers, for which there is greater demand in Europe, and
these are increasingly being recruited formally. France has already developed special visas
for computer engineers.
On the supply side, global skills are emerging: medium skills in information techno-
logy may be viewed as global in character, while traditional craft skills such as sewing,
tailoring, leather processing, and many relatively low skills also have a high degree of
transferability. Although family reunion has been the major type of immigration since
1974, spontaneous, economically motivated asylum-seeking has been the other major
type. Illegal migration continues to increase, and the illegal migrants are able to find rela-
tively unskilled work in the European labour markets. Moreover, most of the migrants
do not come from the lowest income countries, but rather from middle income ones.
Those that do come from low income countries tend to have a middle class background.
Emigration only occurs when a certain level of development has been reached that
allows the first generation of potential emigrants to acquire the necessary means for lea-
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ving their home country.Therefore, in the short run, a successful development process
could lead to an increase in migration rather than a decrease – the ‘migration hump’ –
before it had any lasting impact on the outflow of people.
The effect of these demand and supply factors has been that on average, the annual
net gain from migration to the EU-15 is just over one million people per year, about 2.2
for every 1,000.This accounts for almost four-fifths of Europe’s population growth. In
addition, there has always been some immigration – including labour migration – into
Western Europe, and the costs of emigration have been reduced.With higher unemplo-
yment and increased participation rates for the indigenous populations, there is no lon-
ger any perceived need for importing unskilled immigrant labour to cope with surplus
demand, but nevertheless, selective immigration and regularization are likely to increa-
se. Some issues have become especially complex and sensitive; for example, the migra-
tion that often goes along with arms and drug trafficking, international terrorism, inter-
national organized crime, and the traffic in people. For political analysts such as
Huntington,7 the internal threat to identity posed by migrants from other civilizations
also carries with it a security threat.At the same time, the image of the European Union,
particularly in the southern Mediterranean, is closely linked to the way it treats immi-
grants and refugees.
While demographic equilibrium in the Maghreb is impossible without emigration to
EU countries, economic growth in EU countries needs immigration and southern
Mediterranean countries need the emigrant’s remittances. Moreover, global skills are
emerging, selective immigration has never stopped, and the costs of migration are fal-
ling. It is clear that co-management is possible for issues such as joint border manage-
ment, agreements on visa regimes and labour permits, orderly departures and safe travel
arrangements, and for living and working conditions for migrant workers and perma-
nent immigrants. But issues such as the brain drain and skill formation, transferability and
portability of claims for social security, dual citizenship, channels and average costs of
remittances also need to be considered. Such migration-related issues may also become
elements of future trade, co-operation, and association agreements between the EU and
southern Mediterranean countries.
Prospects for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
The table below shows a summary of the strategic analysis of external factors in the
Barcelona process.The main threats are economic: that is, loss of external competitive-
ness in the Euro-Med region as a whole through globalization, demography, expansion,
and American competition.This external factors analysis also opens up new opportuni-
ties. For one, complementary strengths between both shores of the Mediterranean can
become valuable assets in global competition. But these opportunities will require a
stronger process of integration, which is not compatible with existing lobbies and pro-
tective policies.
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The next table summarizes the current internal strengths and weaknesses that have
emerged from the debate on the Barcelona process. I believe that the ability of the Euro-
Med region to tackle external challenges will greatly depend on internal decisions
among the northern countries on agriculture, labour market regulations, outsourcing,
and internal cohesion. Each of these areas has enormous potential for co-operation,
which can be unleashed when protectionist policies or subsidies that limit prospects for
growth in the southern countries are overcome. In the present situation, a Common
Agricultural Policy dramatically reduces export prospects within the Euro-Med area.
Without any internal reforms, however, association agreements are useless.The same is
true for the potential of migration management to support economic growth on both
110
Strengths
Assets  such as resources,
common history,
historical heritage, human
exchange; complementary
strengths between sub-
regions; comparative advan-
tages in some key industries
such as tourism; success 
stories in co-operative
endeavours
Weaknesses linked to 
decisions in the northern
countries 
Agriculture and Common
Agricultural Policy reforms;
migration and labour policy
regulations; foreign direct
investment outsourcing and
industrial policies; splitting
up of the EU
Weaknesses in decisions in
the southern countries 
Political reforms; inadequa-
te fiscal basis; importance of
the informal economy;
poorly developed 
importance civil ssociety 
External factors
Demography and ageing
population
Globalisation
Enlargement
American initiatives through
a greater Middle East
Threats
Reduces potential growth
in the northern countries
Preference erosion, diver-
sion of foreign direct
investment, competitive
pressure
Preference erosion, diver-
sion of foreign direct
investment, competitive
pressure, splitting of EU
countries
Selective partnership 
Opportunities
Promotes demand for co-
management policies with
respect to migration
Increases value of comple-
mentary strengths as an
asset in global competition
(see Euro-Med textiles)
Increases export prospects
for southern Mediterranean
countries
Requires a strategic 
response
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sides of the Mediterranean. While this has been studied and documented, the current
policy is not consistent with internal market regulations.
If not managed correctly, the likelihood for the Barcelona process to survive is not
very great. External factors reveal the low level of regional competitiveness, as well as its
strategic and political dependence.At the same time, there is little progress internally in
critical areas. Policy reforms in agriculture and labour market regulations among the
northern countries, which are very important for the southern Mediterranean countries,
are still only in their initial stages. Political or governance reforms in the southern coun-
tries are in an even worse state.The last table shows some prospects and comments and
thus summarizes possible scenarios for the future of the Barcelona process.
The first scenario is relatively optimistic. It assumes that if the EU gives more money,
it will result in more reforms in southern Mediterranean countries and the other way
round.This assumption misses a basic point: internal reforms in the northern countries
are indispensable; it is absolutely necessary for shared prosperity to become a serious
objective.The second scenario is put forward by strategy analysts motivated mainly by
non-economic considerations, such as strategy and culture.They point to the possibility
of alternative coalitions, insisting on the irrelevance of the Barcelona process and that
other international alliances be substituted for it. This scenario does not take into
account the critical importance of complementary economic strengths in forging inter-
national alliances. There is also a third scenario that is based on the prospects of pro-
gressive integration between individual neighbours and the EU.
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Prospects
More resources from northern countries vs.
more reforms in southern countries
Dilution of the Barcelona process in globa-
lization and other regional agreements
(main proposals include some kind of
Muslim coalition that includes some Asian
countries or an American kind of coalition)
Complementing the Barcelona process
with a European Neighbourhood Policy8
Comments
Economic reforms in northern countries
are more important than financial aid
Ignores the critical importance of comple-
mentary economic complementarities
strengths in forging international alliances.
Important are references to agriculture and
services, free trade, and to labour mobility,
in a case-by-case approach.
8 http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/2004/20040071.htm: €1.2 billion will be disbursed
during 2005-2006 under the EU’s MEDA program’, €275 million of which for Morocco.
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EU External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten said in May 2004:
‘We are determined to continue developing the Barcelona process to foster democratic stability,
security and sustainable development throughout the Euro-Med region, against a background of incre-
asing interdependency between the EU and its southern neighbours. I am confident that the coming
Euro-Med ministerial meeting in Dublin on 5-6 May will take us another step forward in this direc-
tion. In parallel, we will soon outline our strategic thinking to develop our Neighbourhood Policy,
which will build on the achievements so far of the Barcelona process.’9
This scenario may work if it opens the door to new areas of co-operation, especially in
agriculture, services, and labour mobility, which until now have been lost opportunities.
9 http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/2004/20040071.htm
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Hans van der Veen
Morocco, the state and illegal practices
Introduction
In 1995/1996 the Moroccan government initiated a coercive campaign known as the‘campagne d’assainissement’ or ‘sanitization campaign’. It targeted a number of unlawful
practices such as contraband and other forms of tax evasion, fraud, influence-peddling,
corruption and drug trafficking. Drugs had been targeted earlier in similar campaigns.
The 1995/6 campaign was a landmark assault on many practices that were formally out-
lawed but had been widely tolerated for decades.This chapter reflects on the interacti-
ons between the state and illegal practices in Morocco, focusing on the ‘war’ on drugs as
compared to those elements of the campaign aimed at ‘moralizing’ state and business
behaviour in other sectors of the economy.
The reason for taking up the issue of the state and illegal practices in this chapter is
the ambivalent attitude that can be perceived in Morocco regarding pervasive informal
and illicit practices. Exchanges with Morocco – be they in the sector of trade, diploma-
cy, development cooperation, migration, or judicial collaboration – would benefit from
a judicious understanding of this ambivalence and of possible ways of dealing with it.A
second rationale for this essay is to draw attention to the repercussions that the pervasi-
veness of informal and illicit practices in Morocco may have for Moroccan communi-
ties in Europe, particularly those in Belgium and the Netherlands, and for their relations
with state and society. The third reason for writing this piece is more theoretical, and
aims to take issue with an offhand criminalization of state and society in Morocco. It is
easy to simply outlaw people and their social activities and to opt for ‘solutions’ within
the orbit of a coercive state apparatus, rather than opening up the issue to a distributio-
nal political economy in which various state and societal interests could be calibrated. It
might be important to analyse, not only the differences, but also the similarities between
criminal behaviour and social control, extortion and taxation, repression and law enfor-
cement, and between state-run protection rackets and social contracts.
The chapter is organized as follows. The first section delineates the theoretical 
approach and sketches an analytical framework that fosters an understanding of the 
prevalence of illicit practices. Section two presents a cursory discussion of the scope and
nature of informal and illicit activities in Morocco. Section three analyses the implica-
tions of the existence of such well-established informal and illegal activities. In the 
conclusion, the lines of enquiry and reflection in these three sections are drawn together
in an attempt to clarify the demeanour of the state regarding illegal practices in
Morocco.
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State-building and the organization of production
The starting point for this study is rooted in approaches in political sociology and mar-
ket sociology which seek to understand how states, markets and societies interact to pro-
duce institutions that regulate their relations and that generate certain types of rule.1
Essentially the approach looks at the competences of extraction and violence that were
fundamental to bringing about state structures, and the mutual dependencies between
those that control the means of violence and those that control capital.The result is a
negotiation process in which resources are exchanged for provisions for protective needs.
This results in institutions delineating respective rights and obligations.The basic analy-
tical framework employed here is derived from Charles Tilly (1985) and can be depic-
ted as follows:
Taxation Protection
(Extraction)
Warfare Nature of rule 
(State-building)
Figure 1.Analytical framework: relations between the core activities 
of states and the nature of rule.
The purport of this scheme is that, in order to establish their rule, governments have to
perform these core regulatory functions. Rulers have to extract resources from economic
activities, protect at least part of the population and employ violence against foreign and
domestic competitors, otherwise they will be overthrown by another ruler who per-
forms and combines such functions more efficiently.
Within this general scheme, there are many different ways in which such basic func-
tions of statehood can be performed and combined.Extraction can take the form of nor-
mal taxation but it may also more closely resemble extortion, with the threat of violen-
ce being used to extract resources. Similarly, the protection function can be performed
so as to provide genuine services to specific economic actors and society at large or it
may resemble a protection racket in which case the state itself poses much of the threat
against which it offers protection, and for which it exacts a price. A similar differentia-
tion can be made in uses of organized violence, which can either take the shape of enfor-
cing norms and regulations that carry the consent of large sections of the population and
by which justice is done, or which can aim to damage selected targets and weaken their
protective institutions in order to establish an altogether different system of profit, power
and protection. Many different systems of extraction, protection and enforcement exist
by which governments manage lawful and illicit practices. By combining these capaci-
114
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ties, governments establish their rule and how they do so largely determines the nature
of a regime.
The basic bargaining mechanisms mentioned above imply that the formation of sta-
tes, markets and societies are mutually constitutive. Creating institutions that enable the
development of markets and the organization of production is part of state-building.2 In
order to understand how the state gains obedience and conformity from its population,
it is fruitful to apply a process-oriented view of the state-in-society, instead of isolating
the state and analysing it as a freestanding organization.3 Organizing production and
instituting government are processes that come about through state-society interactions.
In cases where the state fails to provide protection or itself becomes a threat to the free-
dom, property and security of citizens, alternative organizations may fill the void and
offer or impose their protection, e.g. in the form of mafias and other armed groups.4
The ways in which interests of state, market and society are calibrated, translated into
laws and regulations, and enforced by formal and informal means of social control, will
therefore determine the nature of rule. For analytical, comparative and explanatory pur-
poses, such regulatory systems can be placed on a continuum between warfare, protec-
tion rackets and social contracts.This is based on an assessment of the institutions that
regulate relations between the state, market actors and wider society, and that ultimately
determine the distribution of costs and benefits that such systems produce.
This chapter applies this scheme to the analysis of the articulations between the
Moroccan state and illegal practices, to evaluate the coercive campaigns that the
Moroccan state organized in the 1990s against its legal and illegal business community,
and to assess the capacities of Moroccan society to bring coercive state powers and harm-
ful and illicit market forces under control and to make them responsive to wider goals
of society.5
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2 Fligstein (1996).
3 Migdal (1997).
4 For such an argument applied to the role of the mafia and other violent entrepreneurs in regu-
lating markets in the post-Soviet economy, see e.g.Vadim Volkov (2002). State failure of this kind
may be all the more persistent where the law itself prevents state and society from exercising
their full regulatory capacities, as is the case with drug prohibition. In countries where broader
conflicts over the terms of inclusion and exclusion in the political system take a violent turn, the
very control over (illegal) markets may become contested and alternative protectors may also
take the shape of guerrillas, paramilitaries and other armed groups. In Colombia and Algeria for
example those economic sectors in which the state fails to perform its protective and regulatory
functions are indeed most susceptible to impositions by such armed groups (see Zemni (2000)
on Algeria). Once the social body is sufficiently weakened, the role of protector could ultimately
also be taken up by another state.
5 The underlying issues defining the nature of rule in Moroccan state and society can only be
dealt with in a cursory manner within the scope of an essay such as this. For an extensive discus-
sion of the country’s political economy and the system of protection sustaining the power struc-
ture, see Hibou (1996). On the sanitization campaign, see Denoeux (1998) and on the organiza-
tion and control of the drug trade, see OGD (Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues) (1994)
and Van der Veen (2004).Akesbi (1997) provides a very interesting discussion of the workings of
the extraction function that feeds the state and power structure.
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The hidden economy
The scope of illegal and informal activities in Morocco is relatively large, both in terms
of employment and as a share of the total economy.The informal and the illicit sector
represented 40% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1991/92 according to Hibou.6
More elaborate estimates indicate a similar size of the hidden economy of Morocco and
put it at a steady 38%, as a ratio of recorded GDP over the period from 1975 to 2000.7
The Moroccan Accounting Office divides the hidden, i.e. unrecorded, economy in three
sectors: a) the informal sector and domestic service activities; b) the underground econ-
omy, i.e. essentially those activities not declared for fiscal reasons, and c) the illegal sec-
tor.8 The same study found that in 2000 the informal sector alone represented 40% of
non-agricultural labour and 20% of the total workforce, together contributing 17% of
the country’s gross national product.The majority of the informal economic units are in
commerce and repairs (53%), the others in small industry and artisan production (21%),
in construction (6%), and other services (20%). Activities in the informal sector are de-
fined by their deficiency in abiding by accountability laws and their lacking compliance
with formal regulations, including tax payments. In general, informal sector units tend
to operate outside all such regulations, as well as outside the juridical framework that
defines legal enterprises. The majority of the 1.2 million informal sector units in
Morocco tend to be small, precarious and lack protections such as labour contracts. Most
of them have no social security provisions, and only a handful of operators belong to a
sector association that could further their collective interests.
The dimensions of the underground economy are equally sobering. In spite of sub-
stantial reductions in import duties, smuggling is very pervasive and may amount to
some three billion euros.The Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla play an important role
in this respect as depots and conduits for smuggled goods, but the port of Casablanca is
also known to facilitate transhipment of huge quantities of undeclared or improperly
declared goods. Import smuggling constitutes an estimated 30 per cent of registered
imports and is thought to deprive the government of an estimated 500 million euros in
revenue, i.e. one-sixth of the total government budget.9 This category should also inclu-
de the remittances sent home by Moroccan migrants, totalling some 1.5 billion euros,
half of which enters the country unreported.10 The unreported money flows escape
monetary regulations, e.g. those that set exchange rates and could therefore have bene-
fited state coffers.Tax evasion is also widespread in the formal economy. According to
the Minister of the Interior in 1996, the fiscal system only covered 15 per cent of the
country’s non-salaried residents who are required to pay taxes.11
The illegal economy comprises predatory crimes, the provision of illegal services and
the drug trade.The nature and extent of domestic crime is not known to the author.As
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7 Alaoui (2005).
8 Direction de la Statistique (2003).
9 Dialmy (1992) 40.
10 Bouddouft (2001) 74.
11 Le Point (23 March 1996).
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Fig. I: Cannabis production in Morocco is concentrated in the northern provinces enclosing the Rif
Mountains. Aerial surveys conducted in 2003 and 2004 by the UNODC and the Moroccan
Government covered most of this area. The surveys estimate that 96,600 households or some
800,000 people are involved in cannabis cultivation; 66% of rural households in the survey area.
Cannabis cultivation covers 27% of arable land in that area, or some 120,500 ha. Gross canna-
bis production is set at 98,000 tons; potential resin production at 2,760 tons.Total farmer income
from cannabis is estimated at €263 million; €2,700 per household; €330 per capita, 0.7% of
GDP. Annual turnover of international trade in cannabis resin is estimated at €10.8 billion
(UNODC 2004). No recent data is available to show how much of this enters the Moroccan econ-
omy. Cannabis cultivation has soared in recent decades, with the area under cultivation almost doub-
ling every ten years, and a 10% decline over 2003/2004.This map has been adapted from Perry-
Castañeda Library Map Collection.
to activities with international ramifications, substantial activities are thought to include
the smuggling of stolen vehicles from Europe, prostitution, and the trafficking of women
and illegal migrants to Europe.12 However, the largest activity in the illegal sector by far
is the production, processing and export of cannabis products. In economic terms, the
cannabizz contributes $263 million to the households of some 100,000 farmer families
and – according to an old estimate – brings in approximately 1.5 billion euros in foreign
exchange.13 That would make it Morocco’s largest export sector, and the business has
been growing since (see fig. I).
There are important links between the various sections of the hidden economy, bet-
ween the hidden economy and the formal economy, and between the operation of these
economic sectors and that of the state. For example, import smuggling is widely belie-
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ved to be financed with drug earnings, whereas the smuggled commodities are ultima-
tely sold through the informal sector. However, drug earnings will also partly be invested
in legal enterprises and boost consumption. On the other hand, formal businesses may
have to compete with the various sections of the hidden economy: smuggled goods,
non-protected labour, non-fiscalized activities, and investments with dirty money that
may be cheaper to obtain and that will tend to be less concerned with profit margins.
To the extent that the formal and underground economy compete with each other, cer-
tain of their characteristics are likely to become similar.
Since the modern legal sector and Morocco’s state bureaucracy cannot generate
employment for a large part of the population, the informal, illegal sector has become
the main conduit for their survival strategies.Yet part of the expansion and operation of
the hidden economy is more directly related to the way the state performs its regulato-
ry roles. In fact, many of these informal and illegal activities flourish thanks to rather than
in spite of government-induced market imperfections. Outdated governmental regula-
tions aimed at protecting local industry, controlling economic actors and filling state cof-
fers may benefit some actors, but they also lead to artificial scarcities, inefficient resour-
ce allocation, high transaction costs and tariff-induced price rises.The latter effects are
partly remedied by smuggling, tax evasion and other types of illicit behaviour. World
Bank studies insist that the protection of labour also tends to lead to similar outcomes,
inflating the number of people employed in the informal sector.14 Such responses under-
cut society’s capacity to regulate the economy and set norms for business behaviour and
exposing local industry to the competition of foreign imports.What is more, they erode
the fiscal ability of the state to provide basic services to the wider population.
Accordingly, there are also important qualitative and distributional consequences to the
expansion of such activities.The remainder of this essay will scrutinize more closely the
links between informal and illegal practices and the functioning of the state.
Ambivalences of the law
Having a large part of its population reliant on the hidden economy presents the
Moroccan state with very serious problems.The people dependent on the hidden econ-
omy are a political force to be reckoned with, and simply enforcing the laws on drugs,
smuggling, taxation and other regulations is not only beyond the administrative capaci-
ty of the state but politically dangerous as well. Uprisings in Nador and Tétouan in 1984
were closely linked to discontent among smuggling networks.15 Their opposition could
become yet more politicized as shown by the Algerian experience, where the FIS initi-
ally drew firm support from the informal sector.16 In the Moroccan context, the infor-
mal or illegal economy is generally perceived as a cushion that absorbs much of the
potential for social conflict, yet fears have been expressed that drug barons could associ-
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16 Luis Martinez (1995) provides an account of how the clash between the modern and the
informal/traditional has divided Algeria.
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ate with political movements such as Islamic fundamentalism or Berber insurrectionism
to finance an armed front in opposition to and as a defence against the state.
Turning a blind eye to import smuggling, the cannabis trade and the informal sector
has long been perceived as acceptable, since it was thought that what the state lost in
taxes and support from legal industries would be compensated in social and political sta-
bility.17 Yet in reality such a laissez-faire attitude is likely to produce economic, political
and financial powers that could challenge the authority and legitimacy of the govern-
ment. These powers surely weigh heavily on a society which lacks the means to set
norms for business operations or social and political ascendancy. This means that seri-
ously antagonizing the permanent hidden sector may only accelerate such opposition
and further endanger social stability.
However, once a decision is taken to manage outlawed activities instead of repressing
them, it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish between legal and institutional
practices and those that are illegal and informal. The contradictions arising from this
approach may be difficult to contain when the informal and illicit sectors outgrow the
legal and institutional ones.This may imply an increasing convergence between business
conduct in both sectors, and between business and government practices. To a certain
extent, both sectors compete with each other and feed off each other’s existence. State
agents seeking to manage these sectors are obliged to strike deals with outlawed market
actors.18 This is particularly true of the management of the cannabis industry. Unlike the
informal sector that largely comprises precarious economic activities and is highly dis-
persed and incoherent, the cannabis sector is concentrated in the northern provinces and
generates large sums of money for some of its higher-level operators. In the informal and
underground economy, there are formal rules and regulations that could be enforced to
set norms for business operations as well as for the activities of government institutions.
Such a legal alternative is altogether absent in the cannabis sector. Here the state formally
forfeited most of its regulatory capacities, since international treaties now prohibit the
sector and effectively also its regulation.19
Despite prohibition, drug entrepreneurs and state officials still seek to engage with
each other in order to organize the production and trade in cannabis products, as well as
to regulate the investment and distribution of the proceeds from the drug trade.
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18 For an analysis of how the growth of illicit enterprise can influence the behaviour and attitu-
des of actors in legal sectors of the economy, in politics and in society see e.g. Simon Strong
(1995) on Colombia. For Morocco, I know of no research that fully addresses the social conse-
quences of how the relations between drug money and state power influence patterns of security
for the wider population.Abdessamad Dialmy (1992) and Najib Akesbi (1997) give us an impres-
sion of how this informalization has influenced attitudes in Moroccan society.Arbitrary state
power, the ascendancy of parallel power structures (Makhzen) and a faltering enforcement of
(outdated) business regulations, if not a complete absence of such regulations, appear to have
been the rule rather than the exception in the Moroccan political economy (see e.g. Philippe
Brachet, 1992). Or rather, such arbitrariness may be at the heart of the political system’s control
of the economy and society (Béatrice Hibou, 1995).
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Exchanges between the two also prevent the collapse of state institutions in the northern
region. Under the present prohibition regime, however, many such regulatory activities
towards the drug trade resemble extortion, the running of protection rackets and the
arbitrary use of violence rather than the enforcement of a social contract between the
state and wider society.The money extracted from the drug industry generally does not
end up in the state treasury and cannot therefore be used for budget outlays that bene-
fit the general public. Operators of the drug trade who do enjoy protection are selected
on the basis of their loyalties to the political regime and its parallel power structure, the
Makhzen, as well as on their willingness to buy such services. The selection of targets
against which repressive state powers are mustered seems to be determined by the inver-
se criteria.
This means that, no matter how primitive, at least some basic regulatory functions are
performed in a sector where the organization of production and trade has to deal with
unprotected property rights, difficulties in contract enforcement and the persecution and
exploitation of its workforce.Yet many of the institutions through which formal rights
and obligations could be established for drug traders and their regulators have been abo-
lished by prohibition. Their dealings fall outside the institutions for public decision-
making and lack the normative guidelines and transparency through which citizens
could make them responsive to their needs. Justice therefore tends to be the first victim
of law enforcement practices in this field.They strengthen the political order and enrich
the criminal justice system, but leave wider society defenceless against impositions by
both of these free-floating state and market forces.
Coercive campaigns 
The problems Moroccan society faces in controlling both the drug trade and its regula-
tors may in the end not be all that different from the conditions it faces in making its
government and economy responsive to its needs. Problematic relations between the law,
the economy and social justice, as we have seen, also pertain to the large informal sector
and the import-smuggling sector. It could even be argued that the modalities by which
the state and the hidden sector constitute each other do not differ greatly from the ways
in which power, wealth and coercion also operate in the legal sectors of the country’s
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19 The international prohibition regime is rooted in a number of international treaties that
require signatory states to adapt their national laws to the treaties’ stipulations. Of these, the 1961
UN Convention and its 1972 Protocol, the 1971 UN Convention and the 1988 (Vienna) UN
Convention are the most important.The first set out a maximum 25-year period within which
states had to withdraw their regulatory functions over that part of the cannabis trade that was not
for medical use, and take action against it (1961,Article 49 f. and g.).The 1988
Convention aimed to bring a whole series of drug-related practices under criminal law, such as
money laundering and organized crime.These UN treaties are amended by bilateral and 
multilateral treaties that establish the terms of cooperation in the field of drug control.The 
signing of these treaties is one of the conditionalities the EU imposes on the countries with
which it enters into an association agreement. In practice, truly unilateral enforcement activities
also take place, in which law enforcement officers try to collect incriminating information
beyond their jurisdiction.
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political economy. As Béatrice Hibou asserts, the delinquent economy should not be
seen as a marginal symptom of a dysfunctional economy; it is better understood as an
integral part of the economic system, functioning at the heart of Morocco’s political
economy.20 Yet, although the modality of rule over the hidden economy shows impor-
tant similarities with such practices in other fields of social, political and economic life,
there are also important differences.These can be illustrated by means of a brief com-
parison of the sanitization campaign with the wars on drugs.
In the 1990s, or to be more specific in 1992 and 1995-96, Morocco launched several
coercive campaigns against drugs, smuggling, corruption and other such practices, inclu-
ding fraud and tax evasion. Guilain Denoeux gives four broad motives for this wides-
pread use of force against activities and actors that for decades had largely been tolera-
ted with impunity.21 Firstly, the government tried to pre-empt criticism and protect its
international image with an eye to future relations with international creditors (the
World Bank) and the European Union. Secondly, the Makhzen set out to reassert con-
trol over the sources of wealth in the country and its economic actors by eliminating
potential challenges to its control.Thirdly, the campaigns were aimed at enhancing the
government’s legitimacy in the face of the threat of losing initiative to opposition move-
ments. Fourthly, they followed fiscal imperatives, aiming to diminish the budget deficit.
The campaigns were orchestrated by the Ministry of the Interior, which put severe
pressure on the business community and parts of the bureaucracy in order to ‘moralize’
their behaviour and bring it back into line with long-neglected regulations.Their exe-
cution can only marginally be understood as law enforcement, which would have requi-
red it to be impartial and guided by procedures of the judicial system and less by politi-
cal concerns. Rather than seeking retribution or redress for past behaviour, the means
chosen were aimed at enhancing the willingness of people in business and the bureau-
cracy to abide by established rules and regulations. Many people were arrested and
brought to trial. However, they constituted only a relatively small group of offenders,
whereas some notorious lawbreakers were left untouched.The campaign did partly suc-
ceed, in that it left large sections of the business community in fear and near-paralysis,
and sparked negotiations with the state. This resulted in a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ by
which the regime agreed to call off the sanitization campaign in order to give entrepre-
neurs more time to adjust to new conditions, and to make it possible to update laws and
regulations on taxation and imports.22 Tax receipts increased considerably thanks to this
campaign, which enabled the government to agree a new social contract with the
employers’ syndicate and with the labour unions, resulting in a 10% increase in the mini-
mum wage and public sector salaries.23
The targeting of the drug trade was less sophisticated. It eliminated those operators
that were considered potentially disloyal to the throne, most of whom were based in the
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22 Denoeux (1998)106.
23 Denoeux (1997)118.
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Rif, siphoning of their wealth and concentrating the management of the drug trade in
well-oiled and better connected networks closer to the central power structure.24 The
drug campaigns were also much more brutal than those against other sectors.The num-
ber of people arrested on drug charges rose from just under 9,000 in 1991 to some
19,300 in 1995. Unlike the ‘sanitization campaign’, the drug wars did not bring about
any civilizing improvement in state-society relations.They failed to set norms for busin-
ess operations and for the way the state should perform its regulatory functions in
extraction and protection. Nor did they set limits on the use of coercion in their dea-
lings with the sector.The sanitization campaign did bring about some circularity in state-
society relations, providing better social protection at least to some sections of the popu-
lation in exchange for more discipline in compliance with tax and other regulations. In
the Rif, however, the provision of such protective services to the wider population has
largely been made dependent on generous donations by the European Union and its
member states.This is not particularly helpful in enabling Morocco to bring the canna-
bis trade under normative regulations.
The nature of rule
Informal decision-making mechanisms, patronage networks and primordial relations and
obligations continue to constitute the main ingredients of the power structure in
Morocco.Although Morocco has a parliament and elections are held regularly, it remains
in essence a patrimonial state. Many observers illustrate this by pointing out the auto-
cratic, central authority – embodied in the king – that subordinates all other political
institutions, whether legislative, executive or juridical.25 The monarchic regime protects
its position of power and regulates social relations by playing off the interest groups
against each other. It incorporates or co-opts new social actors through ties of patrona-
ge, clientelism, traditionalism, neo-patrimonialism and the like. It keeps a firm grip on
key government ministries, and directly controls the military and other security agen-
cies.This produces a political system that is hard to separate from the economic system.
Economic and political power are fused within multi-layered networks through which
administrative privileges and opportunities for wealth creation are exchanged and distri-
buted. Political control over economic actors still mainly serves to protect the privileges
of a relatively small elite who, together with the royal court, form a power structure
superimposed on the state, the Makhzen.The concentration of power and wealth within
this ruling elite effectively blocks the ascent of new social and economic forces.
In such a system, where the extraction function is to a large extent based on informal
levies, basic rights are for sale and fiscal obligations can be paid off.26 In a system where
those institutions that could make government transparent and accountable are sidelin-
ed by an informal power structure, the very concept of what is legal and what is illegal
are bound to be highly contestable. In a system where the government does not shy away
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26 Akesbi (1997), Dialbi (1992).
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from abusing the law to further its goals, law enforcement may be closer to repression
than to the enforcement of a social contract between state and citizens. In a system
where a government fails to provide justice, many crimes may be understood as forms
of self-help.27 In a system where the state fails to provide protection and citizens have as
much difficulty finding protection by the law as from the law, they cannot be expected
to pay up voluntarily without feeling that the state owes them something in return.
Nevertheless, the sanitization campaign has shown that, even in Morocco, there is a way
out of this deadlock.
At the time of writing, a majority in Dutch parliament is once again preparing to
demand that the government formally regulates the production and trade of cannabis in
the Netherlands.A similar proposal was vetoed by the cabinet in 2001.Acknowledging
that the Netherlands is also engaged in a long and difficult fight to bring coercive state
powers and exploitative market ventures under control might help generate a greater
understanding of the problems Moroccan society is facing in this respect. This notion
may be all the more important since the large majority of Moroccan immigrants living
in the Netherlands originate from the Rif. I believe it would be interesting to research
the extent to which the notorious lack of cohesion in the Moroccan community and
the many difficulties it faces in establishing a social contract with Dutch state and socie-
ty are related to obstacles brought about by the prohibition of the main economic acti-
vities that link the Rif to European countries. It may be that the failure to establish insti-
tutions that could have mediated conflicts of interest in their country of origin by defi-
ning and enforcing mutual rights and obligations between state, market and society, is
being replicated in the Netherlands. In this situation, the preservation of a social taboo
regarding the role and importance of the cannabis trade is not very helpful. Mustering
countervailing powers requires civil society institutions through which civic rights and
obligations can be enforced.These institutions cannot exist without some sort of autho-
rity like the state to protect them.
27 Black (1983).
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Hein de Haas
The social and cultural impact of emigration 
on Moroccan communities: a review
Introduction 
Over the past four decades, Morocco has evolved into one of the world’s leadingemigration countries. Since the mid-1960s, Morocco has experienced large-scale
migration of mostly unskilled workers to Western Europe.The migrants primarily went
to France, but also increasingly to the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and, since the
mid-1980s, Spain and Italy. Following the economic recession and the tightening of
immigration policies after the 1973 oil crisis, relatively few Moroccan migrants have
returned to their country of origin. Migrant networks, combined with a sustained
demand for migrant labour, explain why policies aiming at curbing migration have had
only limited effects. Although most migrants originate from Morocco’s three main
migration belts, the Rif, the Sous, and the southeastern oases, there has been a process
of spatial diffusion in which more and more rural and, increasingly, urban areas have
become firmly integrated in the Euro-Mediterranean migration system.
Moroccans form not only one of the largest, but also one of the most dispersed
migrant communities in Western Europe. From a total population of 30 million, over 2.2
million people of Moroccan descent were living abroad in 2005.The actual number may
be substantially higher because of substantial undocumented migration. Moreover, the
figure does not include the approximately 700,000 Jews of Moroccan descent living in
Israel. France is home to the largest number of legal residents of Moroccan descent
(more than 1,025,000).This is followed by Spain (397,000), the Netherlands (315,000),
Italy (287,000), Belgium (215,000), and Germany (99,000). Smaller communities live in
Scandinavian countries (17,000), the United Kingdom (50,000), the United States
(85,000), and the Canadian province of Quebec (70,000).1
There is a lively and wide-ranging theoretical debate on the effect of migration on
development in source areas. Despite its status as one of the world’s leading emigration
countries, empirical evidence from Morocco has been largely absent from this debate2
Recent theoretical insights concerning migration and development are largely based on
micro studies carried out in Latin America, particularly Mexico. Most of the empirical
studies that have been conducted in Morocco have remained isolated and largely
unknown, especially outside the French-speaking world. Consequently, recent attempts
to review migration impacts in Morocco have ignored most earlier, Francophone empi-
rical work.3
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3 Leichtman (2002) and Nyberg-Sørensen (2004).
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It would be erroneous to see or depict migration as a purely economic phenomenon.4
In terms of its causes and consequences, migration is also a largely social and cultural
event.The social and cultural dimensions of migration cannot realistically be separated
from its economic aspects.The fact that migrants send remittances is itself an expression
of the close social bonds they tend to maintain with family members in the home coun-
try.5 Through its effects on socio-ethnic stratification, migration may also challenge tra-
ditionally established power relations and the functioning of village institutions.This may
also affect economic production, especially where agriculture is collectively managed.
Changing value systems and social stratification can also affect the extent to which the
social and economic benefits – and costs – of migration are distributed among ethnic
groups, households, and sexes.
Moreover, the very social and cultural changes that are driven by migration are them-
selves likely to affect future propensities to migrate. In this context, the literature refers
to a ‘culture of migration’ in which international migration is associated with personal,
social, and material success, where migration has become the norm rather than the
exception, and staying home associated with failure.This cultural connotation is often
said to generate its own dynamic by further strengthening migration propensities. It has
even been argued that migration can be characterized as a modern rite de passage.6
The aim of this paper is to address the social and cultural impact of international
migration on migrant sending communities in Morocco.This is done through a review
of part of the empirical literature, which has mainly been published in the form of con-
ference proceedings, theses, reports, or books with limited distribution.The paper will
focus on the extent to which we can speak of a culture of migration in Moroccan
migrant-sending communities, and on this culture’s characteristics.
Migration, inequality and social stratification 
There is evidence that the inflow of remittances substantially contributes to income
growth and poverty alleviation in Morocco.7 In addition to bringing about considerable
reductions in poverty, the remarkably reliable remittance transfers have improved living
conditions and housing, enhanced incomes and education, and spurred economic acti-
vity through investments in agriculture, real estate, and business. This has transformed
migrant-sending regions into relatively prosperous areas that now attract internal ‘rever-
se’ migrants, although the developmental potential of migration has not been fully rea-
lized because of several structural constraints, such as corruption, excessive bureaucracy,
and a general lack of trust in governments on both sides of the Mediterranean.8
In relative terms, the middle and higher classes profit more from remittances than
groups that have the lowest incomes because migration has itself proved to be a selecti-
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ve process, as most Moroccan migrants do not generally belong to the poorest groups.9
In regions having high outward international migration, the contribution to income
growth can be far higher. In several communities in Morocco’s three main migration
belts, one-fifth to over a half of all households has at least one member who has migra-
ted abroad. One study in the Todgha valley found that the average international migrant
household’s income was 2.5 times higher than the non-migrant household’s income.10
It is a common assumption that migrants are less inclined to remit as they become
integrated in the host societies, as family reunification increases, and as their family obli-
gations back home decrease. However, this decline is much more protracted and the
slope of decline in these perceived obligations is flatter than was once assumed.Trans-
national bonds are more durable than was previously thought, and sending communities
continually renew the remittance potential through new migration.11
As further evidence of their attachment to the sending communities, migrants also
establish many ‘home town’ and development associations. Such ‘development networks’
play an increasingly important role in sending regions; for example, through the esta-
blishment of public infrastructure such as road construction, electricity, drinking water,
irrigation systems, mills, and dams, as well as social development projects such as com-
munity centres, literacy projects, schools and dormitories, and mosques. Other projects
aim at improving local economies; these include workshops, women’s co-operatives,
handicraft groups, vegetable oil and milk productives and tourist development projects.12
Until recently, the operational freedom of migrant association activities used to be very
restricted, but increasing civil liberties in Morocco in the 1990s have led to a remarka-
ble increase in such activities.
Aside from their profound effect on regional economies, migration and remittances
have also changed the social face of many communities. Both internal and international
migration have played a pivotal role in the ‘landslide of social, political and economic
changes’ currently being experienced in rural Morocco.13 Migration is not only an
attempt to secure a better livelihood, but also a clear avenue to upward social mobility.
For instance, in addition to improving the economic well-being and quality of life, the
construction of a house – a typical investment priority for migrants – is also an expres-
sion of the newly acquired social status. Likewise, migrants’ contributions to the renova-
tion or construction of mosques, as well as the hadj, the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca,
not only fulfil an intrinsic religious function, but also add to their social prestige.
Migration has accelerated the breakdown of ancient socio-ethnic hierarchies in
migrant-sending communities. In fact, in rural Morocco, migration has often contribu-
ted to the creation of a new social stratification, with international migrant households
forming a new kind of ‘migration elite’.14 In many respects the new socio-economic
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10 De Haas (2003), Schoorl et al.(2000) xv.
11 Collyer (2004), De Haas (2003), and Saa (2003).
12 Lacroix (2005), Gallina (2004).
13 Crawford (2001) 21.
14 Fadloullah et al. (2000) XXII, Mter (1995).
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dividing line in Moroccan migrant-sending communities is now between households
that receive international remittance income and those that do not.15 On the basis of
such observations it could be concluded that migration and remittances cause increasing
intra-community inequality. However, there is an apparent absence of formal, statistical
tests on the effect of migration on income inequality in Moroccan communities. We
know from the literature that this impact is heterogeneous and highly contingent on
migration selectivity and migration stage.16 We should therefore be extremely prudent
to conclude that migration has increased inequality based on rather superficial observa-
tions.
Furthermore, it is important to avoid romanticizing the past.We must acknowledge
that traditional communities tended to be inherently unequal. In southern oases, for
instance, with their caste-like socio-ethnic stratification, most people lived in grinding
poverty, while subaltern, generally ‘black’ ethnic groups such as the haratin and abid were
restricted to serfdom or slavery.17 Now, however, new forms of inequality have arisen.
These are based mainly on access to monetary resources, which are to a considerable
extent defined along the lines of access to international migration. The new forms of
inequality have been largely superimposed on the traditional forms of structural, here-
ditary inequality, which are based on kinship, complexion, and land possession.The rise
of new elite groups is often accompanied by the relative demise of traditional ones.This
exemplifies the ambiguity and subjectivity entailed in judging whether such migration-
induced shifts should be regarded as beneficial or adverse.
For several formerly subaltern groups, migration literally constituted their liberation
and has been their main avenue to upward socio-economic mobility. Migration and
remittances have at least partially enabled emancipation for individuals belonging to
socially and ethnically subaltern groups. Throughout Morocco, migration has offered
new opportunities to earn money outside the constraints set by traditional peasant socie-
ty. Formerly landless and hence powerless men now earn wages that allow them to buy
land and gain increasing influence in local affairs.18 In Moroccan oases, their new finan-
cial resources have enabled many haratin to acquire a higher social status.19 These migra-
tion-induced shifting patterns or sometimes complete reversals of social stratification
explain why even individuals belonging to traditional high-status groups, who had not
thought about migrating, now aspire to emigrate abroad.20
Consequently, members of formerly subaltern groups increasingly reject traditional
authoritarian structures. Nowadays, they often refuse to work as sharecroppers or agri-
cultural labourers for traditional elite groups.21 Moreover, the jema‘as or traditional vil-
lage councils (the most important local political institutions) have lost much of their
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18 Crawford (2001), Otte (2000).
19 Ilahiane (2001), Bellakhdar et al. (1992), Ensel (1999), Mter (1995), and Naim (1997).
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effective power to settle intra-community conflicts and organize collective labour.22 An
unfortunate consequence for traditional agriculture is that collective agricultural tasks,
such as maintenance of irrigation systems, may not be carried out properly; moreover,
common law that regulates land and water use has become less respected.23 Especially in
fragile anthropogenic labour-intensive agricultural systems, such as traditional oases and
mountain terraces, the short-term result may be a general decline in traditional agricul-
tural systems and land degradation. Nevertheless, in the longer term, migration and
remittances may also enable revitalization of agriculture through investments in land,
crops, and machinery.24
Migration, family life, and the position of the women left behind 
Intra-household relations in Morocco tend to be based on strong patriarchal principles.
Historically, only men have been allowed to migrate alone. Traditionally, migrants left
their wives and daughters behind with their extended family to guard the women’s
chastity. In this context DeMas interpreted remittances to the entire extended family
household as the price a migrant pays for this role.25 In this way, men were able to migra-
te without risking their family’s honour. In the past several decades, however, nuclear
family households have increasingly become the norm.
The impact of Moroccan migration on gender roles has received relatively scant atten-
tion, since most research focuses on the position of the – mostly male – migrants, and
interviews tend to be held with – supposedly male – ‘household heads’.26 The only
attention research has paid to women has been on the consequences of migration on
women’s well-being, and on conjugal and family life in general.This research, done by
predominantly male scholars, usually portrays these consequences in a negative light. For
example,Aït Hamza stated that migration 
‘has contributed to the desaggregation of traditional institutions, and to the devastation of society
without yet resulting in any female wellbeing ...The behaviour of international migrants has engen-
dered a disproportionate dream. Marrying a migrant has become the ideal of anyone. From their
side, the migrants ... indulge in the abuse of marriage, divorce and remarriage.’27
The position of migrants’ wives seems indeed vulnerable, as they may live under threat
of being repudiated by their spouses. This seems especially true for international
migrants, whose relative wealth can make it tempting to find a new and younger spou-
se in Morocco. Furthermore, the presumed lack of ‘paternal authority’ is said to increa-
se delinquency among youngsters.28 However, such assertions tend to be based on gene-
ral impressions rather than on systematic empirical inquiries.
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27 Aït Hamza (1995)159,164; translation from French by author.
28 Fadloullah et al.(2000) 130.
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It is a common assertion that migration has encouraged the emancipation of women.
In the absence of their husbands, women’s responsibilities, autonomy, and power have
been said to increase.29 However, it is a different and complicated question whether
women’s growing autonomy and responsibilities should be equated with women’s eman-
cipation or their increased well-being.A recent comparative study among non-migrants’
and migrants’ wives refuted the hypothesis that migration contributes to changing gen-
der roles.The lives of migrants’ wives remain largely confined to housekeeping, child-
rearing, and agricultural work.30 Although they tend to have more control over the use
of their husbands’ earnings and child-rearing, this gain in authority is mainly tempora-
ry, since migrants resume their position as patriarchs as soon as they return.31
Because the material situation of wives of international migrants is better and more
secure, and their power and status are increased with respect to non-migrant women,
they are generally able to hire non-migrant women and men for some domestic and
agricultural tasks, which eases their physical labour burden compared to other women.32
Spouses of international migrants generally gain in power and status vis-à-vis non-
migrant women. However, Steinmann33 argued that the increasing emphasis on a capi-
tal-based economy as well as the one-sided dependency on their husband’s remittances
have adversely affected women. Moreover, changes in gender roles are not necessarily
advantageous to women; for example, if, as a result of migration, women must perform
traditional male tasks such as harvesting, some of the younger men may refuse to work
in what has now become ‘women’s work’.34
Furthermore, the emotional burden of the increased responsibilities can be high.
Migrants’ wives do not necessarily appreciate the sudden increase in responsibilities and
tasks: they did not have to perform these within the normative context of traditional
society, and they did not always aspire to them.35 So, the rapid transformation of gender
roles can lead to feelings of shame and uneasiness with the new situation, especially for
the often illiterate women who were themselves raised in a strongly patriarchal context.
This explains why ‘emancipation’ is not always regarded as a positive experience by the
women themselves.
As these new roles are generally not assumed voluntarily, but are forced upon women
by the situation, these developments should not automatically be equated with emanci-
pation in the sense of making conscious, independent choices against the prevailing
norms of gender roles. Migration itself apparently has no direct influence, or only a limi-
ted one, on such norms. Gradual changes in these norms and the improving position of
women reflect general processes of cultural change within Moroccan society rather than
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any particular effect of migration.36
There may, however, be less visible, more indirect and long-term effects of migration
on the position of women. First, international migration seems to have a positive influ-
ence on the educational participation of migrants’ daughters.Two different empirical stu-
dies indicate that despite the fact that international migration has not been – or hardly
been – selective for education, international migrants’ children are better educated than
children in non-migrant households.37 Furthermore, both studies suggest that this has
also favourably impacted on young women, and that international migration therefore
plays an accelerating role in closing the gender gap in education.
Besides factors such as a higher age for marriage, increased female labour force parti-
cipation, and improved education, the migration of Moroccan families to European
countries may have contributed to the diffusion and adoption of European marriage pat-
terns and small family norms. In this way migration may have accelerated Morocco’s
demographic transition.38
Migration, and the nucleation and spatial segregation of family life 
Migration-related tensions on remittance use are said to have played an accelerating role
in the breakdown of extended families and the nucleation of family life. Nevertheless, it
is difficult to disentangle the specific role of migration from the general tendency in
Moroccan society towards the establishment of nuclear families along with the decline
of the traditional extended families.
Migration and remittances tend to motivate and enable migrants’ spouses to establish
independent households in newly-constructed houses for their nuclear family, thereby
escaping control by in-laws and gaining personal freedom.39 Migration is seen as a major
cause of the generally increased divorce rates and the increasing number of female-hea-
ded households in Morocco. One study found that the proportion of female-headed
households among migrant households is almost double that among non-migrant hou-
seholds,15 percent as against 8 percent.40 One recent study concluded that, mainly
because of migration, female-headed households accounted for one-third of all the hou-
seholds interviewed.41
Women’s quest for autonomy is a major, but often neglected explanation for the high
priority given to investing in housing by migrant households: all Moroccan migration
impact studies agree that housing construction is the migrants’ first investment priori-
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and North America are female (De Haas 2005a; Salih 2001).This feminization of Moroccan
labour migration also seems to be the result of general economic, social, and cultural change in
Morocco.
37 Bencherifa (1996) 418-9, De Haas (2003) 325-335.
38 Courbage (1995), Fargues (2004).
39 De Haas (2005b).
40 Fadloullah et al. (2000) 130.
41 De Haas (2003).
opm marokko 3  20-06-2006  15:14  Pagina 130
ty.42 In migrant-sending areas throughout Morocco, a building fever has transformed
some villages into towns, where migrants also prefer to locate their other investments.43
Researchers and policy makers tend to lament the migrants’ priority for real estate
investments, their ‘mentalité de pierre’ (stone mentality).44 The researchers almost ‘accu-
se’ international migrants of building large, richly-ornamented houses in an ‘exaggera-
ted’ urban style that reflects an ‘irrational’ use of money for unnecessary status symbols.45
This discourse is typically accompanied by a call for policies to ‘divert remittances to
productive sectors of the economy’ by ‘guiding’ migrants towards more ‘rational’ invest-
ment behaviour.46
Yet there is good reason to criticize this attitude as patronizing because it blames the
migrants’ irrational mentality a priori rather than trying to comprehend their motives.47
Houses do indeed seem to function as a status symbol, expressing the upward social
mobility achieved through migration,48 although some researchers have argued that the
luxury of migrants’ houses is often exaggerated as a result of superficial obervations.49
However, it appears to be mistaken to reduce the desire to construct houses as a quest
to erect status symbols. There is evidence that migrants’ real estate investments can be
highly rewarding and relatively low-risk investment in a relatively insecure investment
environment, and they potentially enable migrant households to secure and increase
their income. Moreover, home ownership tends to provide ‘life insurance’ for migrant
households.50 The importance attached to housing is primarily motivated by a universal
quest for space, safety – especially for protection against earthquakes and flooding –, pri-
vacy, reduction of family conflicts, and better health. In fact, by suggesting that migrants
should stay in their mud brick houses, wealthy and urban-based social scientists apply
other standards to them than they would probably do to themselves. Hajjarabi has poin-
ted to the legitimacy of the desire for decent housing and basic hygienic facilities, which
have a direct and favourable positive impact on the quality of family life.51 Such impro-
vements in living conditions are particularly appreciated by women who are usually con-
fined to household tasks.
It is equally important not to ignore more specific social and cultural reasons for the
priority on housing construction. In extended families remittances are generally not sent
directly to the migrant’s wife, but to one of the men within the household.52 This situ-
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ation generates numerous conflicts between migrants’ wives and their in-laws.53 Because
the wives expect to gain significantly in personal liberty and privacy, the wish to have
their own house is a top priority. In their very architectural design, traditional houses
reflect patriarchal norms and the domination of the mother-in-law, and hence impede
private nuclear family life.54
This is an incentive for migrants’ nuclear families to establish their own households by
constructing a new house either in the native village or in nearby towns. Besides incre-
asing the personal liberty of migrant wives, it can also be an effective strategy for
migrants to escape from the heavy financial burden of supporting large extended fami-
lies. Household tensions about how the remittances are used seem to accelerate the
break-up of extended families and the nucleation of family life, as well as physically sepa-
rating the nuclear family members from their extended families.55 This may take the
form of building their own house in the village, transferring the family from the village
to nearby towns, or family reunification abroad.
Studies conducted in both north and south Morocco indicate that not only returning
migrants prefer to transfer their nuclear households, i.e. spouse and children, to towns;
many of those who are still abroad prefer to do so as well.56 The presence of public ser-
vices and economic opportunities enter into the decision to relocate the entire family
to towns, as well as the frequent occurrence of conflicts between the migrant’s spouse
and her in-laws. Another important factor is to avoid material claims by the migrants’
extended families.57 Remittance-enabled investments in children’s education may also
motivate nuclear migrant households to move to towns with educational facilities.58
Finally, the above processes of family nucleation and extended-family tensions also
provide an incentive for migrants’ nuclear households to opt for family reunification.The
ultimate wish of a migrant’s wife is generally family reunification abroad. The relative
power of women tends to increase significantly with family reunification, not only
because women generally enjoy more rights in Europe, but also because it allows them
to gain independent residence permits and social security rights after three to five
years.59 Along with progressive nucleation of Moroccan family life, there is an increasing
tendency towards reunification of households as soon as legally possible, in contrast to
the former ‘guest worker’ pattern of many years or even decades of separation.60
A culture of migration? 
Migration and close confrontation with other cultural models also have a profound
influence on local culture and perceptions of those who live in the migrant sending
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communities. International migrants have often become role models in these commu-
nities.61 The migrants’ annual massive return during summer holidays and the exposure
of those who stayed behind to the relative wealth of the migrants and their direct rela-
tives have increased the sense of deprivation and aspirations of those who stayed.62
Replacing the importance of the sowing and harvest seasons in autumn and spring is the
July-August holiday season, which is now the yearly economic and cultural peak season,
when markets are at their busiest and most marriage feasts take place.
One study found that migration had increased the use and knowledge of Arabic in a
Berber-speaking community. Paradoxically, this had also led to an increased conscious-
ness of, pride in, and affection for the mother tongue.63 Moreover, migration is said to
influence local tastes and styles, which is especially apparent in the construction of
urban-style houses and villas by migrants.64
There is hardly any research on the impact of migration on local religious life in
Morocco, although these are potentially important factors.65 In the south Moroccan
Todgha valley, internal and international migrants have played an accelerating role in the
rise of orthodox, relatively puritan Islam, which is not fundamentalist but clearly devia-
tes from the declining popular Islam. On their return from cities and abroad, labour
migrants as well as students tend to criticize allegedly pre-Islamic practices of popular
Islam in rural, often Berber, areas. Among these practices are the veneration of marabuts
(local saints) and mountains, sorcery, the tradition of ahidus (mixed dancing and music
making during village feasts), and the traditional custom of tattooing women’s faces and
bodies. Indeed, most of these practices are rapidly declining under the combined influ-
ence of migration, formal education, state-controlled mosques, and the media, which are
all channels for promoting the ‘correct’ version of Islam. It is nonetheless difficult to
distinguish the influence of migration from other influences, which are likely to be more
important.66
One comparative study of migration from Ghana, Senegal, Turkey, Egypt and
Morocco concluded that Morocco had the strongest migration tradition and that migra-
tion had become an ‘all-pervasive phenomenon’ in Morocco.67 Many have characterized
the exposure to migrants’ relative success, wealth, and status symbols as giving rise to a
‘culture of migration’. International migration is perceived as the main or only avenue
to upward socio-economic mobility. Ambitions, life projects, and dreams are generally
situated elsewhere in people’s thoughts.68 It is commonly believed that migrants tend to
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exaggerate their success, and that economic and social problems or outright failure are
generally hidden, which would create exaggerated images of social and economic
opportunities in Europe. For many young people, the question is not so much whether
to migrate, but rather when and how to migrate.The hopes of many young non-migrants
are focused on marriage to an international migrant as the most secure way of migra-
ting abroad.
This fixation on migration is said to be so overwhelming that in Moroccan migrant
sending areas a large number of young men are not only jobless but are not even loo-
king for work.69 Many non-migrants think that it is a good choice for their daughters
to marry a migrant.70 Migration culture is also strong among women who are often still
dependent on men to achieve this ambition.71
In this way migration has increased feelings of relative deprivation among those who
have not migrated, and stimulates the desire to migrate among them. Nevertheless, it is
not only material factors that incite people to leave: migration tends to be associated
with the idea of personal liberty.72 Confronted with economic stagnation and political
and social lack of freedom and insecurity, as well as a general lack of prospects for the
future, many young people aspire to live in open, democratic societies in which they
have more possibilities for personal development.
The perception that migration is the ultimate road to social and material well-being is
further encouraged by special programmes on national television that interview success-
ful Moroccans abroad.73 In the 1990s satellite dishes penetrated even in Morocco’s smal-
lest and most remote villages; the almost universal availability of television has intensi-
fied confrontation with alternative cultural models and the economic affluence usually
depicted on foreign channels.74
This positive image of ‘elsewhere’ and ‘the other’, combined with circumstances of
economic stagnation and high unemployment in Morocco, accounts for why migration
is often seen as the main avenue for upward social mobility.75 It has been commonly
argued that migrants create an unrealistic perception of Europe as an Eldorado of almost
unlimited opportunities.76 The media and the tendency for migrants to show off during
holidays and to conceal their failures would have created overly optimistic images of life
in Europe among non-migrants. However, the simple fact that salaries in Europe easily
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exceed Moroccan salaries by five to ten times, as well as the prospect of increased per-
sonal freedom and access to public health care, education, and social security seem to
justify the strong desire to migrate at least to a significant extent.77 Even the prospect of
becoming an undocumented migrant does not discourage many people. Prospective
migrants are rightly optimistic about their chances of obtaining legal status, given the
fact that, over the past decades, a large proportion of previously undocumented
Moroccan migrants have succeeded in obtaining residence permits through legalization
or marriage.78 The massive legalization campaign in Spain in 2005 further justified pros-
pective migrants’ optimism.
Furthermore, there is good reason to question the uncritical way the culture of migra-
tion has been viewed as a reified entity and subsequently projected onto perceived rea-
lities. For example, in a recent quantitative study of the role of migration culture and net-
works in perpetuating Moroccan migration, migration culture was included in the
model as a dummy variable. It was assumed that regions with established traditions of
high international out-migration ‘had’ a migration culture and regions without such a
tradition did not ‘have’ one.79
Apart from making for obvious measurement problems, the term ‘culture of migra-
tion’ itself can be misleading because it suggests that rising aspirations and an outward-
oriented mentality are mainly the consequence of exposure to the perceived success of
migrants. It is important, however, to recognize that migration itself is a constituent part
of a complex set of radical social, cultural, and economic transformations that have affec-
ted Morocco, as well as an independent factor in perpetuating and probably intensify-
ing, magnifying, and accelerating these processes at the local and regional levels.
Migration is not only a factor that explains change, it is also an integral part of change
itself, to the same degree that it may also enable further change. Other processes, such as
improved education, increasing exposure to electronic media, improved infrastructure,
and increased tourism also play key roles in opening people’s eyes to the wider world
and helping to raise aspirations. Since these are part of more general and universal pro-
cesses, ‘culture of migration’ is perhaps not the most appropriate term to use.
The socio-cultural impact of migration tends to receive a bad press. Migration is said
to have caused people to disdain local wages and manual, particularly agricultural, labour,
and has led to agricultural decline.80 It has often been hypothesized that, as a conse-
quence of the migration culture, young people cannot imagine that their own initiati-
ves will lead to any local improvements; they do not believe they can build a future in
Morocco.81 The ensuing passivity and unwillingness to work and invest is evaluated as
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harmful to regional development. But empirical evidence for this is mixed, and some
evidence points to the contrary. At least in some communities migration and remittan-
ces have in fact led to increased local economic activities, although presumably not at
levels sufficient to respond to the even faster increased aspirations.82
Fadloullah et al. stated that migration culture can become ‘a collective psychosis [in
which] the group becomes almost totally obsessed by the idea of leaving, at any price.’83
But this seems to be a caricature if we consider the empirical facts. According to their
own survey, 29 percent of men intended to emigrate, but only 3 percent had underta-
ken concrete steps in that direction. Moreover, the survey is likely to be biased because
it was conducted only in regions of high out-migration. In fact, international migration
is a highly selective process, mainly occurring among specific sections of the population
of twenty to twenty-nine-year olds.84 Moroccans do not want to leave at ‘any price’, and
this is likely to be the reason why only a minority turns its intentions into action.
Migration demands significant costs and risks, and is therefore generally a well-conside-
red and well-prepared decision in which family and community members are often clo-
sely involved.
In fact, valuation of a strong desire to emigrate is an inherently normative matter.
From one perspective, migration is a kind of rejection that drains migrant-sending
regions of valuable human resources. From another perspective, however, out-migration
can be the inevitable corollary of broader development processes in which people’s hori-
zons widen and their capabilities and aspirations increase. Such rising aspirations inspire
people to exploit their talents and capacities, to become more productive and to incre-
ase their well-being. It would be naïve to assume that such aspirations could all be rea-
lized in the proverbial native village.This seems to be the more fundamental reason why
economic and social development -e.g., improved education, access to information,
income, infrastructure - is initially associated with increasing migration.85 
It seems to be unrealistic to think that young people would do better to stay to help
develop the sending area if we bear in mind the high unemployment and the few resour-
ces available. These factors hinder young people from ‘developing themselves’, while
international migration is the means for the young to acquire such capabilities. It there-
fore seems a rational choice to migrate.
Conclusion 
Four decades of intensive international migration have fundamentally transformed sen-
ding communities, as well as Moroccan society. Migration has become an all-pervasive
phenomenon that has affected the perceptions and increased aspirations of Moroccans.
There is evidence that migration and remittances have enabled the emancipation of for-
merly subaltern socio-ethnic groups, helping them escape from the constraints of tradi-
tional peasant society, sometimes to the detriment of ancient elite groups. Although
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remittance-induced construction of houses destined for nuclear families generally
improves living standards of migrants’ wives, and remittances enable their daughters to
go to school, migration rarely changes norms about gender roles because these reflect
general processes of cultural change.
The socially differentiated nature of the impact of migration exemplifies the inhe-
rently ambiguous, value-laden nature of assessments of this impact. Ultimately, different
valuations relate to different a priori assumptions about what actually constitutes ‘deve-
lopment’. This is apparent in the widely divergent opinions about how to evaluate
migrants’ consumption and investment behaviour as well as various processes of social
change, such as the demise of traditional peasant communities and extended families.The
same applies to the culture of migration.Although this type of culture is often evaluated
negatively because it tends to perpetuate emigration, it can also be interpreted favoura-
bly, as a developmental consequence of the increasing capabilities and aspirations of
young people.
The impact of migration is notoriously difficult to disentangle from the general pro-
cesses of social and cultural change with which it is closely and reciprocally intertwined
as both cause and consequence. Changing norms and increasing knowledge of the out-
side world, especially through improved education, media exposure, infrastructure deve-
lopment, and confrontation with migrants’ as well as tourists’ relative wealth, have
boosted life aspirations for many non-migrants too. Along with increasing income and
the migration facilitating role of migrant networks, these factors continue to provide
Moroccans not only with the material possibilities but also with the necessary aspirations
to migrate abroad.
It also allows for a different evaluation of the ‘culture of migration’, which is often
erroneously assumed to be simply ‘there’ as a reified entity. It is not only difficult to mea-
sure, the term ‘culture of migration’ can itself be misleading, since it suggests that rising
aspirations and an outward-oriented mentality are mainly a consequence of exposure to
the perceived success of migrants. It is important, however, to recognize that migration
itself is a constituent part of a complex set of radical social, cultural, and economic trans-
formations that have affected Morocco, accelerating its integration in global social, econ-
omic, and migratory systems; it is also an intermediate factor in perpetuating and pro-
bably intensifying, magnifying, and accelerating these processes at the local and regional
levels.
Migration is the inevitable corollary of development and globalization processes that
broaden horizons and increase capabilities and aspirations. Paradoxically, economic and
social development tends to go hand-in-hand with increasing migration. Notwithstanding
empirical evidence that migration and remittances have led to increased economic acti-
vities and income growth, such growth has not yet reached levels sufficient to respond
to increased aspirations. Hence, migration continues. Even if the migrants’ impressions of
Europe are too rosy and their problems many, the perception that international migra-
tion is a relatively secure way to social and economic opportunities and freedom is more
than a mirage.
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Mohammed Boudoudou
The three ages of international migration from 
the Maghreb to France and Europe
Introduction
Emigrants from the Maghreb have been described as ‘colonial labourers’,‘colonial sol-diers’, ‘requisitioned war-labourers’, ‘French subjects’ or ‘protégés’, ‘French Muslims
working in the metropolis’,1 and as ‘emigrant-immigrants’. More recently, they have
been referred to as ‘immigrant-citizens’, while at the same time being simply ‘citizens’2
This range of chronologically ordered notions reflects the main periods of Maghreb
migration, and spans a century of their social history.
The Algerians were the first.They produced the most massive and long-lasting waves
of migration.They were soon followed by Moroccans, who often travelled via Algeria
where they traditionally worked as seasonal agricultural labourers.3 After World War II,
there was a break in Moroccan emigration which lasted until 1960. During this period,
the only immigrant workers permitted to enter France were those from Algeria.The last
of the natives of the Maghreb to emigrate to France were the Tunisians. Each of these
migration flows reproduced the classic process of the ‘three ages’, but they did so in their
own way, each to a different rhythm. Algerian emigration-immigration was the first to
develop this process to its full extent.4 The more recent the emigration, the more rapid
this evolution.
Because similar causes produce similar effects, this story is pretty much the same in all
three Maghreb countries. In each case, the migration process is characterized by the same
initial event, colonization. It is true to say that developments proceeded differently in
each case. It is equally true that the twentieth century was characterized by all kinds of
transformational processes, social, economic, political and cultural.Yet, in terms of migra-
tion, the constellation of the Maghreb was unequivocally three emigration countries and
a single immigration country. In the case of the Algerians, there was an exclusive migra-
tion relationship.This applied to a lesser extent to Tunisians. In the case of the Moroc-
cans, however, there was a very broad relationship, which meant that they became wide-
ly distributed throughout various European countries. At the present time, the strong
North African representation in Europe is reflected by statistics for the entire region and
by figures at a national level in a number of European countries.5 With the exception of
the special situation in France, where there has also been large-scale immigration from
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Algeria and Tunisia, this phenomenon is mainly due to the Moroccan presence, which
increased almost threefold from 1975 to 1990.
The Moroccans are the most numerous of the North African communities in Europe.
In the seventies, they represented 30 per cent of the North African population here. By
the beginning of the nineties, this figure had risen to over 50 per cent. One characte-
ristic of the Moroccan population is that it is widely distributed throughout all European
countries. Already evident in the seventies, this aspect has been further accentuated in
recent years.
As a former colonial power, France is an obvious receiving country. Its status as an
immigration country dates back to the nineteenth century.6 While France was host to
68 per cent of the Moroccan population in Europe in 1975, by 1993 this figure had fal-
len to 51 per cent. During the same period, the percentage of Tunisians present in
Europe and established in France declined from 86 per cent to 73 per cent. In a num-
ber of European countries, there is a strong Moroccan representation among resident
foreigners from non European Union member states. Moroccans are the most numerous
members of this group in Belgium, Italy and Spain.They occupy second place in France
(after the Algerians) and the Netherlands (after the Turks).7
The First ‘Age’
When examined retrospectively, the first ‘age’ of the historical-cultural processes inau-
gurated by Algeria, can be seen as a sort of ‘Golden Age’ for emigration-immigration.
This mainly applied to the immigration country, of course. As the head of a colonial
empire, France exercised absolute control over both ends of the migratory chain, i.e. the
ebb and flow of the labour force and of soldiers.As long as the emigration country per-
ceived this situation to be merely transient, involving only a ‘temporary’ absence of its
emigrants, there was no threat to the cohesion and equilibrium of its overall internal
social order. Finally it will not have been perceived as an adverse experience by those
most directly concerned.This was especially true for those who clung to an illusion as a
means of coping with the pressures of being emigrants/immigrants, and as a way of
giving meaning to their situation.The illusion in question was that their ‘absence/pre-
sence’ was no more than a temporary diversion, with no serious consequences for their
long-term destiny.8
On the other hand however this first ‘age’ can be considered as the engineered dis-
placement of population by the colonial power, as a means of satisfying its urgent need
for soldiers and colonial labourers.This was in spite of the illusion that the ‘operation’ in
question was limited in time and space. If you set out to find evidence of the arrival in
France of the first Algerian immigrants – who at the time were not identified as such -
you may find more than you bargained for. In a context that underlines its innovative
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character, you will see that this was a deliberately well-planned and implemented enter-
prise. During World War I, 240,000 Algerians – more than one third of the male popu-
lation aged 20 to 40 – were either mobilized or required for labour. Given the magni-
tude of the effects of induced enrolment in the French army, there is no doubt that the
initial immigration of Algerians was engineered.9 This view is further supported by the
scale of the effects produced by the requisition of labourers for the war industry, or for
trench-digging during World War I.10
During the same period, Moroccans were subject to the same process, with the same
objectives.This is a fact of which French historians are very well aware.
‘The Great War broke out soon after we had established ourselves in Morocco. In the interest of
national defence, many French emigrants were required to return to France. As financial flows
ground to a halt, it was the turn of Moroccans to emigrate. Moroccan soldiers landed on our soil as
early as August 1914. Before the close of 1916, thousands of Moroccan labourers has responded to
the call from our factories and our metropolitan construction sites’.11
The French military was one of the most fundamental instruments of control in Algeria
and Morocco. It depended primarily on indigenous soldiers who were coerced by
French colonial policies while, at the same time, being instrumental in their implemen-
tation. Conscription was the principal means of channelling ‘ex-fellahs’ into the French
army. In the case of Morocco, four major military units had been established and 
were under the effective control of French officers even prior to the signing of the
Protectorate treaty on March 1912. From 1908 to 1956, Moroccan colonial troops par-
ticipated in various military campaigns both within Morocco and elsewhere.These inclu-
ded Morocco (1908-1934), France (1914-1918), Tunisia (1942-1943), Corsica (1943),
Italy (1944), France (1944), Germany (1944-1945), and Indochina (1948-1954).12
‘Voluntary’ enlistment in the army was clearly the only way of escaping from the life
of unmitigated hardship led by these deprived peasants. It can be seen as a collective res-
ponse to the colonial challenge and to the ensuing economic uncertainty. Its real signi-
ficance has nothing whatsoever to do with the colonial ideology of ‘voluntary’ recruit-
ment. One of the fundamental conceptions perpetuated by colonial discourse was the
notion of voluntaryism.The attractiveness of a career in the Goums, or other regiments,
can be explained by the existence of various forms of social benefit which acted as ‘swee-
teners’ for a ‘voluntary’ recruitment. Unlike Algeria, there was no system of conscription
in Morocco. In 1912, because it was considered to be a French département,Algeria was
made subject to the same rules of recruitment that were instituted in a French law of
1872. In Morocco, however, this was not the case.The Tirailleurs were allowed to enlist
for a period of four years only, after which they had the opportunity to re-enlist.13
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Due to the colonial domination which generated it, the first ‘age’ of emigration from
the Maghreb to France is historically seen as an ‘illegitimate’ presence.The phenomenon
of Maghrebians in France and later on, throughout Europe, is viewed as what might be
described as an ‘illegitimate birth’. Much more information is required concerning the
economic, legal, social, and political conditions that mould this presence, and by which
it in turn is defined. Only by this means can we arrive at a better understanding of the
polemic notion of ‘community’. This in turn will enable us to understand how this
group constitutes a ‘particular’ community.An unwarranted view of its history led to the
‘stigmatization’ of this community, thereby hampering its assimilation.The fact that the
community was rooted in a dominated ‘civilization’ was another contributory factor.
Its distinct colonial past places Maghreb emigration-immigration in a class of its own.
In this respect it differs from other migration movements to France, mostly involving
southern-European immigrants. It also differs from Maghrebian immigration in coun-
tries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and more recently, Spain and Italy. Its
specific history results in an essential ‘alterité’, which today still defines the Maghrebian
presence in France, and throughout Europe.
Indeed, this is not simply a matter of representation.The same ‘essentialist’ representa-
tion is the defining principle of current immigration policy, aimed as it is at administe-
ring the presence of foreign populations on home soil, as well as within the nation.14 As
a result, this ‘particular history’ had a profound effect on ‘immigration policy’ that was
unprecedented in the history of immigration into France. People had to face the ‘dilem-
ma’ of ‘choosing’ between ‘labour immigration’ and/or ‘settlement immigration’.
In the seventies, many people deplored the fact that France lacked a coherent immi-
gration policy. However, this simply meant that France was unable to decide – although,
in fact, it had no ‘choice’ in the matter – to opt for either a ‘settlement immigration’ or
a ‘labour immigration’. Settlement immigration was thought to be associated with ‘dan-
gers of inassimilable cores becoming encysted in the country’15, as a result of the immi-
grants’ different geographical, social, and cultural origins. A ‘labour immigration’ invol-
ves temporary settlement only.This ambivalence was maintained, especially during the
period between the two wars. At that time, France needed to compensate for a mainly
male demographic deficit of 2.5 million.This deficit was due to the effects of a long-
term decline in birth rate, combined with military mortality and other human casualties
incurred during the hostilities.16 We should bear in mind, however, that even now it is
not possible to formulate a policy other than a ‘lack of policy’, or a policy that is as
contradictory as the issue itself. However many controls are imposed, labour immigra-
tion will always include a component of settlement immigration. For France, this was
especially true at a time when such matters were not subject to ‘contractual agreements’
(i.e. agreements between states), and during the colonial period. Aside from the matter
of whether ‘settlement immigration’ is either desirable or useful, it is obvious that some
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human settlements will not be totally French, and that they will not automatically turn
people into French citizens.17
The Second ‘Age’
The second ‘age’ corresponds to the adoption of a new form by the foreign labour force.
This was when the Maghreb countries drew up sovereign agreements called
‘Conventions of labour force and social security’.The idea that this would not result in
a definitive transfer of population was, of course, an illusion.
What we witnessed during this second ‘age’ was therefore a form of ‘temporary pre-
sence/absence’.The parties to this were those involved in any migration: the emigration
country, the immigration country, and the migrant himself. Logically, any ‘temporary’
status ends when immigrants return to their homeland. Since 1977, this vision has cau-
sed the immigration country to draw up all kinds of measures intended to encourage
immigrant labourers to return to their native county, for the purpose of ‘réinsertion’.
Paradoxically, while both sides concerned in the phenomenon of migration were
debating the topic of ‘réinsertion’, the implementation of measures to meet the massive
increase in demand to reunite families was in full swing. In reality, no one pays much
attention to this contradiction. Legislation is aimed at making the stay dependent on
employment, which would be the sole source of legitimacy. As babies were born to
Maghrebian emigrants-immigrants, whether to mixed parentage or solely immigrant
parentage, a new form of ‘immigration presence’ arose.This involved ‘immigrants who
emigrated from nowhere’18.This paradoxical situation compels us to re-define the immi-
gration problem.Therefore,
‘those who were previously involved in the processes of institutionalizing the ‘aid to migrants’ are
urged to ‘redirect’ their focus to the new generation. From this standpoint, it is the impending admi-
nistrative division of labour that now makes it vitally important to devise a new definition of immi-
gration’.19
An inevitable ‘human settlement immigration’ emerged from the great economic reces-
sion of 1974. Every attempt to ‘promote’ the immigrants’ final return to their homeland
had failed. Lone immigrants, having benefited from the provisions for family reunifica-
tion during the ‘second age’, decided to stay.This was followed by the birth of a ‘second
generation’, and a third….etc.
Accordingly, a new definition of immigration became imperative. Especially from the
beginning of the 1980s onwards, this constituted the third ‘age’ of Maghreb-France emi-
gration-immigration.This heralded the completion of a migratory cycle in France, and
in other traditional immigration countries throughout Europe.
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The Third ‘Age’
The emigration of entire households obviously meant that assimilation had to take place,
regardless of how it was defined:‘adaptation to social reality’,‘insertion’,‘integration’, etc.
These terms are all euphemisms relating to this inevitable social reality. No one harbou-
red any illusions in this regard. Certainly not those concerned about family or house-
hold emigration because they feared the dissolution of ties with the mother country and
a more or less slow identification with the host society. Nor indeed those who were
repelled by the immigration of such families, whom they considered (on the basis of pre-
judice rather than experience) to be ‘inassimilable’.
This ‘sudden’ awareness of the evolution of this process led to the institutionalization
of the debate about integration and ‘integrative’ actions on ‘cultural’ grounds, particular-
ly in the educational field and mainly in schools.20 This led to the emergence of new
concepts, such as ‘pluricultural’,‘intercultural’,‘multicultural’,‘pluriethnic’ and ‘multieth-
nic’ etc.These notions constitute a ‘social usage’ of the immigrant’s culture,21 especially
in the context of Maghreb immigration and its cultural characteristics, or its ‘intrinsic
exogeneity’.
It was therefore no surprise when, at the end of the past decade, the problem of ‘inte-
gration’ began evolving toward a ‘culturalist’ defining principle.This led to the ‘essenti-
al’ characterization of Maghreb immigration as a ‘radical alterity’, Islam.22 Of course, this
totally contradicts that which – in the context ‘cela-va-de-soi’ – is seen as the basis of the
French ‘national identity’. According to this view, laïcité and secularization form the
cement of veritable ciment ‘national community cohesion’.At this point, it is legitima-
te to wonder whether one can be more integrated, in cultural terms, than those who
were born and socialized in the host society. Is this affected by whether the process of
identification with that society takes place naturally or, as we usually say, ‘par la force des
choses’?
It is not by chance that, as this migratory cycle approaches completion, the processes
of integration are becoming more efficient. After all, more and more Maghrebians are
applying for the nationality of the host country, regardless of ‘resistance’ by the partners
involved in the Maghreb immigration in France and elsewhere in Europe. Such resistan-
ce is merely a negotiation ‘strategy’ in the wider issue, namely the social and political sta-
tus of a permanent presence. Only now are people starting to appreciate the conse-
quences of this situation. In other words, this presence is increasingly being defined on
economic, social, cultural, and political grounds i.e. as an ‘established social fact’.
There are still ‘immigrants’ who, even though they have spent all of their active years
(in some cases their entire lives) in the host country, do not have access to the legitima-
cy of citizenship23 (which is not only a matter of law and regulations). It has to be said
that this will continue to cause ‘cultural’ conflicts and issues for the partners involved in
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the ‘Maghreb-Europe migration system’, whether in France or elsewhere in Europe.
Conclusion
There is an unprecedentedly urgent need for a synthetic review of this kind, dealing with
the Maghreb migratory process in France and throughout Europe, if we are to improve
our understanding of the issues. Immigration has indeed become one of the most con-
troversial public policy issues in immigration societies. Politicians, the media, and citizen
advocacy groups are making a variety of claims about the forces driving international
migration, and about the consequences of immigration for ‘national interests’. Our
understanding should be conditioned less by speculative hazards (i.e. actuality, with its
sometimes tragic aspects) and more by fundamental causes.What we need is objective
research into the wider process and the structural determinants of emigration and immi-
gration.24
24 Boudoudou (1998) 55-70.
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Part IV
Youth
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Edien Bartels and Martijn de Koning 
For Allah and myself
Introduction
Young people of Moroccan-Dutch origin are currently the centre of attention in theNetherlands. In some ways this focus is positive, as in the case of the popular rap
artists Raymzter and Ali B., or the Moroccan writers Abdelkader Benali and Naima El
Bezaz. More often, however, there are negative aspects such as criminality and radicalism.
One example concerns the murder of Theo van Gogh, a Dutch commentator and film
maker, in Amsterdam in November 2004. His killer, a Moroccan-Dutch man, declared
that he acted in the name of his religion, Islam.As a result, attention has primarily focu-
sed on the radical element among young Muslims, who were also the subject of a recent
AIVD (General Intelligence and Security Service) report.1 But how are things going
with ‘normal’ young Moroccan boys and girls who are not involved in criminal activity
and who have not been radicalized? What is their approach to Islam here in the
Netherlands? What was their response to events such as the attacks of 11 September 2001
and the murder of Theo van Gogh?
In this article, we attempt to answer these questions in three ways. Firstly, we exami-
ne discussions between young Moroccans and their peers, parents and imams. Secondly,
we analyse the impact that the social debate on Islam is having on these young people.
Finally, we investigate their activities on the Internet.As a part of this effort, we also turn
our attention to the radical element among these young people.This article is based on
a 6-year anthropological fieldwork study carried out in a Moroccan mosque and in the
mosque’s homework assistance programme in Gouda, a small town of 70,000 people, in
the western part of Holland.The research into the Websites started four years ago as a
part of the anthropological research into the meaning of religion for young Moroccans.
The research focused on Moroccan Muslim youth aged between ten and twenty. In these
six years, about two hundred boys and girls were monitored almost every day in the mos-
que and on the streets and sometimes in their homes and schools. During the final year,
interviews were held with twenty boys and twenty girls who were monitored on a daily
basis for two years.The selection of the Websites is based on the choices made by young
Muslims in Gouda.At the sites and discussion groups (on MSN and Yahoo) they visited,
other sites are linked and/or used.They have been analysed as well. In total, this invol-
ved about eighty Websites and MSN and Yahoo groups.The central focus of our analy-
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sis is a search for the pure, unadulterated or real Islam and the form that this search takes
in the everyday lives of young Muslims in the Netherlands.2
We view Islam as a complete repertoire of activities, a type of tool-chest containing a
range of practices (such as prayer and fasting, the wearing of the headscarf) and regula-
tions (such as halal and haram).3 In the public debate Islam is generally seen within a fixed
and clearly delineated context. However, research (including our work among
Moroccans in Gouda) shows that the reality is very different.4 Young Muslims are con-
fronted with choices from different repertoires of activities. Girls, for instance, have a
choice of wearing or not wearing a headscarf. Christians are viewed either as heathens,
or as representatives of a ‘people of the book’ – which calls for an entirely different
approach.
Young people develop their identity by choosing a particular interpretation of their
faith.This always occurs in interaction with others, both inside and outside their own
cultural group.There is a balance of power within and between these divergent groups.
That is why the terms identity politics or Muslim politics are used within this context.These
relate to the negotiation of one’s personal identity and to the struggle for acceptance of
this identity via a strategy.5 The definition of Islam, its significance and its importance
are continually under negotiation, both implicitly and explicitly.This process takes place
between individuals within one’s own group and with outsiders.Accordingly, rather than
being a self-evident given, Islam instead serves as a source of reflection, study and dis-
cussion, within a process of identity formation.6
Continue to ask questions
From a very early age, Moroccan boys and girls become familiar with the concepts of
halal and haram.The term haram, in particular, is often used.Those young people that took
part in our study in Gouda had no problem in citing examples of behaviour that fall into
this category: lying, sex before marriage, drinking alcohol, eating pork, etc. However,
most of them were unable to name more than two or three examples of halal. 7 The con-
cepts of halal and haram are most often used in connection with food, clothing, male-
female relationships, and when judging one another’s conduct.These are not objective
categories, but rather religious-cultural concepts that young people use to demarcate
their environment and to form their identity. Young people almost always use these
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2 Young Muslims use the words ‘pure’, ‘real’ or ‘true’ in relation to Islam, to emphasize an Islam
that is different from the faith of their parents; an Islam that is free of Moroccan cultural influen-
ces.This is not necessarily the same thing as the ‘pure Islam’ of the various Salafi groups in the
AIVD report. In order to avoid misunderstanding we use the term ‘real Islam’ in relation to the
Muslim youth in our research and the term ‘pure Islam’ for the Salafi groups.
3 Halal is what is allowed and haram is what is forbidden according to Islamic traditions.
4 Edien Bartels has done research among Moroccan Muslims in Gouda since 1995 and Martijn
de Koning since 1997.
5 See: Eriksen (1993) and Eickelman & Piscatori (1996).
6 See: Eickelman (1992) and Roy (2004).
7 Examples given of halal are halal meat, wearing a headsarf for girls and no sex before marriage.
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terms when framing questions about Islam. Is it haram to eat at the home of non-Muslim
friends? Is it permitted to wear make-up, as Dutch girls do? Is it haram to work as a stu-
dent intern in a restaurant where alcohol and pork are served? Is it permissible for a girl
to take off her headscarf at school if the wearing of this garment is prohibited there?
These are the questions that young people repeatedly put to imams or others, who in
their eyes are authorities on Islam.These questions usually pertain to everyday life in the
Netherlands and often imply a comparison with the – reputed – practices of young, nati-
ve Dutch non-Muslims.
Although young Muslims discuss these types of questions with their parents, they
often seek answers from others.This is because they are too embarrassed to discuss cer-
tain subjects – such as male-female relationships – with members of their family.Another
reason is that they believe their parents’ view of Islam to be permeated with cultural arte-
facts.Young people want to ‘strip’ Islam of what they see as purely Moroccan traditions.
In the case of girls, for instance, this means that they appeal to Islam to support their des-
ire to study, to work and to argue for equal rights between men and women.The tradi-
tion of mothers staying at home and taking care of the children is seen by them as ‘a
Moroccan custom’, rather than something that is dictated by the ‘real’ Islam. Boys inter-
pret the ‘real’ Islam as something that restricts the freedom of girls. It is noteworthy that
the drive to seek the ‘real’ Islam is not restricted to those young people who strictly and
carefully observe their religious obligations, such as prayer and the avoidance of contacts
between boys and girls.The same phenomenon can be seen among boys and girls who
take a more liberal view.This search is not restricted to the young Muslim radicals who
are the subject of the AIVD reports, it is also seen among ‘normal’ young Muslims.
In addition to their role as categories of norms and concepts that are used to form a
personal identity, halal and haram are also used as negotiating tools in discussions.This is
revealed by the answer given by an imam in Gouda to the question ‘am I obliged to wear
a headscarf?’The question was asked by a girl who attended a school where the wearing
of the headscarf was not permitted at that time.8 His answer to her question was ‘Yes, it
is required.’ Unlike the imam, a number of adult women who were present at the time
were aware of the girl’s situation.The following discussion then ensued:
‘But what should you do if it is prohibited?’
‘You should wear it regardless, because it is prescribed’.
‘But what if this means that you have to leave school?’
‘Then you should fight for the right to wear it!’
‘What if the school continues enforcing the ban regardless?’
‘Then you should talk with the school authorities.’
After about ten minutes of this, the imam’s final answer was:
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‘When you go to school, you should wear the headscarf. Once you enter the building,
remove it.When you return home, put the headscarf back on.’
This was exactly what all girls that wore a headscarf to school were doing every day.The
women who continued asking for clarification later commented that they had in fact
been hoping for this very answer. Although the norm was clearly stated, the girls were
allowed to obey their school’s regulations, with the consent of the imam. It was impor-
tant for them to hear the imam’s view, because they had felt guilty every time they remo-
ved the headscarf and every time they put it back on.This issue was raised for discussion
by other Muslims. One commented ‘That is playing around with your religion, which
you shouldn’t do. It is haram.’The imam’s statement, however, conferred legitimacy on
the solution that the girls had come up with themselves.
A second example shows a different side to this negotiation process. An imam had
declared that women were not permitted to work or ride a bicycle.This aroused the ire
of many adults, who found this to be a complete denial of the situation in the
Netherlands. Boys were particularly enthusiastic about the imam’s statement.‘The imam
is speaking the truth and our parents find it hard to accept. But it is the truth, this is
demanded by Islam!’ Still, many boys and girls themselves chose not to obey these sta-
tements ‘What I do privately is my business. It is between me and Allah. I do it for Allah
and myself.’
In the Nour mosque at Gouda, where we conducted our study, young people were
given ample opportunity to discuss their questions and needs.9 Imams, mosque council
members, volunteers and assistants in social-cultural activities were always willing to ans-
wer questions and to organize activities. But this is not the case at all mosques. Many
mosque councils and imams are not well informed about the everyday experiences of
young people in the Netherlands. Imams often speak no Dutch.Young people, in turn,
speak little or no Arabic. This means they do not understand the sermons on Friday.
Young people tend to continue asking questions about things that are described in the
Koran. They want to understand why things are the way they are. Although they are 
clearly looking for norms, they also want to know why one thing is permitted while
something else is prohibited. Parents do not always have a ready answer.They sometimes
feel that their children’s persistent enquiries are not compatible with the view that one
must accept Allah’s creation as it is.10
Young people feel that their views are not reflected by mosque organizations, nor by
umbrella organizations such as the UMMON11, the Moroccan mosques association.
They see both types of organizations as representing male first generation immigrants
only. These organizations focus on issues that are quite different from those faced by
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De Koning (2002).
10 Religious upbringing by parents seems to be limited to explanations of how to pray and fast,
and to telling stories about the life of the Prophet Mohammed.
11 Unie van Marokkaanse Moskeeën in Nederland: Union of Moroccan Mosques in the
Netherlands.
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young people. When young people become serious and devout, their parents applaud
them. However, some parents also think that young people are too strict in their doctri-
nal beliefs.When meetings outside the mosque are addressed by speakers who the parents
think are too strict in their interpretation, this can cause a commotion.As a result, such
groups of young people gradually become isolated, or are banned from the mosque enti-
rely.
The view of people on the outside
When identities are formed through a process of negotiation, it is important to know
who is negotiating with whom.Young Muslims consult each other and a wide range of
authorities in their search for Islam.At the same time, the reactions of Dutch society also
influence their development as Muslims.12 Accordingly, it is important to find out how
Muslims are viewed by those outside the faith.What significance do people outside the
Islamic tradition give to a Muslim identity, and how are their opinions in this regard
received by Muslims?
Most native Dutch people see Islam as a foreign element in society.This became espe-
cially clear following the events of 11 September 2001. It was also highlighted during
the election campaign involving Pim Fortuyn in 2002, and in the ongoing debates on
integration. On these occasions, terms such as ‘immigrants’, ‘Muslims’, ‘ethnic minori-
ties’ and ‘foreigners’ were used interchangeably. For Muslims themselves, 11 September
marked an important turning point. When cycling down the street, the day after the
attacks in America, one of the girls in our study at Gouda was cursed by someone she
passed. She later identified that as the moment when she realized that she ‘did not belong
to Dutch society’. She spoke Dutch very well and had a job, but she felt that she was not
a part of the ‘imagined community’ in the Netherlands.13
This impression was reinforced by the public statements made by various politicians,
in Parliament, following the murder of Theo van Gogh.Those involved included Rita
Verdonk, the Minister for Immigration and Integration, Jozias van Aartsen, the leader of
the Liberal Party, and Geert Wilders, a right-wing extremist who broke away from the
Liberal Party. Muslim organizations were expected to distance themselves publicly from
the murder.This contrasted sharply with events following the murder of Pim Fortuyn
by an environmental activist in 2002, when no such demands were made of environ-
mental organizations. Many Muslims see themselves as the victims of double standards.
It confirms their belief that they are second-class citizens.
The murder of Theo van Gogh was not denounced by all Muslims, many of whom
had been deeply offended by his use of terms such as ‘goat-fuckers’ and ‘the fifth
column’. His collaboration on the film Submission I was seen as just one of many insults
to Muslims. Nevertheless, there were some Moroccans who didn’t see the film as an
insult, primarily those for whom Islam had little significance and older people who were
not familiar with the film. However, many young people were enraged by Submission I.
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It was not the first time that Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a former Somali refugee and now a liberal
member of parliament, had asserted that all Muslim men use passages in the Koran to
justify beating their wives.The film was doubly offensive because this message was con-
veyed in the form of a veiled, naked woman with holy scripture written on her body.
After Van Gogh’s murder, a change occurred within Muslim organizations.Many of them
are now openly talking about the radicalization of young people, and are making every
effort to combat the process. Nevertheless, the predominant impression is that Muslims
are not accepted in the Netherlands.
This lack of acceptance of Islam tends to negate an important strategy used by young
Muslims. In their search for Islam, young Muslims are seeking ways of making a place
for themselves in Dutch society.They are looking for a separate Muslim identity.The aim
is to free themselves, as far as possible, of the stigma associated with being Moroccan, a
nationality that currently has a bad name and is associated with crime. Being Moroccan
implies being non-Dutch. Islam, on the other hand, is a universal religion. It is interna-
tional and therefore not tied to a particular nationality or even a given ethnicity.14 Seeing
Islam as an identity that transcends ethnicity is the result of a cognitive shift.Young peo-
ple are orienting themselves increasingly towards Dutch society instead of towards their
parents’ country of origin.15 But the fact that Islam is often considered to be foreign to
Dutch society and culture does not make this change of identity any easier. It shows that
integration is a two-way process, requiring changes in Dutch society itself, as well as in
Muslims themselves.
Another strategy that young people use to ‘be a part of society’ involves an explicit
definition of their interpretation of what it means to be a Muslim. However, this strate-
gy has also run into opposition. During a debate at Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam, short-
ly after Van Gogh’s murder, a Muslim girl stated that Islam stood for peace, tolerance and
love.A native Dutch person, who was a non-Muslim, retorted that this was not true. He
pointed out that the Koran states, after all, that un-believers may be killed. In this way,
non-Muslims force their own definition of Islam onto Muslims.This definition differs
from the one formulated by Muslims, and is more negative in nature. Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s
stated opinions about ‘true’ Islam and its dangers also fall into this category.16 In an open
letter to Job Cohen17, she explains that true Muslims have an agenda of their own which,
unlike Cohen’s, does not include any attempt to reach a consensus. According to Hirsi
Ali, the true Muslim has an anti-Semitic streak and relegates women and children to a
subordinate role.
Paul Cliteur, a philosopher and commentator, avails himself of a similar strategy –
which he directs not only against Muslims, but also against Christians. He states that a
society composed of real Muslims and real Christians would not be viable.18 Geert
Wilders took the same line when he said ‘I expect nothing from people. I only want
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them to obey Dutch laws and regulations.Yet, if you take Islamic rules at face value, they
won’t be able to do this. A liberal Islam is impossible.’19 In making statements of this
kind, those such as Hirsi Ali,Wilders and Cliteur ignore the fact that young Muslims are
trying to interpret Islam as a religion of tolerance and peace. In other words, non-
Muslims first create their own definition of ‘true’ Islam, and then proceed to criticize it.
However, the basis for their definition of Islam remains unclear.
Cyber Islam
Radical Muslims are not participating in the social debate on Islam.They are holding
their own discussions within a virtual umma (international Islamic community).
However, this is not to say that all debates on the Internet are radical in nature. The
Internet is a new arena, one where negotiations are initiated into what Islam is and what
being Muslim means in terms of an individual’s daily life.As with all young people, the
use of the Internet among young Moroccan-Dutch people has expanded enormously.20
This is reflected by Websites such as Marokko.nl, Maghrebonline.nl, Maroc.nl and
Mocros.nl.These sites discuss a wide range of subjects, varying from the news of the day
up to and including sex & Islam.There are also countless Websites whose goal is to edu-
cate the visitor,Muslim and non-Muslim alike, about Islam.These include al-islaam.com,
Selefiepublikaties.com, redouan.nl and al-yaqeen.com.Their function is characterized as
an electronic da‘wah or ‘invitation to Islam’ via the Internet. Some sites feature a ‘cyber
imam’21 who will answer questions sent by e-mail or placed on a Web forum. Sometimes
a question is typed into a database search engine, and an answer is supplied. There 
are also intermediate forms, in which the most frequently asked questions are grouped
together.
Almost all Websites provide space for discussion, and people make full use of this.
Young people take positions which they base on the Koran, hadith and the statements of
scholars. In this way, they actually create their own fatwas.The advantage of the Internet,
of course, is that they can participate in these discussions under a pseudonym, which
gives them the freedom to ask all kinds of questions. In this way, discussion forums and
chat rooms provide a platform where young people can develop a (virtual) identity. Sites
such as Marokko.nl and Maroc.nl are aimed primarily at a single ethnic group:
Moroccan-Dutch people. Islamic Websites, on the other hand, are aimed at Muslims in
general, irrespective of their ethnic background.That is not to say, however, that all eth-
nic groups are equally represented. Moroccan and native Dutch individuals (converts to
Islam) seem to predominate, particularly on the Salafi sites.The latter sites are so named
because they appeal to people to follow the ‘way of the Salaf’.The Salaf were the com-
panions of the prophet Mohammed.The Muslims associated with these sites are saying
that they have returned to the era of the prophet Mohammed, before Islam became ‘con-
taminated’ with a range of non-Islamic (Western) elements.The Salafi sites are clearly the
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most dominant Islamic sites on the Internet.22 They seem to be regarded by young peo-
ple as having particular authority.This becomes clear when we look at the debates on
the Internet concerning halal and haram. Most of the answers given are derived from
Salafi sites.Although all Salafi sites appeal to the Salaf, there are a number of differences
between them. Some sites challenge one another. Not all Salafi sites are expressly anti-
Dutch or anti-Western. However, they do contain considerable social criticism concer-
ning, for example, the sexual objectification of Western women.
In addition to Websites, there are also online communities, the so-called MSN groups.
Some of the more prominent examples are WareMoslims (TrueMuslims),
Moslimsdeenigeechte (Muslimstheoneandonly) and IslamenMeer (IslamandMore). Salafi
dominance at such sites seems to be greater than on the Websites.The MSN groups usu-
ally have fewer permanent members than the Websites, which is not to say they reach a
smaller audience. Messages from these MSN groups can regularly be found on sites such
as Marokko.nl.The larger groups, such as IslamenMeer, which can have up to a couple of
thousand members, are more moderate than the smaller groups and reflect a more varied
range of opinions concerning Islam.23The smaller groups are generally short-lived.Once
complaints have been made concerning inflammatory texts and the exchange of threats,
such groups are quickly closed down by the provider. The discussions and messages
within the groups vary widely. The subjects covered range from the devil to sex, and
from demonstrations to jihad. One common theme is that they all discuss ways of dea-
ling with the Western world.‘The West’ stands primarily for the US, Israel and the Jews,
and the Netherlands. Some Salafi MSN groups strongly reject Dutch society, while
others seek a rapprochement and reject violence.24
The Salafi MSN groups and Websites base their approach on the concepts of halal and
haram.The emphasis here differs from that in discussions between ‘normal’ young peo-
ple.All matters that are seen as being ‘Western’ are haram, such as demonstrations, music
and similar things.The position of women is a major issue about which people hold a
wide range of views. Some have a problem with women working outside the home.
Others only see it as a problem if both sexes are present in the workplace. Some Salafis
emphasize the ‘jihad of the heart’, which is the individual’s internal struggle to resist a
range of temptations that violate the rules of the faith. Other Salafis support the ‘jihad of
the sword’, the defensive war or holy war.They reject the jihad of the heart because it is
based on a weak tradition. Most Salafi sites and MSN groups have few, if any, real dis-
cussions.They are primarily meeting places for like-minded individuals seeking an ideal,
who want answers about how to follow the right path.
Issues affecting young people’s daily lives in a non-Muslim society, such as the wea-
ring of make-up, the headscarf, etc., do not appear on Salafi sites.These issues are dis-
cussed in the MSN groups and the larger non-Salafi sites, where Salafis nevertheless take
the lead in providing answers to questions. In this way, Salafis extend their influence
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beyond their own, restricted discussion groups. However, it is difficult to determine the
full extent of this influence.The Internet is anonymous, and it is almost impossible to
unmask the person behind the pseudonym. Nevertheless, their influence does seem to
be quite extensive. Many young people sympathize with the Salafis because they are seen
as ‘serious’ and consistent.They do not draw the line at promulgating ‘pure’ Islam and
acknowledging its sources, they also live according to its tenets.These Salafis are often
young people themselves. Clearly aware of young Muslims’ desires and needs, they are
quite capable of providing answers to their questions.
On the other hand, their influence should not be overestimated. While Salafi state-
ments set the norm in terms of haram and halal, many young people say that this is not
particularly useful in practice.While numerous people, both young and old, may appre-
ciate the Salafis’ efforts to adopt a serious approach to the faith, they also disagree with
them on many points. For example, they take issue with the Salafis’ attitude towards
unbelievers and less consistent fellow Muslims.The aggressive manner in which Salafis
spread their message creates opposition and causes commotion. For many, this is suffi-
cient reason to avoid any contact with them. In some cases, it is even given as a reason
for refusing Salafis access to a mosque.This may cause these groups to become still more
isolated.While their isolation from the rest of society is partly a result of their own doing,
it is also caused by the reactions of other Muslims.
Gap in the market
The Muslim identity of young Moroccan-Dutch people is based on a search for the ‘real’
Islam.This quest involves choosing from a range of interpretations of the Islamic faith,
through negotiations about the definition of the religion. Such negotiations are con-
ducted with peers, parents, imams and non-Muslims.The ‘real’ Islam that many young
people seek is quite different from the Moroccan traditions of their parents. It provides
them with ways to be Muslim in the Netherlands.The concepts of halal and haram also
play an important role in this endeavour.
However, those searching for the ‘real’ Islam are faced with struggles of their own.
Moroccan religious organizations are not always willing to comply with these young
people’s wishes and needs.They take the view that non-Muslims exclude Islam on the
grounds that it is a foreign religion. As a result, many young Moroccan-Dutch people
feel that they are not accepted as Muslims.With the help of Islam, they try to navigate
a path between two worlds. They do not feel at home in mosque organizations and
national umbrella organizations. At the same time, they are alienated from the non-
Muslim population of the Netherlands.The Internet is an important instrument in their
search.
In the public debate that is currently taking place in the Netherlands, all attention is
focused on radical young Muslims. ‘Normal’ young people are overlooked, even though
they are the key to fighting such radicalization. Both Muslim organizations and the
government should work together to ensure that these ‘normal’ young people do not go
off the rails. Mosques should open their doors to a wider range of religious and social-
cultural activities aimed at women and young people.This could take the form of coun-
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selling, assistance with schoolwork, groups for girls, religious classes, etc.The mosque at
Gouda, where our study was conducted, is an exception to the rule. It has been catering
to activities of this kind for many years.This mosque could serve as a source of inspira-
tion for other mosques, and for organizations in the area of social assistance. It deserves
clear government support, but none has been forthcoming.
Our analysis has revealed a gap in the identity market. In this market, young people
form the demand side. Mosque organizations and non-Muslims are the supply side.
Mosques and government should work hand-in-hand to keep young people on the right
track. Effective measures to prevent young people with radical ideas from isolating them-
selves will have a significant preventative impact. A good example of this collaboration
is the ‘contract with society’ that was concluded after the murder of Theo van Gogh.The
parties to this contract were the Pakistani mosque Moka Ghousia Masjid, the Turkish Aya
Sofia, and the city district of De Baarsjes in Amsterdam.25 This contract states that all par-
ties will make an effort to protect freedom of expression and that those with a tenden-
cy towards radicalization will be monitored and confronted.This latter promise will not
be easy to keep, since a devout Muslim is not necessarily a radical Muslim and a radical
Muslim is not necessarily an extremist. Religious organizations should strive to make
voices other than those of the radicals clearly heard in the community. Non-Muslim
commentators should use their influence on the native Dutch population to build brid-
ges. Instead, individuals such as Ellian – a former refugee from Iran, and now a scholar
in international law –,Wilders, Cliteur and Hirsi Ali prefer to seek confrontation by voi-
cing radical opinions.Wilders’ proposal to amend both the constitution and internatio-
nal treaties in order to combat against radical Islam will actually have the opposite effect.
This reinforces the feeling among young Muslims in the Netherlands that they are not
accepted.We must avoid blaming a single group for the impasse we face. By definition,
peaceful coexistence involves us all.
25 The Aya Sofia Mosque is part of the the Milli Görüs¸ movement, a religious movement in
Turkish Islam.
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Lenie Brouwer
The meaning of Moroccan Websites: 
A new social space
Introduction
‘Too much is written about Moroccan youths and too few people speak with them.We want this site to give Moroccan youths a voice.’This statement was made by
the Dutch-Moroccan young men who set up the Website Yasmina.nl. It is also the main
motivation of other Dutch-Moroccans to start Moroccan Websites with forums such as
Maroc.nl or Maghreb.nl.They criticize the Dutch integration debate in which the views
of Moroccan youths are not heard, and their religion has been over-emphasized.The first
Moroccan Website in the Netherlands – Maroc.nl – was launched in 1999, and soon
became very popular among Dutch-Moroccan youth.They raise sensitive topics in these
forums: religion, relationships or marriage, but also talk about topical or social events, all
anonymously. No topic is taboo.
The success of this and other Websites has caused other groups to launch Websites of
their own.These included Berbers, who felt they were not represented in the Moroccan
Arabic dominated sites.They started Berber Websites (Amazigh.nl), recalling their speci-
fic history and traditional heritage, and discussed their own identity, history, language,
culture, or ‘what is typically Tmazight?’
These discussion boards are interesting new aspects of the information society that can
be of great significance for the participants.An increasing number of studies have shown
the importance of online groups for social support and exchange of information. For
example, religious questions can be a good reason to join an online group, as is shown
in research on an international Muslim women’s mailing list.1The opportunity to extend
their social network through the Internet is of great value for most users, especially those
with shared experiences.2 Along with anonymity, the forums can also offer emotional
support. They can stimulate people to reflect about their position in society and how
they perceive themselves.
We argue here that Moroccan Websites reflect the ambivalences of Dutch-Moroccan
youth who are faced with the process of constructing an identity in Dutch modern
society. Born in the Netherlands of parents who came as migrants from Morocco, and
having strong feelings of loyalty to Morocco, this second generation is not Moroccan in
the same way as their parents. Similarly, their relationship with Dutch society is not
uncomplicated: although they speak Dutch fluently, most of them do not consider them-
selves Dutch.
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Their identity is not only formed through self-definition, however, but is also influ-
enced by ascription, the way other people perceive them.3 One of the outcomes of the
current Dutch integration debate is that Islam has been so over-emphasized that
Moroccan migrants are now primarily perceived as Muslims.4 This is not a static rela-
tionship, but a very dynamic one, and it can have different meanings depending on the
social context.These meanings are not fixed, but are contested in the animated debates
of the forums.The second generation may feel they are Moroccans in the Netherlands,
but when they go for a holiday visit to a Moroccan village they discover how Dutch
they really are. Identity formation includes the interrelationship between ascription by
others and the way people see themselves. Hence, we will call this group Dutch-Moroc-
cans to show their relationship with both ethnicities.
This chapter focuses on the role of discussion forums on Moroccan Websites in the
construction of identity for Dutch-Moroccan youth in the Netherlands. These online
forums create a new space for communication between Dutch-Moroccan youth, and
this new medium can give these groups a voice that can stimulate reflection about their
social identity.5 This chapter is based on qualitative research on discussions on the forums
of Moroccan Websites as well as on several online and offline interviews with Dutch-
Moroccan users.6 We will first discuss some other research on the Internet and then exa-
mine the Yasmina Website and examples of the debates to be found there.
The Internet
The pattern of online interaction among a group of Muslim women and the support
these women provide one another was studied in an online research effort.7 Participants
in this forum are dispersed across the globe, and interact via an electronic mailing list.
They discuss problems in a way they would not have done in public face-to-face mee-
tings; the anonymity allows them to speak more freely, without having any information
about the other users. Furthermore, the interactions gave the participants a sense of
belonging; they discover that there were others who shared similar problems, and they
were able to learn from their advice.
It is also clear that the Internet offers a new context for thinking of identity and 
community: it has its own rules and potential. For ethnic communities the Internet has
become a new way of direct communication, an alternative to mainstream media and
community discourse.8 The second generation experiments with the Internet; they par-
ticipate in their own online forums and express alternative points of view to the homo-
geneous, bounded national cultures. In the online forums individuals can claim space,
have a visible presence, challenge their own ethnicity, and imagine a community where
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they can have a different opinion and be proud of it.9 In addition, it can be a place where
people can adopt and adapt the Internet to their own needs and views.10 Therefore, the
Internet is a tool that supports many uses: it includes individuals who seek to build con-
sensus as well as alternative discourse.
Most people in the Netherlands – 76 percent – and nearly all of those between fifteen
and twenty four – 96 percent – have access to a computer with an Internet connection.11
Although this percentage is much lower for migrant families – 42 percent in 200212 – ,
fortunately a large number of community centres, libraries, and schools provide almost
free access to the Internet. It is assumed that visitors to Moroccan Websites generally
reflect the diversity of Moroccan youth: girls tend to participate in forums about marri-
age, social relationships, and Islam, while boys tend to be more interested in forums that
focus on news and matters related to Islam.The most popular Website is the virtual com-
munity, Marokko.nl. It has more than eight forums and over 68,000 members, and recei-
ves more visitors than Maroc.nl, which has 36,700 members (April 2005). The site’s
owners claim that 15,000 Moroccan young people access it daily, and that in its four
years of existence the 160,000 themes discussed have provoked almost 3.5 million reac-
tions (May 2005).
According to the site’s owner, some 85 percent of the members of the Yasmina Website
are Moroccan, 10 percent are Dutch, and 5 percent are from other ethnic groups.About
70 percent of the members are female.To become a member of the Website, it is only
necessary to choose an I.D. name to register, as it is open to everyone.These I.D. names
often reveal how the users see themselves: they can express the owner’s nationality
(‘Marocgirl’) or city of origin (‘Casablanca25’).The number following the name usual-
ly refers to the person’s age. Some use the name of a popular Moroccan dish (couscousje
– ‘little couscous’), some choose a musical preference (‘missrapster’), or a common epi-
thet (‘womanpower’).The age of the visitors ranges from fifteen to thirty.
The girls have various reasons for participating in online discussions.Active members
post between ten and thirty emails a day. One of them wrote,‘it has become such a habit
that I cannot live without it.’ Others told me: it is ‘cool’ to have such a forum, where you
do not have ‘to explain your background all the time’, because ‘we Moroccans just
understand each other.’ They also emphasized the importance of having ‘a space of their
own’, a space where they can meet with ‘other believers’.Another reason for participa-
ting is to disagree with somebody and to debate. Or they have a personal problem and
want to know what other members think about it: ‘to hear another view can be very
interesting and you can learn something.’ Similarly, it is fun to read debates and make a
contribution.There are also a great many jokes among the postings.
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Examples of debates
One of the issues frequently raised in the forums is whether to choose education or mar-
riage. For example, there was the following posting: ‘Dilemma: give preference to study
or marriage?’ In two days thirty five responses were posted to the forum, and almost
three hundred people had read the debate (1 December 2003).The dominant theme in
this debate is that most people prefer to study and advise postponing marriage.There was
one male visitor, however, who had a negative attitude towards education and women;
he represented the traditional mainstream opinion that women should marry rather than
study.
Another woman began a discussion about her future husband; he will not allow her
to study when she is married and demands that she will wear a headscarf as a married
woman. She wants to finish her education before she gets married, and she does not
want to be forced to wear a scarf: ‘it must be my own choice,’ she emphasized. She asks
for advice.What would women do in her situation? In two days thirty one responses are
posted on the forum, which records three hundred people as having accessed the page.
The visitors have all kinds of different interpretations. The general opinion is: ‘don’t
accept it.’There was a variety of advice, including: ‘talk with your husband’, or ‘challen-
ge the dominance of men by saying “no”’,‘send him away’,‘you are your own boss’, etc.
Another participant adds:‘if a man makes such demands, I would feel oppressed; this does
not fit with the image of marriage. Be happy you know this before your marriage; such
marriages mostly end in a divorce.’ Several advise her not to marry: ‘If you are not allo-
wed to study’, they say, ‘how can you develop yourself in your marriage? Man and
woman are equal in a marriage, and they have to deal with each other. Or am I wrong?’
The dominant theme in these debates is quite clear: a woman should first study and
then marry, although this is not the main attitude within their community.The partici-
pants try to support the one who asked for advice and seek to give a modern meaning
to marriage as part of their identity.They try to share the same ideas and ambitions and
thus become an opposing voice to the dominant male view.
Virginity 
Virginity is a central value for a Muslim adolescent woman; it usually means that a man
may not touch her before marriage, but it can also mean she may not have a boyfriend
or engage in premarital sex.Virginity also symbolizes purity and modesty, and is closely
related to honour and shame codes of the family.13 In the Netherlands, however, girls
have to attend school, at least until they are sixteen, and at school they meet boys, even
though it is not proper for a Muslim girl to be seen with a boy. Girls are aware of their
vulnerable status when they walk in a town or city with a group of friends. Gossip can
ruin a girl’s reputation and have severe consequences for the honour of the family. As
long as virginity is still a prerequisite for a good marriage, Moroccan girls will be very
involved with and emotional about this topic.
As a consequence, virginity is a very popular issue in all the debates of the forum,
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although some visitors and respondents complain about the predominance of this subject.
The meaning of virginity is often disputed in these discussions. For example, one girl
posted a message asking whether it is possible to get a declaration of virginity from a
Dutch doctor, because she is planning to marry the next summer. She wrote:‘I know I’m
a thousand percent a virgin, but you never know, there’s much gossip in our community.’
There were thirty responses to this in two days, and the posts were viewed 440 times.
Only three visitors claimed to understand her attitude, although most of the posters cri-
ticized the fact that she wanted an official declaration to prove her virginity, rather than
challenging the demand for virginity. One member said that the hymen does not exist,
while another framed the question as an Islamic discourse: ‘it is better to fear God than
your gossiping neighbour.’ The posters challenged the traditional community’s control
and encouraged the girl to make her own decision, because they defined virginity as a
private matter between two individuals, the woman and her future husband.
Thus, the girl who asked for help did not receive the kind of support she was looking
for.Although nobody challenged the demand for virginity as a prerequisite to marriage,
they sought to give it another meaning, to make it an aspect of individual choice. In this
tension-laden area, Islam becomes an important frame of reference in the way visitors
see themselves.
Islam 
In many other discussions visitors to the forums refer to Islam when talking about moral
issues; they want to know the Islamic standpoint. Because they believe they lack infor-
mation about the correct interpretation of their religion, they submit a question to the
forum.This was confirmed by most of the girls I emailed or spoke with.They use the
Website to find information about Islam and to discuss the ‘right’ behaviour for a good
Muslim girl in Western society. Debates about wearing a headscarf, at what age, and in
what manner are key issues in the construction of their identity.
Most of the debates are also influenced by the negative image Islam has in Dutch
society and how Muslim women are seen by Dutch people. As Muslims, they feel dis-
criminated and use the forum as an outlet to express their anger. For instance, one
Muslim girl said she is very angry about the anti-Islamic attitude of the media, and is
‘extremely irritated’ by people who consider Muslim women to be oppressed and who
want to help those ‘pitiful’ Muslim girls. She said that her headscarf does not hinder
emancipation, but that ‘this narrow-minded mentality’ does. She continued by stressing
that she has to justify daily why she covers her hair.
Compared with other debates, such as those on education or virginity, the discussions
on Islam are dominated by the struggle against the negative stereotypes in society, and
do not allow space for internal reflection.The participants in forums are not very wil-
ling to accept criticism of their faith and are quite defensive. One girl opened a discus-
sion by stating provocatively that girls with headscarves are weak, and wondered why
girls should hide from men’s eyes. Within two days there were fifty seven responses,
which were accessed 530 times. Nobody agreed with the girl’s statement; in fact, every-
body thoroughly disagreed.They claimed that a woman with a headscarf is not weak but
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strong.This is the problem faced by girls who consider themselves liberal and try to chal-
lenge the mainstream discourse on the forum. As one girl wrote: ‘For them, Islam is
sacred; they see me as a traitor.’ It is difficult to develop an alternative discourse about
Islam, because it is too close to discourse in the public media.
Discussions on Islam become very sensitive because Dutch people perceive Islam and
Muslim girls as oppressed.These discussions are influenced more by the anti-Islam dis-
course in daily life than by internal reflection about Islam or the desire to develop a more
open-minded perspective.
Conclusion
Dutch-Moroccan youth has found a new place on their Websites for expressing and
exchanging views.This can be seen as an example of the new ways marginalized groups
can make their opinions known.14 The need for discussion and information makes such
Websites very successful among Dutch-Moroccan youth, especially girls.Their restricted
freedom of movement and vulnerable position as Muslim girls in Western society make
them more prone to participate in forum discussions on social issues. Recognition of
shared experiences stimulate them to visit the Website, and as a consequence, to extend
their social network.
These forums give girls an opportunity to raise topics they are interested in, and the
fact that they can contribute anonymously encourages them to talk about sensitive issu-
es.15 In addition to using the forums for entertainment, they are also used for debating
significant issues, such as the choice between school and marriage, how to deal with
virginity, or the meaning of Islam as a moral frame of reference.The discussions about
these social issues stimulate visitors to reflect about their identity and about what they
believe is important to identify with as Dutch-Moroccans.
Most visitors agreed that a girl should first finish school before getting married.This
dominant theme in the forum is not yet true for all Moroccan families.This fact leads
to a form of counter discourse on the forums as one of the possibilities of the Internet.16
Schoolgirls who are obliged to marry can find social support in these online discussions,
especially when they have to struggle to postpone marriage and contest the traditional
meaning of marriage.17
The girl who brought up the question about the declaration of virginity did not feel
supported.The dominant discourse on female virginity before marriage as part of their
identity is generally accepted, but the meaning of virginity as a more private, individual
matter was open to discussion. Because Muslim women are considered oppressed in the
Dutch public debate, most of the girls perceive it is important to stress that they make
their own decisions, especially concerning Islam.These decisions are not forced on them
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by their family, culture, or religion. In that sense Dutch-Moroccan youth are involved in
a process of individualization.
The various lively debates stimulate them to reflect about issues that are of great sig-
nificance for their identity formation.Visitors discuss many different issues and sensitive
topics in a way they would never do in public face-to-face meetings.This anonymity lets
them speak more freely and is a vital outlet. Furthermore, the interactions with other
visitors give the participants a sense of belonging when they discover there are others
who have similar problems and they can learn from their advice.The debates also help
make Dutch society aware that a new generation of Dutch-Moroccans has emerged, one
that is assertive, emancipated, and finds its inspiration in Islam.
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Els Vanderwaeren
Perceptions of Islam among highly educated Muslims 
in Flanders
Introduction
This article is based on the results of a study into the role of Islam in the daily livesof young, highly educated Muslims of mainly Moroccan or Turkish origin, living
in Flanders, Belgium.1 The collection of qualitative data for the study was conducted in
Flanders between September 2001 and February 2003. I will first give some background
information on the Muslim population in Europe before presenting some results of our
analysis, which indicate the importance of Islam as a factor for social cohesion in Europe.
The Muslim population in Western Europe
Approximately 11 million Muslims2 live in Western Europe.3 This number covers an ave-
rage of four percent of the total European population.This relatively low percentage of
Muslims in Western European countries contrasts sharply with the high visibility of this
population group, which is mainly concentrated in urban regions.
As elsewhere in Western Europe, the presence of different Muslim communities in
Belgium results from migration from non-European countries.This migration has chan-
ged the local population’s social scene profoundly, and it continues to do so.
On the other hand, for European Muslims, affinity with a global religious movement
that transcends national boundaries has become a basis of moral solidarity.4 It allows
them to participate in a type of group solidarity that is legitimized by supranational dis-
course.This is a movement that transcends people’s precarious socio-economic situations
and accepts them as individuals, regardless of their personal status.
Three distinctive circumstances account for the growing visibility of Islam in Belgium
and elsewhere in Western Europe since the end of the 1980s.The first is the internatio-
nal revival of Islam, the second is the nature of the institutionalization of Islam in
Belgium, and finally there is the significance of Islam as an ‘identity marker’ for an in-
creasing group of citizens. However, numerous factors are involved, and the situation
varies considerably from one European country to another. For instance, there are diffe-
rences in national and local community building, as well as different migration histories
and motivations for migration.5 As in other European countries, the Islamic landscape in
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Belgium is quite diverse.The two main Muslim communities in Flanders (Turkish and
Moroccan), are separated by ideological and ethnic differences. Some ascribe these
distinctions to differences in perceptions of Islam in their respective home countries.6
In Belgium, religions7 that have been formally recognized by the state can obtain
financial support towards  for example the cost of setting up a representational organi-
zation for secular affairs.The Muslim communities had been established in Belgium for
twenty-five years before they were able to take advantage of these opportunities. As in
other European countries, Belgium has seen Islam rise to become the second most com-
monly professed religion in the country. However, not until in 1993 was a resolution for-
mulated that was acceptable to both Muslim communities and public authorities alike.
The Executive Body of Muslims in Belgium, a temporary interlocutor with limited
public powers, was set up following long negotiations between the various Muslim com-
munities. It is essential that this representative body be recognized unanimously by all
Muslim groups, however, internal ethnic differentiations and disputes still hamper its
smooth operation.
In addition to the above-mentioned differences within the Muslim community, and
amid tensions related to both local and global issues, a ‘local Islam’ is emerging among
highly educated young Muslims in Belgium.8 In this chapter, we attempt to elucidate
the beliefs and praxis of these young Muslims in our society.
Subgroup of highly educated Muslims
The present study investigates the perceptions Islam of among highly educated, mainly
second generation Muslims in Flanders. There is a special focus on the differences 
between men and women in this regard. Our decision to select highly educated Muslims
from Moroccan or Turkish backgrounds as our target group was prompted by the
assumption that they represent subgroups within their communities. From our perspec-
tive, these subgroups occupy a valuable position in Flemish society. In general, school-
going children from a Moroccan or Turkish background have fewer opportunities to
succeed in education than members of the indigenous population. This limits their
options within society, such as entering the labour market.
To obtain an idea of the importance of Islam among less disillusioned young Muslims,
we decided to restrict our interviews to past and present students with successful edu-
cational careers. Sixty-one in-depth interviews with highly educated Muslims were used
in our analysis.The topics covered included the role played by Islam in the individual’s
daily life, the subject’s education, and their religious identity (or their search for such an
identity). Even within our relatively small subgroup of highly educated Muslims, we
found an enormous diversity in terms of their perceptions of Islam.
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Being the ‘other’
This analysis has established that our respondents define themselves as different.They see
themselves as differing from groups such as the first generation, the less well educated
members of their peer group, and members of the indigenous community.The Turkish
man in the following interview is talking about the differences between him and his less
well educated friends:
interviewer: And your other Turkish friends?
respondent: Those who are not highly educated? Yes, well, they are more conservative.They
are not open-minded to other religions and cultures.That is actually something
of a problem. (…) I think a student, or highly educated Muslim, has a complete-
ly different opinion about Islam and about other religions.
interviewer: So you noticed a difference?
respondent: Difference? Mmm, that’s what I noticed. Most highly educated individuals,
about 90%, share a common vision in this regard.
interviewer: Ninety percent of highly educated Muslims you mean?
respondent: Yes, they have the same vision. (man,Turkish origin)
In the construction of identities, people generally give greater emphasis to any differen-
ces between themselves and others. This is a common phenomenon in the process of
defining oneself. One’s self only exists by virtue of ‘being different’.
The pressures of having to reconcile the demands of different living environments
have contributed to the development of a complex religious identity structure in our
respondents. Beyond the confines of their immediate living environment, as members of
a Muslim community in Europe they find themselves in the middle of a debate about
how believers should live in non-Islamic societies.As a consequence of this search at the
communal and individual level, in their discourses our respondents see Islam as flexible
and open to interpretation (or re-interpretation):
respondent: In principal, that is what is said.The book is finished. It is made forever.That
might be true.That is true.Yes, but the book is from a certain historical time
period, it has to be interpreted to meet the needs of modern society. So, I say it
does not have to be fixed.There has to be space for interpretation, but this does
not mean a rewriting of the Qur’an. (man,Turkish origin)
At the same time, we found that their religion functions as a stepping stone, and as a
highly individual way of observing the world around them:
respondent: We grew up as Muslims. Eh, the Muslim identity is very important now.And
was very important in the past. It was our leitmotiv in the educational process.
(woman, Moroccan origin)
Their perception of Islam is not a static one.The shifts in these individuals’ perception
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of their belief are part of an ongoing and lifelong process.The ‘alienation’ of a commu-
nity in diaspora, and its separation from the ‘natural setting’ of the homeland, give rise to
an intensive search for identity, and to discussions regarding its nature.9
Our respondents illustrate the ongoing and lifelong nature of this process by drawing
a clear distinction between their current perceptions of Islam and the views that they
held during their primary socialization.The respondents describe how their parents, first
generation migrants, developed, duplicated and preserved their own identities, cultural
traditions and their religion after migrating to Belgium.They invested in the develop-
ment of migrant networks, mosques, Islamic butcheries, and migrant organizations.They
had little or no interest in building bridges with the indigenous society. On the contra-
ry, the older Muslims had a profound and sustained fear of losing their core identity, as
well as a distrust of indigenous groups in Belgian society.The respondents taking part in
the present study felt that they had a more individualized interpretation of religious pre-
scriptions and symbols:
respondent: There are basic rules in Islam.You may not violate them, whatever your level of
education.
interviewer: And what are your own views on this matter? 
respondent: I think it is bullshit. I try to understand why some people really believe and
accept everything that exists in the religious book.They do, don’t they? But, I
believe that the Book is too stiff.We need some flexibility.Things are written in
the Book that are not possible anymore. (woman, Moroccan origin)
The respondents find support in the diasporic notion of a universal Islam that transcends
the borders of nation states. In our study, we found that ethnic territorial disconnection
(such as that experienced by those living in the context of a diaspora) has prompted our
respondents to develop other ‘identity markers’. These markers designate their mem-
bership of the universal Muslim community or umma10 rather than of the local Muslim
community established by first generation Muslim migrants:
interviewer: What do you understand by umma?
respondent: Belonging, belonging to a group.This time a religious belonging. It means 
belonging to a group wherever you are. (man, Syrian origin)
A successful symbiosis
Our respondents are searching for a constructive symbiosis between their families’
values and norms and the perceived values and norms of ‘the others’ at high school, col-
lege and university.When an individual commences a course of higher education, their
borders concerning what is ‘tolerable’ shift almost automatically:
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respondent: At home, education is seen as being very important.And I soon realized that
when I tried harder at school and got good results, I was allowed to go out and
to stay out a bit longer. … I noticed that things became easier as a result.
As long as everything went well at school, I was allowed more freedom.
(man, Moroccan origin)
The parents of most of our respondents are conveying a complex message. On the one
hand they see integration as undesirable because they fear that this will inherently invol-
ve the loss of their ethno-religious identity. On the other hand, they have to safeguard
their socio-economic future in Flemish society at formal levels of participation, such as
education. For many Muslims, their first intense contact with the indigenous population
and society occurs at secondary school.This is all the more true of those who are trans-
ferred to a school that has no clear ethnic concentration of pupils. Experiences of this
kind are described as difficult but useful. It gives such Muslim pupils a different per-
spective on their own ethnic, cultural and religious identity. Particularly in situations like
this, our respondents can relate to the parental message of retaining their ethno-religi-
ous identity. While the schools in question often verbally expressed our respondents’
‘right to individuality’, the Muslim pupils perceived non-verbal signals conveying a
negative attitude towards their ethno-religious identity. Our respondents describe the
pressure they experience from both sides, and reveal how any tendency on their part to
favour one side immediately results in punishment by the other side:
respondent: I grew up between two worlds. I have no problem being in the company of
Belgians, but it can sometimes be easier to be among Moroccans. I do not 
always have to explain, tell untruths or the like, so it is easier. (…) But if I were
to marry a Belgian rather than a Moroccan, then I certainly wouldn’t get off
easily. It would cause a break with my family.Yes, oh dear! (woman, Moroccan 
origin)
Without wanting to make a choice, respondents seek a worthy middle course in their
search for an identity. In doing so, they rely less on cultural, traditional and ethnic aspects,
which they consider to be conservative, traditional and often ‘negative’. They reframe
their religious identity from a new Islamic point of view.This Islamic framework is an
individual construction in which Islam is disconnected from territorial boundaries and
replaced by the universal elements of their religion.
A growing number of young Muslims define their religion in terms of their own
choices, i.e. those observances that they are prepared to follow, and those that they are
not.The fact that they live in a secular environment forces them to undertake their own
personal quest, characterized by individual choice rather than traditional Islam. For our
respondents, this leads to a real search for understanding rather than the passive adoption
of a religion.Their praxis is privatized and internal, rather than shared and public:
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respondent: Look, when I turned seven, my parents told me that I had to pray. So I would
go upstairs for five minutes and let them think I had prayed.That’s what my
cousins do. So, okay, I do not always pray, I am not a perfect religious person, but
I am more honest. Now, when I pray, I do so with conviction. I feel a connec-
tion with God while I am praying. (woman, Moroccan origin)
Many respondents oppose the cultural traditions that their parents brought with them
when they migrated, because they see them as old-fashioned:
respondent: No.There are differences between my parents and me. But at the same time
there are similarities as well.There will be differences between my children 
and me.That is clear, and surely logical? Do we not have to move with the
times? (man,Turkish origin)
The respondents argue that certain usages and practices are not so much Islamic but
more part of the culture of their country of origin.Their parents find this quite shoc-
king, having spent their entire lives believing that their culture was based on Islamic
foundations:11
interviewer: Are there ideological differences between your grandparents, your parents 
and yourself?
respondent: Not concerning Islam, but certainly with regard to culture.Yes. But that is 
not Islam, just culture. It was passed down to them by their parents, but it 
does not always make sense in religious terms. (man, Moroccan origin)
When discussing the aim of creating a transnational Islam, our respondents talked about
the concept of the umma. On this basis, they espoused the idea of a ‘Muslim being’ that
is related to values and behaviour, rather than to the country that you are from or where
you live.This brings religion into the sphere of individual choice, doing away with its
social dominance and its strong ties to the surrounding culture.12
When Muslim migrants came to Western Europe, they brought their Islamic belief
with them.This Islam included popular local religious practices and local references to
religious authority.As a result, many different local forms of Islam sprang up in the host
societies. Now, Muslim communities everywhere have to decide which aspects of their
Islam are contextual and negotiable and which must remain intact because they are essen-
tial and universal13. In doing so, the main problem facing the communities of the Islamic
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diaspora assumes a new urgency. How are they to acquire religious legitimacy, authority
and knowledge for their own discourse when it often contradicts that of the traditional
ulama?14 In addition, these Muslims typically lack a well founded theological and theore-
tical knowledge of Islam.The main group of Muslims in Belgium received little educa-
tion in Islam, and then only at a very basic level.15 This engendered a need, in subsequent
generations of Muslims, to seek out the roots of their religion. Our respondents want to
read and analyse the religious scripts personally.They are trying to separate cultural tra-
dition from belief. In their view, conflicts between Islam and modernity, for example, are
based on an ‘incorrect reading’ or ‘different interpretation’ of Islamic sources:
respondent: There are indeed different interpretations.A scholar in Morocco 
may have one interpretation, while in China a totally different 
interpretation is used.These are different interpretations of Islam.
(man, Moroccan origin)
To narrow the gap between different interpretations, they develop arguments to support
a personal reading of Islam that would allow Muslims to participate actively in a secular
Western society. In this way, as European Muslims16, they provide daily proof that their
religion is indeed compatible with modernity, and with the preservation of a critical atti-
tude towards Western values:
respondent: Tarik Ramadan’s renewal is removing the distinction between the area of war
and the area of Islam. For him, a secular context can be an Islamic context.And
as a Muslim in a secularized society, you have to accept secularity while remai-
ning a good Muslim.You do not need to de-secularize the context to be a good
Muslim. Individuals can have a personal Islamic programme for the society in
which they find themselves.When you become aware that something in 
economy goes against your principles, you can simply search for an alternative,
or create one. (woman, Moroccan origin)17
The appearance of local forms of Islam involves a struggle for emancipation that is
oriented towards the traditional interpretation of Islam.These local, European forms of
Islam involve shifts in the meaning of various religious concepts.They lead to the deve-
lopment of personal interpretations, which represents a breakthrough in terms of the
monopoly on religious knowledge.This gives highly educated people an opportunity to
become the new shapers of opinion.18 At the same time, we notice among the respon-
169
14 Van Bruinessen & Allievi (2002).
15 Renaerts (1994).
16 What the content of a European Islam is, is still unclear and is not a central issue of this 
contribution.
17 Ramadan (2003).
18 Bartelink (1994) 28-29; Babès (1997) 17,115; Nielsen (1995); Sunier (1996) 218; Bunt (2000);
Allievi (2001).
opm marokko 3  20-06-2006  15:14  Pagina 169
dents a general interest in an ‘orthodox’, or pure Islam.They feel that this gives them the
progressive dynamism to distance themselves from their traditional family roots, which
– being more alienated – reject Western cultural norms. Nielsen19 indicates here also that
the emphasis is increasingly on underlying ethical values and spiritual principles.
The religious orientation of the respondents in this study is the result of a massive tan-
gle of forces, which cannot easily be untangled. It does not exist in a linear relationship
with a given generation’s educational level or socio-economic stratum.The reality is far
more complex than that.
19 Nielsen (1987) 392.
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Anas Talbi
Jeunes immigrés de culture musulmane en Hollande
entre traditionalisme et modernité
Dans une société en pleine mutation, les individus et les collectivités se trouvent con-frontés à la question du difficile équilibre entre traditionalisme et modernité, soule-
vée par la mondialisation de l’économie et de la culture. Cette question est corrélative-
ment liée à celle de la personne et de son identité. En fait, ce sujet, que j’ai déjà abordé
dans mes recherches antérieures,1 bénéficie d’un intérêt accru dans la mesure où les chan-
gements qui affectent les sociétés de l’époque moderne mettent à l’épreuve nos systèmes
de valeurs et nos identités. Au moment où l’insécurité, la criminalité et le terrorisme
international donnent lieu à des obsessions sécuritaires, nous constatons non seulement
une diminution de la justice sociale et des libertés individuelles, mais aussi une tentation
du repli identitaire. Qu’en est-il pour la communauté marocaine en Hollande?
Si l’immigration marocaine a connu d’importantes transformations sociologiques et
démographiques, avec un processus d’implantation largement avancé et une volonté
d’intégration de plus en plus affirmée, les cas de réussite sociale de certains jeunes ne
sauraient masquer l’impact du chômage qui frappe les jeunes immigrés dans une pro-
portion beaucoup plus large que la moyenne nationale.Ainsi s’accentue chez eux un sen-
timent d’exclusion et de marginalisation. La précarité socio-économique les pousse par-
fois à se manifester dans des comportements déviants ou délinquants. De plus, depuis les
années 1990, la violence intégriste est de plus en plus perçue comme un dangereux
phénomène émergeant dans ‘les quartiers islamistes’.
Vu les limites des analyses classiques socio-économiques, pouvons-nous avancer l’hy-
pothèse de la crise identitaire comme explication des troubles de comportement chez
certains jeunes immigrés, qui ont du mal à vivre entre deux pays et deux cultures? A vrai
dire, les troubles psychologiques qui affectent la population mondiale constituent un
sujet auquel s’intéresse, à juste titre, l’Organisation Mondiale de la Santé (OMS). En effet,
dépression, suicide et autres troubles de l’enfance et de l’adolescence sont des phénom-
ènes qui inquiètent désormais toutes les sociétés et qui seraient directement liés à la crise
de l’identité.
Cette étude vise à souligner l’importance de la santé mentale des immigrés, rendus par-
ticulièrement vulnérables par le choc des cultures. Elle a ensuite pour objectif de cher-
cher des réponses en vue du maintien des équilibres socio-psychologiques chez des jeu-
nes qui vivent parfois difficilement leur double culture, leur double identité, leur double
nationalité et des valeurs tiraillées entre traditionalisme et modernité. La problématique
traite donc l’emprise de la crise identitaire chez les jeunes issus de l’immigration maro-
caine sur le processus psychopathologique et analyse la relation entre identité et inté-
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gration d’une part, et identité et culture d’autre part pour souligner ensuite le rôle de 
l’apport identitaire dans la construction d’une personnalité équilibrée et bien intégrée.
Maturation criminelle ou immaturation identitaire?
Le tragique assassinat du cinéaste Theo Van Gogh par un jeune néerlandais d’origine
marocaine a soulevé sur la scène publique l’importante question de la place et de l’ave-
nir du million de musulmans vivants aux Pays-Bas. Ce crime, qui a indigné les
Néerlandais, qui y voient une atteinte à la liberté d’expression, intervient dans un con-
texte de radicalisation du débat politique national et européen sur des questions liées à
l’immigration, telles que notamment l’intégration des jeunes de culture musulmane. Il
s’est ajouté à un climat pesant, survenu après les attentats du 11 septembre 2001, dans
lequel Arabes et musulmans font l’objet de stigmatisations et de discriminalisations.
La question qui s’est aussitôt posée était de savoir si cet assassinat était un crime banal
ou un crime idéologique prémédité, dans le droit fil de l’intégrisme islamiste.
Dans les deux cas, bien que la deuxième piste soit définitivement privilégiée, puisque,
selon la police, l’assassin, Mohammed Bouyeri, jouait ‘un rôle clé’ dans le groupe terro-
riste islamiste Hofstadgroep, il serait judicieux d’en tirer les leçons qui s’imposent.
Pour traiter le sujet, nous avons choisi, comme fil directeur, le thème de l’identité, qui
constitue un des problèmes centraux des sciences sociales et qui ne cesse de poser des
interrogations, à la fois à l’intégré et à l’intégrateur.
Lorsque nous parlons de l’identitaire, nous sous-entendons, bien sûr, cette dynamique
conflictuelle qui risque de se transformer parfois en dynamique criminelle, voire terro-
riste. Nous retrouvons cette dynamique au cœur même de l’itinéraire de certains jeunes
issus de l’immigration marocaine. Les conflits jalonnant leur parcours personnel décou-
lent des différents antagonismes qui les empêchent d’être en symbiose avec leur soi iden-
titaire. La description des antagonismes constituant cette dynamique commence par celle
de l’antagonisme socioculturel, qui développe le contrôle social par le biais des travail-
leurs sociaux, et l’antagonisme socio-politique, qui développe le contrôle policier et
judiciaire, plus répressif. Ces deux types de contrôle sont motivés par la sécurité des
biens, des personnes et de l’État. Dans ce cadre, les jeunes issus de l’immigration maro-
caine souffrent de la xénophobie raciste, du rejet et de l’indifférence.‘Les marginaux des
banlieues, les minorités, les jeunes qui ‘galèrent’ ne sont pas exploités comme autrefois
les classes ouvrières … Ils sont ignorés et méprisés. Ils n’accèdent plus à la représentation
politique. Ils sont relégués à la périphérie de nos villes … La violence, les émeutes tra-
hissent la brutalité de l’exclusion subie et l’ampleur des frustrations éprouvées, notam-
ment par les jeunes privés d’avenir.2
La stigmatisation au niveau individuel et collectif constitue un autre mal dont souf-
frent ces jeunes.Ainsi, après le chômage qui les frappe doublement, arrive, en 1989, l’af-
faire du voile islamique, qui stigmatise quatre millions de musulmans de France. Il s’agit
là d’indices du grand vide politique, du fatalisme et du sentiment d’abandon qui s’in-
stallent finalement dans les banlieues. Selon Goffman,‘la société établit des procédés ser-
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vant à répartir en catégories les personnes et les contingents d’attributs ordinaires et
naturels chez les membres de cette catégorie.3 Ces attributs circonscrivent des identités
sociales. Goffman appelle ‘stigmatisation’ ce processus de catégorisation lorsqu’il a pour
effet de discréditer la personne en l’enfermant dans une présentation dévalorisée. Il
distingue trois types de stigmates désignant les anomalies du corps, des déviances – aux
yeux d’autrui – du caractère comme délinquance, drogue, homosexualité, ou encore des
attributs collectifs comme ethnie, nationalité, religion.
Selon Moumen-Marcoux, ‘les stigmates dont la population maghrébine peut souffrir
sont liés au mot ‘immigré’. Les jeunes ‘immigrés’ qui, rappelons-le, ne le sont pas pour la
plupart, sont des ‘Beurs’, des ‘Arabes’ … des ‘bougnoules’4… des banlieusards5. Derrière
la désignation ‘étranger’ se cache un caractère discriminatoire par rapport à leur culture,
leurs croyances et coutumes … Avec l’image de l’islam, leur religion deviendrait elle-
même un stigmate les excluant et les rejetant.
Plusieurs chercheurs en sciences sociales, qui ont traité la question identitaire chez les
populations immigrées, se sont posé les questions suivantes: l’identité est-elle un facteur
d’intégration nationale ou de repli communautaire? Et dans quelle mesure peut-elle
constituer un facteur de crise ou, au contraire, d’équilibre psychosocial?6
La situation de crise issue du 11 septembre 2001 a donc obligé les sociétés occiden-
tales à formuler des questions autour de leurs citoyens de culture musulmane, ainsi que
sur leurs politiques d’intégration. Or, c’est dans un contexte d’intégration difficile, sur
fond de crise identitaire et sous la pression croissante de revendications socio-économi-
ques et politico-religieuses que la délinquance des jeunes risque de s’aggraver. La thèse
de la crise identitaire ne servirait pas seulement à expliquer les troubles de la personna-
lité, mais aussi ce mal des banlieues qui frappe des populations reléguées, les poussant
ainsi à retrouver de nouvelles racines, origines ou groupes d’appartenance.7 Dans la
mesure où la violence intégriste a durement frappé la société néerlandaise, ce phénom-
ène y apparaît comme le paroxysme de l’inadaptation psychosociale de certains jeunes
immigrés de culture musulmane ayant du mal à vivre entre traditionalisme et moderni-
té.
Il est important de souligner que le processus de la violence commence souvent à un
âge précoce et qu’il est jalonné par une suite de troubles de comportement, de dévian-
ces et d’actes de délinquance graves. Nous avons pu déduire lors de nos recherches anté-
rieures sur les jeunes délinquants d’origine maghrébine en France8 que leur délinquan-
ce est en majeure partie une délinquance d’acquisition de biens. Nous avons conclu que,
si le problème socio-économique était à la source des délits contre les biens, le terro-
risme islamiste serait quant à lui plutôt lié aux troubles identitaires et aux carences cul-
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turelles. Dans le cas néerlandais, il est nécessaire de souligner que les idées obscurantistes
ou salafistes-jihadistes qui s’infiltrent de plus en plus parmi les jeunes immigrés exposent
les plus vulnérables d’entres eux à la manipulation mentale, voire à la violence intégriste.
Le phénomène n’est pas propre à la France, à l’Espagne ou aux Pays-Bas. Il touche
aussi le Maghreb, dont l’Algérie en premier lieu, mais aussi le Maroc. En effet le terro-
risme islamiste local a frappé le 16 mai 2003 Casablanca, faisant quarante quatre morts,
outre les quatorze jeunes kamikazes. Bien qu’ils soient tous autochtones et provenant de
bidonvilles et des quartiers défavorisés, où règnent ignorance, misère et chômage, il est
nécessaire de chercher les causes de leur violence, non seulement dans la crise socio-
économique, mais aussi dans la crise identitaire. Cette crise devient parfois très destruc-
tive en raison du choc culturel qui les frappe dans un Maroc qui se veut moderne, alors
que les possibilités de profiter des avantages de la modernité y sont extrêmement rares
et que les mentalités y sont encore conservatrices et conformistes.
Comment est-il possible pour ces jeunes, notamment pour ceux issus de l’immigra-
tion marocaine, de maintenir l’équilibre d’une personnalité épanouie et d’une identité
bien intégrée dans leur milieu de vie? Comment serait-il possible d’observer le bon
équilibre entre traditionalisme et modernité?
L’identité, vers un équilibre souhaité
La violence intégriste serait-elle la preuve d’un échec et d’une remise en question de la
politique d’intégration des jeunes immigrés de culture musulmane? Pour répondre à
cette interrogation, il faut savoir, tout d’abord, que l’identité immigrée se fabrique par
l’affirmation de son contenu propre. Elle n’est pas seulement l’autre de l’identité domi-
nante. Elle est basée sur un héritage et une histoire spécifiques, que les groupes immi-
grés cherchent à conforter en les appuyant sur des formes d’organisation sociales et col-
lectives, et dont elles veulent obtenir la reconnaissance en revendiquant leur légitimité
dans la société d’accueil, au besoin en lui donnant un prolongement politique. Cette
action identitaire est traduite par des demandes d’accès à l’espace public et par la recher-
che d’une visibilité culturelle. Cependant, les multiples conflits locaux autour de la con-
struction des mosquées et de l’affaire du foulard islamique, à titre d’exemple, ont mon-
tré toute la difficulté pour la société d’accueil du migrant à accepter intimement la pré-
sence musulmane au-delà de la simple rhétorique de la tolérance.
Aussi, l’intégration s’avère profondément paradoxale. Son succès suscite l’apparition de
cette différence au cœur même de l’identité collective. En effet: l’on voit l’Arabe et pas
la personne. Pour les groupes dominants, cette construction ne constitue pas une mise à
distance, mais une purification. Elle relève d’une logique du soupçon. La différence est
vécue comme une sorte d’opacité de l’immigré, sommé d’être transparent et sujet de
débats publics. Certes, il est bien devenu un individu qui a accédé à la modernité et à la
rationalité et s’est pleinement assimilé: il a oublié sa langue d’origine, et ne pratique plus
la religion de ses parents, son conjoint est un national, son identité a été digérée et ne se
manifeste plus, ou presque plus, dans des pratiques culturelles spécifiques. Cependant, en
marge de grands sacrifices, une véritable intégration citoyenne reste hypothétique et lui
est même refusée.
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Pour les immigrés, l’identité fonde une zone intermédiaire, une sorte de sous-société
dans laquelle l’immigré peut trouver les appuis et les ressources nécessaires pour affron-
ter le choc social et culturel de la société d’accueil.Telle est l’une des conclusions les plus
anciennes d’enquêtes sociologiques effectuées au début du 20ème siècle par les sociolo-
gues de l’École de Chicago: l’intégration est un processus actif et collectif, qui se traduit
par la construction d’une identité intermédiaire, permettant aux immigrés de gérer les
tensions affectives, religieuses, culturelles et sociaux propres à toute forme d’exil.
Pourquoi donc la communauté musulmane serait-elle plus réfractaire à l’intégration?
Parce que celle-ci serait synonyme d’assimilation intégrale. Cependant, il n’y a aucune
raison pour ne pas être Arabe ou musulman et Européen à la fois, répliquent d’autres.
Par ailleurs, le racisme et l’humiliation pousseraient une minorité, se sentant culturel-
lement agressée, à reproduire des mécanismes de repli identitaire et de rejet de l’autre.
De cette représentation péjorative, les jeunes issus de l’immigration marocaine, par dépit
identitaire ou par pure provocation, utilisent l’islam comme un instrument de contesta-
tion contre une société qui les stigmatise. Ervin Goffman explique la stigmatisation par
un processus qui a pour effet de discréditer la personne en l’enfermant dans une pré-
sentation dévalorisée. Derrière la désignation ‘étranger’ ou ‘issus de l’immigration’ se
cache un caractère discriminatoire par rapport à la culture, aux croyances et coutumes
des immigrés.
Avec l’image de l’islam, leur religion devient elle-même un stigmate facteur d’exclu-
sion et de rejet. Alors, certains jeunes, incapables d’agir positivement face à leur envi-
ronnement, trouvent parfois dans la drogue et la délinquance un moyen d’exorciser leurs
peurs ou de surmonter les échecs. D’autres se retournent vers les valeurs spirituelles et
la pratique religieuse comme une stratégie leur permettant de surmonter la violence
dont ils se sentent victimes9. L’exclusion et la montée du racisme, dont ils souffrent, ont
favorisé la renaissance du mouvement communautaire s’exprimant par une certaine isla-
misation des quartiers.
Toutefois, la très grande majorité des jeunes qui se ‘convertissent’ à l’islam pratique,
en réalité, une religion largement laïcisée, qui vise avant tout à reconstruire une identi-
té collective10. En fait, ce qui pose aujourd’hui problème, c’est le décalage entre l’inté-
gration culturelle des minorités d’origine étrangère et leur non-intégration sociale11.
Face aux incidences de la modernité et de la mondialisation, face à la misère socio-
économique, à la désintégration politique et aux multiples appréhensions culturelles,
l’identité collective d’un groupe humain redevient le seul point stable. L’identitaire et le
groupe d’appartenance deviennent pour la communauté et pour l’individu un des seuls
repères structurants.
Conclusion
Si l’on en croit l’adage ‘plus les racines de l’arbre sont profondes, plus il peut monter 
haut’, il serait souhaitable que nos jeunes puissent se munir d’une identité reliant la cul-
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ture d’origine à celle de la société actuelle. La pratique de l’islam serait perçue comme
un avantage au service d’une intégration citoyenne, qui ne se fait pas par l’élimination
des traits culturels, mais au contraire par leur mise en valeur.Voilà pourquoi il faudra rati-
onaliser et moderniser ce référent culturel afin de concevoir un islam européen adapté à
son nouveau contexte. Ceci implique aussi la nécessité de l’expliquer, de l’organiser et
de le banaliser, attendu qu’il fait désormais partie intégrante du paysage sociologique
européen. Il s’agit d’une question de reconnaissance et d’estime de soi nécessaire au
bien-être personnel, dans la mesure où, pour l’équilibre de la personnalité, il est néces-
saire de trouver l’équilibre de son soi identitaire, sans déficit, ni excès.
Nous soulignons sur ce plan l’importance du rôle, à réactiver, des grands intégrateurs
sociaux, à commencer par la famille qui est le berceau d’une personnalité équilibrée et
le premier agent de socialisation de l’enfant. Les enfants des familles immigrées sont les
premières victimes du dysfonctionnement de l’institution familiale, mise à rude épreuve
sur le plan social et culturel. L’absentéisme des parents dans le processus éducatif de leurs
enfants, tout comme le manque de communication dans les familles, constituent un des
principaux facteurs de dysfonctionnement social.
Il sera aussi nécessaire de réviser les mécanismes d’intégration et l’importance du rôle
des partis politiques dans l’encadrement des jeunes, ainsi que celui de l’école. En effet,
l’éducation et la formation sont certainement à la base de toute insertion socioprofessi-
onnelle.
Néanmoins, un travail supplémentaire sur soi s’imposera aussi, d’autant plus que ce soi
évolue inéluctablement dans une situation de métissage et d’acculturation. Cette situa-
tion constitue, certes, une richesse, mais aussi une complexité qu’il faut savoir gérer.
Comme toute idéologie, la religion pourrait être bénéfique dans la modération ou malé-
fique dans l’excès. Le génie de l’islam réside justement dans sa souplesse et dans sa gran-
de capacité d’adaptation loin de toute interprétation archaïque ou fanatique. Afin de
pouvoir vivre en symbiose avec leur nouvel environnement occidental, tout comme ils
ont droit au respect de leur identité religieuse, les musulmans devront, à leur tour, res-
pecter les libertés fondamentales, favoriser le dialogue et rejetter la violence.
Une meilleure compréhension de l’islam, ainsi qu’un réel investissement personnel et
communautaire dans le projet national, permettront certainement aux jeunes de profiter
positivement de la dynamique entre traditionalisme et modernité.
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Rachid Touhtouh
Gender identity in a high school in the North of Morocco:
resistance to hshouma culture
Introduction
Philosophers, psychologists and sociologists argue that the act of speaking or any formof expression that guarantees communication is fundamental to a human being’s
social and personal development.Those who defend this approach to the role of educa-
tion in creating spaces for speaking are also the defenders of democratic schools. The
question is, how can school educate their pupils democratically, and offer them an edu-
cation in democracy? This paper proposes an approach based on Gender Theory.
Gender education is a necessary prerequisite to the democratization process, bearing
in mind the role that schools play in the socialization process and in the construction of
identity. Gender education is a cornerstone for the promotion and integration of human
rights values in schools. Gender education, or engendering education, is an essential
component of an education based on equality and citizenship. In fact, this paper sheds
light on the idea that any pedagogical reform necessitates integrating gender education
as the core area of the process of modernizing our educational system.
The question this paper attempts to answer is: how can educators promote and inte-
grate an education based on gender theory? The present paper attempts to answer this
question by adopting a bottom-up approach, that is to say, by teaching these values and
sensitizing students to them. This requires a knowledge of students’ perceptions and
representations because they are the basis of processes through which meaning is pro-
duced. One must also allow them to express their thoughts and feelings, and consider
them as active actors in the process.
Practically and methodologically, this paper is the result of fieldwork that was con-
ducted at the Lycée Imam Shoutaibi, a high school in the Ghafsai region, in the north of
Morocco. Students at this school were interviewed during lessons in the classroom.The
method adopted for the interviews was specifically chosen to elicit students’ perceptions
on gender identity in an educational space.
The present paper, which answers and analyzes these issues, is organized as follows.
The first part is mainly methodological in nature, providing information on methods of
research. It also explains the purpose of the paper and its importance to gender studies.
The second part is purely theoretical. A set of concepts will be defined and conceptual
frameworks will be debated.The third part sets out the practical aspects of the paper. It
sets out and analyzes the results of the fieldwork. Its final section deals with recommen-
dations, suggestions and measures for effective engendered co-education.
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Gender role socialization: theoretical framework
Feminist theorists and activists argue that it is the very transmission of culture and soci-
al hierarchies in schools that reproduces gender differences. They evaluate the way in
which teaching contributes to the maintenance of sexual divisions in schools. The 
approach used is to research overt and hidden curricula which represent the conscious
or unconscious ideology of such institutions.They argue that all curricula reinforce sex-
role stereotyping by encouraging girls to study ‘female’ subjects such as arts and biology.
This reinforces existing gender stereotypes, and reduces girls’ future employment oppor-
tunities. Classroom dynamics is also a critical part in the process, because it contains
implicit messages about the status of men in society.
This gender gap in educational attainment gives girls a lesser status in the classroom,
affecting their performance and hindering their commitment to subjects.At an interna-
tional conference on Women and Education, the same line of reasoning was followed:
‘Scientific research must aim to pinpoint the tools that can be used to make changes in social atti-
tudes, as well as policies in favour of women. School and family are two spaces where the image of
women has to be polished and improved. School manuals are generally imbued with a great deal
of sexism and gender discrimination.’1
Institutions involved in socialization, especially family and schools, play a central role in
gender socialization.The education system, which is a very complex space made up of
assorted variables and factors, contributes to the process of inculcating dominant cultu-
ral values and beliefs on feminine and masculine identities.
Representation, sexuality and adolescence
Feminists argue that there is no separation between real relationships and representations,
since the latter are also part of real experience. In a gendered world, stereotypes are fra-
med in constructed images. Stereotypes are the only means by which children form con-
cepts of femininity and masculinity. Representation is a process through which meaning
is produced. It can also be described in the following terms:
‘Feminists argue that representation continually creates, endorses, or alters ideas of gender identity.
Feminist analysis…has produced many strategies for feminist practice…[so as] to use the concept
of representation to move from content analysis to understanding the functions of femininity in
society and how it is represented in terms of class, race and gender.’2
One aim of the development of a feminist culture, both in theory and practice, is to
achieve productive social change. Such development requires a recognition of the fact
that representation is a political issue, as it is of strategic importance to analyze women’s
subordination within patriarchal forms of representation.
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Representation functions very effectively in educational spaces, as students are not
aware of it, and its supporting structures are least visible. It gives students a ready-made
matrix in which to position themselves as females and males:
‘The nature of femininity and masculinity is one of the key sites of discursive struggle of the indi-
vidual … it is a struggle which begins at birth and which is central to upbringing and education.
At the centre of struggle is the common-sense assumption that there is a natural way for girls, boys,
women and men to be.This gives rise to a battle to fix particular versions of femininity and mas-
culinity as natural.’3
Gender identity is fixed through various activities, roles and behaviours. In the context
of adolescents, it enables them to understand their bodies and sexualities. Social repre-
sentation of sexuality as an identity of the adolescent guarantees social positioning of the
individual in his/her milieu. Sexual orientation is a crucial component of one’s identity.
Adolescents interpret their sexuality as the core of their self and of gendered identity.
Adolescence – though a universal and civilizational phenomenon – is coloured with
various particularities and specificities according to culture, tradition, stereotypes, and
archetypes. In Morocco, as in other Arab-Islamic countries, adolescence is a painful phase
of life for young men and women. It is a period of hshouma, of fear and taboo. Many girls
shed tears during their first menstruation, thinking that they have been raped by God or
a man while they were sleeping.
Biological difference creates cultural difference.This is an essentialist view of the soci-
alization/acculturation effect:
‘Separation creates an enormous gap in understanding. Men do not understand women…and
women do not understand men and it all starts when little girls are separated from little boys in the
hammam. At that point a cosmic frontier splits the world into two halves.The frontier demarcates
the line of power.Wherever a frontier is drawn on Allah’s Earth, the powerful will be on one side
and the powerless on the other.’4
Adolescence and sexuality in Morocco and other Arab-Islamic countries are mystified
by control strategies involving honour and shame.Adolescents have the perception that
all aspects of their behaviour is subject to chronic censorship.They react by rejecting any
temptation to express themselves either verbally or non-verbally.These teenagers seem
to have evolved ways of surviving within a society teeming with control mechanisms for
gendered identity and for any anomalies that do not meet the criteria of normalcy or
cultural nurturing.
Becoming gendered: gender role socialization through school discourses
In a previous paper, I dealt with the image of women presented by school textbooks in
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general, and those used in the teaching of English in particular.This study dealt with the
role of this image in gender identity construction by means of written text and illustra-
tions. I attempted to unveil the sexism prevalent in such textbooks.The paper provided
an analysis of gender as a socio-cultural variable or construct produced by the way in
which females are represented. It shows that these representations reproduce the tools of
male domination and reflect attitudes towards women. Course content analysis reveals
judgments, opinions and behaviours which segregate between the genders.These results
indicate possible directions for future research.The course content is based on a biased
division of roles, involving sexual roles that are geared to society’s collective self. The
women in these textbooks occupy a dependent social position, leading a life of subordi-
nation.Women are depicted either as housewives or family care-givers.The image pro-
jected by primary school textbooks is even more extreme5. These roles, which are
echoed implicitly by school textbooks, have both a pedagogic function and a cultural
impact:
‘L’action pédagogique qui implique le travail pédagogique comme travail d’inculcation qui doit
durer assez pour reproduire une formation durable, un habitus, comme produit de l’intériorisation
des principes d’un arbitraire culturel capable de se perpétuer après la cessation de l’action pédago-
gique et par là de perpétuer dans les pratiques les principes de l’arbitraire intériorisé.’6
The cultural construction of gendered students is secured in a sustainable way through
the use of such textbooks. However, these books are not the only tools for framing the
identities of future citizens.The structure of the classroom and the teaching methodolo-
gies used, as well as language, are all factors that guarantee the coherent and harmonious
inculcation of the values echoed by textbooks.7
The fact that other subjects also create a hierarchical division of roles, is revealed by
an examination of the textbooks used in History, Geography, Islamic Education, and
Philosophy. These ideological effects were deconstructed in a study of the Moroccan
social model, via school debates:
‘La famille, selon ces manuels repose sur un certain nombre de vertus…qui font de la famille musul-
mane une institution sociale ou l’harmonie est la règle entre l’époux et l’épouse. Cette harmonie
est basée sur la distribution des tâches et sur la complémentarité des rôles de l’homme et de la
femme. La femme en tant qu’épouse et mère représente l’affection, elle doit obéir son mari qui en
contrepartie doit être bon et bienveillant envers elle. Son rôle est de prendre soin de son époux, de
son foyer et de ses enfants; l’homme, en revanche, détient l’autorité. Il assure la subsistance et la
sécurité de la famille.’8
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The basis of personality is produced through a model of subordination/domination.
School discourse perpetuates the status-quo, male domination in a society based on
sexual division of labour. Acculturation through school ideologies is efficient, effective
and sustainable.
A study of the significance of illustrations and images in history books, concluded that
only 20% of illustrations in these textbooks depicted both sexes, the remaining 80%
depicted only men. These history books made no mention whatsoever of female 
leaders.9 School projects women’s invisibility in society to inculcate in students (of both
sexes) an ideal concept of family, of gender identity and of the division of space.
Methodology: research design
This paper describes the socializing effects of co-education, and their role in gender
identity construction. One key issue in the promotion of gender education is sexuality,
another involves values linked to being male or female.To ensure that any data collected
was reliable, I spent an entire year promoting a culture of dialogue and participation in
the classroom.The goal was to break with the traditional role of a teacher as the only
source of knowledge and with the student’s classical role as a passive receiver. Increased
emphasis was also given to the teaching method used:
‘Pour notre part, nous pensions que les approches qui considèrent l’élève comme un acteur à part
entière sont plus propices à favoriser des valeurs basées sur l’autonomie, le sens de l’initiative de
même qu’à contribuer au développement et au plein épanouissement de la personnalité de l’enfant
et à son intégration dans une société libre et démocratique.’10
This atmosphere enables students to talk freely, to express themselves, and to voice their
thoughts and feelings. Students are taught how to listen, speak and develop an opinion.
It is a liberating approach, in the sense that this methodology is based on democracy, res-
pect and participation.
The fieldwork involved four classes (two baccalaureate classes, one second-level class,
and one first-level class).The number of students in these classes ranged from 40 to 42.
I interviewed 10 or 12 students from each class, most of whom were female. I found
female students to be more courageous and daring than their male counterparts.A total
of 40 students were interviewed, more than 30 of whom were female. I found most
female students to be intelligent and hard working.Their ages ranged from 15 to 18.
Methods of research
In the course of my research, I relied mainly on interviews as a means of data collecti-
on. Interviews are authentic in the sense that informants speak freely, without interrup-
tions, and express themselves better. Interviews provide direct quotes that can be used
later, during data-analysis and interpretation.
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For greater reliability, I depended on participant observation.This meant carrying out
my teaching duties while observing students’ behaviour, language, and relations with
other students (both in the classroom and in the school-yard).This gives me the status
of outsider-insider, as far as my position as a researcher is concerned. In order to obtain
additional information, I sometimes conducted informal interviews with school offici-
als, teachers, and students from other classes. Document analysis was also part of the
investigation, as were surveys of previously published studies.The study is predominant-
ly qualitative in nature, due to the constraints of time and space.
Purpose and importance
One objective of this paper is to analyze students’ perceptions of femininity and mascu-
linity. Another is to unveil the values associated with being male or female. The third
objective is to deconstruct female identity and gender ideology in an educational space.
The rationale behind these objectives is to explore the effects of socialization and co-
education in the construction of a gendered identity.This will help us identify the ele-
ments that need to be incorporated into a pedagogical reform based on a gender per-
spective.
The results of this fieldwork are of great importance to both gender studies and edu-
cation studies.The aim is to employ gender as an analytical tool in deconstructing the
impact of education on gendered beings, especially adolescents.
Gender identities within a northern high school: students’ testimonies
As a social space, school is a site of resistance for these adolescents.There are two reasons
for this. Firstly, school is a contested terrain within which these young adolescents’ iden-
tities are being constructed. Secondly, it is a powerful tool in the process of identity for-
mation. School in Morocco is a public space that brings different groups into contact
with one another. Both materially and symbolically, teachers and students embody com-
peting discourses.
Morocco is a country in which social structures are characterized by two modes of
thinking: traditional and modern.11 These two tendencies oppose and contradict one
another in many ways.Adolescents establish an in-between space and create a harmoni-
ous link between these two ways of life.This necessitates a continual reworking of iden-
tity and self.Adolescents successfully negotiate this construction. In this context, I would
like to quote De Lauretis and Allcoff ’s definition of identity12:
‘Identity – a necessary component of the subject’s agency – is attained through an on-going pro-
cess of people’s self-analysis, interpretation and reworking of their actual social positions, and of the
meanings given to these positions through discourse.’
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Identity in this sense is the fruit of an individual’s (or group’s) interpretation and recon-
struction of their personal history and particular social location, as well as the discursive
context within which they find themselves.
Accordingly, gender identity formation in schools is a process of self-definitions and
practices through which these students constantly modify this construction.The ways in
which these young adolescents understand and interpret their position as adolescents
necessitates a careful negotiation and recording of the symbols and common-sense ideas
that permeate mass culture. It also necessitates exchange and communication.
Gender identity interacts with various factors. In an educational space, construction of
gender identity is one of the most problematic processes of identity formation.This deri-
ves from the space itself, the age of the adolescents in question, and the changing factors
within this space.Any definition of the way in which adolescents perceive femininity and
masculinity necessitates an analysis of the values associated with being male and female
in this particular context.The goal is to unveil female identity in particular and gender
ideology in general.
Co-education and gender identity construction
The aim of this section is to analyze students’ perceptions of femininity and masculini-
ty, and the values associated with being male and female.The students interviewed dis-
cuss the importance of co-education and its effects on the relationship between girls and
boys. Each wants to understand the other. Co-education allows them a space in which
to meet, hold discussions, and establish friendships.At the same time, they resent the con-
trol imposed on them by parents, school officials, and teachers.
Students prefer mixed classes, in which boys and girls can interact, as they feel that this
will better equip them to deal with life’s challenges in future. Fatemzahra (aged 18) says:
‘a mixed class is a microcosm of life … it teaches us how to talk to boys and how to get
to know their character and personality13…’ Aziz (aged 19) argues that co-education is
the best type of education students can receive:‘at primary school there was an enormous
gulf between us. Girls sit with other girls, and boys with other boys … at the lycée there
is greater freedom.There is also more space for talk and interaction, although the admi-
nistration is keeping a close eye on us … as are our parents’. Shaimaa, one of the students,
points out that school offers a space in which meetings with the opposite sex can take
place: ‘the contact with your classmates, especially boys, teaches you a lot … I prefer co-
education … even though teachers avoid certain subjects, such as sex, for example’.
The subject to which Shaimaa is apparently referring is becoming a necessity in public
schools. Most students see sexual education as an important subject and feel that it is
high time they learned about it.They suggest that teachers should address these themes,
since there are strict taboos against discussing such issues within families. At the same
time, however, sex segregation continues to dominate the ways in which these students
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and groups of students associate with one another. In the school-yard, for example, you
will rarely see groups of male students associating with groups of female students.
Hind (aged 15) says ‘Next year, I hope that school officials will create spaces for us
girls to discuss feminine topics with the female teachers … this is badly needed ...
Morocco is a very patriarchal society … we should start by discussing matters between
ourselves …’. Her strategy is to form a kind of sisterhood between females while, at the
same time, opting for co-education, because she feels that this gives her power, solidari-
ty and new ideas.
Shaimaa, a particularly daring student, broached the issue of sexuality because she is
convinced that this is one of the tools of female subordination and control in schools,
on the street and at home. ‘I think that in school the theme [i.e. sex] should be discus-
sed … I wish I were a boy … parents do not trust me … my mother always tells me:
“if you were a boy, I would not try to control you” … I would do whatever I like …’.
Many girls suffer from this lack of confidence. Girls reject such discrimination. It alie-
nates them at home, on the street and in class.
Maryama, another formidable girl, complains about the way her parents brought her
up: ‘Maryama … wear loose clothes … do not wear tight ones … Maryama … do not
be late … do not talk to boys … boys are different from you.They have all the privile-
ges … we girls are controlled in everything we do …’. Maryama deplores the socializa-
tion of girls in families and in schools. As far as she is concerned, teachers actively dis-
criminate between boys and girls. Administrators also control girls, but not boys. The
educational system reproduces the tools of subordination for girls and domination for
boys.
In the lycée, girls are obliged to wear a garment that conceals their bodies completely.
They have to wear a similar type of garment during sporting activities.Worse still, these
discriminatory measures have been legally incorporated into the lycée’s internal regula-
tions. One teacher told me that he allows boys to be absent without permission. In the
case of girls, however, he told the administration ‘I don’t trust girls … a boy will lose
nothing … for a girl it creates problems for me …’.The ‘taming’ aspect of the education
system involves a web of discriminatory and control mechanisms that reproduce the
same gender relations seen in society at large. It guarantees the continuity of the type of
gender ideology and power that permeate the culture as a whole.
In another study, 73% of the adolescents interviewed described their ideal woman as
one who cares for her husband, does the domestic chores, and educates her children.
They added that what they appreciate in a woman is her patience and house-manage-
ment skills.14 This study revealed that this same idealized image of a Moroccan woman
is found in all school discourses, and especially in textbooks used as reading material.The
same image is found in the Mudawwana (the Moroccan Family Code). It is also project-
ed at home, by subordinated grandmothers, mothers and sisters. Only 12% of these ado-
lescents believe in, and insist on, equality between men and women.
Fatima, a brilliant baccalaureate student, is proud of her femininity. She is determined
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to advance herself within society, so as to achieve a feeling of independence. ‘Society,
family, and school are a network of controlling mechanisms, they subordinate and jail
boys as well as girls … they impose a certain mode of dress, of language and behaviour
on both boys and girls … girls continue to experience discrimination in their homes,
their schools, on the street, and throughout society as a whole …’.This girl sees this web
of controlling mechanisms, and their interrelatedness, in the various factors imposed by
society and controlled by its institutions.
School as a tool of knowledge, par excellence, creates identities, subjects, and gende-
red selves that are poorly equipped for a future role as active and equal citizens.Educators
should be careful and vigilant with regard to human rights, equality, tolerance and the
establishment of well-balanced roles between the genders. To this end, they must also
strive for the continual reform of discourses within schools.
The interviews suggest that students are acutely aware of gender asymmetry at school
and within their families. Hind voices her outrage, feeling much more controlled than
her brothers or other boys:‘School rules compel girls to wear blouses, while boys are free
of such restrictions … school rules oblige girls to wear a garment that conceals their
bodies completely during sporting activities … everyone controls us.Textbooks also pre-
sent girls as angels … wherever you go, eyes control you …’. Girls resent the existence
of such controls.Yet, despite their criticism, they continue to toe the line. It is a negoti-
ation of subversion, with strict limits on the space and freedoms that they are permitted.
Shaimaa hints at the driving force behind such control: ‘when we go out with boys,
people assume that we are doing dishonest things’. These young adolescents are quite
aware that their use of space is tightly controlled, to maintain checks on their sexuality.
These controls are exerted by their parents, teachers and school officials, as well as their
brothers.
On the other hand, they seem to accept the legitimacy of such constraints, to a cer-
tain extent. Ibtissam insists that she is free. ‘I do not feel such control … it is natural …
some boys and girls should be controlled …’. Nawal explains that ‘boys and girls befriend
each other … their friendship is not innocent’. Fatemzahra says that ‘I should obey my
parents … I will behave the way society wishes because I am not yet independent’.These
testimonies illustrate the complex nature of the cultural construction of gender identity.
It is an ongoing process of self-formation and self-definition.
For these adolescents, school should be a space of freedom, democracy, participation
and access to the same privileges on an equal footing. Boys and girls should enjoy these
privileges without discrimination. Discrimination negates adolescents’ personality, iden-
tity and creative abilities. It negates critical and reflective thinking.
Elements of a pedagogical reform:Aspects of a gendered co-education
The revision of pedagogical tools is not an easy task. It requires the involvement of spe-
cialists from every field of knowledge, but it also needs the political will to make it suc-
ceed.Any pedagogical reform must have a human face. Educators must target the human
element in their discourses. For this reason, I believe that an international reference point
– the values of human rights – should provide the theoretical underpinning for any such
185
opm marokko 3  20-06-2006  15:14  Pagina 185
reform. Gender theory should also provide a guideline in this regard. Sex discrimination
should be firmly avoided, with equal opportunities in the teaching process as the goal.
At the level of school textbooks and pedagogies, the following aspects are worth
taking into consideration. Firstly, sexual stereotypes and common sexist references are to
be avoided.Textbooks should promote task-sharing between men and women both out-
side and inside homes.These textbooks and school discourses should project an appro-
priate image of women, rather than one that is adversely biased.They should stress the
importance of women’s participation in all spheres of life. Secondly, there is the option
of creating a specifically feminist pedagogy. Here, the feminist teacher or pedagogue acts
as a facilitator or coordinator in a non- hierarchical classroom environment. Failing that,
the existing pedagogies, methodologies, and approaches should, at the very least, incor-
porate gender analysis (both as a concept and as a tool) into the practice of teaching.
Thirdly, female models should be diversified, valued, and given enough space in text-
books. Fourthly, cooperative learning should be introduced. This would involve small
groups of students working together to create a group dynamic, and to give girls the
opportunity to emerge as group leaders. Fifthly, the classroom setting should be rearran-
ged to create an atmosphere of cooperation, leadership and competition.The sixth point
in this first level of revision is that teachers should adopt a fluid conception of gender
identity. Last but not least, teachers should be aware of gender ideology, and of the fact
that extreme gender ideology leads to exploitation.
Sex education and gender analysis should be integrated, to create a well-balanced gen-
der identity in schools.These elements are of paramount importance. First and foremost,
there must be a democratic climate within the school. The schools are challenged to
change their whole philosophy, since this is the only way to achieve democracy, partici-
pation, access to information and freedom of expression.
At the pedagogical level, efforts must be made to sensitize mothers, bearing in mind
their early and decisive role in socialization. Mothers can also play an essential role
during their children’s adolescence, when boys and girls turn to their parents for advice
and help. As stated, schools participate in the gender construction of identities.
Accordingly, students should be sensitized to gender analysis. Furthermore, schools
should also provide sex education, either as a separate subject or as a component of other
subjects. Gender analysis should permeate school discourses at all levels.
While encouraging adolescents to be happy and proud of what they are, school dis-
courses must avoid perpetuating the idea that males are superior to females.
Gender analysis workshops must target teachers, administrators and students, to sensi-
tize them to gender roles.Teacher training centres should also provide instruction in gen-
der analysis, as part of psycho-pedagogy. All in all, more profound studies and more
exhaustive analyses should be conducted on gender identity construction in Moroccan
schools, in order to obtain more results.
These recommendations are the result of fieldwork, involving analysis and observa-
tion. They derive from a knowledge of the terrain. They are very practical measures,
aimed at achieving a better understanding of adolescents’ gender identities, and of the
effects of socialization on their sense of self.There is the option of conducting a more
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thoroughgoing analysis in future, as the paper presents extensive data from a fertile field
of research.
Conclusion
‘You kill and I bury’.This sentence is uttered by many parents when taking their chil-
dren to school for the first time. It reveals the foundations of our socialization system
within schools and homes. This socialization involves the ‘killing and burying of mal-
adjusted behaviour’. In fact, both family and school, the very institutions responsible for
children’s education, work together to shape children’s thoughts and to reconfigure them
to fit the norm. School kills maladjustment and families bury it.This conscious educa-
tional strategy creates gender hierarchies in terms of behaviour and of self. By influen-
cing our identities, this hierarchy also influences our roles in society. Gender, sex, and
sexuality are interrelated variables which guarantee an ideal construction of identity.
The results of this study are qualitative in nature.They throw light on essential aspects
of our educational system, aspects that are usually neglected in school reforms. In terms
of research, the field of co-education and its relation to gender identity in Morocco is
very much virgin territory.These studies tackle new elements in the system of educa-
tion as a whole, such as textbooks, different approaches, the way in which the classroom
environment and school administration are organized, as well as students’ relationships
and identities.The paper is a step towards the incorporation of gender education, edu-
cation for equality, citizenship and human rights.
It recommends the integration of gender analysis at all levels of education, from pri-
mary schools to universities. This would facilitate a well-balanced education, greater
democracy, and more participation, as well as access to rights and obligations. Integrating
gender in education is the first step towards greater social equity and equality among stu-
dents.
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Zakaria Zakri
Youth in the postmodern condition and the ideology 
of resentment
Introduction
As you may have noticed, part of my title is taken from Jean-François Lyotard’s bookThe Postmodern Condition. Nowadays there are a host of ‘post’ discourses, emerging
together with postmodernism as the preferred mode of criticism and analysis. In very
simple terms, postmodernity can be defined as the condition of existing in the present
era of late capitalism. My aim is to discuss the position of Moroccan and Dutch youth
in the context of such a condition. I would also like to approach youth as a category
within our social structures, a category that tends to be politically exploited most of the
time.
To return to postmodernity for a moment: a recurring element within postmodern
discourse is legitimacy.The conference for which this paper was written is part of a lar-
ger event focusing on 400 years of relations between Morocco and the Netherlands. My
point of departure is to investigate whether the proposal for staging such an event is legi-
timate or not.
Legitimacy in the postmodern condition is directly related to issues of value and posi-
tion. In other words, we need to prove that a paper like this has any value.To put it ano-
ther way, is this going to be a reproduction of existing relations, if indeed there are any,
or is it going to form the background for producing a new mode of interaction? It is
important to make sure that a contribution like this paper has a position of some kind,
or, in other words, that it is put in the right context. In answering these questions, my
approach will be based on proving value through positioning. I will endeavour to draw
a parallel between value and position.
The global context
My hypothesis is that the legitimacy of talking about Moroccan and Dutch relations lies
in the context and value of such a discussion. But what is the essence of such context?
I believe the present context can be identified in terms of what is known as ‘the New
World Order’.This in turn prompts the question: what is the nature of this order? 
The term ‘world order’ refers to a group of political units that interact on a regular
basis so as to attain mutual reliance and interdependence.The world order could there-
fore be said to incorporate the interaction between nations such as Morocco and the
Netherlands. Another crucial point is that the hallmark of such an order is the wides-
pread phenomenon called globalization. Globalization can roughly be defined as a histo-
rical event whose main tenet is to maximize the interconnectedness between the diffe-
rent parts of the world.
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This interconnectedness and interdependence leaves us no option but to resist a dan-
gerous myth, that of exceptionality. In this regard, it is crucial to realize that Moroccan
officials have been committing an immense error in thinking that Morocco represents a
fabulous exception with respect to Arab geopolitics. This idea has been all-encompas-
sing.The evidence that Morocco’s exceptionality is a myth was provided by the attacks
in Casablanca on 16 May 2003, which heralded its demise. Due to changes occurring in
the late modern condition, such as the circulation and flow of capital across national bor-
ders, the line between what is local, national and international has become inescapably
blurred.What Moroccan officials need to realize is that the world to which we citizens
belong extends far beyond the territorial state of Morocco.
To sum up the first part of my paper: it is legitimate to speak of Moroccan-Dutch rela-
tions since they form part of an attempt to maximize interconnectedness and interde-
pendence. It is this endeavour that lends ‘value’ to a paper such as this.
The ideology of resentment
This brings me to the heart of the matter: youth and the ideology of resentment. Last
year, 2004, I attended a conference entitled ‘Européen et Musulman, une espèce en voie d’ap-
parition’ (European and Muslim: an emerging species) organized by the Fondation Orient-
Occident. Its thesis was based on ‘constructive destruction’. It set out to destroy the fashi-
onable discursive notion of ‘the endangered species’.There is a prevalent discourse that
our modern environment is too negative and unhealthy to allow the emergence of new
species, be they biological or cultural.The presenter placed his thesis against this back-
drop. For me, however, the big question was whether or not we really have an environ-
ment in which this new species of ‘European and Muslim’ can appear. If we are to grasp
the meaning of such a phrase, we must first study the context in which it is utilized.
The conference for which the present paper was written was organized with the aim
of working towards founding a new vision of Moroccan-Dutch relations.This new rela-
tionship between Morocco and the Netherlands can therefore also be seen as a kind of
emerging species. Biologically speaking, a species needs an appropriate environment in
order to emerge. But do we really have this environment? My answer to this question
has to be ‘no’ but it is even more crucial to ask: why is this the case? 
At this point I would like to introduce Lyotard’s concept of ‘the Differend’.What is
the ‘Differend’ all about? Consider a situation in which we have two persons, A and B,
neither of whom knows the other, and each one of whom has the keys to the same
apartment. If they both find themselves in the apartment at the same time, of course, one
will invite the other to leave. If neither of them decides to back down, they can take each
other to court.This type of conflict between two people is therefore resolvable. Each dis-
putant is required to provide valid proof that he or she is entitled to live in the apart-
ment. In this case, there is a common yardstick against which positions in the conflict
can be measured.
In the case of a Differend, there is no way of measuring the conflict.A Differend is a
conflict irresolvable ‘for lack of a rule of judgment applicable to both arguments’.1 As I
189
1 Lyotard (1991) 11.
opm marokko 3  20-06-2006  15:14  Pagina 189
see it, this is the case between Morocco, as a part of the Arab world, and the Netherlands,
as part of Europe. Although I have just placed Morocco and the Netherlands in two
separate categories, it is important to realize that they come face to face through a varie-
ty of channels. The positive channel is the previously discussed interdependence and
interconnectedness. A negative one is what I would like to discuss as the ideology of
resentment.There is a slogan saying:‘They hate, because they hate us’ which reflects dee-
ply ingrained cultural and religious attitudes. Some analysts justify such hostility as the
outcome of Western foreign policy with respect to decisive issues such as Palestine,
Afghanistan and Iraq, to name but a few.
Now let us have a look at the dynamics of such an ideology. I have chosen to use a
figure published by Daniel Brumberg in his study of Arab public opinion to trace the
operation of such an ideology.2
At the centre, there are committed ideologues who are informed by an ideology of
resentment which subscribes to the theory of conspiracy, a theory of sinister forces bent
on the fragmentation of the cohesion of the Muslim community, as well as decrying the
complexity of the Western individual. Consequently, such an ideology is very much cha-
racterized by identity, power and, above all, extremes.
The second circle consists of people like me: youth.We, university students, members
of cultural associations and adherents to political parties are the immediate audience of
such an ideology.This part of the social structure represents a source of potential recruits
for the political activists at the centre of these three circles of influence.
The outer circle consists of the populace in general. It is made up of individuals and
collectivities struggling for survival and, at best, achievement. Once again, youth are a
pervasive presence in this circle.They are a mass who might be mobilized to espouse an
ideology of resentment and there is a suitable environment for this enterprise: unem-
ployment and the general conditions of regional and domestic crisis.
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I therefore consider radicalism in both the Dutch and the Moroccan context as being
empowered by context, rather than being essentially powerful.The same is true of every
living ideology. In other words, radicalism grows through the medium of circumstances.
For instance, radical Islamists address their audience with respect to experienced condi-
tions.They articulate the anger and alienation of youth, who because of these characte-
ristics are predisposed to becoming recruits of resentful radicalism.
Conclusion
To conclude: Moroccan-Dutch relations are characterized by a subtle state of conflict,
which I have tried to identify using Lyotard’s concept of the ‘Differend’. There is no
yardstick for resolving a conflict of this kind. Evidence for the validity of this hypothe-
sis can be found in the answers to the following questions:
- How many institutes for European studies are there in Morocco? None.
- How many international relations departments are there in Moroccan universities?
None.
- How many institutes for comparative theology are there in Morocco? None.
The concept of an international orientation as something of value for Moroccan uni-
versity students does not really seem to be on the agenda of Moroccan society. The
absence of these elements reflects the absence of a yardstick for the present conflict bet-
ween the Arab world and the West. Morocco and the Netherlands are in no way sepa-
rate or exceptional cases in this conflict.
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Part V
Culture
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Ouafaâ El Mesmoudi
Une captive hollandaise au Maroc 
entre tradition et modernité
Introduction
L’histoire du Maroc des dix-septième et dix-huitième siècles a suscité l’intérêt del’Europe. La course, l’esclavage, la rédemption des esclaves, le commerce, la diplo-
matie, l’esprit de découverte, ont fait l’objet d’une riche littérature qui témoigne de
l’ampleur considérable de cet intérêt. Cette littérature européenne reste une source
importante qui nous renseigne sur l’image du Maroc qu’avaient les Européens, grâce à
la description qu’elle donne du Maroc et de la société marocaine vue par des gens issus
de sociétés différentes, notamment en Europe.
Je m’intéresserai ici à la perception du Maroc par l’Europe vu par les yeux d’une cap-
tive. J’étudierai certaines manifestations des tensions, tantôt conflictuelles, tantôt positi-
ves, entre des aspects de modernité du personnage étudié et des sociétés – celle de sa
communauté hollandaise et celle du Maroc – imprégnées de valeurs traditionnelles.
Certes, l’image que se faisaient les Européens du Maroc a fait l’objet de nombreuses étu-
des.Toutefois, il faut noter que l’accent a toujours été mis sur les textes français, anglais
et espagnols. Par contre, la référence aux textes hollandais reste un exercice très peu
exploré.
J’entends par cette contribution présenter certains aspects de la société marocaine au
dix-huitième siècle à travers la vision d’une prisonnière hollandaise, en l’occurrence,
Maria ter Meetelen. J’ai fait le choix d’approcher cette question en présentant un résu-
mé de sa vie comme il est paru dans l’introduction de son récit.
Qui était Maria ter Meetelen?
Maria ter Meetelen fut baptisé dans la religion catholique le vingt juin 1704 à
Amsterdam. A treize ans, elle commença à errer à travers l’Europe. Elle fut enrôlée de
force pour peu de temps dans un régiment espagnol. Elle fut prisonnière à Meknès au
Maroc de 1731 à 1743, et est décédée à une date inconnue, sans doute entre 1753 et
1774 à Medemblik aux Pays Bas. On ne sait à peu près rien d’autre d’elle.1
Dans son récit intitulé L’annotation ponctuelle de la description de voyage étonnante et de la
captivité remarquable et triste durant douze ans de moi Maria ter Meetelen et de l’heureuse déliv-
rance d’icelle et mon joyeux retour dans ma chère patrie, le tout décrit selon la vérité et mon expé-
rience personnelle, Maria ter Meetelen relate avec minutie son vécu de captive, et plus par-
ticulièrement sa vie quotidienne au Maroc depuis le jour où elle tomba en esclavage en
1731 à l’âge de vingt-sept ans jusqu’à sa libération en 1743.
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Il ressort de la lecture du texte que sa captivité fut une expérience très riche, durant
laquelle elle côtoya les hauts dignitaires du Maroc. Elle a ainsi servi successivement plu-
sieurs rois du Maroc. Chaque fois qu’un nouveau roi accède au trône, elle devient son
esclave. Ainsi, elle a passé une période de sa vie dans les palais, les bagnes des rois et les
maisons réservées aux captifs mariés. Ce vécu lui a permis de décrire la situation politi-
que, économique et sociale au cours d’une époque d’anarchie totale après le décès du
grand empereur Moulay Ismail et avec les conflits de ses successeurs sur le trône.
La situation politique du Maroc
Maria ter Meetelen est arrivée au Maroc quatre ans après le décès du grand roi Moulay
Ismail (1672-1727), autrement dit alors que le Maroc traversait une période de trente ans
d’anarchie totale due à l’accession au trône par plusieurs sultans incompétents et pour de
très brèves périodes. Cette période a connu aussi l’hégémonie du corps de l’armée noire
sur l’administration et la gestion des affaires de l’état. Maria n’a pas essayé de décrire ou
d’expliquer les répercutions de la situation politique de l’état sur le pays. Néanmoins cela
est appréhendé au fil du récit lorsqu’elle décrit sa situation ou celle de sa famille, et sa
relation immédiate avec le sultan et ses proches, et lorsqu’elle évoque la situation des cap-
tifs après un changement de sultan, attendu qu’à cette époque, les esclaves au Maroc étai-
ent tous la propriété du roi.2
Ainsi, Maria a vécu au Maroc pendant le règne de plusieurs rois notamment: Moulay
Abdellah qui a régné pendant quatre périodes,3 Moulay El Moustadi qui a gouverné le
Maroc pendant deux périodes, Moulay Ali El Araj, Moulay Zine El Abidine, Moulay
Mohammed Ould Arbiya. Ces derniers ont régné chacun une seule fois. Nous ne nous
attarderons pas sur les rois qui n’ont gouverné que pour de très courtes périodes, fait
qu’elle a mentionné en parlant du troisième et du quatrième règne de Moulay Abdellah,
lorsque pendant huit jours l’armée noire a proclamé la succession de quatre rois, dont
certains n’ont gouverné que pendant quelques heures.
Elle a aussi mis l’accent sur le rôle important des femmes du palais dans le gouverne-
ment du pays, surtout sous les règnes de Moulay Abdellah et de Moulay El Moustadi,
qui furent les seuls rois, pendant cette période, à gouverner plus d’une fois, et dont les
mères jouaient un rôle dans la gestion de l’État. Je citerai ici l’exemple le plus intéres-
sant, à savoir celui de Khnata Bent Bekkar, mère du sultan Abdellah qui a pu rétablir l’or-
dre dans le pays.4
La situation économique et sociale
Comme nous l’avons déjà mentionné, Maria ter Meetelen a vécu au Maroc au début du
dix-huitième siècle. Cette période a connu, outre le désordre politique, des crises écon-
omiques et sociales dues à la sécheresse et à la sous-production, qui plongèrent le pays
dans une période de famines, de vie chère, de révoltes et d’épidémies. Maria a donné une
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description très riche de cette situation, qui a connu son apogée au moment du règne
du roi Mohammed Ould Arbiya, entre 1737 et 1738:
‘Pendant le règne de ce roi, nous traversâmes une lamentable époque de vie chère et cela dura de
1737 jusqu’en juin 1738. Mille personnes moururent de faim, les vivants dévoraient les morts, les
mères leurs enfants, il ne resta ni un chien ni un chat, tous furent mangés, on sortit de terre les os
des animaux et on les brisait entre deux pierres et on les avalait avec une gorgée d’eau, on man-
geait le ciment des murs et de la paille comme les bêtes par manque d’herbes, les captifs du roi
recevaient chaque jour au lieu de pain quelques poignées d’olive découvertes de leur écorces
dont l’huile avait été extraite. Jusq’à dans la maison royale on manqua de nourriture mais on n’y
mourut pas de faim. Pourtant il arriva, par centaines des pays chrétiens des bateaux chargés de blé
mais cela ne servit pas à grand chose pour la ville royale, car les convois du roi et des citoyens de
la ville furent pillés par les campagnards qui étaient révoltés contre le roi de sorte que la cherté
dans la ville de Mekhnès était beaucoup plus considérable qu’ailleurs. Nous dûment maintenant
payer deux ducats pour dix livres de froment et on n’en obtenait pas toujours et les autres élé-
ments étaient à l’instar. Les gens n’avaient plus d’argent mais dieu fit merveille pour nous autres
chrétiens car d’abord le roi libéra les Espagnols dans l’année 1736 au milieu de novembre et le
dix août de l’année 1737 au début de l’époque de la cherté il laissa aller les Français de sorte que
nous autres Hollandais ne restâmes que vingt huit ainsi que trois Portugais.’5
Tradition et modernité à travers un récit de captivité
Dès son arrivée au Maroc, Maria ter Meetelen fit preuve d’une forte personnalité et
d’une intelligence remarquable, qui l’aidèrent à parvenir à ses fins. Sa situation de capti-
ve ne l’a pas conduite à renoncer à sa personnalité de femme européenne libre et aver-
tie par sa grande expérience du voyage. Ainsi, lorsqu’elle dû se présenter devant le roi
après son arrivée à Meknès pour regagner son harem et se convertir à l’Islam, elle refu-
sa avec force de renier sa foi devant le roi, prétendant qu’elle était enceinte pour y échap-
per. Devant son insistance, le roi décida de ne pas l’y contraindre. Elle osa même lui
demander l’autorisation d’épouser l’homme qu’elle avait choisi, qui était le chef de la
nation hollandaise au Maroc.6
Par ailleurs, Maria a su s’intégrer parfaitement à la vie du palais, de sorte qu’elle assurait
même parfois certaines intermédiations entre le palais et des représentants de pays euro-
péens, dont témoigne sa rencontre avec l’ambassadeur de France au Maroc. Ainsi, à l’oc-
casion du retour de pèlerinage de la mère du sultan Moulay Abdellah et de l’arrivée de
l’ambassadeur de France au Maroc pour la libération des prisonniers français, ce dernier
lui a confia la tâche, à l’époque considérée comme règle nécessaire de bienséance dans ce
genre de missions, de présenter le cadeau qu’il avait ramené pour la mère du sultan.7
Sa personnalité et son style lui permirent également de tisser des relations d’amitié
avec la famille royale, particulièrement avec la mère et la sœur du roi El Mostadi et avec
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le roi lui-même. Ceci devait lui permettre de jouir d’un traitement spécial et très géné-
reux, et de bénéficier de divers avantages. Dans son récit, elle a décrit le moment d’adieu
avec la mère du roi avec une grande affection.Après l’obtention de sa liberté et dans sa
dernière discussion avec le roi Almostadi – raconte-t-elle – ses compliments à la turque
furent tellement beaux que le roi en fut ravi et déclara ‘aussi vrai que je vis, cette chré-
tienne est digne d’être princesse.’8
Sur ce point, on ne peut ignorer que cette différence de caractère qui la distinguait,
était perçue positivement comme un signe de personnalité féminine forte et moderne
par l’élite de la société marocaine de l’époque. Ainsi, à titre d’exemple, le pacha de
Tétouan, ayant beaucoup entendu parler de cette femme, fut très curieux d’avoir une
conversation avec elle. Il saisit l’occasion de son voyage de retour à son pays après sa libé-
ration et son passage par Tétouan, fit venir tous les esclaves devant lui, il lui parla devant
tout le monde, et, lorsque leur conversation fut terminée, ‘il dit à ses gens:‘en vérité cette
chrétienne est digne d’être reine.’
En lisant son récit, on s’aperçoit qu’elle expliquait ce succès et cette admiration géné-
ralement par ses qualités d’éloquence et d’audace. Elle parlait, dit-elle, de manière très
polie et aimable, et était aussi capable, plus que le plus avisé des gens du pays, de faire un
compliment à quelqu’un selon son rang. Elle était très à l’aise et sans crainte lorsqu’ elle
parlait, de sorte qu’elle osait dire ce qu’aucun d’autre dans le pays n’osait seulement pen-
ser. ‘Les Maures s’exclamaient devant le pacha qu’ils n’avaient jamais entendu ou vu une
femme qui sache tout dire comme Maria.’9
La forte personnalité de Maria ter Meetelen n’aurait cependant pas été pu s’épanou-
ir si elle ne s’était pas trouvé un climat adéquat, de tolérance et de modernité. On remar-
que même à ce niveau une chose très importante qui peut paraître, a priori, paradoxale:
sa personnalité ‘moderne’ révèle une tension avec les valeurs traditionnelles issue sous
certains aspects de sa société plus que celles de la société marocaine.Ainsi, en ce qui con-
cerne son attitude à l’égard de la conversion à l’Islam, l’on observera que ni le roi
Abdellah ni la mère et la sœur du roi Mostadi ne l’avaient obligée à renier sa foi.10 Ils
faisaient toujours une demande qu’elle était libre d’accepter ou de refuser. Néanmoins,
au sein de la communauté hollandaise au Maroc, il existait une certaine rigueur en mati-
ère de religion. C’est ce que nous avons relevé lorsque Maria relate que, lors de la mala-
die de son premier mari, les prêtres qui se trouvaient au Maroc, qui étaient catholiques,
lui refusèrent l’entrée à l’église lors de son agonie parce qu’il était protestant. La même
chose s’était produite lorsqu’elle avait voulu épouser le chef de la nation hollandaise au
Maroc qui était également protestant, les prêtres exigeant son baptême et sa conversion
à la religion catholique.11
De même, il est, à mon sens, intéressant de noter que dans une société considérée
comme traditionnelle, en l’occurrence le Maroc, il y avait un respect des qualités ‘moder-
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nes’ qui se révélait dans le bon traitement dont jouissait une captive comme Maria, sans
accorder une grande considération à la différence d’origine. Il est aussi important de
noter que la situation des captifs chrétiens en général n’était pas aussi dramatique si on
la compare avec la période de crise générale que connaissait le Maroc à l’époque. Parfois
même l’on s’étonne en remarquant que Maria, quand elle parle de la libération des pri-
sonniers chrétiens, le fait sans éprouver aucune envie envers eux et sans le moindre sen-
timent de nostalgie pour son pays,12 sentiment dont nous remarquons la présence, par
contre, dans presque tous les récits des captifs.
L’on note aussi des aspects de modernité dans la façon dont les captifs chrétiens étai-
ent traités.Alors que les prisonniers célibataires vivaient dans les bagnes, le roi du Maroc
offrait aux captifs mariés des maisons pour y vivre avec leurs familles. Les captifs chré-
tiens mariés étaient aussi exonérés des travaux pénibles et étaient libres de chercher du
travail pour nourrir leurs familles.13 Nous faisons observer que, bien que Maria ait tou-
jours considéré Moulay Abdellah comme le roi le plus cruel pour les prisonniers, elle
n’hésite pas à citer que, lorsqu’elle se plaignit de n’avoir personne pour la nourrir avec
ses enfants, alors que la ville était pleine de voleurs, et qu’elle vivait seule tandis que son
mari travaillait au palais de Fès, le roi lui accorda une ration équivalente à celle qu’il con-
sentait à ses femmes légitimes, et qu’elle avait une juive à son service ainsi qu’un chré-
tien. Il lui a remit un pistolet avec de la poudre et des balles ainsi qu’une épée, avec l’au-
torisation de tuer quiconque l’accosterait pour la voler.
Conclusion
Tout en signalant les limites de cette analyse micro-historique du récit, dues notamment
à l’objectif de cette contribution, il est certain que la relation de Maria ter Meetelen
garde son importance comme source historique qui nous renseigne sur une facette peu
explorée des relations entre deux sociétés appartenant à des cultures différentes, à savoir
celle du dialogue des civilisations.
12 Ibidem 44.
13 Ibidem 45.
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Marianne Hermans
Moroccan writers in the Netherlands 
Introduction
Since the Second World War, the Netherlands has frequently experienced flows of immi-
gration from non-western nations.There were immigrants from former colonies in the
East and the West, as well as guest workers from Spain, Italy, Turkey and Morocco. As
elsewhere in the western world, non-western immigrants blend the perception of their
host country with memories of their homeland.The recent growth of interest in ‘hybrid’
or multicultural literature shows this to be a fruitful concept for interesting narratives.
The authors elaborate upon the migrant experience, also defined as ‘the experience of
dislocation, displacement and hybridity’.1
Literature by Moroccans in the Netherlands is frequently classified under the term
‘migrant literature’.This is something of a misnomer, since most of these individuals are
not really immigrants.They have either lived in the Netherlands since they were very
young or they were born here.Alternative designations are ‘minority literature’, literatu-
re written by ‘newcomers’,‘multi-cultural’ or ‘ethnic’ literature.2 Hafid Bouazza refers to
this discussion in his essay in Een beer in bontjas (A Bear in a Fur Coat) (2001) when he
ironically proposes the term N.S.M.A.N.N. for Nederlandse Schrijver van Marokkaanse
Afkomst met een Nederlandse Nationaliteit (Dutch Writer of Moroccan Descent with
Dutch Nationality).
Whatever name is given to it, defining a piece of literature in terms of the author’s
cultural origin remains problematic, primarily because this practice seems to oblige
authors to confine themselves to exotic themes.3 Ironically, in their debut works, most
multicultural writers play it smart and create an ‘imaginary homeland’ as Rushdie named
it.Their parents’ homeland is an enlivening presence in the scenery of the narrative.The
protagonist, usually young and bi-cultural, experiences feelings of loss and is in search of
a new identity.
Critics like to group these authors by emphasizing internal thematic commonalities
and by pointing at external differences to mainstream literature. However, as Rushdie
stated in his essay entitled Imaginary homelands, ‘Literature is not in the business of copy-
righting certain themes for certain groups’. Is there a specific thematic affinity that cha-
racterizes multicultural literature, besides the fact that it is written by authors who come
from a different, i.e. non-western culture? If there is, then it is not so much the quest for
one’s roots, but rather an attempt to look forwards, into the future. In other words, to
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look into the position that one chooses to take in today’s multicultural society.4 The pro-
tagonists in these multicultural books have to navigate between who they themselves
want to be and who society wants them to be. In other words, the focus is on the sub-
ject’s need to define themselves, rather than having their identity defined by others.5
A short history
Dutch publishers first focused on literature from non-Western countries in the seven-
ties, mainly due to ideological motives.6 In the eighties, the field of what was then refer-
red to as ‘Third World Literature’ was divided up between a few publishing houses, each
serving their own segment, such as Caribbean literature or African literature. In 1994,
the publishing house Vassallucci was founded. Vassallucci claimed that they wanted to pro-
mote a new type of Dutch literature.They broke down the barriers to literary bastions
by pro-actively seeking out multicultural literary talent at literary festivals, by organizing
writing contests and poetry readings.Another element that should not be underestima-
ted is the El Hizjra Foundation in Amsterdam. Since 1987, they have provided a plat-
form for Arabic writing by organizing literature contests for talented young individuals
from an Arabic background. Among their discoveries were Mustafa Stitou, Abdelkader
Benali, Rashid Novaire, Khalid Boudou and Said El Haji, for whom El Hizjra functio-
ned as a springboard to the Dutch publishing field.
The nineties saw the breakthrough of new, multicultural literature into the Dutch
market.The subsequent debuts of some Moroccan-Dutch authors unleashed a storm of
media attention. People focused mainly on the social value of these writer’s work, try-
ing eagerly to present them as a group, and ignoring literary standards.The theme of the
National Book Week in 2001 was taken from E. du Perron’s famous autobiographical
novel Het land van herkomst (Land of Origin).This work, which was published in 1935,
dealt with the Dutch East Indies. The Book Week was organized by the Stichting
Collectieve Propaganda van het Nederlandse Boek (Foundation for the Collective Promotion
of the Dutch Book).The Foundation added to the hype by asking Salman Rushdie to
write the Book Week gift, a free book given to anyone who buys a book during
National Book Week.
The first Moroccan-Dutch authors: Moustapha Stitou, Naima el Bezaz and Hans Sahar
Who are these authors and why is it legitimate to consider them as a group? Let’s take
a closer look at these questions by focusing on the debuts of some young authors from
a Moroccan background.The enormous amount of media attention that greeted their
debuts can be seen as a multi-cultural plot. Some of these authors succeed in creating a
dazzling mixture of Dutch language, Moroccan couleur locale, and exotic sounds. The
resultant exuberant style is something that was hitherto quite uncommon in the
Calvinistic tradition of Dutch literature. Critics quickly agreed that these authors were
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innovative both in their use of language and in the subjects that they chose as their main
themes. These include a father who lives in the past – imagining that he is still in his
native country, a new generation abandoning their religion, and the search for a new
identity by those who have grown up between two incompatible cultures.7
It all began in 1994, when the poet Mustafa Stitou made his debut with Mijn vormen
(My forms) at the tender age of nineteen. Stitou was supported by the celebrated Dutch
author Remco Campert. From the very start, his work received rave reviews.The few
critical reactions, based on suspicions as to the motives for publishing ‘squabbling’ that is
generally typified as authentic, were probably from those who had never seen a
Moroccan at first hand. Stitou’s earliest poetic works reveal a mixture of Moroccan and
Dutch culture.This is typified by the verse in which he refers to himself as ‘the young
Moroccan and his non-Dutch thoughts’.8 His poems frequently feature a father who
works abroad and who can no longer get along with his sons. In the wicked
Netherlands, these sons lose their faith in Allah and in their fathers. Stitou’s second col-
lection of poems (Mijn gedichten – My poems), which was published in 1998, received a
similarly positive response from the critics. His third piece of work, which was publis-
hed in 2003 (Varkensroze ansichten: gedichten – Pig-pink cards: poems), was even awarded
the VSB Poetry Prize.
Naima El Bezaz, a Moroccan-Dutch prose author, published her first work in 1995.
Entitled De weg naar het Noorden (The way to the North), it describes a Moroccan ille-
gal immigrant’s flight to the Netherlands. This book was awarded the Jenny Smelik
IBBY (Internatial Board on Books for Young People)-Prize for children’s literature.
Though the work was not initially published as a children’s book, the jury felt that its
theme, language and style made it accessible to readers of this age group. In 2002, Naima
El Bezaz published Minnares van de Duivel (Satan’s mistress), a collection of interwoven
stories about the djinn Farzi and his female accomplice Lalla Rebha, a seherra or sorce-
ress. Scenes involving ghosts, djinns and magic gave her stories a touch of macabre sus-
pense, which enlivened the underlying theme of the oppression of Muslim women.
Like El Bezaz, Hans Sahar also published his first novel in 1995. Entitled Hoezo bloed-
mooi (What do you mean ‘stunning’?), this centred on the figure of Abi, a Moroccan
gigolo, and was based on stories that he had heard during a two-year spell in prison.
Sahar’s second novel, Zoveel liefde (So much love), which was published one year later,
also explored life at the fringes of society.While many view his work as an interesting
document humaine, others have sharply criticized his novels for their lack of literary qua-
lity.Another of his works is a collection of short stories entitled De heimweekaravaan (The
caravan of homesickness). Hans Sahar and Naima El Bezaz have often been invited to
appear together at interviews and to give joint performances, even though their work
has very little in common, except for the Moroccan background of the protagonists and
the writers.
202
7 Anbeek (1999).
8 In the poem Zomaarcafé (Just café), in his first book.
opm marokko 3  20-06-2006  15:14  Pagina 202
Hafid Bouazza and Abdelkader Benali
In 1996, two authors succeeded in attracting the attention of literary critics and in
remaining in the literary spotlight, Hafid Bouazza and Abdelkader Benali. Bouazza wrote
a collection of seven stories entitled Abdullah’s feet. The book derives its name from the
title story, in which a young warrior is killed in action. Somehow, his feet manage to
return by themselves, where they are welcomed as if it was Abdullah himself who retur-
ned home. Five of the seven stories are situated in a tiny village populated by eccentrics.
They are told from the viewpoint of an adolescent Muslim boy living in Morocco.Two
of the stories are set in Holland, and these describe the loves of a Moroccan-Dutch boy.
The cast of characters includes numerous Fatimas and Abdullahs, a dishonest imam with
an active interest in local boys, and the owner of a grocery store selling what is quite lite-
rally forbidden fruit.The stories are brimming with sexual tension. As Bouazza himself
put it, a repressive atmosphere is the best setting in which to describe the frustration of
inarticulate sexual desire.
The book, which was nominated for literary prizes on three occasions, remained
among the top ten best-selling books for months on end. In 1997 it was awarded the E.
du Perron Award for its intercultural value.The jury expressed their astonishment at the
fact that Bouazza had managed to free himself of the appellation ‘immigrant writer’ at
one fell swoop. Dutch reviewers praised Bouazza’s baroque style, with its abundance of
neologisms and, at first sight, strange and seemingly exotic words. It turned out that he
made frequent use of the Woordenboek der Nederlandse Taal (Dutch Dictionary) in search
for long-forgotten words that expressed exactly the nuance he had in mind. He seems
to be obsessed with finding a way of translating perceptions and sensations into written
language.This results in an extremely sensory style that is filled with sounds and associ-
ations. One reviewer in the UK described the collection of ‘naughty fairy tales’ as an
example of the ‘vomit novel’: ‘The book contains a strong element of bawdy comedy
(…) this brief novel charms the reader by taking a wry look at youth. Bouazza has come
up with a witty and original work, which rejects many of the easy conventions of novel-
writing’. A Dutch critic put it this way:‘a novel that reports the discovery that language
is a means of furnishing the world.’9
Following this overwhelmingly successful debut, Bouazza published a novella in 1998.
This work, Momo, does not refer to Morocco in any way, instead it concentrates on lang-
uage and imagination. Momo is a dreamy child surrounded by invisible ghosts who
direct his gaze and whisper things into his ear. In this work, the road to the imagination
is paved with words. However, this approach had become mere irritating trickery by the
time Bouazza finished his third book, Solomon in 2001.The poor reader was bombarded
by seemingly endless sentences full of fantastic findings. Reviewers became irritated by
the way in which even the simplest statements were embroidered with bombastic lang-
uage. One reviewer writing for a national paper described Solomon as a ‘completely
ridiculous form of linguistic pathos, the poetic or visionary qualities of which were
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rather hopefully expected to catch the reader’s eye. Instead I am reminded of the dicta-
tions that we had to do in school, which were full of strange and difficult words.’10
In 2003, Bouazza dispensed with this critique by writing what is by far his best work
to date, Paravion. The novel reads like a fairy-tale, and parodies the experiences of
Moroccan immigrants in Amsterdam. It reminds the reader of Rushdie’s words: ‘… that
we will not be capable of reclaiming precisely the thing that was lost; that we will, in
short, create fictions, not actual cities or villages, but invisible ones, imaginary homelands,
Indias of the mind.’11 The book received rave reviews and was awarded the Flemish Prize
for Literature, the Gouden Uil (Golden Owl) in 2004.
The first novel by Abdelkader Benali, who also made his debut in 1996, was Bruiloft
aan zee (Wedding by the Sea). Initially, the novel did not attract much media attention
and, for the first twelve months, critics took no notice of it. However, the novel was then
short-listed for the Dutch equivalent of the Booker, the Libris Literatuur Prize and won
the Best Literary Debut (Geertjan Lubberhuizenprijs). The book was quickly translated
into several other languages and, in 1999, Benali won the French Prix du Meilleur Premier
Roman Etranger. It is a family fable featuring twenty year-old Lamarat Minar, who is of
Moroccan parentage but was raised in Holland. He returns to his family’s village to
attend the marriage of his sister and his uncle Mosa.When Lamarat arrives in the bor-
der town it turns out that Mosa is missing. Lamarat mainly conducts his search for the
vanished bridegroom from the back seat of a dilapidated taxi, while telling the taxi-dri-
ver, Chalid, the story of his life.This plot forms the backbone of the book but there are
numerous digressions, dealing, for example, with the double standards concerning pre-
marital sex by males and by females. Other story lines involve the respective families of
Lamarat’s parents and the poorly constructed house that they are building in Morocco.
Reviewers praised Benali’s ‘dazzling, quasi-chaotic style’ and his ‘exuberant, playful use
of language’.They all spoke highly of the way in which he blends different languages
and cultures.The public also seemed to be captivated by his writing. By the summer of
1998 Bruiloft aan zee was already into its fourteenth printed edition.
Benali continued his festive approach to storytelling in his second novel De
Langverwachte (The Long-Awaited), and once again his style received critical acclaim.
However, Benali’s preference for long, complex sentences, and for experimentation with
language, gave some critics the impression the work had been completed too hastily,
with too little control. The title is ambiguous, it refers to the long-awaited but still
unborn baby from whose viewpoint we hear the story. The title also refers to the 
baby’s 17-year-old father, Mehdi, whose name also means ‘the long awaited’. It also refers
to the long period preceding the publication of the book, due to a case of writer’s block.
The unborn baby who is still in her Dutch mother’s womb is quite an unusual narrator.
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Her thumb and a special gift from her grandmother give her the ability to discover 
everything about the cast of characters that populate the book.With a fine sense of sym-
bolism, Benali places the baby’s birth at a time of transition, the turn of the millennium.
De Langverwachte won the Libris Prize in 2003.
Benali’s latest novel Laat het morgen mooi weer zijn (Let the weather be fine tomorrow),
however, received generally poor reviews. The opening sentence ‘Malik Ben weighed
140 kilos the day he decided to have his name deleted from the Yellow Pages’ did not
live up to expectations. Looking back in time,we see Malik Ben as a young man in 1995,
the year his father sent him on a cruise on the SS Latina. Malik soon falls under the spell
of a fellow passenger, the beautiful Spanish widow, Carmen.The story goes back-and-
forth, giving detailed descriptions of every minor character in the book, but the story’s
lack of suspense fails to keep the reader’s interest.
A second generation: Said El Haji, Khalid Boudou and Najoua Bijjir
Said El Haji and Khalid Boudou are two young Moroccan authors who made their
debuts in 2000 and 2001 respectively.Their novels resemble one another in having the
same theme, a young adolescent’s attempt to come to terms with his environment and
to find his own way, and both use their biculturality as a source of inspiration for their
literary work. In De dagen van Sjaitan (The days of Shaytan), Said El Haji’s protagonist is
shy little Hamid, who needs an alter ego to stand up to his father.The story of young
Hamid is interwoven with passages about his alter ego, Sjaitan, the Arabic word for the
Devil. Hamid becomes increasingly rebellious in the face of his authoritarian father’s
dualistic moral standards, at the same time Sjaitan vents his rage at the hypocritical imam
of the small, provincial Muslim community. El Haji’s portrait of a rebellious son was
strongly influenced by Herman Hesse’s novel Siddharta, also about an adolescent boy
who leaves his father because he wants to find out what life is all about. In a way, as he
says himself, El Haji tried to get even with his strict Islamic upbringing.The novel was
labelled ‘a typically Dutch novel’. It has been compared to the work of Jan Wolkers, a
celebrated Dutch writer whose books also elaborate on the theme of an oppressive reli-
gious upbringing.Wolkers’ stories, however, were set in the Holland of the nineteen fif-
ties.
The other coming of age novel, Het Schnitzelparadijs (The Schnitzel Paradise) by
Khalid Boudou, tells the story of 19-year old dropout, Nordip, who, after spending two
years asleep, wants to make a comeback to everyday society.To this end he gets a job in
a restaurant, working as a dishwasher in a kitchen that is a tiny world in itself. Here, too,
the theme owes less to Moroccan culture than to the relative youth of the writer and his
protagonist. One of the outstanding qualities of this novel is the use of vernacular to
make the characters realistic. Khalid Boudou has creatively blended the Dutch language
with neologisms, English words and Arabic idiom. One example is salaamize, which
means to greet someone. In 2001, the book won the Gouden Ezelsoor (Golden Donkey’s
Ear) for best debut of the year. It was subsequently translated into several different lang-
uages.Abdelkader Benali’s response to his colleague’s work was ‘Adapt it for the screen,
immediately!’ His advice was apparently taken, as the movie was successfully released in
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2005. Boudou recently published his second novel, De President (The President, 2005), a
satire of Dutch politics.
A young female author, Najoua Bijjir, of this second generation of Moroccan writers
in the Netherlands, made her debut in 2001 with El weswes (The obsession).The title
refers to suspicion and paranoia, but also to finding the inner strength to overcome fear
and weakness. Najoua Bijjir gives in-depth descriptions of the secret life of three
Moroccan girls and a Moroccan boy.The protagonists waste most of their energy in kee-
ping up appearances, by trying to be someone other than who they really are.Toeria hap-
pens to be no longer a virgin when her mother has found her the perfect husband, shy
little Chadija decides to wear a headscarf and finds out how hard others treat her from
that moment on and Kenza, the artistic dreamer, suffers from anorexia. Student Nabil
dresses to impress and makes fake phone calls using a mobile telephone whose credit has
expired. Her debut was hardly spectacular. As a review in El weswes concluded,Toeria,
Chadija and Kenza are quite similar to some of the characters in Sex and the City, or to
those in so-called chick literature.12 They hang out in cafés, just like Western girls, and
are just as attracted by fashion and electronic gadgets as any other girl. From there on,
however, there is a parting of the ways.The Moroccan girls are continuously steering a
middle course between tradition and modern temptations, between the life of a career
woman and that of a housewife, between marriage and making their own choices, bet-
ween virginality and sex.
In fact Bijjir’s themes are not unlike those of Zohra Zarouali who in 1989 was the first
Dutch-Moroccan writer to publish a book about the double lives led by Moroccan girls
in the Western world. She published four books between 1989 and 2001, all about intel-
ligent Moroccan girls growing up in the Netherlands or Flanders. Zarouali’s books,
however, failed to meet common literary standards. Her books are extremely popular
with young girls, particularly those of the Muslim faith.They are classified as children’s
literature, despite the fact that her protagonists face what are actually very complex pro-
blems. Bijjir has succeeded in producing more incisive characterizations.
Dutch-Moroccan authors as a group? 
Is it legitimate to lump the chosen authors together as a subgroup within modern Dutch
literature? What meaningful comparisons, if any, can be drawn between their work, their
writing styles, or their language? They are alike in the way that they started their careers,
they are of a similar age, they all received a boost from media attention, and they won
prizes. Furthermore, there are some commonalities in the setting and subjects of their
literary work that cannot pass unnoticed. Most of the narratives are set at the crossroads
of cultures.They feature a young Moroccan protagonist and, to a degree, touch on rebel-
lion against religion and against family traditions.They also make use of sharp irony to
create a safe distance between their depicted worlds and the real world of migrant issu-
es. Most of these authors also exhibit a playful use and blending of language and genre,
even though they differ in the way that they elaborate these elements.And last but not
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least, the author’s land of origin plays a distinct role in the works of Hafid Bouazza,
Moses Isegawa, Kader Abdolah and Mustafa Stitou.13 The mixture of Dutch and verna-
cular employed by Boudou, Sahar, or Bijjir, the neologisms and Dutch-English used by
Benali, or Bouazza’s baroque style all give the Dutch language a fresh, new sound.The
same holds true for Stitou’s poetry, whose simultaneous use of different registers and spo-
radic dancing rhythms take the reader by surprise.
However much we may want to emphasize commonalities in their literary work and
careers, there are actually some quite striking differences between the members of this
group of Moroccan-Dutch authors.A critical reader is particularly aware of the division
along gender lines.The most successful Moroccan-Dutch writers are male.They write
about conflicts with an authoritarian father, alienation from the Islamic religion, and
double standards towards women. The female voice speaks in totally different terms.
Authors like Zohra Zarouali, Naima El Bezaz and Najoua Bijjir choose to write about
the position of Islamic women in the Western world, or, in the case of Minnares van de
duivel, the non-western world.They depict a life that is furnished with the do’s and don’ts
of self-respecting Islamic women.
Conclusion
Western readers share a common horizon of expectation with regard to such works.They
assume that migrant characters are in search of their own identity, that they feel torn bet-
ween their home culture and the country in which they live, and that they somehow
experience a permanent feeling of loss.Accordingly, non-western writers are expected to
live up to these expectations and pick a theme involving nostalgia, homesickness and
quests for identity. However, if we examine the careers of the most successful Moroccan
writers in the field of Dutch literature, they seem to have outgrown the migrant theme
to which they were initially so indebted.These authors have extremely close ties to the
Netherlands, where they were raised, and few if any links with Morocco, the country in
which they were born.
It seems to be an inescapable trend. In their debut works, Moroccans make grateful
use of their biculturalism by exploring the Moroccan and Dutch facets of their prota-
gonists and settings. However, their later books show that they are starting to transcend
this limited field.The narrow-mindedness of critics who want to lump them together as
‘the Moroccan experience’ causes them to respond by attempting to free themselves
from Morocco-related topics. Some may switch to slightly different themes, only to
return to multicultural issues indirectly, but in a more sophisticated way, as Bouazza did
in Paravion. Mustafa Stitou, Hafid Bouazza, and Abdelkader Benali are just some mem-
bers of the Moroccan-Dutch avant garde who have successfully taken this road.
13 Bresser (2001).
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Moha Ennaji
Language, identity, and the impact of globalization 
in Morocco1
Introduction
This chapter is concerned with the issues of language and identity, as well as with the
impact of globalization/Westernization, in the Moroccan context. It deals with the lang-
uage-culture interface and stresses that mother tongues are vitally important for identi-
ty-building. I take the view that the experience of colonization was quite dramatic.This
was because it highlighted a strong conflict between the values and beliefs of two diffe-
rent cultures, Muslim and Western. By ‘Muslim culture’, I mean the social behaviour,
beliefs, and traditional way of life that are connected to Islam. By ‘Western culture’, I
mean the modern way of life, values and way of thinking of Westerners in Europe and
North America in particular.
In the years following independence, as part of their effort to modernize the country,
the Moroccan ruling elite adopted French-Arabic bilingualism as a political option.
Today there is tension between French-Western values and Arab-Islamic beliefs. Further-
more, tension also exists within the Moroccan context itself, between Berber and Arab
languages and cultures.The situation, as it pertains to language, highlights a clash of inte-
rests and ideological tensions which themselves mirror the struggle for power at various
levels. I should point out from the outset that, in many issues, the interaction between
the languages and cultures of Morocco is characterized by contrasts and paradoxes.
Language and identity
Definitions and formulations of the concept of ‘identity’ vary from one academic disci-
pline to another, yet identity as a ‘process’ within specific power constellations is a recur-
rent image. Identity has been a persistent problem for sociolinguistic theory. However,
the terms of debate seem to have shifted from identity as a problem to a consideration
of what kind of problem it represents.Theory has moved towards the recognition of the
diversity of identities that such an all-encompassing term obscures. It is also starting to
acknowledge that identity is far less static than previously conceived, and that it is more
of a construct than a structure.The existence of a multiplicity of identities entails that
people have many different social and cultural identities, which they somehow merge
together. In the same way, numerous joint identities are often smoothly combined, e.g.
Afro-American, Franco-German, Dutch-Moroccan, etc.
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Identity conflict may arise if a person has many different competing identities, which
sometimes contradict each other.This applies to many Moroccan French-educated intel-
lectuals.These individuals feel guilty because they are more immersed in the French cul-
ture than in their own, and because they speak excellent French while struggling to
master standard Arabic.This is also the case with some Moroccan immigrants in Europe,
who are torn between their original culture and the culture of the host country. As a
result, identity conflict hampers their creativity, as well their integration. Identity is the
dynamic relationship between the ancestral heritage, with all its components – oral tra-
dition, literature, beliefs, etc. – and the language or languages which give birth to a spe-
cific cultural identity.2
The language and identity link has itself been subjected to a great deal of analysis and
scrutiny throughout the history of scholarship. However, the topic remains controversi-
al to this day.There are two major trends within the scientific inquiry in this domain.3
The first argues that race, political affiliation, social class, and nationality are more impor-
tant factors than language in the determination of one’s identity.4 The second trend ass-
erts that language is directly linked to identity, along with cultural heritage and values.
Language and identity can be seen as closely related, especially when the members of a
linguistic community have a favourable attitude toward their own group.5 I, for one,
would stress the important link between language and identity. However, I should add
that other factors such as race, nationality, religion, social class, cultural heritage, gender,
and attitude also determine the formation of identity.6 At any rate, research has shown
that language is intimately linked to cultural identity, and that both factors interact on a
daily basis, in many interesting ways.
Languages, and more particularly mother tongues, are important for identity-building.
They have a symbolic role as they represent cultural elements that affect the first identi-
ty of individuals.They are used by the child for early socialization. Mother tongues help
to define the specificity, culture, and ideology of both individuals and groups.They also
shape people’s personalities and ways of thinking.7 Mother tongues have social functions
that are fundamentally related to identity, everyday life, family, and friends.This is becau-
se they express people’s feelings, values, aspirations, and beliefs.The mother tongue is the
vehicle of a rich oral literature, in all its facets, songs, poems, anecdotes, proverbs, ridd-
les, etc., and the voice of many forms of art and culture.
However, in some situations, a bilingual shift to a second language may not lead to the
absolute erosion of the original identity. For instance, Moroccan immigrants in Europe
may maintain their original languages and cultures.This may cause them to develop a
sense of cultural boundaries between their native language and the language of their
European host country. A person or group may even give up their language without
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necessarily losing their original sense of identity.8 This is the case with many Berbers in
Morocco and many native Americans in North America, who still feel that these are
their true identities, even though they no longer speak their native language.
Cultural identity is closely related to variables like nation, nationalism, identity, and the
individual. It overlaps with context, geography, gender, class and ideology. Attitudes in
this regard are crucial.A positive attitude toward a language would create a positive cul-
tural identity, and this contributes to the maintenance and promotion of the language.
On the other hand, a negative attitude would inhibit and crush identity, eventually lea-
ding to language loss. In short, identity is closely related to the individual’s linguistic, cul-
tural, and historical backgrounds. Several studies have independently confirmed the rela-
tionship between language and cultural identity.
Over the centuries,Morocco has been shaped by Berber culture, Islam, and Arab influ-
ence. To these, we can add the Hispano-Moorish and Jewish cultures, which have
immensely enriched the dialogue among different communities. Pluralism is both a
historical tradition and a way of life in this region of the world.This is one of the rea-
sons why most Moroccans do not view multilingualism and multiculturalism as dangers
to national unity. Morocco is a complex country, in the sense that it is linguistically and
culturally diverse. Islam, Arabic, Berber, and French are the main pillars on which
Moroccan national identity is built. In the following section, I will focus on the interac-
tion between Arab-Islamic and Western cultures, and on the relationship between these
major cultures and civilizations.
The encounter between Muslim and Western cultures in a globalizing world
The recent interaction between Arab-Berber-Islamic and Western cultures goes back to
the French colonial period. It can also be traced further back to the conquests of
Morocco by other foreign powers: the Phoenicians, the Byzantines, the Romans, the
Portuguese, and the Spanish.As mentioned earlier, in the period of re-birth, from 1798
to 1905, the interactions between Muslim and Western cultures were both enriching and
progressive. During the period of decline, i.e. the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and
the period of colonization in the twentieth century, however, these contacts were anta-
gonistic.This resulted in the imposition of biculturalism.
Colonization was a dramatic experience, highlighting a yawning gap between the
values and beliefs of two very different cultures:Arab-Muslim and Franco-Western.The
French colonizers sought to marginalize the Arab-Muslim culture through the assimila-
tion and alienation of the Maghrebi peoples. This assimilation policy was criticised by
Islamic institutions like the Qarawiyyine University in Morocco, as well as by nationa-
list leaders such as Allal Al Fassi who created the Istiqlal (Independence) party.The birth
of the Moroccan nationalist movement is also associated with the Berber Decree of
1930, which sought to divide Berbers and Arabs.The 1940s saw the rise of nationalist
movements in Morocco and throughout the Arab world. One of the aims of the strug-
gle against the colonizers was to protect the country’s indigenous cultural identity.
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Nationalist thinkers and leaders like Jamal Eddine Al Afghani, Muhamed Abdu, and
Rachid Rida, all three in Egypt, Ibn Badis in Algeria, and Mohamed Ben El Hassan 
El Ouazzani in Morocco contributed to the spread of nationalist feelings and to the
struggle against colonization across the Arab-Muslim world. Pan-Arab and Pan-African
cultural nationalism was a response to colonialism and the resultant cultural domination.
European colonizers wrongly accused Arabs, and Africans in general, of being lazy,
unsophisticated, unskilled, and unproductive. Colonizers also made the negative value
judgement that those who were unskilled and non-creative were uncivilized.
The contemporary period is characterized by a relative balance between modernity
and tradition. Modernity is a complex notion, as it is linked to the transfer of ideas gene-
rated by the European Enlightenment (in which science and progress were adopted as
the bases of a more rational and civilized world). Modernity is often contrasted with tra-
dition, which is closely associated with a conservative system of beliefs and archaic cul-
tural values.This is exemplified by the supremacy of religion, which often restricted indi-
viduals’ freedom and self-expression. Modernization, on the other hand, involves the pur-
suit of scientific, technological, economic, sociocultural and constitutional change that is
in conformity with the present level of human development and knowledge.Accordingly,
skills and values are at the core of this process. Modernization is linked to development,
taking society’s needs into consideration, as well as its global environment.9 In the
modern period, however, modernity has been equated with Western values.This has led
to the devaluation of other cultures, which are considered unsophisticated and backward.
Unfortunately, this idea of modernity degenerated during the colonial era, when colo-
nialism justified itself by pretending to have a ‘civilizing mission’. Liberation movements
challenged the assumed superiority of the West. They demanded respect for cultural
diversity which, until recently, has been under attack.
Historically speaking, Moroccans have always sought contact with other cultures. In
terms of languages and cultures, neither Berbers nor Arabs have ever shunned or feared
interactions with Europeans. In the past, this most notably involved Latin, today it is
French.10 In post-independence Morocco, French is widely used in education, science
and technology. It is a means of social promotion and upward mobility.The increasing
number of French-Arabic bilinguals in the country are making their presence felt.11 By
contrast, in this context, Classical Arabic is strongly associated with cultural independen-
ce and with the affirmation of Arab-Islamic identity.The latter has been described as ‘the
only identity recognised as legitimate in the postcolonial era’.12 This polarization besto-
wed a ‘sacred’ status on Classical Arabic, which is used by traditionalists and nationalists
as a symbol of religion, authenticity and nationalism. Many researchers argue that this
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attitude reflects existing tensions between tradition and modernity, as well as the resistan-
ce among traditionalists to the modernizing movement that stems from the West.
However, it seems difficult to ignore the fact that there is a crisis of identity in
Morocco today. Furthermore, the situation is far more complex than it would at first
seem. On the one hand, Morocco is witnessing the rise of Islamic fundamentalism.This
is reflected by the existence of dozens of Islamist associations, the most important of
which are Al-Islah wat-Tawhid, Al-Adl wal-Ihsan, and Shabiba al-Islamiya. It has also
prompted the creation of an Islamist party (Le Parti de la Justice et de Développement),
which won forty four seats in Parliament after the elections of September 27th, 2002.
Islamism is linked to Arabism, which demands that Morocco, as an Arab country, should
align with the Arab world in the interests of Arab unity.
On the other hand, there is Berberism.This purports to revive the Berber language
and culture, with a view to unifying Berber territories across the Maghreb. Thus,
Moroccans are apparently unable to agree on the kind of societal project that they want
to achieve. Furthermore, the socio-cultural situation is more paradoxical than it seems.
Berber activists fervently defend the Berber cultural identity, and Islamists their Muslim
and Arabic roots, to reduce the effects of Western hegemony.Yet, most of these indivi-
duals also send their children to French-style schools, so that they can acquire a modern
education. By contrast, Francophone urban intellectuals openly argue that French and
Western values are good for the future of Morocco.
The preamble to the Moroccan constitution, states that Arabic is the official language
of Morocco, and Islam the state religion. However,Article 9 states that the constitution
‘guarantees all of its citizens freedom of expression in all its forms’.This article provides
for the right of any group of citizens to preserve their language and culture. Nonetheless,
the constitution does not allude specifically to Berber, Moroccan Arabic, or even to
French. In reality, however, French prevails throughout the media, the administration,
and higher education, as well as in science and technology.
The expansion of free education in post-independence Morocco inevitably meant
that more and more people would encounter and experience the interface between the
Arabic and French languages and cultures. It also exacerbated people’s feelings of accul-
turation.Young people in general suffer from alienation, due to the gulf between moder-
nity and tradition.Their attitudes fall into one of three categories.Those from the urban
middle and upper class advocate a total immersion in Western culture, which they see as
the sole model and means of progress. Educated young people from a lower middle class
background favour a possible marriage of Arab-Islamic and Western cultures. Finally,
those belonging to the urban working class want to fully embrace Arab-Islamic culture.
The latter view is shared by young fundamentalists, who see Arab-Islamic beliefs and
values as the only solution to the country’s social and economic woes.13
Muslim fundamentalist groups vary in their interpretations of Islam, they also hold dif-
fering views of modernity and Western culture.There are moderate, less moderate and
extremist fundamentalists. While the moderates accept modernity and are open to
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Western values, the extremists totally reject modern lifestyles and modes of thought.
Fundamentalists generally reject Western culture, folk culture and modernity in the
name of authenticity and Islam.They argue that only Islam can lead the nation to soci-
al stability and economic well-being.14 Their awareness of the yawning gap that exists
between Arab-Muslim culture and French-Western culture, means that young people are
particularly torn between these two modes of life.They waver between a strong attach-
ment to local traditions and a favourable attitude to the Western way of life. Many edu-
cated young people see the latter as a means of progress and development. At any rate,
there is a feeling of uneasiness among people in this age group, which is amplified by
economic difficulties such as unemployment. In 2004, according to official statistics,
Morocco had an unemployment rate of 12.1%.15 Although the country’s economy is
growing at an impressive 4.4%, the goals of development and modernization still seem
far away.
It has been more than forty years since Morocco gained its independence. During that
time, the country has experienced numerous changes at the political, economic and soci-
al level, which has led to constantly shifting attitudes and ideas.This period has involved
psychological setbacks, coupled with ambivalent attitudes toward modernity and tradi-
tion.The entire post-independence generation is torn between a Western way of life and
Islamic conservatism.
This wavering between modernism and tradition is characteristic of post-indepen-
dence Morocco. Conservative forces within the country feel more secure with traditio-
nal Islamic values than with the modern values of the new world.They cling more to
the Muslim tradition and identity than to Western thoughts and values. Moroccans feel
more comfortable with the old traditions.They are fearful of the changes that may flow
from globalization and from the West.With the growth of Muslim fundamentalism in
the region, the pendulum seems to have swung back towards tradition, which means
Arabic, Islam, cultural identity and authenticity.
Since independence, schools have been an efficient instrument of modernization.
Teachers have played a positive role in the reshaping of education and administration.
They have fostered the acquisition of Western culture and the adoption of modern valu-
es, including openness to the advanced societies of Europe and North America.This is
exemplified by many highly educated people and nationalist leaders like Allal Al Fassi,
Abderrahim Bouabid, Mohamed Ben El Hassan El Ouazzani, Mahjoubi Aherdane, and
Mohamed Chafik.These individuals encouraged their daughters to go to school unvei-
led, and to study science and technology at institutions of higher education, both at
home and abroad.These enlightened Moroccan intellectuals have actively participated in
the struggle for democracy and the rule of law. Working through political parties and
education, in general, they have succeeded in establishing the basis of a democratic socie-
ty.16 However, schools are now being targeted by Islamists, whose aim is to disseminate
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religious fundamentalism. Indeed, many Islamist teachers have turned their backs on
modernity.They are now propagating radical Islamist ideologies among schoolchildren
and university students, in an attempt to return to Muslim religious precepts and to
Arab-Islamic roots.17
These contradictory attitudes toward modernity and tradition have had an impact on
family, school, and various other institutions.18 The ambivalence in attitudes is making
people increasingly uneasy, especially the young. School consolidates this uneasiness, as
it accentuates acculturation and a sense of insecurity.This does not mean that the two
cultures are incompatible.What is needed is a favourable social and educational context
within which the two cultures could be presented fairly, without any prejudice or falsi-
fication.An environment of this kind would enable educators to ameliorate this feeling
of acculturation. Students should first have a good knowledge of the Arab-Muslim cul-
ture before they are introduced to Western culture.This would reduce the feeling of ten-
sion and profound frustration that they are currently experiencing.
Pedagogical reforms must take into account the sociolinguistic and cultural back-
grounds of pupils and students.These reforms must address the interaction of traditional
and Western values, by encouraging tolerance, mutual acceptance and co-habitation.
Social reforms, on the other hand, must ensure social justice and equity. Schools must
allow pupils and students from different social backgrounds to further their education
and to improve their social positions.The modernization efforts made by Morocco after
independence reinforced acculturation and dependence on Western culture. This is an
almost inevitable consequence of globalization, which to some extent implies borrowing
from modern societies and cultures.
Globalization in this sense means the adoption of a set of borrowed Western cultural
strategies to achieve socio-economic development. However, this also involves the loss
of the country’s traditional Arab-Islamic identity. One way of limiting cultural and scien-
tific dependence on the West is through indigenization.This involves greater use of nati-
ve languages, techniques, personnel and approaches, to achieve purposeful change.The
effect of engaging indigenous languages in this way is to make them more scientific
which, in turn, means that they are better adapted to the new needs of society. Moroccan
and African cultures continue to be affected by the hegemony of Western civilization and
by the power of Western languages. Socio-cultural change in Africa is a prerequisite for
reducing the linguistic and cultural gap which separates that continent from the West.
Another strategy for transcending dependency on the West is to adopt projects that
are relevant to the needs of developing societies.This means that it is important to make
European languages more relevant to African needs. For instance, instead of using French
and English to promote Western civilization, these languages could better be used to
serve Moroccan – or African – culture and civilization. Great novels in French by nove-
lists like Tahar Ben Jelloun or Kateb Yacine are landmarks in the process of domestica-
ting Euro-colonial languages. Similarly, such cultural achievements must also be made
214
17 See Ali Oumlil in Al-Ittihad Al-Ishtiraaki of January 3rd (2001).
18 Cf. Suleiman (1999).
opm marokko 3  20-06-2006  15:14  Pagina 214
accessible to the West, for instance, by translating Arabic works into European languages,
and vice versa. One wonders which individuals, and what social groups, stand to bene-
fit from globalization and Westernization.The problem is that the majority of the peo-
ple are traditionally minded. They have reservations about the way Westernization has
been processed and applied since independence.
After four decades of independence, the process of Westernization is still under way.
Its influence today is probably even greater than it was during the period of coloniza-
tion. For example, French has never been so widespread as it is nowadays.19 Decision-
makers opted for Westernization as a means of modernizing the country.This was sim-
ply because the ruling elite believes that Western methods and ideologies are an appro-
priate and efficient means of achieving development.The conservatives’ resistance to the
modernizing process is levelled not only against Western values as such, but also against
the way in which these values have been introduced.The speed with which the moder-
nizing reforms have been implemented did not take the conservative forces into
account. The modernizing reforms were led by enlightened political leaders who had
been educated in the West, mainly in France, namely the late Kings Mohammed V and
Hassan II.
Conclusion
Globalization is a worldwide process which has both benefits and drawbacks. One of its
great advantages is that it encourages communication and exchange between different
peoples and cultures. Its disadvantages include the risk that local and national cultures
will become westernized. Morocco is characterized by cultural contacts that have led to
its Westernization. Over time,Western culture has been imposed on the population by
various European powers, most recently by France during the period of colonization.
The aim of the latter was to assimilate the indigenous population into French culture.
This was in the interests of the French colonizers, who aimed to alienate the Moroccan
people from one another. By this means, the colonial masters would be able to rule over
and exploit the natural and human resources of the country. However, the French paid
little heed to the needs of the indigenous people or to their development.Accordingly,
they failed to provide schooling and healthcare for the majority of the population.Today,
after so many years of independence, French culture is still predominant in education,
administration and other dynamic sectors. At the personal and psychological levels, the
Westernization of Moroccan culture is a powerful force.
The modernization efforts made by Morocco after independence reinforced accultu-
ration and dependence on Western culture.This is the almost inevitable consequence of
modernization and globalization, which partly involves borrowing from modern socie-
ties and cultures.
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One way of limiting cultural and scientific dependence on the West is through indi-
genization. This involves greater use of native languages, techniques, personnel and
approaches, to achieve purposeful change.The effect of engaging indigenous languages
in this way is to make them more scientific which, in turn, means that they are better
adapted to the new needs of society.Moroccan and African cultures continue to be affec-
ted by the hegemony of Western civilization and by the power of Western languages.
Socio-cultural change in Africa is a prerequisite for reducing the linguistic and cultural
gap which separates that continent from the West.
We live in a globalizing world, which imposes conflict and which represses the human
will to do good, to love, and to appreciate beauty. Now, more than ever, there is a need
to reinforce dialogue and communication between cultures, civilizations and religions.
Only in this way can we ensure coexistence between the peoples of the East and West,
and their ultimate survival. One enduring lesson from human history is that the most
important civilized relationship between contemporary cultures is the maintenance of a
genuine dialogue.The antithesis of dialogue is conflict.The goal of dialogue is to under-
stand the other party, and to appreciate its cultural, moral and rational basis. Conflict
seeks only to invade, crush, conquer, and defeat the other, in order to exert control.
Contemporary cultures must continue to talk to one another.The future of humani-
ty is contingent upon the ability of different civilizations and religions to hold a civili-
zed and reasonable dialogue with one another.20 Accordingly, the relationship between
the Arab-Islamic culture and other cultures must rest on a sound dialogue, on civiliza-
tional and cultural coexistence, and on the desire to learn from anything new and use-
ful. If a dialogue between cultures is established on this basis, it will lead to intercultural
understanding and peace.The recognition and preservation of cultural diversity has today
become a basic tenet of Human Rights.Article 1 of the Declaration of the Principles of
International Cultural Cooperation states that ‘Every culture has its own dignity and
value that must be respected and preserved. It is the right and duty of every people to
develop their culture.All cultures constitute, with their rich diversity and mutual influ-
ence, part of the heritage which belongs to all humans’.21
20 Cf.Tjomsland (2003).
21 www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/n_decl.htm
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Hanane Bouchtalla 
L’architecture dans la zone de tension 
entre tradition et modernité
La tradition, cette polémique du 20ème siècle. Pourquoi parler du conflit entre tradi-tion et modernité à l’ère actuelle et non pas avant? Pourquoi a-t-il suffi d’un siècle
pour remettre en question l’histoire et le vécu humain dans leur ensemble? Après tout
l’homme est toujours le même, n’ayant pas connu de transformations physiologiques ou
psychologiques capitales depuis sa création jusqu’à nos jours. Nous nous sentons tou-
jours éphémères sous la lumière tachetée par les arbres d’un ciel de printemps. Si nous
admirons tant les temples grecs, c’est certainement parce que nous portons encore les
mêmes fragilités que nos ancêtres. Face à une œuvre d’une telle valeur artistique, tout
être humain a les mêmes émotions, et ou réactions, indépendamment de son contexte
culturel ou de son appartenance ethnique ou géographique. Il est clair que nous garde-
rons certaines choses gravées en nous pour l’éternité. L’être humain de l’antiquité, du
moyen-age ou de l’ère moderne, possède toujours les mêmes sensibilités.
Pourquoi la tradition cause-t-elle alors un tel sentiment de gêne? Pour quelle raison
l’homme tend-t-il de plus en plus vers la modernité? L’on ne peut pas se contenter de
répondre que la tradition est un produit passéiste, en effet, nous la portons toujours en
nous. Que nous voulions ou pas, nous sommes encore conditionnés par certaines de ses
valeurs; voilà pourquoi nous en parlons encore. Par ailleurs l’ère moderne n’est pas le
fruit du néant, mais le résultat d’une sédimentation de quelques centaines d’années. Il
existe donc bien un certain lien entre tradition et modernité, même s’il ne se traduit pas
par une véritable continuité, et, si nous continuons à parler de confrontation, voire même
dualité entre tradition et modernité, c’est parce que nous n’arrivons pas à nous détacher
de nos origines, même lorsque nous adhérons aux nouveautés.
Cette tension actuelle entre tradition et modernité est due de prime abord à l’accélé-
ration du processus de l’évolution humaine, ainsi qu’à l’attitude de l’être humain durant
cette évolution. Il est tout à fait logique que ce passage d’un modèle traditionnel, con-
servateur, chargé de valeurs et de vécu historique, qui a régné pendant plusieurs siècles,
à un autre modèle complètement nouveau dont le rythme est accéléré, cause le désé-
quilibre la perte d’identité que nous connaissons actuellement.
Cette accélération du processus de l’évolution humaine a crée une faille entre le passé
traditionnel et l’époque moderne. La révolution industrielle du 19ème siècle a permis
l’épanouissement des sciences et des techniques, qui s’est reflété dans le mode de vie de
la nouvelle société assoiffée du progrès, devenant si vite adepte de nouvelles références
et ayant d’autres leitmotivs. L’ère nouvelle a ouvert la voie à une industrialisation sans
précédent, d’où l’émergence de valeurs récentes accompagnant ce changement radical
des fondements traditionnels. Cette ère est celle de la production matérielle par excel-
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lence, ayant pour devise gain, profit et rentabilité. L’homme du 20ème siècle s’est trou-
vé face à multiples choix, alors que le cadre traditionnel restreint et réserviste est perçu
comme un handicap au développement, d’une part, parce qu’il impose un seul et uni-
que modèle et d’autre part car la tension et le contrôle de la société traditionnelle est
vive voire même insupportable, dans une société moderne qui se voit libérale, laissant
une plus grande place à l’individu.
Il est certain que ce changement a chamboulé le cours de la vie et a trouvé des expres-
sions dans tous les domaines de l’ère moderne. Gardant à l’esprit que le progrès ou la
décadence d’une société se révèlent avant tout dans son cadre spatial, il était indispensa-
ble de voir comment le cadre architectural arrive à cristalliser les valeurs d’une société
moderne ou traditionnelle et comment se traduit le passage d’un monde à l’autre.
Il n’existe pas de société qui puisse se passer du cadre architectural, quelle que soit sa
nature physique ou son degré d’évolution, son époque historique ou son aire géogra-
phique. Afin de subvenir à leurs besoins matériels et de manifester leurs aspirations spi-
rituelles, toutes les sociétés ont besoin d’un territoire et d’un lieu, qui soit un témoin
privilégié de leur présence. Pour tout être humain, le cadre architectural est fortement
porteur de sens et d’émotions, offrant un refuge et un abri contre les agressions du
monde extérieur. Néanmoins cette interaction entre l’espace et l’individu passe par le
contrôle de la société, qui décide de la nature de ce contact. Plus ce contrôle est présent,
plus le cadre architectural ou l’espace est apte à véhiculer la culture et à cristalliser les
valeurs de la société.
Le cadre traditionnel permet un modèle dans lequel les valeurs d’une société se reflè-
tent à travers l’espace pour la simple raison que les individus y partageaient le même
mode de vie et visaient les mêmes fins. Il représente un modèle unique, construit par
tous et pour tous, car toute les membres de la société se posaient les mêmes questions et
tous proposaient les mêmes réponses.
Pendant des années, voire des siècles, tous les individus de la société traditionnelle
vivaient suivant un seul cadre architectural, représentant d’ailleurs tout le poids de la tra-
dition. Elle a pu assurer pendant longtemps l’équilibre et la stabilité de la communauté.
L’architecture traditionnelle est une expression culturelle, dans laquelle le concepteur et
l’usager se trouvent confondus. Le cadre physique est un produit social issu de la cultu-
re. L’on distingue dans le modèle traditionnel généralement deux types d’expressions
architecturales, à savoir les édifices profanes et les édifices sacrés, qui sont étroitement liés.
Nous pouvons même dire que le profane ne prend forme ce par le biais du sacré.
Dans le cadre moderne, l’on note une complexité et une pluralité de spécialisations,
avec plusieurs modèles de références, dans lesquels chaque produit est original. En effet,
les individus ne se posent plus les mêmes questions et par conséquent ils n’ont plus les
mêmes réponses. Désormais, chaque question a plusieurs réponses, et la valeur de réfé-
rence n’existe plus. L’on a plutôt affaire à des valeurs institutionnalisées, et l’on pourrait
dire que, contrairement à la situation du cadre traditionnel, la culture appartient désor-
mais à l’élite. Le cadre architectural n’est plus un indice permettant d’évaluer la société,
le concepteur et l’usager n’ont plus les mêmes valeurs, les règles et les lois étant faites par
un troisième membre, à savoir les institutions. La société et la culture ne sont plus com-
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patibles; l’on ne peut plus parler de cadre communautaire, mais d’une société formée par
des individus, et l’on ne construit plus pour une société mais pour des individus. Ceci
explique la variété de modèles et l’infinité de solutions architecturales.
L’accélération du rythme de vie a exigé le rapprochement de l’espace, ainsi le change-
ment de la notion du territoire, autrement dit des limites géographiques accessibles à un
être humain. La mobilité de l’ère moderne a permis l’apparition de nouveaux modes de
communication et d’innombrables possibilités de rencontres, entraînant la perméabilité des
valeurs locales aux valeurs étrangères. Nous n’avons plus besoin de nous déplacer pour
connaître la culture de l’autre. Il suffit en effet de se connecter à un réseau de communi-
cation par satellite ou à l’Internet, pour être rapidement projeté dans son monde. Je peux
suivre un défilé de mode au japon, sans même quitter ma chaise, je sais à présent comment
l’on décore sa maison en Chine, le mode de vie américain n’a pratiquement plus de secrets
pour moi, tandis que je peux apprécier le design en vogue cette année des bureaux russes.
Il est normal que l’usager profane en matière d’architecture se trouve désorienté devant le
nombre de modèles qui se présentent à lui. Les concepteurs ne le sont pas moins, ce qui
se reflète dans le cadre architectural. Au bout du compte, l’on récupère un produit sans
aucune valeur identitaire, parfois même sans aucune dimension artistique, un pastiche
dénué de toute qualité. Je pense que le problème émane avant tout de notre incompré-
hension de la modernité et de notre mauvais usage de ses outils.
Nous ne devons nier en aucun cas les avantages de l’ère moderne, la modernité étant
le résultat normal de l’évolution humaine. Notre tendance à parfois trop mythifier le
cadre traditionnel et à l’opposer continuellement au moderne nous fait tomber dans des
jugements souvent subjectifs, plus motivés par la nostalgie que par tout autre sentiment.
A mon avis il ne s’agit pas de valoriser le cadre traditionnel ou le cadre moderne, mais
bien plutôt l’homme. Nous devons nous focaliser sur la dimension humaine, respecter la
nature de l’homme et surtout sa fragilité.
Il est vrai que l’espace traditionnel a su d’une manière ou d’une autre protéger l’indi-
vidu, et le ramener à une origine dans laquelle il partage l’identité du groupe. Par con-
tre il lui a laissé peu d’expression, non pas au point de la réprimer mais prétendant l’a-
voir apprivoisée. L’espace moderne quant à lui, a proposé une multitude d’expressions à
chaque individu, mais aucune n’a su parfaitement contenir sa sensibilité et respecter sa
vraie nature. L’objet architectural moderne s’est lancé dans une recherche éperdue de la
plasticité formelle et de l’abstraction scientifique, omettant complètement la dimension
assurée par la présence humaine et séparant ainsi le sentiment de la pensée.
Certes, les humains ont les mêmes sensibilités, mais ils n’ont ni le même vécu, ni la
même culture, ni la même manière d’être. L’architecture est avant tout conditionnée par
le lieu qui résume la culture, le vécu, et le mode de vie, la modernité exprimant le chan-
gement et l’évolution. L’architecture moderne est appelée à assurer le changement dans
la continuité, respectant à la fois le lieu et la sensibilité. Autrement dit le nouveau est
appelé à contenir l’ancien.
A l’époque moderne, seules très peu d’architectures sont arrivées à résoudre ce dilem-
me. Le lieu exprimant le milieu immédiat dans lequel se passe la vie de chacun de nous,
est seul capable de nous offrir une compréhension qualitative du quotidien et lui don-
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ner une identité. Aucun lieu ne ressemble à un autre, chacun possède une atmosphère
propre, mais chacun nous submerge du même bien être, du fait de son interaction avec
l’humain. Arracher l’architecture à son contexte c’est aliéner l’usager et perturber ses
références. Comprendre ces différences et les convertir en sensibilités est, quelque part,
la voie qui mène vers la solution.
L’architecture moderne du début du 20ème siècle se voulait respectueuse du lieu et
de la présence humaine. Rattraper l’écart entre pensée et sentiment était sa raison d’ê-
tre. Les pionniers du mouvement moderne tel que Le Corbusier, Louis Kahn, Mies van
der Rohe, et d’autres cherchaient à accompagner le changement dans la continuité. Pour
ce faire, ils ne reproduisaient pas la forme traditionnelle, mais réservaient plutôt son
essence et ont par ailleurs le mieux exprimé sa présence. La dimension humaine occu-
pait toute leur attention; ils ne cherchaient pas à loger l’homme dans de belles sculptu-
res, mais dans des lieux qui respectent sa nature, ses sensibilités et ses différences. Pour ces
architectes, les techniques récentes sont la seule nouveauté apportée par la modernité,
rendant désormais réel ce qui relevait autrefois de l’imaginaire. Ils ont conçu une archi-
tecture sublime et atemporelle, nous indiquant comment comprendre la modernité en
architecture. Le nouveau est une expression ininterrompue de l’ancien.
Actuellement nous sommes pratiquement confrontés à un nihilisme de l’architecture,
l’objet architectural étant devenu un moyen d’exhibition et le concepteur ayant com-
plètement perdu la référence humaine. Nous avons affaire à des projets signés, exprimant
de prime abord le formalisme et la spécificité propres à chaque architecte. Dans chaque
partie du monde, le concepteur conçoit selon un même style afin que son architecture
soit reconnaissable et distinguable.Tout ce que nous craignons aujourd’hui, est de tom-
ber dans une standardisation de l’architecture ou pire encore, dans sa commercialisation.
Que reste-t-il si nous écartons le facteur humain et culturel de la conception? 
La modernité a mis à la disposition des architectes de l’ère moderne les moyens maté-
riels et techniques pour traduire leurs pensées en sentiments. Les contraintes techniques
qui empêchaient jadis nos ancêtres de pousser leurs réflexions sur l’espace architectural
sont aujourd’hui pratiquement dépassées. Les architectes de la modernité sont priés de
poursuivre leur quête de l’objet architectural à la fois beau et original.Tant qu’ils pré-
servent la sensibilité de l’être humain et n’estompent à aucun moment son identité, le
rapprochement des cultures et l’apparition de l’individu doivent être compris comme
une richesse et non pas comme une offense à la tradition. Que nous ayons affaire à une
architecture traditionnelle ou moderne, ce sont l’essence de l’œuvre et son pouvoir de
procurer à l’être humain une dimension dans l’espace et dans le temps, qui doivent nous
intéresser. Le changement ne doit pas nous faire peur. Tant que nous le contrôlons, le
progrès ne pourra que servir le culte de l’humanité. La continuité est importante dans la
mesure où elle nous permet de nous évaluer par rapport à une référence, car toute arri-
vée est déterminée par un point de départ. Je conclurai sur une citation de Christian
Norberg-Schulz, architecte norvégien et théoricien de l’art: ‘demeurer le même sans être
jamais pareils’.1
1 Norberg-Schulz (1997) 298.
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Fatima Sadiqi
A feminist view of the architecture of the medina of Fes
Introduction 
Architecture is related to people and to their various ways of life.The evolution ofarchitecture reflects the evolution of society, which itself is a product of the evo-
lution of its constituent men and women. Accordingly, there is a chain of interaction
between the physical environment in which we live (space) and our socio-cultural
background. All of these systems are interrelated and this relationship is dynamic and
functional.
The architecture of the medina1 of Fes is rich with historical influences, and consti-
tutes a valuable heritage. It makes Fes one of the leading Islamic cities in the world. In
his typology of Islamic cities, Taha El Ouali2 categorizes them into two major types:
administrative cities and military cities. He goes on to classify military cities into four
sub-types: thaghr (place at the mouth of a river: harbour places), ribat (horse-shoeing
place), asima (capital), and askar (military place).According to this author, the medina of
Fes was first conceived as an administrative city, hence its importance from the key and
related aspects of politics and religion, both of which are intricately related to the ‘con-
trol’ of women.Women’s/Gender studies increasingly involve the investigation of archi-
tecture as a way of exploring male-female relationships throughout various stages of
history.The architecture of the medina of Fes is particularly relevant in this respect.
The medina of Fes was founded by Moulay Idriss II some twelve centuries ago, during
a crucial period in the history of Morocco. The indigenous tribal communities were
encountering Islam for the first time, and there was a need to spread the religion and to
establish order by various means. It is the important socio-political context in which it
was constructed that makes the medina interesting. If we compare the architecture of the
ville nouvelle with that of the medina, it is immediately apparent that the architecture of
the former is based on purely economic needs.The architecture of the medina, howe-
ver, clearly expresses a strong desire to transcend space.The passage from the ville nouvelle
to the medina is indeed a passage from one logic to another, and from one vision of the
world and space to another. Mosques, medersas, suqs, baths, tombs, etc. were built with the
intention of ‘sense-making’ (assigning an abstract value to things that transcends the phy-
sical objects themselves).This paper is an attempt to interpret this original ‘sense-making’
from a feminist perspective. Some of the opinions given in this paper remain valid to this
day, others do not.
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1 The term ‘medina’ means ‘city’ and is semantically and formally connected to the term 
‘madaniyya’ (civilization, urbanity). It usually refers to the oldest part of a town that is surrounded
by a wall.
2 El Ouali (1982).
opm marokko 3  20-06-2006  15:14  Pagina 221
The architecture of the medina and the overall perception of women
The primary architectural characteristic of the medina of Fes is that the houses are very
large. They were designed to accommodate entire households, which usually included
paternal grandparents, uncles, and aunts, as well as the smaller nuclear families of their
various offspring.These houses usually have two (sometimes three) floors, which open
on to a spacious inner courtyard.The houses usually have luxuriously appointed interi-
ors, which contrast sharply with the small, crooked, low and shabby-looking front
entrance.This outdoor ‘apparel’ of the medina resembles women’s veils, whose plainness
masks the beauty of their wearers.The outer walls of the houses of the medina have nei-
ther windows nor balconies.This lends an introverted feel to the overall architecture of
these dwellings.The only points of access to the outside world are the front door and
barred ‘openings’ in the walls of the upper floor, which is usually occupied by women.
In territorial terms, some areas within the houses of the medina are reserved for men
while other places are reserved for women.There are also common areas that are used
by both sexes. Women usually occupy smaller rooms in the upper floors and areas
towards the back of the house, which include cooking places and spaces where animals
are kept. The places that women occupy are ‘hidden’ from strangers coming into the
house.The expression diru triq! (free the way!), which is still in use in Morocco, is utte-
red by the male members of the household before a male guest is ushered into the house.
It literally means ‘get the women out of the way’.
Between the houses, the streets of the medina are narrow and tortuous. When the
medina was first built, animals (especially donkeys and mules) were the sole means of
transport for people and goods. Some streets in the medina are so narrow that people
can only traverse them in single file.There are numerous sacred and religious places in
the medina, such as mosques, religious schools, tombs of saints, etc.The majority of the
saints buried in Fes were male. It is these sacred and religious places that earned Fes its
appellation of the ‘spiritual capital of Morocco’.
The overall (internal and external) aspects of the medina’s architecture were certainly
dictated by specific logics. Given the historical era in which the medina was built, these
logics were probably motivated by two powerful, historically complimentary but contra-
dictory trends: the predominance of the tribal mentality and the need to enforce Islamic
law. On the one hand, Islam has never completely uprooted the tribal system that pre-
ceded it. On the other hand, the central authorities in Morocco needed Islamic law to
establish and maintain order in the newly established urban centres.
The first of these trends, the tribal mentality, was (and still is) mainly evidenced by an
eagerness to ensure, maintain and protect the paternal line of descent. Girls from ‘good’
(wealthy) families were only permitted to marry boys from ‘good’ families.As in all Arab-
Islamic cities, the original architecture of the medina was intended to ensure tribal segre-
gation. Each tribe needed to keep to its own quarters, and each ethnic group was asso-
ciated with a specific trade (cf. najjarin ‘carpenters’, dabbaghin ‘leather men’, etc. which
are still in use today). By enforcing integration within groups (tribes), this policy enabled
new identities to emerge. In a sense, the architecture of the medina of Fes was an expres-
sion of the tribal and patriarchal ‘inner self ’, in the face of a hegemonic Islamic influen-
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ce. If these influences were to succeed, it was necessary for women to be secluded and
controlled.
As for the second trend, namely the enforcement of Islamic law, the medina was also
called dar al-Islam (the house of Islam). Its architectural design was geared towards pro-
ducing legal entities, in the sense that women, like men, could own money and proper-
ty, and pass them on. However, as women do not inherit in the same way as men under
Islamic law, it was necessary to control them.The net effect of both the tribal mentality
and the logic underpinning Islamic law required that women be denied the right to
move freely in mixed-sex public spaces, which could lead to ‘mixed’ marriages and to a
loss of family wealth. In spite of this convergence in the logics underpinning the tribal
mentality and Islamic law, there is a blunt contradiction between the two. On the one
hand, the tribal mentality meant endogamous marriages and resistance to Islamic assi-
milation, and on the other hand, Islam needed to be powerful enough to impose Islamic
law on all Muslims regardless of tribe or social rank. From the Islamic perspective, the
architecture of the medina was conceived as a way of transcending tribal divisions.The
idea was to create a space (the medina) where different identities could integrate under
the banner of Islam, thereby acquiring a religious and universal identity. From the dual
perspective of these two trends, the architecture of the medina reflects both tribal racism
and a desire to maintain hegemonic power.The seclusion of women was a pre-requisi-
te for both.
In addition to tribal mentality and Islamic law, the design and shape of the buildings
of the medina were meant to express an immense ‘public’ pride in a glorious past. Both
the artistry evident in the decoration of religious structures and the size of their doors
contrast sharply with the shabbiness of the entrances to ordinary houses.The large num-
ber of museums are evidence of the fact that the architecture of the medina also reflects
traditions, especially religious ones.The public display of wealth and strength required
male-only places. Furthermore, the medina of Fes has a circular layout, which expresses
a strong desire to protect wealth and valuables. This layout was preferred to a linear 
design, which was thought to grant easier access to strangers.
The linguistic aspects of the architecture of the medina
According to Lévi-Strauss3, ‘l’espace est une société de lieux-dits’. He meant that when we
name places within a given space, we socially construct this space, appropriate it, and
make it our own. Although the inter-borrowing from the body to the space and vice-
versa is usually symmetrical, space borrows more from the body than the body does from
space. Since they are seen as sexual parts, some places are named after parts of the body.
In this case, it is the body that lends terms to space. For example, the word thaghr (mouth)
for ‘city’, mentioned above, is case of the body lending a term to a space because the
term in question pre-dated the ‘city’. Boughali4 cites the following body expressions,
which designate parts of the house: ras dderb (head of district) for ‘street quarters’, fum
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ddar (mouth of the house) for ‘entrance door’, and sder lbit (chest of room) for ‘male guest
room’.
These terms are not interchangeable, each applies to one specific place. Street quarters
are public spaces where males, rather than females, usually congregate. The linguistic
referent includes the term ras ‘head’, a noble appendage often associated with wisdom.
According to the dominant Arab-Islamic social constructions, women possess no reason,
or at least much less reason than men. Fum ddar or ‘entrance’, refers to a place where
older women usually sit and supposedly ‘gossip’. This place is constructed as female.
Indeed, in the Arab-Islamic mentality, the house is generally associated with women. It
is seen as a woman’s ‘natural’ place. Hence, whereas the head/reason quarter is male, the
mouth is female. Sder ddar (chest of the house), designates a large and luxuriously fur-
nished sitting room that is reserved for male guests.This room is usually used to convey
an impression of the household’s wealth. In Morocco, these and similar terms are acqui-
red by children in their mother tongues, thereby shaping their views of the world.
Far from being arbitrary, the association between given places and corresponding lexi-
cal terms is founded on a symbolic mode of the gender-space relationship.These terms
show that communities unconsciously acquire important values through their mother
tongues. Sacred, noble and taboo things are considered important within a community,
and this importance is sometimes encoded linguistically by assigning the names of parts
of the body to them.The aim of assigning linguistic terms to places is to render the lat-
ter sacred. For example, the head is not only associated with wisdom but also with con-
trol; the mouth is not only associated with gossip, but also with passage; the chest is not
only associated with male power, but also with pride and ‘showing off ’. It is an establis-
hed fact in linguistics that polysemy (several different meanings of one word) is never
arbitrary; it derives from an unconscious logic in which literal, figurative, as well as meta-
phoric meanings acquire significant symbolic dimensions in people’s lives. Like the
mouth of the house, the mouth of a woman should not open without the authorization
of the man (who is the symbol of power).The Arab-Islamic mentality feels that houses
and women should have closed mouths, and that sharing these mouths with others may
lead to the destruction of male power.
The psychological aspects of the architecture of the medina
According to Merleau-Ponty, the human body dictates spatial logic. From this perspecti-
ve, houses, and perhaps architecture in general, are extensions of our bodies.They are outer
bodies, which protect the self.The architecture of the medina offers the following psycho-
logical interpretations: men and male places inside and outside houses are generally per-
ceived as ‘seen’,‘clear’,‘straight’,‘pure’,‘central’, and ‘clean’; whereas women and their pla-
ces are perceived as ‘unseen’,‘ambiguous’,‘crooked’,‘impure’,‘peripheral’, and ‘dirty’ (with
reference to menstruation).These oppositions are established on the male-female dichot-
omy, itself the result of the traditional patriarchal universe whose starting-point is the
human body. The male body is attributed positive values and the female body negative
ones. From the psychological perspective, the architecture of the medina appears to have
been based on a sexist ideology in which women are excluded from the holy public pla-
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ces such as the mosques, the zawiyas, the qisriyats (trade centres) etc. which harbour the tri-
bal and Islamic selves.Women are indeed considered sources of chaos (fitna) in the public
space. On the other hand, the tortuous and labyrinth-like streets of the medina are also
seen as a womb (a symbol of birth and passage to light). Motherhood is highly valued in
the tribal and Islamic logic, so long as the woman reproduces ‘good’ subjects she is valued
but she is never socially and culturally valued as a woman in her own right.
The symbolic aspects of the architecture of the medina
According to Lévi-Strauss5, some objects are perceived as masculine and others as femi-
nine.The house is symbolically associated with the female body and the medina with
the male body.The house is where women spend most of their time, looking after the
family.The medina is dar al-Islam (the house of Islam) where Islamic law must be enfor-
ced.The medina is meant to be the opposite of rural areas, where tribal traditions and
disorder prevail. However, there are specific elements that make the house male and the
medina female.The medina is also dar (from daara, ‘be circular’) and being circular, the
medina forms a unity, which ensures lhkam, ‘control and the rule of law’.
Symbolically, the external aspects of a thing can be explained in terms of its internal
logic.The circular form of the medina, as well as that of the interior parts of houses, are
important symbolically.The circle is a symbol for the protection of that which is valua-
ble. Since women are valuable to men they need to be protected.The circular form also
symbolizes the maximum possible protection of women’s honour in their own places
(involving special efforts to shield women from the gaze of outsiders).The wealthier the
family the greater the protection provided in terms of architecture, such as high walls,
big fences, impasses, etc.
Conclusion
The architecture of the medina of Fes differs from that of the ville nouvelle.The modern
aspect of the latter contrasts sharply with the ‘sense-seeking’ (the profound human search
for an abstract value for things that transcends the physical objects themselves) and ‘sense-
making’ (assigning an abstract value to things that transcends the physical objects them-
selves) aspect of the former.Part of this ‘sense-making’ relates to the way in which women
and the roles they were expected to play were perceived.This is attested in various soci-
al, linguistic, psychological, and symbolic feminist readings of the architecture of the med-
ina of Fes.The importance of these readings is linked to the fact that the architecture of
the medina reflects the abrupt meeting of tribal and Islamic world-views.These traditio-
nally see women as mere instruments in a heavily patriarchal system that depends on men
acquiring and maintaining power both inside and outside the household.
This paper provides just a glimpse of the many ways in which architecture can inform us
about the status of women, as well as the nature and extent of their active or passive influ-
ence.The topic is fascinating and ground-breaking, and certainly needs further investiga-
tion.
5 Lévi-Strauss (1966).
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Monique Eleb
L'évolution de l'habitat et des modes de vie à Casablanca
Introduction
En travaillant depuis 1989 sur l’architecture et l’urbanisme de la ville de Casablanca1,j’ai visité de très nombreuses habitations, de la pièce unique pour une famille dans
une maison à cour de la medina ou du quartier des Habous, pastiche réussi construit dans
les années 20, à la luxueuse villa entourée de jardins des hauteurs d’Anfa, en passant par
des logements d’immeubles modernes des quartiers populaires et par des pièces dans les
bidonvilles. Je ne faisais alors pas d’enquête sur les façons de vivre des Marocains d’au-
jourd’hui, mais mon activité habituelle à Paris consiste à analyser les modes de vie de
mes contemporains du point de vue de leur habitat ainsi que les transformations qu’ils
opèrent dans ces logements. Aussi ai-je posé mes questions habituelles sur les pratiques
quotidiennes et ai-je acquis peu à peu un savoir que je n’avais jamais songé à synthéti-
ser. Pour cet article j’ai refais une campagne d’enquête sur le terrain en avril 2005.
Mes recherches sur l’espace domestique ont une hypothèse commune: l’organisation
de l’habitat, la distribution, rend compte des valeurs d’une société et des structures des
rapports interindividuels. Cet art d’organiser les espaces de l’habitation est étudié à tra-
vers des catégories ou des variables: la partition, la hiérarchie entre les pièces, la proxi-
mité ou la distance entre elles, les liaisons, la contiguïté, le type de mobilier et d’objets
décoratifs, etc. Dans l’habitation, le dispositif mis en place propose un mode de relations
interindividuelles (hommes/femmes, parents/enfants, maîtres/domestiques) mais inclut
aussi la dimension économique (espace de travail, de production) et la sociabilité large
(accueil, réception, mise en scène…). La notion de dispositif 2 est comprise ici comme
l’organisation d’éléments assemblés de façon particulière pour produire un effet, concer-
nant les conduites, et les pratiques mais aussi les valeurs d’une société.
A Casablanca, ville nouvelle du XXe siècle, qui s’est développée jusqu’en 1956 sous
le colonialisme français, on trouve aujourd’hui toutes les figures des façons de vivre des
Marocains, dont la plupart se sont retrouvés dans des habitations qui avaient des caracté-
ristiques bien éloignées de la maison à cour traditionnelle qu’ils connaissaient. Beaucoup
sont passés d’un habitat vernaculaire, souvent construit sans architecte, à un habitat
‘moderne’,‘européen’ comme on dit ici. Et cela a contribué à mettre en question les pra-
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1 Cf Cohen & Eleb (1998) et Cohen & Eleb (2003).
2 Cette notion pourrait être rapprochée de celle de Michel Foucault, mais le champ dans lequel
elle s’inscrit est plus pour moi celui du dispositif de la cure psychanalytique freudienne où la
position des meubles, des objets ou tableaux dans la pièce, celle des corps, ainsi que la maîtrise
des vues et des regards constituent une mise en scène qui doit produire des effets. Cf. Eleb &
Debarre (1995).
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tiques sociales, les structures des relations entre homme et femmes, entre parents et
enfants. Cela a changé aussi les codes spécifiques des rapports du privé et du public.3 Les
coutumes et les usages traditionnels, parfaitement intériorisés par certains, sont mis en
question par d’autres au nom de l’appartenance au monde moderne. D’autres, encore,
qui se veulent modernes tiennent à montrer chez eux leur attachement à certains traits
de la culture marocaine. La présence ou l’absence d’un salon marocain dans l’habitation
en est l’indice le plus frappant, mais on observe aussi une montée de la conjugalité et de
la famille restreinte.
Cette ville nouvelle du XXe siècle qu’est Casablanca est aujourd’hui entourée de bâti-
ments et de quartiers qui enserrent son périmètre initial. Dans une ville de plus de qua-
tre millions d’habitants, l’appartenance à une classe sociale structure les modes d’habitat.
On oppose ici comme une évidence la distance très grande entre les extrêmes car les
plus misérables et les nantis se côtoient, mais il existe aussi une classe moyenne de plus
en plus nombreuse qui peut soit faire des choix de vie quotidienne très proches des habi-
tudes ancestrales, soit préférer vivre ‘à l’européenne’, ou ‘de façon moderne’, selon l’in-
terprétation qu’ils en donnent eux-mêmes. Ces choix sont donc fondés sur des valeurs,
des idéologies, des croyances. Et le degré de modernisation des lieux (distribution de
l’habitat, confort, hygiène, équipements) dans lequel vivent les casablancais est en partie
lié à cette appartenance. Cela émerge clairement quand on regarde de plus près le mobi-
lier et les systèmes distributifs des différents habitats: la plupart des Marocains sont fidè-
les à certaines façons de faire incorporées, même quand ils vivent dans des espaces qui
semblent à priori modernisés, voire occidentalisés. Mais les mêmes valeurs peuvent con-
duire à des modes de vie et des pratiques fort différents. Il y a donc hétérogénéité des
comportements.
Des casablancais habitent, encore aujourd’hui, dans une maison marocaine tradition-
nelle. Quelles sont ses caractéristiques? Un des premiers permis de construire de la ville
nous montre ce qu’était une maison au début du siècle. C’est le relevé d’une habitation
à laquelle l’architecte doit ajouter une chambre, dans un quartier de l’ancienne médina
en 1918.4 Les ‘chambres’, (bit) sans autre qualificatif, organisées autour de la cour, sont
plus longues que larges, pour des raisons constructives, elles font en général 2,50 mètres
mais sont très hautes – 3,50 mètres – seul un WC (bit l’ma), où l’on peut se laver, équi-
pe cette maison et le hammam du quartier complète le dispositif. La cuisine est vrai-
semblablement faite dehors, sur un kanoun (brasero) posé au sol, au-dessus duquel la
femme se penche, comme dans le monde rural. Un auvent la protège parfois de la pluie.
Les relevés sont une autre source pour comprendre les qualités de la maison marocai-
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3 De très nombreux travaux ont démontré comment l’organisation culturelle était étayée par
l’organisation de la maison, pour des aires géographiques très différentes. Parmi les classiques:
Mauss (1960), Bourdieu (1972). D’autres travaux ont mis en relief la rupture que constituait le
passage d’un habitat traditionnel à l’habitat imposé, d’une autre culture: Lévi-Strauss (1955),
Bourdieu & Sayad (1964).
4 Demande de permis de construire pour agrandir une maison, rue 15, quartier de Bousbir
(ancienne médina) en 1918. cf. Cohen & Eleb (1998). 54.
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ne. L’architecte Laprade a fait au début du siècle des relevés ‘de l’ancienne maison musul-
mane qui est, à quelques nuances près, celui de l’antique maison méditerranéenne’, dit
un commentateur de l’époque5. Pour créer une ville nouvelle marocaine près de la ville
nouvelle européenne de Casablanca, Laprade prend comme modèle ‘les maisons pauvres
de Rabat et Salé’6 et construit de toutes pièces, avec Cadet et Brion en 1917, un quar-
tier, les Habous, pour les classes populaires marocaines, utilisant les observations et les
relevés de l’architecture ancienne du Maroc. Certaines de ces maisons, que j’analyse ici,
apparaissent luxueuses aujourd’hui.
Recomposition: maintenir la pièce de famille traditionnelle et organiser une nouvelle 
spécification des pièces
On peut observer actuellement des recompositions de l’intérieur, que ce soit dans la mai-
son traditionnelle ou dans l’immeuble collectif.Alors que le caractère de la distribution
au Maroc suit les règles d’une affectation des pièces selon le temps de la journée, des sai-
sons et de l’année – ce qui peut être public le jour peut devenir privé la nuit, et l’on peut
manger où l’on dormira – on assiste actuellement à une tendance à la spécification des
pièces liée à plusieurs variables. Il y a tout d’abord celle liée au bâti, à la configuration
de la distribution des habitations: l’organisation ‘à l’européenne’, (en réalité souvent issue
des réflexions sur l’habitat minimum du Mouvement moderne, quand il s’agit de col-
lectifs des années 50), est un point de vue sur la structure de la famille et sur le statut de
la personne. A chaque type de pratiques correspond un espace et l’individu est protégé
dans sa chambre. Ces conceptions ne sont pas celles du monde marocain musulman,
arabe ou berbère ni en général du monde rural, mais les habitants s’y sont adaptés de
diverses façons.
Plusieurs hypothèses sont à vérifier: la présence des Espagnols et des Français a joué un
rôle pour suggérer d’autres façons d’habiter et d’organiser l’espace domestique et rendre
désirables des façons de vivre étrangères. Mais une autre variable semble aussi avoir eu son
importance. Les modèles d’organisation de l’habitat et du décor proposés par le cinéma
et la télévision, depuis les années cinquante ont laissé une empreinte dans certains milieux
urbains. Ces modèles montrés par les films égyptiens en particulier, tant appréciés des
Marocains, proposaient un autre art de vivre, ou mode de vie, dans un pays musulman,
celui de la bourgeoisie égyptienne qui alliait coutumes orientales et pratiques occidenta-
les. Ces films ont peut-être conduit à une réflexion sur les coutumes locales et les ont fait
évoluer, de même que, comme partout ailleurs, le décor des sitcoms occidentales.
Des salons qualifiés
Comment expliquer qu’aujourd’hui, ceux qui le peuvent, possèdent trois types de piè-
ces pour la vie en commun, du plus public au plus privé: bit ed dyaf (pièce de réception
des invités), saloune roumi ou saloune ou sala (empruntée aux étrangers: roumi vient de
romain, terme générique pour désigner les étrangers, saloune vient du français et sala de
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l’espagnol), et enfin bit la glass, (pièce où l’on s’assoit, où l’on se tient, où l’on séjourne)
ce qui la distingue du saloune roumi, ‘à l’occidental’. Cette multiplication courante dans
la bourgeoisie permet en fait d’atteindre, selon les moments, le degré d’ostentation ou
d’intimité désiré.
En se souvenant de la plasticité de l’espace et du fait que son affectation change selon
les moments du jour, de l’année et des saisons, on peut dessiner grossièrement un sché-
ma des pratiques courantes dans les maisons organisées selon le modèle traditionnel. Bit
la glass pièce à tout faire est l’équivalent de notre séjour mais il se différencie selon la tail-
le de l’habitation et les classes sociales. La pièce est entourée de banquettes continues, des
sdader, achetées au mètre et faîtes sur mesure selon la configuration de la pièce. Elles sont
souvent recouvertes de lourds tissus et bordées de coussins assez durs pour soutenir le
corps.
Bit la glass est une salle de famille où la femme se tient pour faire des tâches ménagè-
res propres, ou se reposer et où la famille peut se retrouver pour manger et regarder la
télévision. Elle reste dans les milieux populaires, la ressource qui permet à chacun de dis-
poser d’un lit. Les enfants dorment directement sur les banquettes ou sur des matelas
posés au sol qu’on range tous les matins pour que cet espace conserve son aspect de pièce
de réception. Quand cette pratique perdure les pièces gardent leur caractère pluri-fonc-
tionnel, les petits meubles courants (table basse, tabourets, poufs, etc.) étant rangés après
utilisation.
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Dans les milieux plus aisés, cette pièce est souvent à l’écart de l’espace de réception
ostentatoire, et près de la cuisine. Elle peut servir aussi de chambre d’enfant la nuit et à
accueillir la famille en visite. C’est la pièce la plus privée de la maison que l’on n’ouvre
qu’aux intimes quand on en a d’autres.
Un chauffeur de maître, Brahim A., originaire de Taroudant, (il a une épouse qui ne
travaille pas au dehors, un enfant qui dort dans bit la glass sur la banquette) habitant un
deux pièces dans un petit immeuble situé en banlieue, aux limites de la ville, explique
que ses parents ont depuis toujours, comme il est de coutume dans sa région, dormi sur
un tapis sur lequel on pose un matelas, rangé le matin. Dans les familles très pauvres,
récemment urbanisées il arrive qu’on réserve le lit à l’enfant et que les parents dorment
sur un tapis dans ces logements bricolés sur une terrasse qui sont légion à Casablanca.
Brahim qui a donc conscience d’avoir grimpé dans l’échelle sociale, insiste sur le fait
qu’avoir deux pièces est nécessaire pour les visites car les hommes s’installent dans bit la
glass, tandis que les femmes se réunissent dans la chambre conjugale, dont ils sont tous
les deux très fiers et qui tient alors lieu d’espace de réception. Elles s’assoient sur le lit
conjugale, à boldaquins.
Mais ça n’est encore pour lui peut-être qu’une étape car avoir deux types de salons est
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devenu une aspiration dans la classe moyenne.A ce premier séjour qu’est bit la glass, on
peut associer un salon à l’européenne avec fauteuils, canapés et table basse. Et quand on
est plus riche un troisième salon. Dans les familles aisées aux mœurs traditionnelles
quand il est nécessaire de dissocier des activités masculines ou féminines, les femmes se
tiennent dans bit la glass tandis que les hommes iront plus volontiers dans la bit ed dyaf, si
on en dispose, surtout quand il y a un visiteur. Les petits garçons et les hommes y font
la sieste ou y dorment de préférence, alors que comme l’a remarqué aussi Navez-
Bouchanine7, les filles peuvent se contenter bit la glass.
Mais bit ed dyaf peut être aussi dans certaines circonstances festives, le lieu d’une récep-
tion entre femmes. Le statut élevé de cette pièce, la met cependant, dans les classes popu-
laires ou nouvellement urbanisées, du côté du masculin.
Dans les grandes maisons à cour une inversion apparaît car le centre de la maison est
le plus public et les femmes peuvent donc se retrouver entre elles dans un salon plus petit
ou comme chez Abdelhamid S., (commerçant) avoir le choix de s’installer dans la salle à
manger, nouvelle spécialisation très luxueuse. Cette maison n’est occupée que par une
famille ce qui dit son niveau financier élevé. Quand plusieurs générations d’une famille
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bit la glass, bit ed dyaf et bit el makla (salle à manger). Maison d’Abdelhamid S., dans le quar-
tier des Habous
7 Navez-Bouchanine (1997), 16.
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élargie y cohabite une pièce est dévolue à chacune d’elle.
De plus en plus, les habitants ayant accédé à la classe moyenne évoquent l’existence 
de la pièce poly fonctionnelle comme un moment passé de leur vie ou espèrent qu’un
progrès dans leur carrière professionnelle pourra éliminer. Cette pratique qui a pourtant
été la règle depuis des siècles au Maroc est maintenant perçue par eux comme une
contrainte, liée à une mauvaise situation financière. Quand ils ne sont pas parvenus à
vivre dans un logement à pièces spécialisées, ils en rêvent, font des projets de déména-
gements ou d’extension de l’habitation.
L’autre symbole de progrès social, outre la chambre conjugale sur laquelle je vais m’at-
tarder, sera, dans les classes moyennes de posséder un deuxième salon meublé à l’euro-
péenne. Il arrive même que dans ces classes celui-ci soit si prestigieux que si l’on ne peut
en avoir qu’un, on choisisse le salone roumi, avec les attributs, signes de modernité, qui
l’accompagnent: télévision avec magnétoscope et téléphone fixe notamment. Les fran-
cophones le nomment tout simplement salon ou grande pièce.
Dans les riches villas des bourgeois, cadres ou professions libérales, la règle est d’avoir
une multiplicité de salon pour les diverses circonstances de la vie quotidienne et festive,
pour le prestige ou la sociabilité familiale. On peut observer que les salons en tout gen-
res – marocains,‘à l’européenne’, coin lecture, coin musique etc. – sont rarement séparés
par des cloisons mais plutôt par des éléments de décor ou de construction qui les diffé-
rencient: grilles légères de fer forgé à mi-hauteur, différences de niveau du sol ou simp-
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les tapis définissant des espaces, niche ou loggia, etc. La fluidité des espaces est donc pri-
vilégiée et la grande surface et les doubles hauteurs, sont un signe de prospérité recher-
ché dans ces classes possédantes. S’y ajoute le salon de jardin qui peut être ‘marocanisé’
par une tenture, des tapis et des banquettes traditionnels, où l’on peut dormir à l’occa-
sion, pendant la canicule, par exemple.
Ces multiples salons ne sont pas sans lien avec le sens de l’hospitalité et le rapport au
temps des Marocains. Les règles très contraignantes de l’appartenance à une famille élar-
gie impliquent qu’on accueille avec effusion les membres de celle-ci quand, par exem-
ple, elle débarque de province sans prévenir et qu’on n’évoque pas le terme de la visite,
sur lequel il n’est pas courtois de poser une question directe. C’est une pratique banale
encore qui embarrasse bien aujourd’hui les habitants des petits logements collectifs et qui
complique la vie de bien des femmes qui travaillent car elles doivent être des hôtesses
parfaites dans des conditions difficiles. Les banquettes nombreuses jouent alors leur rôle
et un désordre passager dans cette pièce est perçu comme normal. Il est rare qu’arrivant
à l’improviste dans une maison casablancaise modeste, on ne vous présente pas le grand-
oncle ou la cousine de province, allongés sur les banquettes.
Certains, qui vivent complètement ‘à l’européenne’ justifient les banquettes et la large
table dans un coin de salon, par ailleurs organisé comme dans les salles d’exposition de
grandes marques de mobilier populaires en France ou en Suède, en expliquant:‘c’est plus
convivial’.
A la recherche de la pièce centrale: permanence d’un dispositif
Nombreux sont les marocains qui tentent de retrouver la pièce de famille qui soit le cen-
tre de la maison. Appelée wast-ed-dar (littéralement: le centre de la maison) ou wastiyya
ou oustia, la pièce centrale, tradition séculaire ici, célèbre le groupe familial. De nom-
breux exemples de cette volonté de créer un espace central, distributif et dédié à la famil-
le a été noté par divers auteurs.8 Certains immeubles de l’entre-deux-guerres construits
à Casablanca s’y prêtent plus ou moins quand les appartements ont des distributions qui
associent une entrée et une grande pièce dans la continuité, flanquée de deux pièces laté-
rales, comme c’est le cas dans certains des trois pièces de l’immeuble Assayag de Marius
Boyer (1930), obéissant pourtant à des préceptes chers à Le Corbusier ou Henri Sauvage.
Un salon marocain ou un séjour, lieux centraux de l’appartement et de la famille, satis-
fait les membres de la classe moyenne. On y accède souvent après un petit hall et c’est
véritablement une spatialisation de la notion de foyer, lieu de toutes les activités quoti-
diennes des différents membres de la famille, mais surtout lieu de la femme quand elle
ne travaille pas.
L’architecte Elie Mouyal, dans des logements récemment construits à Marrakech cette
fois, a eu l’idée de dessiner un couloir élargi prés de la cuisine au centre du logement
qui est immédiatement devenu une véritable pièce distributive, sur laquelle les autres
ouvrent, éclairée en second jour par les portes jamais fermées, de la cuisine et du salon
marocain. Cet espace devient alors la salle de famille où l’on mange et se retrouve entre
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soi. Dans plusieurs de ces logements la famille n’a pas de chambre conjugale mais ce
séjour,‘pour tous les jours’, le salon ‘à l’occidental’ et le salon marocain. Où dorment-ils?
Selon les cas, ils ouvrent le canapé du salon ou dorment sur les banquettes du salon
marocain. Dans l’un d’eux, le jour de ma visite, la grand-mère se reposait. Et la femme
rencontrée dit le plaisir d’avoir conquis cette pièce où l’on se tient et où les enfants man-
gent et font leur devoir en sortant de l’école.
Cette tendance à trouver un centre à la maison est un fait culturel connu et étudié par
les ethnologues, et il est alors frappant d’observer que les raisons données par les habi-
tants sont le plus souvent fonctionnelles: ‘C’est pratique que les enfants mangent et fas-
sent leur devoir dans une pièce qui n’est pas la pièce de réception’ dit une des habitan-
tes. Mais ce choix renvoie en réalité à des raisons plus symboliques liées à l’idée qu’une
vraie maison a un centre qui relie toutes les pièces. Peut-on y voir un attachement au type
de la maison centrée sur la cour et aux habitus inscrits dans les pratiques des chemine-
ments qui y sont liés? La distribution de la maison à cour, faite de pièces non communi-
cantes entre elles, oblige à passer par la cour pour aller d’une pièce à l’autre. La maison
est donc centrée et même quand la cour est recouverte d’une verrière, ou quand ce dis-
positif n’existe pas, on observe que les gestuelles traditionnelles tendent à être retrou-
vées. C’est un exemple frappant de la force des habitus. La valeur de centralité est si intri-
quée avec l’idée d’habitation qu’elle est recherchée dans des espaces qui ne sont pas orga-
nisés autour de cette notion. Et l’on trouve dans les logements les moins proches de cette
configuration des tentatives pour la retrouver: couloirs élargis, cuisine ‘bien placée’
(comme dit une habitante), position qui permet de la transformer en pièce centrale de
la maison, pièce de famille qui permet de se sentir bien sans contraintes, entre soi, de
prendre le thé avec ses intimes et de regarder la télévision avec ses enfants.
L’apparition de la chambre conjugale (bit en-na‘âs, ‘la chambre où l’on dort’)
L’autre changement d’importance est la diffusion dans la société marocaine de la cham-
bre conjugale, ce que de nombreux chercheurs interprètent comme un symptôme de
l’autonomisation des individus. C’est une pratique observable dans toutes les classes soci-
ales.Ainsi Brahim A., chauffeur de maître, explique-t-il dans un raccourci saisissant: ‘On
dormait sur les tapis à Taroudant.Vers douze ans, on a eu des banquettes et quand je me
suis marié, on a tout de suite eu une chambre’. Et Abdelhamid S., commerçant, insiste,
avec une pointe de fierté et de provocation peut-être car il a affirmé son appartenance à
une tradition religieuse militante: ‘Mes parents en avaient déjà une!’ La chambre conju-
gale apparaît alors comme un signe de progrès social et économique et parfois quand
plusieurs générations cohabitent, elle indique la place dans la hiérarchie de la maison.
Arrif évoque l’exemple d’un jeune couple habitant un quartier très populaire et dont les
deux membres travaillent. Il a droit, de ce fait, à une chambre, alors que leurs parents
continuent à vivre selon la tradition, ce qui est perçu comme une baisse de leur statut.9
Il est devenu d’avant-garde dans certains milieux de posséder un ensemble de cham-
bre à coucher avec lit, armoire et tables de nuit assortis. Est-ce une mode esthétique ou
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un mode relationnel choisi? Si c’est une mode, elle n’a pu se transformer en pratique
durable que parce que l’aspiration à une relation duelle privilégiée, selon le modèle du
couple occidental, s’est développée. Et avec l’arrivée dans les grandes villes et la généra-
lisation du salariat féminin, la pression du groupe familial s’est quelque peu relâchée.
D’autre part, certaines femmes revendiquent un statut égalitaire par rapport à l’homme,
ce qu’elles sont en train d’obtenir légalement, et la chambre conjugale peut être la preu-
ve de ce statut, elle peut jouer un rôle d’étayage, de preuve de l’égalité. Dans les repré-
sentations, elle en est un peu le garant: il s’agit de partager un espace où chacun a sa
place reconnue et il est une métaphore du lien privilégié et du colloque conjugal. La
conjugalité choisie a comme corollaire l’idée du couple autonome face au groupe de la
famille élargie. Est-ce un signe d’individualisation? Peut-être pas, cela reste à approfon-
dir. Arrif voit dans cette ‘autonomisation de l’espace de sommeil des parents […] la
transformation la plus notable dans les modes d’habiter’ dans les classes populaires casa-
blancaises.’10
La mono-fonctionnalité des pièces est aujourd’hui perçue par de nombreux
Casablancais comme un signe de luxe, comme une aspiration, un progrès. Il est courant
qu’ils évoquent leurs projets d’agrandissement, de déménagement, d’achat (les Marocains
sont très attachés à la propriété) d’une habitation qui permettrait que tous les membres
de la famille disposent d’une chambre ou, au moins que les filles d’une part et les gar-
çons de l’autre, aient une chambre. Pour les moins favorisés, c’est l’accès à la chambre du
couple qui est mise en avant. Et comme en France et ailleurs, chacun imagine qu’une
pièce de plus calmerait les conflits de la vie quotidienne.
A travers ces différents modes de vie, tous casablancais, apparaît bien une mosaïque
sociale, caractérisant particulièrement la vie dans les grandes villes. Casablanca est une
ville multipolaire regroupant toutes les figures des habitus marocains car y coexistent des
pratiques et des ethos traditionnels, peut-être même ancestraux – façons de faire, gestu-
elles transmises liées à des valeurs culturelles,morales ou religieuses et incorporées – mais
adaptés aux conditions de logement et de développement technologiques actuels.
Certaines pratiques semblent se rapprocher de celles des occidentaux, mais les façons de
faire marocaines ne sont pas annulés pour autant.Ainsi la tendance à la spécialisation des
pièces peut à tout moment et selon les circonstances de la vie quotidienne être remise
en question. Des pratiques exogènes ont été amalgamées aux pratiques locales et selon
les circonstances, les unes ou les autres, plus pertinentes ici et maintenant sont convoquées,
sans état d’âme semble-t-il. Les enfants des familles aisés, qui ont une chambre, peuvent
dormir dans celle-ci ou sur les banquettes du salon si le sommeil les a saisis dans cette
pièce. Les parents n’auront pas toujours le réflexe de les porter dans leur chambre, la ban-
quette leur semblant parfaitement adaptée. Un jeu libre semble s’être mis en place. Est-
ce le signe d’une acculturation réussie qui ne mettrait pas en question la culture princi-
pale? Ce jeu permet d’emprunter à d’autres des pratiques perçues comme plus presti-
gieuses parfois, comme plus pratiques ou plus confortables à certains moments, des usa-
ges adoptés car interprétés comme plus modernes, voire comme symboles de moderni-
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sation, de transformation et d’épanouissement personnel. Ce jeu n’oblige pas à renoncer
aux aspects des modes de vie et des habitus marocains empreints de valeurs qui laissent
tout leur sens aux lois de l’hospitalité et au respect des autres, ainsi qu’à un rapport au
corps spécifique. La façon particulière qu’a la culture marocaine de hiérarchiser les rap-
ports entre hommes et femmes, parents et enfants et maîtres et domestiques peut conti-
nuer à avoir cours dans cet espace hétérogène.Ainsi la force des dispositifs spatiaux appa-
raît: ils aident à accompagner des changements quand le désir d’évolution était latent.
236
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